Jefferson Electric Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 21, 1984

271 N.L.R.B. 1089 (N.L.R.B. 1984)

JEFFERSON ELECTRIC CO.
Jefferson Electric Company, a Division of Litton
Systems, Inc. and International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local Union 1533, AFL-
CIO-CLC. Case 9-CA- 16403
21 August 1984
DECISION AND ORDER ON REMAND
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 8 June 1982 Administrative Law Judge John
H. West issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief,
and the General Counsel filed a brief in support of
the judge's decision.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and
conclusions only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Order.
The judge found that the Respondent terminated
employee Yvonne Bonnie Hoskins because she en-
gaged in union and protected concerted activity.
The Respondent has excepted to the judge's find-
ings that its conduct violated Section 8(a)(l) and
(3) of the Act. We find, contrary to the judge, that
Hoskins' filing of a state OSHA complaint did not
constitute concerted activity under the Act.
The Respondent manufactures electrical trans-
formers at its plant in Williamstown, Kentucky.
Until April 1980,2 the Respondent produced its
own transformer fuses. The fuse production proc-
ess required heating a mixture of acid and resin.
The process released fumes which were normally
removed from the plant through an air vent. On 23
April the vent became clogged. Although some
employees complained to the Respondent about the
fumes, the process continued throughout the day.
The next day approximately 11 employees were
sent to the Respondent's doctor. Three of the em-
ployees, including Hoskins, were admitted to a hos-
pital. Hoskins remained in the hospital for 2
weeks-longer than any hospitalized employee.
She spent 3 additional weeks recuperating at home.
While hospitalized, Hoskins filed a complaint on
28 April with Kentucky OSHA, citing the incident
I The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951).
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings.
2 All dates occur in 1980 unless otherwise indicated.
that resulted in her injury. There is no evidence
that Hoskins solicited the support of other employ-
ees before she decided to file the OSHA complaint.
The Respondent was cited for a safety violation
and in late August paid a $240 fine.
The Respondent failed to post the citation, and
Hoskins notified Kentucky OSHA. Again, there is
no evidence that, before her second OSHA con-
tact, Hoskins solicited the views of the other em-
ployees regarding the Respondent's failure to
comply with OSHA posting requirements. OSHA
representative Kelly Servant thereafter visited the
plant to monitor the Respondent's compliance with
the citation. Personnel Manager Bill Buffin escort-
ed Servant to the plant floor. There, against Buf-
fin's expressed wishes, Servant spoke with Hoskins
and other department employees. During the plant
floor conversation Servant told Hoskins, "Well,
I've talked to you on the phone .... You're the
one that talked to Otis . . . [another OSHA repre-
sentative]." Buffin overheard the conversation.
IBEW, Local 1533 (the Union) began an orga-
nizing campaign at the Respondent's plant in June
or July. The judge found that Hoskins actively
supported the Union3 and that the Respondent dis-
charged her on 28 January 1981. 4
The judge concluded that Hoskins' discharge
violated Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act. For the
reasons set forth below, we shall dismiss the 8(a)(1)
complaint allegation.
The Board's Meyers Industries5 decision rejected
the per se standard of concerted activity and over-
ruled Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 NLRB 999 (1975).
Meyers held that an employee's activity is concert-
ed when "engaged in with or on the authority of
other employees, and not solely by and on behalf
of the employee himself."6 There is no evidence
that Hoskins filed the state OSHA complaint with
or on the authority of other employees. The record
is similarly silent regarding employee involvement
in Hoskins' subsequent charge that the Respondent
failed to comply with that agency's posting re-
quirements. We therefore conclude that Hoskins'
actions do not fall within the Meyers definition of
concerted activity.
The judge found that Hoskins' discharge also
violated Section 8(a)(3), relying on Hoskins' role in
the organizing campaign. The judge found that the
Respondent's asserted reason for Hoskins' dis-
charge-her refusal to work near the chemical that
3 The judge's factual findings concerning Hoskins' precise role in the
organizing campaign are fully set forth in the decision.
4 The judge's factual findings concerning the Respondent's asserted
reasons for Hoskins' discharge are fully set forth in the decision.
5Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB 493 (1984).
8 Id at 497.
271 NLRB No. 177
1089
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
caused her illness-was pretextual. The judge also
said, however, that Wright Line7 "does not apply."
We disagree. In Limestone Apparel8 the Board
stated it "would apply the [Wright Line analysis] to
all cases alleging violations of Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) turning on employer motivation."9
The judge did not clearly delineate whether the
Respondent discharged Hoskins because she com-
plained to OSHA, because she engaged in union
activity, or both. To the extent that Hoskins' dis-
charge was motivated by her OSHA-related activi-
ty the discharge is not unlawful.
We shall therefore remand the 8(a)(3) allegation
to the judge for analysis, decision, and recommend-
ed Order consistent with Wright Line and with this
Decision and Order.
ORDER
The complaint allegation that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act is dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-entitled
proceeding is remanded to Administrative Law
Judge John H. West for analysis, decision, and rec-
ommended Order consistent with Wright Line and
with this Decision and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the administrative
law judge shall prepare and serve on the parties a
supplemental decision containing credibility resolu-
tions, findings of fact upon the entire record, con-
clusions of law, and a recommended Order consist-
ent with the remand. Following service of the sup-
plemental decision on the parties, the provisions of
Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regula-
tions, shall apply.
7 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989, approved in NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
8 Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722 (1981).
9 Id.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JOHN H. WEST, Administrative Law Judge. Upon a
charge filed February 3, 1981, by International Brother-
hood of Electrical Workers, Local Union 1533, AFL-
CIO-CLC, hereinafter called the Union, a complaint was
issued by the General Counsel on March 16, 1981, alleg-
ing that Respondent Jefferson Electric, Division of
Litton Systems, Inc.,' violated Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of
the National Labor Relations Act (Act) by discharging
Yvonne Bonnie Hoskins assertedly because she supported
or assisted the Union, and engaged in concerted activities
At the beginning of the hearing herein, counsel for Respondent
pointed out that Respondent's name is Jefferson Electric Company, a Di-
vision of Litton Systems, Inc.
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, and in order to discourage employees
from engaging in such activities or other concerted ac-
tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection. Respondent denies the allega-
tion.
A hearing was held in Williamstown, Kentucky, on
December 10 and 11, 1981, and January 6, 7, and 8,
1982. On the entire record 2 in this case, including my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses and consid-
eration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and
Respondent, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent, an unincorporated operating division of
Litton Systems, Inc., of Delaware, manufactures electri-
cal transformers at the involved Williamstown facility.
The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits, I find that
at all times material herein Respondent has been an em-
ployer and engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and the Union has
been a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
On January 28, 1981, Hoskins was asked to leave her
normal job in the subassembly area of Respondent's plant
and work in the final assembly area of the facility. The
task assigned her by management would have placed her
in close proximity (described by Hoskins as I foot) of a
liquid used for cleaning purposes, which liquid is said to
be mineral spirits. While apparently Hoskins formerly
had experienced no patent ill effects working with the
cleaning fluid, after spending 2 weeks in the hospital in
April and May 1980 as a result of inhaling fumes given
off by a process involving the mixing of acid and resin at
Respondent's plant, she could not work with the mixing
of acid and resin at Respondent's plant, she could not
work with the cleaning fluid. A doctor's statement was
given to Respondent on October 2, 1980, stating that
"Hoskins avoid petroleum distillates (mineral spirits) if at
all possible." General Counsel's Exhibit 5. Nevertheless,
Respondent assigned the task asserting, at the hearing,
that Hoskins was not asked to use the cleaning fluid and
would be no nearer the cleaning fluid in the final assem-
bly area than she was at times in her normal work area.
When Hoskins refused to perform the assigned task stat-
ing that she was afraid that it would make her sick and
her doctor advised against it, she was told by Respond-
ent that she was terminating her own employment. Ac-
cording to Respondent, Hoskins' employment was sev-
ered for no other reason. The General Counsel disagrees.
For the reasons stated below, it is my opinion that there
2 Respondent's unopposed motion to correct the transcript, dated
March 3, 1982, is granted and received in evidence as R. Exh. 32.
1090
JEFFERSON ELECTRIC CO.
is merit to the the General Counsel's assertion that Hos-
kins was unlawfully terminated by Respondent.
Hoskins began working for Respondent on September
18, 1978. Normally, she worked in the subassembly area
making capacitors, moulds, and fuses. Although her
work station in subassembly changed some, for the most
part (said to be about 70 percent of the time) Hoskins
worked at a table the furthest side of which (where she
normally worked) was between 15 and 17 feet from the
repair table where personnel in the repair department
normally used the involved cleaning fluid. 3 Repair per-
sonnel sometimes used the cleaning fluid at one side of a
4-foot-wide table, the nearest side of which (the side op-
posite where the cleaning took place) was located be-
tween 7 and 8 feet from Hoskins' normal work station. It
was not credibly demonstrated that subsequent to April
1980 Hoskins worked in the subassembly area within I or
even 2 feet of the involved cleaning fluid when it was
being used. 4
A part of the fuse making process at Respondent's
plant was the heating of a mixture of acid and resin. On
April 23, 1980, the air vent through which the fumes
from this process are normally drawn out of the plant
was apparently clogged. The heating of the mixture took
place about 10 feet from Hoskins' normal work station.
Some of Respondent's employees complained about the
fumes. The following day over 10 of them were sent to
the doctors used by Respondent. Three of the employ-
ees, including Hoskins, were admitted to a hospital. Of
the three, Hoskins' hospital stay was the longest, and she
spent 3 additional weeks recuperating.5
s Where the cleaning fluid was stored in metal containers is not deter-
minative since the fumes were given off only when the fluid was used.
4 Lorine Orick, a repair employee, testified that she saw Hoskins
making a certain fuse at the same table which the repair personnel some-
times used for cleaning (Hoskins worked at the side opposite the repair
personnel) but Orick could not remember seeing Hoskins there when
repair personnel were using the cleaning fluid at the same table. Addi-
tionally, the fuse in question was discountinued immediately after the
aforementioned April 1980 incident. Supervisor Juanita Brown initially
testified that she observed Hoskins working at the table repair personnel
sometimes used for cleaning when repair personnel were actually using
the cleaning fluid. When counsel for Respondent asked for the time
period Brown replied May 1980. Respondent's counsel then attempted to
introduce Hoskins' doctor's statement allowing her to return to work
after the aforementioned incident, which statement had already been re-
ceived in evidence (G.C. Exh. 8). The doctor's statement is dated May
30, 1980, and allowed Hoskins to return to work on June 2, 1980. She
was still recuperating during May 1980 and, therefore, could not have
been working at the table. Brown's testimony about Hoskins working at
the table then became generalized and Brown did not testify that she ac-
tually saw Hoskins at the table subsequent to April 1980 while repair per-
sonnel were using the cleaning fluid. Hoskins testified that while she oc-
casionally worked at this table she never saw repair personnel using the
cleaning fluid on ballasts stacked on the table. A current subassembly em-
ployee Kathy Wainscott testified that she never saw repair personnel use
the cleaning fluid on the table in question. Another repair employee Eliz-
abeth Bowman testified that sometimes repair pesonnel used cleaning
fluid at the table in question but Hoskins was not working at the same
table but rather at her normal work station at another table.
I Hoskins' symptoms were as follows: numb hands and feet, difficulty
in breathing, weak, high blood pressure, hands and feet turned blue. pulse
rate 280 at one time, sore throat, eyes inflamed and sensitive to light.
could not keep food in stomach, rash on face and her skin peeled. She
was given oxygen and her heart was monitored. One of the other em-
ployees hospitialized, Doris McClure, complained of difficulty in breath-
ing and being nauseated. Also, her skin turned red from head to toe. She
worked near the above-described process but not for the entire da.
On April 28, 1980, Hoskins filed a complaint with the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA)
section of the Kentucky Department of Labor regarding
the above-described incident. The matter was investigat-
ed, and Respondent received a citation. By check dated
August 25, 1980, signed by both Cummings and Bill
Buffin, Respondent's personnel manager, Respondent
paid a $240 OSHA fine or penalty. When the citation
was not placed on Respondent's bulletin board as re-
quired, a representative of the Department of Labor
came to the plant and discussed the matter with Hoskins,
among other subassembly personnel, in the presence of
Buffin. Hoskins testified that when she was introduced to
the representative he said, "Well, I've talked to you on
the phone .... You're the one that talked to . . . [an-
other representative of the Department of Labor]." Ini-
tially Buffin testified that he never overheard any con-
versation between Hoskins and a Department of Labor
representative. Later he testified that he did overhear the
conversation but he did not recall what the representa-
tive said to Hoskins.b
Both Hoskins and McClure testified that after the
April 1980 incident they were more sensitive to fumes.
The latter testified that when she was around the in-
volved cleaning fluid she would start to breathe heavy
and get flushed.
About 3 or 4 weeks after returning to work, in late
June or early July, Hoskins was told to leave her normal
work area and assist in the final assembly area, where
she was assigned to use the involved cleaning fluid.
After working with the fluid for about 2 hours Hoskins
became ill. She was permitted to rest in the locker room
for about I hour and then she went back to work doing
something which did not involve the use of the cleaning
fluid.
During the 1980 union organizing campaign at Re-
spondent's involved plant, which began in the summer of
that year, Hoskins passed out 12 authorization cards at a
grocery store which is located about I mile from Re-
spondent's involved facility, and she wore union buttons
while at work. 7 At one of the meetings which the Com-
After spending 5 days in the hospital she recuperated for I week. An-
other of Respondent's employees Kathy Wainscott testified that she went
to see a doctor when she experienced difficulty in breathing and a tight-
ening in the chest.
One of the Doctors used by Respondent testified that Hoskins' main
problem was what he described as an anxiety neurosis. Assertedly,
Hoskins suffered from hyperventilation. But the doctor used by Re-
spondent was unable to explain certain of Hoskins' symptoms in
view of his diagnosis. Hoskins' family physician had her transferred
from the hospital were the doctor used by Respondent practiced and
Hoskins spend the second week of her hospitialization under her
own physician's care.
This was the last time this process took place for the next morning,
according to Plant Manager David Cummings. it was determined
that it was less expensive to purchase the fuse than to make it
Contradicting Buffin and contrary to all other credible evidence of
record, Brown testified that Buffin was with her when the Department of
Labor representative spoke to Hoskins shortly after her return to work
following the April incident, and that both of them were some distance
away from Hoskins or in her words. "out of ear shot."
7 The buttons, which are 3 inches in diameter. read "VOTE I.B E.W."
G.C. Exh. 3. Hoskins' immediate supervisor Brown testified that Hoskins
wore union buttons for about 3 weeks before the election, which was
Continued
1091
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
pany held for its employees, Hoskins defended the Union
in an exchange with Robert Lee, a company representa-
tive of Litton Industries who flew in from California to
conduct the meetings on behalf of Respondent. 8 Accord-
ing to Brown this meeting took place at least 2 weeks
before the election. On another occasion, after being ad-
vised that the Company did not allow employees to ask
questions at the morning session, Hoskins attended the
afternoon company meeting wearing a shirt with the fol-
lowing written on the front: "POLISH PEOPLE
RISKED BEING SHOT, OR PUT IN JAIL FOR THE
RIGHT TO FORM LABOR UNIONS. ALL WE
HAVE TO DO IS VOTE YES," and the following
written on the back: "COMMUNISTS DON'T LET
YOU ASK QUESTIONS EITHER! VOTE YES." Gen-
eral Counsel's Exhibit 2. When Hoskins made her grand
entrance wearing the shirt some of the employees attend-
ing the meeting cheered, some laughed, and some booed.
Cummings and Buffin were present. Employees were al-
lowed to ask questions at this session. Apparently the
latter meeting was held the day before the election.
On September 25, 1980, 4 weeks before the election,
Hoskins was told to report to final assembly and use the
involved cleaning fluid. She explained to management
that she became ill the last time she used the fluid. Plant
manager Cummings told Hoskins to get a doctor's state-
ment and she was sent back to subassembly. As indicated
supra, Hoskins obtained a doctor's statement and she
gave it to Respondent on October 2, 1980.
Twelve days later, October 14, 1980, Hoskins was
again told to report to final assembly to use the cleaning
fluid. Again she explained to management that working
with the cleaning fluid made her ill. Also, she stated that
she had turned in a doctor's statement. Jerry Scroggins,
the supervisor of final assembly, then stated that he had
already looked in her personnel file and the doctor's
statement was not in it. Hoskins advised Scroggins that
she had a copy of it in her billfold. He then took her to
Buffin's office where she observed her personnel file on
Buffin's desk. Brown was asked to attend the meeting.
Regarding the meeting, Hoskins testified as follows:
[Buffin] said that the doctor's statement wasn't
good, and I said, well, I thought he meant with
working on it, and I said, well, how would you like
the doctor to give it, and he said it doesn't matter
held on October 23. 1980. At least one other employee testified that she
saw Hoskins wearing a union button a couple of weeks before the elec-
tion. Initially Buffin, who walks through the plant daily, testified that he
did not see Hoskins wear a union button during the campaign. Later he
testified that he did "not recall seeing Hoskins' Union button until she
was wearing this shirt [described infra] . . at the very end of the cam-
paign when she was very outspoken, certainly I was aware of that. But I
cannot testify that I observed or saw her wearing union buttons. She
could have been. I cannot recall that or testify to that fact." Cummings
testified that he did not see a union button on Hoskins'at any time prior
to the union election.
8 Lee stated at the meeting that he had been refused a copy of the
union bylaws and that assertedly there were 12 pages of penalties that
could be assessed against members. Hoskins showed a copy she had of
the bylaws but refused to let Lee see it saying that anyone could see it at
anytime they wanted to at a union meeting. When Lee's offer of a trade
was turned down by Hoskins, Lee, according to the testimony of Hos-
kins, "started laughing and got a very red face" Another employee at-
tending the meeting, John Ison, testified that Lee was embarrassed.
what you bring in here, we want you to scope and
clean [with the involved cleaning fluid]. And I told
him that I didn't want to intentionally endanger my
health, and I just didn't feel I could do it. And he
said that was the only job he had for me to do, and
what would my answer be? And I told him I
couldn't do it because it would endanger my health
and he said he would like me to wait in the lobby
and he would talk to Mr. Cummings about it.9
Hoskins did not have to use the cleaning fluid that day
and she returned to her normal department, subassembly.
Before arriving there, however, she overheard another
employee, Elizabeth Bowman, offer to Brown to take
Hoskins' place in final assembly and Brown "kind of
laughed and said no." 10 Hoskins' testimony regarding
what occurred and what was said on October 14, 1980, is
credited.
Since repair personnel, in order to repair units, were
knowledgeable in many facets of Respondent's operation,
this department was, as described by Cummings, the
"draw" department. In other words, when other depart-
ments needed personnel on a temporary basis, normally
the temporary workers came from the repair department.
Cummings, upon hearing complaints that repair person-
nel believed that this was not fair, advised them that
temporary transfers would be assigned on a more equita-
ble basis. When this was not done, repair personnel com-
plained again and on October 14, 1980, after meeting
with Cummings, they were promised that a rotation pro-
gram would be set up. I Two of the workers in the
9 Scroggins testified that while he accompanied Hoskins to Buffin's
office he did not stay for the meeting. Buffin testified that, after discuss-
ing the matter with Hoskins, he asked her to wait outside his office; that
Cummings was consulted by Buffin and it was agreed that Hoskins
would have to give a more specific reason as to why she could not work
around the cleaning fluid and that the doctor's statement was not valid;
that he then told Hoskins that the doctor's statement did not excuse her
from working in or around areas where there were mineral spirits; that
Hoskins did not indicate that she would get another statement; that he
told Hoskins that she could go back to her regular work area; and that at
the behest of Cummings later on October 14, 1980, he called the compa-
ny doctors to schedule an appointment for Hoskins but was advised by a
company doctor that it would be a waste of time because the doctor
could not make a determination regarding Hoskins and her complaints
that the cleaning fluid gave her a headache and made her dizzy and sick.
Brown testified that she did not recall Hoskins asking Buffin how he
would like the doctor to give the statement or Buffin saying that it did
not matter what Hoskins brought in. Rather, Brown testified that she re-
called Buffin saying that he needed something more specific; and that if
Hoskins could not work in the cleaning fluid, then a doctor had to say
that. Brown testified that she thought Hoskins said "okay I'll go get a
doctor's statement, another doctor's statement." Once again Brown con-
tradicted Buffin's testimony and other credible evidence of record. See
fn. 6 supra. A motion to sequester the witnesses was granted and Brown
did not know how Buffin previously testified. She impressed me as being
an individual whose version of what wvas said would be presented in such
a manner as to cast her employer in the best light possible. Brown was
not a credible witness.
0O Regarding this portion of Hoskins' testimony, Bowman initially as-
serted that she did not remember offering to substitute for Hoskins, testi-
fying "I don't think I ever offered to clean for anybody. I am sure I
didn't " Later she testified that she did offer to clean for one other em-
ployee in the repair department. Brown denied that Bowman offered to
take Hoskins' place. Bowman's testimony is equivocal and Brown, for the
reasons given above, was not a credible witness.
"i Cummings' testimony about what one of the repair personnel said
while leaving his office is not credited. Two repair personnel testified
Continued
1092
JEFFERSON ELECTRIC CO.
repair department, Bowman and Orick, testified that they
did not resent being transferred to perform any specific
task, but rather they resented being taken out of their de-
partment and moved around. (They constantly used the
involved cleaning fluid in their own department.) 12
As indicated supra, the election was held on October
23, 1980. The Union lost by three votes (74-71). The
year before the Union lost by a two-to-one margin. Ob-
jections were filed by the Union regarding the 1980 elec-
tion and the Board affirmed the decision of the Regional
Director overruling the objections and certified the re-
sults of the election on January 21, 1981. The Board's
certification of the results of the election were received
by Respondent shortly after January 21, 1981.
At 2 p.m. on January 28, 1981, Brown told Hoskins,
along with at least one other employee in her depart-
ment, to go to final assembly and work for Scroggins.
When she arrived in final assembly, Hoskins was told to
work at that portion of final assembly line A where the
involved cleaning fluid is used. She refused telling
Scroggins that the cleaning fluid made her very ill and
pointing out that she had a doctor's statement. Hoskins
was then told to go to the front of the line and perform a
task which did not involve the cleaning fluid.
During the day it is not possible to scrape and clean
all of the ballasts as they come down the line, especially
if the model being manufactured is one which requires
more scraping than normal. Such was the case on Janu-
ary 28, 1981, and throughout the day an unspecified
number of ballasts had been placed on a rolling table
near the line to be scraped and cleaned during the last 30
minutes of the shift, from 4 to 4:30 p.m. At 4 p.m. that
day, as was the standard operating procedure, the front
of the line was shut down. The workers on the front of
the line were sent to the end of the line to process the
remaining units. Scroggins asked Hoskins to scrape. She
observed that "there were so many girls at the end of the
line that they were getting in each other's way," and that
if she stood where she was directed by Scroggins to
stand, she would have been 1 foot away from the clean-
ing fluid which was being used.'3 Once again Hoskins
and, when asked about what was said on the way out of Cummings'
office, neither corroborated Cummings.
12 Buffin, who did not attend the meeting between Cummings and
repair personnel, testified that these employees complained "that each
time someone was needed they were the ones that had to go over and do
the stinking scraping job and do the cleaning job and go over and do the
other jobs."
13 Scroggins testified that he did not remember whether he told Hos-
kins where to stand at 4 p.m. In the circumstances, Hoskins' testimony is
credited. Credible testimony of witnesses called by both sides, including
those in management, demonstrates that management did not concern
itself with anything other than getting the units scraped and cleaned. Ac-
cording to Plant Manager Cummings, employees could be stumbling over
each other while they scraped and cleaned. He did not care as long as
the units were scraped and cleaned. Some of the witnesses testified that
at the end of the day when many workers are scraping and cleaning
there would be two cans of the cleaning fluid and they would be placed
anywhere they were handy to the people using them. Others testified that
they only saw one can of cleaning fluid in the involved area at the end of
the workday. Scroggins conceded that on occasion there was more than
one can of cleaning fluid in the involved area in final assembly. In any
event, the number of cans is not determinative. Rather, Hoskins' proximi-
ty to the cleaning fluid is decisive. Her testimony that at 4 p.m. she
would have been I foot away from the cleaning fluid which was being
informed Scroggins that the cleaning fluid would make
her very ill and once again she referred to her doctor's
statement. Scroggins took Hoskins to Buffin's office and
Scroggins remained there throughout most of the meet-
ing described infra.
Buffin had Hoskins' file on his desk. Brown was called
in. According to Buffin, Hoskins was then advised by
him that she had two options; she could try to scrape the
units or if she refused she was terminating her own em-
ployment. Buffin also advised Hoskins that she could
possibly be assigned to do scraping the next day or the
day after that.' 4 At the hearing Buffin testified that Hos-
kins could have been assigned tasks normally assigned to
her, i.e., assembling fuses or capacitors,'5 but that is not
where she was needed; and that while some action short
of discharge, such as suspension or warning,' may have
used is not refuted by credible evidence and, consequently, Hoskins' testi-
mony is credited.
14 Scroggins testified that Buffin told Hoskins that he did not know
whether she would be assigned to work near the cleaning fluid scraping
and cleaning in final assembly the next day because he did not know
whether Respondent would get a repair part for the Venus machine used
on final line A which would have obviated the need for the number of
scrapers and cleaners required to remove drylock when the machine was
not in operation. According to Cummings, the Venus machine broke
down on January 27, 1981, repair parts were ordered, they arrived on
January 28 and 29, 1981, and the machine was operational on January 29,
1981. See R. Exh. 23, attached hereto as Appendix A [omitted from pub-
lication], which was sponsored by Cummings and is a business record
maintained by Respondent It was introduced to show when the Venus
machine broke down and when the repair parts arrived. This document
will be treated more fully infra
'5 Scroggins testified that Buffin told Hoskins that "this is the only job
we got, we don't have any other job available for you." Hoskins testified
that she had work in her own department, viz., wrapping 2500 capaci-
tors, filling an order Brown gave her that morning for 800 fuses, and as-
sembling 2000 capacitors; that normally the fuses were made by another
employee but the other employee had another order to fill; that she had
made 400 of the fuses and it would have taken her the rest of the day to
fill the order; and that it would have taken her a couple of days to wrap
the capacitors. Brown testified that the employee normally assigned to
make the fuses assembled the remaining 400 fuses; that since Brown did
not have an order for the 2000 capacitors it was not necessary for Hos-
kins to make them that day and this is why Brown assigned Hoskins to
make the 800 fuses; and that the fact that there were 2500 capacitors on
final line A to wrap meant that she was 2 days ahead of the line on that
capacitor.
i' At least two other of Respondent's employees who were assigned
permanent jobs which involved the use of the involved cleaning fluid
were permitted to transfer after they advised management that they
could not work with the cleaning fluid. McClure, who was hospitalized
over the April 1980 incident described above, did not have a doctor's
statement. Debbie Edwards Feltner did have a doctor's statement. The
former accepted a lower paying job which involved working with miner-
al spirits diluted with 30 weight oil. Hoskins was never permanently as-
signed a job which involved using the cleaning fluid. Rather, four or five
times a year for part of a workday Hoskins was sent over on a temporary
basis to perform a task which involved either working with or near the
cleaning fluid. A number of other employees complained about the ef-
fects of working with the cleaning fluid. Wainscott's hands got red, broke
out, and got numb. She normally worked in final assembly and com-
plained to no avail. Shelia Taylor's hands got red and she was given a
protective cream. She continued to complain but continued to work as a
cleaner in final assembly. Respondent introduced evidence showing that
three probationary employees hired, after Hoskins' departure and after
the charge was filed herein, to work in final assembly as cleaners experi-
enced problems (two suffered skin irritation and the third, after complain-
ing about the fumes, had to lay down in the first-aid room) working with
the cleaning fluid, and all three were terminated by Respondent because
they had not "adapted." Buffin was asked twice if he could state how
Continued
1093
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
been available, Hoskins made her own decision. Hoskins
advised Buffin she could not perform the assigned task
because she was afraid it would make her sick and her
doctor advised against it.
In his decision dated April 3, 1981, in AD #81-2322,
Yvonne B. Hoskins v. Jefferson Electric,l7 a hearing offi-
cer of Kentucky's Department of Human Resources,
Bureau of Social Insurance, Division of Unemployment
Insurance, as here pertinent, stated as follows:
The claimant was employed with the captioned
company as a general factory laborer in sub-assem-
bly. She last worked as an auto-splice operator. The
company discharged her on January 28, 1981, when
she refused to accept temporary reassignment to an-
other job.
The last day, the claimant was asked by manage-
ment to work on a final assembly job known as
"clean and scrape". The operation involved scrap-
ing dried compound from finished parts and then
cleaning them off with rags soaked in mineral spir-
its. The claimant was instructed to scrape the parts
while nearby workers would be cleaning. She re-
fused to accept the reassignment because she is al-
lergic to mineral spirits. She was taken to the as-
sembly line and shown where she would have been
working. A container of mineral spirits with a pump
was located within arm's reach of where the claim-
ant was told she was to work. Other workers used
the pump to wet their cleaning rags and were work-
ing within a few feet away. The claimant told the
supervisor assigning her there of her allergy and the
fact that a statement from her doctor to that effect
was on file in the personnel office. The supervisor
stated that the medical statement was not "accepta-
ble" and when she continued to refuse the reassign-
ment, took her to the personnel office where she
was discharged.
The company's personnel manager had previous-
ly accepted a medical statement from the claimant
advising that she should avoid exposure to petrole-
um distillate. The claimant had on a prior occasion
been excused from working on the clean and scrape
operation because of her allergy. On the last day,
many employees were terminated between January 1979, when Buffin
became personnel director of Respondent's involved facility, and March
1981, when the first of the three above-described probationary employees
was terminated, because they had problems working with the involved
cleaning fluid. After stating that he would have to check the records on
that, Buffin testified that "lilt is very safe to say that yes, there have been
other employees during that period of time that has been hired to do the
job that entailed difficulties of those reasons and other reasons that could
not or did not perform the job and were discharged." Respondent intro-
duced R. Exhs. 8, 9, and 10, to support Buffin's testimony that the three
above-described probationary employees were released for "not adapt-
ed." No such evidence was ever introduced to demonstrate that anyone
was released for a similar reason prior to the charge being filed herein.
17 G.C. Exh. 7. Hoskins testified and she called David King, Ison, and
Wainscott as witnesses. Witnesses testifying on behalf of Jefferson Elec-
tric were Buffin, Brown, and Scroggins. Jefferson Electric was represent-
ed at the hearing by Mark Boysen of the National Employer's Counsel,
Inc. While the decision indicates that a party adversely affected may
appeal within 15 days of the decision's mailing date, Respondent did not
indicate that it in fact filed an appeal.
there was work available in the claimant's regularly
assigned department.
DECISION: The adjusted determination is set
aside. It is now held the claimant was discharged,
but not for misconduct connected with the work.
The employer's reserve account is charged.
REASONS: KRS 341.370 (I)(B) and (I)(c) re-
spectively provide for the disqualification of a
worker from receiving benefits where she was dis-
charged for misconduct connected with the work
or voluntarily quit suitable work without good
cause attributable to the employment. KRS 341.530
(3) provides that benefits paid to an eligible worker
and chargeable to an employer's reserve account
shall be charged against the pooled account if such
worker was discharged for misconduct connected
with his most recent work with such employer or
voluntarily quit his most recent work with such em-
ployer without good cause attributable to the em-
ployment.
The employer herein asserts that the claimant
should be subject to disqualification from benefits,
citing a 1948 Commission Order wherein the
worker voluntarily quit his job which required ex-
posure to fumes from varnish stains to which he
had a reaction. In ruling that the employer's reserve
account was not chargeable under KRS 341.530 (3),
and that the worker voluntarily quit without good
cause attributable to the employment, the Commis-
sion stated: "The test under this standard (Section
341.100) is whether the work is suitable to the ordi-
nary or average worker similarly situation. The re-
action of an individual worker and his acceptablility
to the agents used in the job operation do not
render the work unsuitable in nature if the ordinary,
average worker experiences no difficulty." This po-
sition has been restated by the Commission on occa-
sion in more recent Orders. (See Commission Order
#5429). Such reasoning, however, uses a tortured
logic since it is clear from KRS 341.100 that in de-
termining whether work is suitable for a particular
worker, we shall consider "the degree of risk in-
volved to his health." At any rate, the Commission
has never used this argument to disqualify a worker
from benefits but only to facilitate relieving the em-
ployer's reserve account in certain cases where ben-
efits could be charged to the pooled account. This
line of Commission Orders moreover may be distin-
guished from the case at hand and [sic] that claim-
ant herein did not voluntarily quit, but was dis-
charged by the employer. Since the claimant was
discharged, the real question is whether the dis-
charge was for misconduct so as to warrant a dis-
qualification from benefits and permit relief of
charges to the employer's reserve account? The
simple answer is that there was no misconduct on
the part of the claimant.
The time honored definition of industrial miscon-
duct is found in a Wisconsin case, Boyton Cab Com-
pany vs. Neubeck, 237 WIS 249, which stated: ("the
term 'misconduct' . . . is limited to conduct evinc-
1094
JEFFERSON ELECTRIC CO.
ing such willful or wanton disregard of an employ-
er's interest as found in deliberate violations or dis-
regard of standards of behavior which the employer
has the right to expect of his employee .... ") As a
general rule, it is the employer's prerogative to
assign workers in such a way as it feels best serves a
legitimate business interest. However, a worker has
the right to refuse work which is injurious to her
health. The weight of evidence clearly establishes
that the work assigned in the present case was inju-
rious to the claimant's health and that the compa-
ny's management was so advised and in possession
of a doctor's statement to that effect. It is therefore
concluded that the claimant was discharged for
other non-disqualifying reasons and that benefits are
chargeable to the company's reserve account.
The chief investigator for the Kentucky Department
of Labor (Department) J. C. Grider testified herein that
for the last 5 years he has investigated discrimination
charge cases such as the one filed with the Department
by Hoskins subsequent to the termination of her employ-
ment with Respondent; that during this period he had
been involved in several hundred cases; and that as a
result of his investigation of Hoskins' discrimination
charge"8 he concluded that Hoskins had been discrimi-
nated against because
Hoskins' normal work station was at one part of
the plant, and she was asked to go in another part
of the plant, which wasn't her normal work station
and work around the certain chemical which she
was allergic to. She has a doctor's statement, which
I have a copy of, for her not to be around this par-
ticular chemical. And I feel that the company knew
that she had this doctor's statement and that if they
asked her to work in this area, she would have to
refuse and that would give them an excuse to termi-
nate her.
The Kentucky Department of Labor has filed a civil
action against Jefferson Electric in the Grant County
Circuit Court over Hoskins' discharge.
B. Contentions
On brief, the General Counsel contends that Hoskins
was discharged in retaliation either for her participation
in the organizational efforts of the Union or for her in-
volvement in protected concerted activities, to wit, pro-
testing being required to work with chemicals that
caused her and other employees to become ill. What the
General Counsel describes as Respondent's sole defense,
viz., that repair personnel were upset because they had
to scrape and clean on the final assembly lines and they
had to be appeased, is assertedly not supported by the
record since repair personnel testified that they scraped
and cleaned in the final assembly area only three to five
'8 Grider testified that Respondent did not cooperate in his investiga-
tion in that Respondent's management refused to be interviewed regard-
ing this matter. Earlier, Respondent would not voluntarily allow an
OSHA inspection of its involved plant regarding the above-described
April 1980 incident but rather required OSHA to obtain a court order to
gain access to the company facility.
times a year and they did not complain about the scrap-
ing and cleaning but rather about the lack of general ro-
tation around the plant. Regarding animus, the General
Counsel argues that "[niot only was Hoskins a key orga-
nizer in the plant but she was also a persuasive force for
unionization at the plant. She was an articulate and com-
posed spokesperson who was able to stand up and suc-
cessfully challenge Lee's stock arguments and garner em-
ployees' support." General Counsel's brief p. 4. It is con-
tended by the General Counsel that it is probable that
management at Respondent's involved facility found out
about the Board certification of the results of the 1980
election on January 23 or 26, 1981. Hoskins was then
asked to perform a job which, the General Counsel
argues, all parties she the would refuse to do. Buffin as-
sertedly was pressuring Hoskins to quit on January 28,
1981 when he told her she could be assigned the same
task the next day for, according to the General Counsel,
Buffin knew this was not possible since Hoskins would
not be assigned this task again until there was a complete
rotation, which would not likely have occurred in I day.
In view of the fact that, in the General Counsel's opin-
ion, the discharge was pretextual, assertedly Wright Line,
251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (Ist Cir.
1981), does not apply.
Respondent, on brief, argues that there is no evidence
of animus since (a) no unlawful statements have been at-
tributed to Respondent, (b) there were no other unfair
labor charges, (c) Hoskins was not treated disparately,
(d) the Board affirmed the Regional Director's Decision
overruling the Union's objections to the conduct of the
election, (e) no animus toward Hoskins can be inferred
because of her protected activity, and (f) other union ac-
tivists were not discriminated against; that the employer's
request at 4 p.m. on January 28, 1981, was reasonable;
that Hoskins' refusal to try to scrape units was unreason-
able; that Hoskins was discharged for cause; that the em-
ployer had no knowledge that Hoskins was responsible
for the filing of the OSHA complaint, that there was no
evidence of animus regarding the filing of the OSHA
complaint; that the fact Hoskins could have performed
other jobs in the plant is immaterial and the fact that Re-
spondent could have taken action such as a suspension or
warning begs the issue; and that Hoskins and Nancy
Salmons should be discredited.' 9
"I Respondent also argues that the complaint should be dismissed. At
p. 1, fn. I of its brief it states as follows:
At the hearing the undersigned pointed out that Respondent was
incorrectly named in the Complaint; that Respondent's correct name
is Jefferson Electric Company, Division of Litton Systems, Inc. Gen-
eral Counsel expressed no opposition (Tr. 5, LL. 11-16). Moreover,
the "Charge Against Employer" [G.C. Exh. l(a)] is against "Jeffer-
son Electric Co., a Division of Litton Systems." No amended charge
was ever filed. To this extent the undersigned move for a dismissal
of the complaint against "Jefferson Electric, Williamstown, Division
of Litton Industries" [G.C. Exh. l(a)].
Respondent is correctly described in the body of the complaint. Its
motion to dismiss, made for the first time on brief, is denied Respondent
also requests reconsideration of a number of my rulings. In my opinion
no sufficient cause has been shown for reversing any of them. There is no
need to consider the testimony of Nancy Salmons who testified solely as
a rebuttal witness. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that Respondent
was justified in requesting a continuance, there was no need to continue
this proceeding a second time. for an indefinite period of time
1095
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C. Analysis
Respondent's request that Hoskins work within I foot
of the involved cleaning fluid at 4 p.m. on January 28,
1981, was not reasonable. And there was no legitimate
business justification for firing Hoskins when she refused
the assignment. Respondent's claim that it was Hoskins'
decision to leave and she herself terminated her employ-
ment does not alone make it so. Hoskins had no real
choice. She did what any reasonable person would have
done under the circumstances; she did exactly what the
Respondent expected her to do.
Why did Respondent place Hoskins in this position?
Respondent claims that because its Venus machine was
not operable it needed to utilize a number of workers to
remove the drylock from ballasts on final assembly line
A at the end of the day on January 28, 1981.20 But even
if that was the case, why would Respondent's manage-
ment ask Hoskins to perform a task they knew or should
have known she would refuse? In my opinion, it is ques-
tionable whether a reasonable person would ask anyone
to expose themselves to the vapor of mineral spirits if in
fact that is the cleaning fluid involved herein. There is
no question, however, but that a person acting reason-
ably would not ask someone to do this if the person
asked (1) was hospitalized for 2 weeks as a result of
being exposed to the fumes of a chemical process just 9
months prior to the involved incident; (2) was subse-
quently more sensitive, along with one of the other
workers hospitalized, to the vapors from the cleaning
fluid; (3) was not assigned this task as a part of her regu-
lar job but did it on a temporary basis four or five times
a year, for less than a day at a time; (4) had a doctor's
statement which stated that she avoid mineral spirits; and
(5) could do other work and could have in some other
20 R. Exh. 23 raises a number of questions that its sponsoring witness,
Cummings, could not adequately answer. The exhibit is atached hereto as
Appendix A. A perusal of the exhibit reveals that while it is captioned
"1-22-81 to 1-30-81" the first date on the page is "1-26-81"; that the
first date, "1-26-81" appears to be written over "1-22-81;" that the next
date "1-27-81" appears twice and the first time it appears to been written
over 1-23-81, and then both are crossed out; that the next date appearing
on the page, "1-29-81" is out of sequence and, as admitted by Cummings
(Tr. p. 1240), is written over an erasure; that the number which was
erased may have been a 6 making the erased date 1-26-81; that for the
first time in the exhibit the day of the week is written in the second
column from the left on the 1-29-81 entry (compare entries on R. Exh.
22, a similar exhibit where the day of the week is never given.); that the
day of the week is given also in the next entry (A possible explanation is
that because of the reverse order of the dates someone felt constrained to
give the day of the week also.); and that at least one of the numbers of
the 1-28-81 entry appears to been written over another number, i.e., "5"
appears to be written over "2." Cummings did not prepare the document
and its preparer was no longer with the Company. If the Venus machine
broke down Friday, January 23, 1981, the repair parts could and most
likely would have been ordered that day. They could have been trans-
ported over the weekend and could have arrived Monday, January 26,
1981; Tuesday, January 27, 1981; or even early Wednesday, January 28,
1981. If that was the case, the Venus machine could have been repaired
prior to the confrontation between Hoskins and Respondent's manage-
ment. But if that were the case, then R. Exh. 23 would be a fabrication.
Cummings testified, however, that he was personally familiar with and
verified what occurred with the Venus machine on the dates specified on
R. Exh. 23. Surely, the exhibit is not a fabrication for if it ever became an
issue it would be too easy to prove, i.e., there would be records showing
when the parts were ordered and when they were transported. And
surely Cummings, under the circumstances, would not have testified that
the exhibit correctly depicts events as they occurred.
way participated meaningfully in an equitable rotation
program. The request was not a reasonable request.
Was Respondent's reaction reasonable? Was there a
business justification for firing Hoskins? No evidence was
introduced by Respondent to show that it had ever fired
anyone else for refusing a temporary assignment to work
with or near the involved cleaning fluid. In fact, al-
though asked for, there is no evidence, other than Buf-
fin's pure speculation, that Respondent ever fired anyone
for either refusing to work with the involved cleaning
fluid or for experiencing a problem with the involved
cleaning fluid prior to the time the charge was filed
herein. Buffin was not a credible witness. If his assertion
was correct, Respondent could have introduced its busi-
ness records. No weight is given to the fact that Re-
spondent fired three probationary employees after the
charge was filed herein. A part of their regular job was
working with the cleaning fluid. The fact that they were
hired and fired after the charge was filed herein and Re-
spondent did not demonstrate that it had in fact taken
similar action before forces me to conclude that these ac-
tions were no more than an attempt on Respondent's
part to bolster its position. Two other employees who
were permanently assigned tasks involving the use of the
involved cleaning fluid were allowed to transfer. Hoskins
was treated disparately and no lawful reason was given
for the disparate treatment.
The General Counsel demonstrated that Hoskins was
an obvious union supporter, a fact known to Respondent,
and that she was not afraid to, and did, cross swords
with management during the union organizing drive. It
was not demonstrated that anyone else challenged and
embarrassed Lee the way Hoskins did. And it was not
demonstrated that any other union activist was willing to
go so far as to graphically equate management's refusal
to allow employees to ask questions at a meeting with
communist tactics, and thereby embarrass management
into allowing questions.
The fact that Respondent's witness did not testify cre-
dibly about the OSHA representative's in-plant interview
with Hoskins demonstrates that management was con-
cerned that being candid about this matter would
damage Respondent's position. In my opinion, Respond-
ent concluded long before January 1981 that Hoskins
was behind their problem with OSHA but it hesitated to
do anything which would jeopardize the results of the
October 1980 election. Respondent, notwithstanding the
size of the fine, viewed this incursion as a serious matter.
It forced OSHA to obtain a court order to initially gain
access to the plant. Buffin personally accompanied the
OSHA representative when he spoke with employees in
the plant, and Buffin stood within hearing range so that
he could make sure the representative was not conduct-
ing a confidential inquiry.
The grounds given by Respondent for Hoskins' firing
are pretextual. Since there was no legitimate business jus-
tification for the firing there was no dual motive and,
therefore, Wright Line, supra, does not apply.
Lacking a lawful reason for the firing, one is left only
with unlawful reasons, viz, Hoskins' union activities and
her protected concerted activities. Regarding the latter,
1096
JEFFERSON ELECTRIC CO.
compare Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 NLRB 999 (1975).
Hoskins' firing was in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3)
of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the
Act by discharging Yvonne Bonnie Hoskins because she
joined, supported, or assisted the Union, and engaged in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in an
unfair labor practice, I shall recommend that Respondent
be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act.
Having found that Respondent discharged Yvonne
Bonnie Hoskins in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of
the Act, it is recommended that Respondent offer Hos-
kins immediate and full reinstatement to her former job
or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equiva-
lent position without prejudice to her seniority or other
rights and privileges and make her whole for any loss of
pay she may have suffered as a result of the discrimina-
tion against her by payment to her of a sum of money
equal to that which she would have earned as wages
during the period from the date of her discharge to the
date on which Respondent offers reinstatement less her
net earnings, if any, during said period, with interest
thereon to be computed in the manner set forth in F. W.
Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel
Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).21
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed 2 2
ORDER
The Respondent, Jefferson Electric Company, a Divi-
sion of Litton Systems, Inc., Williamstown, Kentucky, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
I. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging employees because they have joined,
supported, or assisted the union, and engaged in concert-
ed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.
2I See generally lIis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
z2 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings. conclusions, and recommended
Order shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the purposes of the Act.
(a) Offer Yvonne Bonnie Hoskins immediate and full
reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent
job and make her whole for any loss of earnings she may
have suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimination
against her in the manner and to the extent set forth in
the section herein entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Preserve and, on request, make available to the
Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records and reports, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
and the right of reinstatement under the terms of this
recommended Order.
(c) Post at its facilities in Williamstown, Kentucky,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B." 23
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 9, after being signed by Respond-
ent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt and be maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director 9, in writing within
20 days from the date of this Order what steps have been
taken to comply.
23 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of
Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board"
APPENDIX B
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise punish you be-
cause you have joined, supported, or assisted any union
or engaged in concerted activities for mutual aid or pro-
tection.
WE WILL NOT discharge you or otherwise discriminate
against you in regard to your hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment, to dis-
courage membership in the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local Union 1533, AFL-CIO-CLC.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your
1097
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rights under the National Labor Relations Act. These
rights are:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of your own choosing
To engage in activities together for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection
To refrain from any such activities.
Our employees are free to exercise any or all of these
rights, including the right to join or assist the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union
1533, AFL-CIO-CLC, or any other union. Our employ-
ees are also free to refrain from any or all such activities.
WE WILL offer Yvonne Bonnie Hoskins reinstatement
to the job of which she was unlawfully deprived or, if
such a job no longer exists, a substantially equivalent job,
without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and
privileges previously enjoyed, and make her whole, with
interest for any loss of pay she may have suffered by
reason of her discharge.
JEFFERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY, A DIVI-
SION OF LITTON SYSTEMS, INC.
1098