JACK IN THE BOX, INC.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 24, 2016

364 NLRB No. 12 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

364 NLRB No. 12
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Jack in the Box, Inc. and Dana Ocampo. Case 32–
CA–145068
May 24, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS MISCIMARRA, HIROZAWA,
AND MCFERRAN
On December 1, 2015, Administrative Law Judge
Mary Miller Cracraft issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Applying the Board’s decisions in D. R. Horton, 357
NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part 737 F.3d
344 (5th Cir. 2013), and Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361
NLRB No. 72 (2014), enf. denied in relevant part 808
F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), the judge found that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by maintain-
ing a Dispute Resolution Agreement (Arbitration
Agreement) that requires employees, as a condition of
employment, to waive their rights to pursue class or col-
lective actions involving employment-related claims in
all forums, whether arbitral or judicial. The judge also
found, relying on D. R. Horton and U-Haul of Califor-
nia, 347 NLRB 375, 377–378 (2006), enfd. 255
Fed.Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007), that maintaining the
Arbitration Agreement violated Section 8(a)(1) because
employees reasonably would construe it to prohibit or
restrict their right to file unfair labor practice charges
with the Board. Finally, the judge found that the Re-
spondent’s maintenance of the confidentiality provision
of the Arbitration Agreement independently violated
Section 8(a)(1).
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and, based on the
judge’s application of D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil, has
decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-

1 The Respondent contends that its Arbitration Agreement includes
an exemption allowing employees to file charges with administrative
agencies and thus does not, as in D. R. Horton, unlawfully prohibit
them from collectively pursuing litigation of employment claims in all
forums. We reject this argument for the reasons set forth in SolarCity
Corp., 363 NLRB No. 83, slip op. at 2–4 (2015).
In finding the Arbitration Agreement unlawful, we do not rely on
Supply Technologies, LLC, 359 NLRB No. 38 (2012), cited by the
judge.
clusions as amended, and to adopt the recommended
Order, as modified and set forth in full below.2
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Delete the phrase “and enforcing” from Conclusions of
Law 1, 2, and 3.

2 This case was submitted to the judge on a joint motion to waive a
hearing and proceed on a stipulated record. The judge found that the
Respondent violated the Act by “maintaining and/or enforcing” (em-
phasis added) its Arbitration Agreement. However, although the state-
ment of issues in the joint motion asks whether the Respondent unlaw-
fully enforced the Arbitration Agreement, the complaint does not allege
unlawful enforcement, and there is no evidence in the stipulation of
facts that the Respondent ever enforced the Arbitration Agreement.
Accordingly, we shall amend the judge’s conclusions of law and modi-
fy the judge’s recommended Order and notice to omit the reference to
enforcement. We shall further modify the judge’s recommended Order
to conform to the Board’s standard remedial language, and we shall
substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified.
The dissent observes that the Act does not “dictate” any particular
procedures for the litigation of non-NLRA claims, and “creates no
substantive right for employees to insist on class-type treatment” of
such claims. This is correct, as the Board has previously explained in
Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 2, and Bristol Farms, 363
NLRB No. 45, slip op. at 2 & fn. 2 (2015). But what the dissent ig-
nores is that the Act “does create a right to pursue joint, class, or collec-
tive claims if and as available, without the interference of an employer-
imposed restraint.” Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 2 (em-
phasis in original). The Respondent’s Arbitration Agreement is just
such an unlawful restraint.
Likewise, for the reasons explained in Murphy Oil and Bristol
Farms, above, there is no merit to the dissent’s view that finding the
Arbitration Agreement unlawful runs afoul of employees’ Sec. 7 right
to “refrain from” engaging in protected concerted activity. See Murphy
Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 18; Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No.
45, slip op. at 3. Nor is the dissent correct in insisting that Sec. 9(a) of
the Act requires the Board to permit individual employees to prospec-
tively waive their Sec. 7 right to engage in concerted legal activity. See
Murphy Oil, slip op. at 17–18; Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 2.
We note that there is a statement on the second page of the Arbitra-
tion Agreement, under the heading “Claims Covered by the Agree-
ment,” that states that “[n]othing in this Agreement precludes Employ-
ee from filing a charge or from participating in an administrative inves-
tigation of a charge before an appropriate government agency including
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or similar state agen-
cy.” For the reasons set forth in The Rose Group d/b/a Applebee’s
Restaurant, 363 NLRB No. 75, slip op. at 1 fn. 1, slip op. at 10 (2015),
we disagree with the dissent that, in context, the inclusion of this lan-
guage would eliminate any reasonable uncertainty about the right of
employees to file charges with the Board to resolve claims specifically
covered by the mandatory arbitration agreement described as the exclu-
sive means for dispute resolution. Indeed, the language here is even
less likely to do so than in the cases cited by our colleague, where the
policies referred to the filing of charges with a “federal” agency. Here,
the policy refers only to the “Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion or similar state agency” (emphasis added).
Finally, for the reasons stated in Ralph’s Grocery Co., 363 NLRB
No. 128, slip op. at 3 (2016), we disagree with the dissent’s argument
that the Respondent’s Arbitration Agreement would be lawful even if it
requires employees to arbitrate their unfair labor practice claims be-
cause, in his view, it does not restrict employees’ right to file charges
with the Board.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Jack in the Box, Inc., nationwide including
a facility in San Jose, California, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
that requires employees, as a condition of employment,
to waive the right to maintain employment-related class
or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral or
judicial.
(b) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
that employees reasonably would believe bars or restricts
the right to file charges with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.
(c) Maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
that requires employees to maintain the confidentiality of
the terms of an arbitrator’s decision unless agreed to in
writing, subpoenaed by a court to testify, or required by
law.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement in all
of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make clear
to employees that the arbitration agreement does not con-
stitute a waiver of their right to maintain employment-
related joint, class, or collective actions in all forums,
that it does not restrict employees’ right to file charges
with the National Labor Relations Board, and that it does
not require employees to maintain the confidentiality of
arbitration proceedings.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were
required to sign acknowledgements regarding the manda-
tory arbitration agreement in any form that it has been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy
of the revised policy.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
all of its locations nationwide copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 32, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily

3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices,
the notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by
email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the penden-
cy of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed any of the facilities involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at those facilities at any time since July 26,
2014.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 32 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 24, 2016
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
In this case, my colleagues find that the Respondent’s
Dispute Resolution Agreement (the Agreement) violates
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act or NLRA) because the Agreement waives the right
to participate in class or collective actions regarding non-
NLRA employment claims. I respectfully dissent from
this finding for the reasons explained in my partial dis-
senting opinion in Murphy Oil USA, Inc.1 I also dissent
from my colleagues’ finding that the Agreement violates
Section 8(a)(1) on the basis that it interferes with the
right of employees to file charges with the Board. How-
ever, I agree with my colleagues that a confidentiality
provision in the Agreement, which explicitly restricts

1 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014) (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting in part). The Board majority’s holding in Murphy Oil inval-
idating class-action waiver agreements was denied enforcement by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB,
808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).
JACK IN THE BOX, INC. 3
employees from disclosing the arbitrator’s decision or
the terms of the arbitrator’s award, is unlawful, but I
would reach that conclusion under a different standard
than my colleagues apply. Accordingly, I respectfully
concur in part and dissent in part.2
DISCUSSION
1. Legality of the class action waiver
I agree that an employee may engage in “concerted”
activities for “mutual aid or protection” in relation to a
claim asserted under a statute other than NLRA.3 How-
ever, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not vest authority in
the Board to dictate any particular procedures pertaining
to the litigation of non-NLRA claims, nor does the Act
render unlawful agreements in which employees waive
class-type treatment of non-NLRA claims. To the con-
trary, as discussed in my partial dissenting opinion in
Murphy Oil, NLRA Section 9(a) protects the right of
every employee as an “individual” to “present” and “ad-
just” grievances “at any time.”4 This aspect of Section
9(a) is reinforced by Section 7 of the Act, which protects
each employee’s right to “refrain from” exercising the
collective rights enumerated in Section 7. Thus, I be-
lieve it is clear that (i) the NLRA creates no substantive
right for employees to insist on class-type treatment of

2 I join my colleagues in setting aside the judge’s finding that the
Respondent violated the Act by enforcing the Agreement.
3 I agree that non-NLRA claims can give rise to “concerted” activi-
ties engaged in by two or more employees for the “purpose” of “mutual
aid or protection,” which would come within the protection of NLRA
Sec. 7. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 23–25 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part). However, the existence or absence of
Sec. 7 protection does not depend on whether non-NLRA claims are
pursued as a class or collective action, but on whether Sec. 7’s statutory
requirements are met—an issue separate and distinct from whether an
individual employee chooses to pursue a claim as a class or collective
action. Id.; see also Beyoglu, 362 NLRB No. 152, slip op. at 4–5
(2015) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
4 Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 30–34 (Member Miscimarra, dis-
senting in part). Sec. 9(a) states: “Representatives designated or se-
lected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclu-
sive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any
individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment” (emphasis added). The Act’s legisla-
tive history shows that Congress intended to preserve every individual
employee’s right to “adjust” any employment-related dispute with his
or her employer. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 31–32 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part).
non-NLRA claims;5 (ii) a class-waiver agreement per-
taining to non-NLRA claims does not infringe on any
NLRA rights or obligations, which has prompted the
overwhelming majority of courts to reject the Board’s
position regarding class-waiver agreements;6 and (iii)
enforcement of a class-action waiver as part of an arbitra-
tion agreement is also warranted by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA).7 Although questions may arise regard-
ing the enforceability of particular agreements that waive
class or collective litigation of non-NLRA claims, I be-
lieve these questions are exclusively within the province
of the court or other tribunal that, unlike the NLRB, has
jurisdiction over such claims.
2. Alleged interference with NLRB charge filing
The judge also found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining the Agreement because,
in her view, the Agreement is “reasonably read to pre-
clude filing charges with the NLRB” (emphasis added).
See, e.g., U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB 375,
377–378 (2006) (finding that employer violated the Act
by maintaining an arbitration policy that employees
would reasonably read as prohibiting them from filing
unfair labor practice charges with the Board), enfd. mem.
255 Fed. Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007). My colleagues
affirm the judge’s finding that the Agreement interferes

5 When courts have jurisdiction over non-NLRA claims that are po-
tentially subject to class treatment, the availability of class-type proce-
dures does not rise to the level of a substantive right. See D.R. Horton,
Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The use of class
action procedures . . . is not a substantive right.”) (citations omitted),
petition for rehearing en banc denied No. 12–60031 (5th Cir. 2014);
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980)
(“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only,
ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”).
6 The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly denied enforcement of Board or-
ders invalidating a mandatory arbitration agreement that waived class-
type treatment of non-NLRA claims. See, e.g., Murphy Oil, Inc., USA
v. NLRB, above; D. R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, above. The overwhelm-
ing majority of courts considering the Board’s position have likewise
rejected it. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 34 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 36 fn. 5 (Member John-
son, dissenting) (collecting cases); see also Patterson v. Raymours
Furniture Co., Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Nanavati v.
Adecco USA, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015), motion to
certify for interlocutory appeal denied 2015 WL 4035072 (N.D. Cal.
June 30, 2015); Brown v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., No. 1:12–cv–
00062–BLW, 2015 WL 1401604 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2015) (granting
reconsideration of prior determination that class waiver in arbitration
agreement violated NLRA); but see Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root,
LLC, No. ED CV 14–1766 DMG (DTBx), 2016 WL 316019 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 22, 2016).
7 For the reasons expressed in my Murphy Oil partial dissent and
those thoroughly explained in former Member Johnson’s dissent in
Murphy Oil, the FAA requires that the arbitration agreement be en-
forced according to its terms. Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 34 (Mem-
ber Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 49–58 (Member
Johnson, dissenting).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
with employees’ right to file charges with the Board. I
disagree, and I would reverse the judge’s finding.
The Agreement is set forth in a five-page document. It
broadly requires arbitration of all employment related
claims, which would encompass claims arising under the
NLRA.8 However, for the reasons stated in my separate
opinion in The Rose Group d/b/a Applebee’s Restaurant,
I believe that an agreement may lawfully provide for the
arbitration of NLRA claims, and such an agreement does
not unlawfully prohibit the filing of charges with the
NLRB, particularly when the right to do so is explicitly
stated in the agreement itself.9 In the instant case, the
Agreement specifically provides that “[n]othing in this
Agreement precludes Employee from filing a charge or
from participating in an administrative investigation of a
charge before an appropriate government agency includ-
ing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or
similar state agency.” I believe that language in the
Agreement requiring the arbitration of NLRA claims
does not unlawfully restrict the right to file charges with
the Board, where the Agreement also states that
“[n]othing in this Agreement precludes Employee from
filing a charge [with] . . . an appropriate government
agency.” See GameStop Corp., above, 363 NLRB No.
89, slip op. at 4–5 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (no violation where employ-
er’s arbitration rules allowed for filing a charge “with a
state, local or federal administrative agency such as the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission”); Great
Lakes Restaurant Management, LLC, 363 NLRB No.
130, slip op. at 7 (2016) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting
in part) (no violation where arbitration agreement re-
quired arbitration of all legal claims, including those aris-
ing under the NLRA, and also stated that the agreement
“will not prevent you from filing a charge with any state
or federal government administrative agency”). Accord-
ingly, I would reverse the judge’s finding that the
Agreement unlawfully interferes with Board charge fil-
ing.

8 Under the heading “Claims Covered by the Agreement,” the
Agreement states it applies to all “disputes and claims . . . in any way
related to Employee’s employment or termination of employment.”
The Agreement further states that “all claims or disputes covered by
this Agreement must be submitted to binding arbitration, and that this
binding arbitration will be the sole and exclusive remedy for resolving
any such claim or dispute.”
9 363 NLRB No. 75, slip op. at 3–5 (2015) (Member Miscimarra,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Ralph’s Grocery
Co., 363 NLRB No. 128, slip op. at 6–7 (Member Miscimarra, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); GameStop Corp., 363 NLRB No.
89, slip op. at 4–5 (2015) (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
3. Confidentiality clause
Finally, I concur in the majority’s finding that the
Agreement violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it
contains an overbroad confidentiality restriction. The
confidentiality provision states: “The Arbitrator’s deci-
sion is confidential. Neither Employee nor the Company
may publicly disclose the terms of the award unless:
 Agreed to in writing by the party, or
 Subpoenaed by a court to testify, or
 Required by law.”
I agree that the confidentiality provision violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) because it would preclude all public discus-
sion (with narrow exceptions) of employment-related
matters addressed in arbitral decisions, including discus-
sions that constitute concerted activity involving two or
more employees engaged in for the purpose of mutual
aid or protection, and the record reveals no countervail-
ing interest that justifies the impact on NLRA-protected
rights. Cf. William Beaumont Hospital, 363 NLRB No.
162, slip op. at 11–13 (2016) (Member Miscimarra, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (describing re-
quirement that Board strike a proper balance between
asserted business justifications and potential impact on
NLRA rights); Banner Estrella Medical Center, 362
NLRB No. 137, slip op. at 13–18 (2015) (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part) (same).10
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, I respectful-
ly concur in part with and dissent in part from the majori-
ty’s decision.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 24, 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

10 In their analysis of the lawfulness of the confidentiality provision,
my colleagues do not consider whether the Respondent demonstrated
an interest that potentially justifies the impact of the provision on pro-
tected rights under the NLRA. In my view, the Board must do so, for
the reasons I explained at length in my separate opinions in William
Beaumont Hospital, above, and Banner Estrella, above.
JACK IN THE BOX, INC. 5
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires our employees, as a condition of em-
ployment, to waive the right to maintain employment-
related class or collective actions in all forums, whether
arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that employees reasonably would believe bars or
restricts their right to file charges with the National La-
bor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that requires employees to maintain the confidenti-
ality of the terms of an arbitrator’s decision unless agreed
to in writing, subpoenaed by a court to testify, or re-
quired by law.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the mandatory arbitration agreement
in all of its forms, or revise it in all of its forms to make
clear that the arbitration program does not constitute a
waiver of your right to maintain employment-related
joint, class, or collective actions in all forums, that it
does not restrict your right to file charges with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, and that it does not require
you to maintain the confidentiality of arbitration pro-
ceedings.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
were required to sign acknowledgements regarding the
mandatory arbitration agreement in any form that it has
been rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a
copy of the revised policy.
JACK IN THE BOX, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/32–CA–145068 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street S.E., Washington, DC
20570, or by calling (202) 273–1940.
Lelia M. Gomez, Esq. and Judith J. Chang, Esq., for the Gen-
eral Counsel.
Christian J. Rowley, Esq., for the Respondent.
Kevin R. Allen, Esq., for the Charging Party.
DECISION
MARY MILLER CRACRAFT, Administrative Law Judge. This
case concerns the Arbitration Agreement maintained by Jack in
the Box, Inc. (Respondent). The issues presented are whether
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by soliciting
employees to sign the Arbitration Agreement and by maintain-
ing and/or enforcing the Arbitration Agreement (1) because it
interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in collec-
tive legal activity such as participating in collective and class
litigation; (2) because it interferes with employees’ access to
the Board and its processes; and (3) because the confidentiality
provision interferes with employees’ Section 7 rights to discuss
their wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment with others by restricting employees from publicly dis-
closing the terms of arbitration awards.1
The parties submitted this case by joint stipulation of facts
which was accepted on October 6, 2015. On the entire record,
and after considering the parties’ statements of position and the
briefs filed by counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for
the Respondent, the following findings of fact and conclusions
of law are made.
JURISDICTION
Respondent is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters
in San Diego, California. It operates fast-food restaurants on a
nationwide basis, including a fast-food restaurant in San Jose,
California. In conducting its operations during the 12-month
period ending June 30, 2015, Respondent derived gross revenue
in excess of $500,000. During that same period, Respondent
purchased and received goods valued in excess of $5000 direct-
ly from points outside the State of California. The parties thus
stipulate and I find that Respondent has been an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act. Accordingly, this dispute affects interstate
commerce and the Board has jurisdiction of this case pursuant
to Section 10(a) of the Act.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE ALLEGATIONS
Respondent has maintained the Arbitration Agreement on a
nationwide basis since at least July 26, 2014. Respondent

1 The unfair labor practice charge was filed by Dana Ocampo, an in-
dividual, on January 26, 2015. On July 30, 2015, the complaint and
notice of hearing issued. Respondent duly filed an answer to the com-
plaint, admitting and denying certain allegations.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
promulgates to its employees at the time of their hire and re-
quires them, through a web-based application, to sign a “Dis-
pute Resolution and Arbitration Agreement” (the Arbitration
Agreement). Specific portions of the Arbitration Agreement are
alleged to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees. The
parties stipulated that the Arbitration Agreement specifically
informs employees that they are bound to the Arbitration
Agreement as a condition of their employment with Respond-
ent.
Alleged Interference with Right to Engage in Collective Legal
Action
The Arbitration Agreement is a 5-page, single spaced docu-
ment. The portions quoted below are from pages 1–2 and 5.
The second sentence of the Arbitration Agreement (page 1)
states, “Employee understands and agrees that any such differ-
ences [that may arise between Employee and Respondent] will
be resolved by the terms of this [Arbitration Agreement].” Var-
ious other parts of the Arbitration Agreement also reference or
inform an employee’s ability to engage in collective court,
administrative, or arbitral action. For instance:
Mutual Promise to Resolve Claims by Binding Arbitration
(page 1)
In signing the Acknowledgment and Receipt, Employee
agrees that all claims or disputes covered by this Agreement
must be submitted to binding arbitration and that this binding
arbitration will be the sole and exclusive remedy for resolving
any such claim or disputes. The Company also agrees that all
claims or disputes covered by this Agreement that Company
may have against Employee will be submitted to binding arbi-
tration as the sole and exclusive remedy for any such claim or
dispute.
Claims Covered by the Agreement (pages 1–2)
This Agreement applies to disputes and claims for relief Em-
ployee may presently or in the future have against the Com-
pany or against its officers, directors, employees, or agents in
any way related to Employee’s employment or termination of
employment including, but not limited to, claims for wrongful
discharge under statutory and common law; claims for dis-
crimination based on [specifically enumerated bases not in-
cluding NLRA] or any other claim of discrimination. This
Agreement also applies to claims brought under state or fed-
eral laws including, but not limited to [specifically enumerat-
ed bases not including NLRA] or any other present or future
laws; any claims for retaliatory discharge . . . and any other
statutory and common law claims under any law of the United
States or State or local agency are also covered by this
Agreement. . . .
Nothing in this Agreement precludes Employee from filing a
charge or from participating in an administrative investigation
of a charge before an appropriate government agency, includ-
ing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or simi-
lar state Agency.
Claims Not Covered by this Agreement (page 2)
The following claims or disputes are not covered by this
Agreement: claims for unemployment insurance benefits;
claims for workman’s compensation benefits; claims seeking
only monetary recovery where the total amount of the claim
does not exceed $15,000; claims that in the absence of This
Agreement have no basis in law or could not be filed in court;
or claims both Employee and Company agree are not covered
by this Agreement. Neither Employee nor Company shall be
entitled to join or consolidate in arbitration claims not covered
by this Agreement or arbitrate a representative action or a
claim as a representative or member of a class.
Exclusive, Final and Binding Remedy for Eligible Disputes
(page 2)
If employee or Company is seeking to resolve claims covered
by this Agreement, they must use binding arbitration. As to
any such dispute, arbitration is designed as a substitute for
court action and except as provided by this Agreement is the
exclusive, final, and binding method to resolve the dispute,
whether based on federal, state, or local law. Neither the
Company nor the Employee can initiate or prosecute a lawsuit
which raises a dispute covered by this Agreement. Employee
must first pursue an administrative claim or charge under fed-
eral or state discrimination laws prior to seeking arbitration of
that claim or charge as required by law. The Company and
Employee agree to give up their respective constitutional
rights to have these claims decided in a court of law before a
jury, and instead are accepting the use of final and binding ar-
bitration.
No Loss of Rights (page 5)
This procedure, and the Agreement implementing it, does not
create or destroy any individual legal rights; it only changes
the forum in which those rights will be resolved. In other
words, the Employee will be able to arbitrate the same claims
he/she could bring in court, and the Arbitrator will apply ex-
actly the same laws and principles as would a judge or jury.
The arbitrator can award to the winning party the same recov-
ery the party would be entitled to in a court of law subject to
the same limitations used by courts of law.
The language in the Arbitration Agreement, an acknowl-
edged condition of employment, is quite broad. The terms of
the agreement specifically require single2 employee arbitration
as the only method for resolving all employment-related claims.
It is “the sole and exclusive remedy for any such claim or dis-
pute.”3 No employee can initiate or prosecute a lawsuit which
raises a dispute covered by the Arbitration Agreement.4 Thus,
the Arbitration Agreement applies to “disputes and claims for
relief Employee may presently or in the future have against
[Respondent] . . . in any way related to Employee’s employ-
ment or termination of employment.”5

2 Neither Employee nor Company shall be entitled to join or consol-
idate in arbitration claims not covered by this Agreement or arbitrate a
representative action or a claim as a representative or member of a
class. (Claims Not Covered by this Agreement.)
3 Mutual Promise to Resolve Claims by Binding Arbitration.
4 Exclusive, Final and Binding Remedy for Eligible Disputes.
5 Claims Covered by this Agreement.
JACK IN THE BOX, INC. 7
Nothing in the “Claims Not Covered” portion of the Arbitra-
tion Agreement lessens the impact of the broad language. The
only exemptions in that language are for unemployment com-
pensation, workers’ compensation, claims for less than
$15,000, and baseless claims. Moreover, the specific language
allowing “filing a charge” or “participating in an administrative
investigation of a charge before an appropriate government
agency”6 does not include allowing employees to access the
courts in concert regarding employment-related matters.
In Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), enf. de-
nied, ___ F.3d ___ (5th Cir. No. 15–60800, Oct. 26, 2015),7 the
Board emphasized the core objective of the Act to protect
workers’ ability to act in concert in support of one another, and
held that “arbitration agreements that are imposed as a condi-
tion of employment, and that compel NLRA-covered employ-
ees to pursue workplace claims against their employer individ-
ually” require forfeiture of the substantive right to act collec-
tively. Murphy Oil, supra, slip op. at 2. Thus, the Board found
that such an arbitration agreement nullified “the foundational
principle that has consistently informed national labor policy as
developed by the Board and the courts.” Id. This includes seek-
ing to improve working conditions through resort to administra-
tive and judicial forums. . . .”8
Respondent asserts that Murphy Oil was improperly decided
arguing that by holding that an employer may not require its
employees to agree to arbitration as a condition of employment
“the Board overreached its statutory authority and ignored set-
tled Supreme Court precedent.” Specifically, Respondent as-
serts that Murphy Oil conflicts with the fundamental principles
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Relying on CompuCredit
Corp. v. Greenwood, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 665 (2012) (be-
cause the Credit Repair Organization Act is silent on whether
claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum, the
FAA requires the parties’ arbitration agreement to be enforced
according to its terms), Respondent argues that because the
NLRA is silent on whether claims under it can proceed to arbi-
tration, the FAA requires that arbitration agreements be en-
forced according to their terms. Respondent asserts that the
Board failed to give appropriate deference to the FAA in Mur-
phy Oil, thus resulting in rejection of its holding by almost
every federal and state court presented with the issue. These

6 Claims Covered by this Agreement.
7 As Respondent points out, the courts which have reviewed cases
relying on Murphy Oil and on an earlier case, D. R. Horton, Inc., 357
NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part, 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir.
2013), petition for rehearing en banc denied (5th Cir. No. 12–60031,
April 16, 2014), have denied enforcement of the Board’s holdings. This
argument was addressed and rejected in Murphy Oil, supra, slip op.6–
11. Moreover, the Board is not required to acquiesce in adverse deci-
sions of the Federal courts in subsequent proceedings not involving the
same parties. Murphy Oil, supra, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. p. 2, fn.
17, citing, Enloe Medical Center v. NLRB, 433 F.3d 834, 838 (D.C. Cir.
2005); Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063, 1066–1067
(7th Cir. 1988).
8 Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 566 (1978), cited in Murphy
Oil, supra, slip op. at 1. See also, Amex Card Services Co., 363 NLRB
No. 40, slip op. at p. 2 (2015) (arbitration policy facially unlawful
because it requires employees, as a condition of employment, to submit
their employment-related legal claims to individual arbitration).
arguments were addressed and rejected in Murphy Oil.9 Murphy
Oil is binding precedent for purposes of this proceeding.
Further, Respondent argues that its Arbitration Agreement is
specifically permitted by the FAA as recently interpreted in
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, ___ U.S.
___, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013), and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Con-
cepcion, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). In Murphy Oil,
supra, 361 NLRB No. 62, slip op. at 10–15, the Board rejected
this argument. The Board found instead that its view—that
requiring employees to waive their right to collectively pursue
employment-related claims in all forums, arbitral and judicial
violated Section 8(a)(1)—did not conflict with the letter or
interfere with the policies underlying the FAA.
An administrative law judge is required to apply established
Board precedent which the Supreme Court has not reversed.
“Only by such recognition of the legal authority of Board prec-
edent, will a uniform and orderly administration of a national
act, such as the National Labor Relations Act, be achieved.”
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 342 NLRB 378 at fn. 1 (2004) (quoting
Iowa Beef Packers, Inc., 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1963), enfd. in
part 331 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964) (quoting Insurance Agents’
International Union, AFL–CIO, 119 NLRB 768, 773 (1957)).
Respondent asserts that because Murphy Oil has essentially
been overruled or reversed by Supreme Court precedent, I may
not follow it. I disagree.
Murphy Oil is consistent with the Court's holdings which did
not involve the core substantive Section 7 right of employees to
act together to file a class action lawsuit. The Board's interpre-
tation of the Section 7 right of employees to act together to file
lawsuits against for employment related claims as a core sub-
stantive right is entitled to judicial deference. Moreover, Amer-
ican Express and Concepcion did not involve an employer who
required employees to waive their substantive Section 7 rights.
Because Murphy Oil was not reversed by Supreme Court prec-
edent, Respondent’s argument is rejected.
A reasonable reading of the plain language of the Arbitration
Agreement leaves no doubt that a term and condition of em-
ployment is forfeiture of the substantive right to act in concert
in filing collective or class litigation regarding employment
wages, hours, or other working conditions against Respondent
in any forum, arbitral or judicial.10 Thus, employees are com-
pelled to pursue workplace claims against their employer
through individual arbitration, forfeiting their substantive right
to act collectively in that forum or any other forum. Based upon
the record as a whole, I find that by requiring employees to act
individually by precluding them from participating in collective

9 Murphy Oil, supra, slip op. 1–2 holding “Arbitration [under the
FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion,” and a valid arbitration
agreement may not require a party to prospectively waive its “right to
pursue statutory remedies; slip op. at 9 holding that the FAA does not
apply, “because Section 7 of the NLRA amounts to a “contrary con-
gressional command” overriding the FAA.” See also, Convergys Corp.,
363 NLRB No. 51, fn. 3 (2015).
10 In my view, the language is not ambiguous at all. Moreover, to the
extent there are any ambiguities, they must be resolved against Re-
spondent, the drafter of the document. See, e.g., Supply Technologies,
LLC, 359 NLRB 38, slip op. at 3 (2012), citing Lafayette Park Hotel,
326 NLRB 824, 828 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
and class arbitration or litigation, the Arbitration Agreement
interferes with the core substantive workers’ Section 7 right:
the ability to act in concert in support of one another. Thus, the
Arbitration Agreement violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Alleged Interference with Access to the Board
The Arbitration Agreement does not specifically prohibit ac-
cess to the NLRB. Rather, the General Counsel claims that the
language of the Arbitration Agreement is so broad and confus-
ing that employees would reasonably conclude that they are
precluded from filing unfair labor practice charges with the
Board.
Specifically, as seen in the quoted provisions above, the Ar-
bitration Agreement provides that “all claims or disputes cov-
ered by this Agreement must be submitted to binding arbitra-
tion” which is “the sole and exclusive remedy for resolving any
such claim or dispute.”11 Further, the Arbitration Agreement
provides, “Nothing in this Agreement precludes Employee
from filing a charge or from participating in an administrative
investigation of a charge before an appropriate government
agency, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission or similar state Agency.”12 Specific exclusions from
binding arbitration include only unemployment insurance bene-
fits, workmen’s compensation benefits, monetary claims for
less than $15,000, and claims without a basis in law.13
As the Board stated in Hooters of Ontario Mills, 363 NLRB
No. 2 (2015):
It is well settled that a work rule violates Section 8(a)(1) if
employees would reasonably believe that the rule interferes
with their ability to file Board charges, even if the policy does
not expressly prohibit access to the Board. See Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 19 fn. 98 (2014); D.
R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184, slip op. at 2 fn. 2 (2012),
enf. denied on other grounds 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013),
petition for rehearing en banc denied (2014); U-Haul Co. of
California, 347 NLRB 375, 377–378 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed.
Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Furthermore, it is settled that
production of extrinsic evidence, such as testimony showing
that employees interpreted the rule to preclude access to the
Board, is not a precondition to finding that a rule is unlawful
by its terms. See, e.g., Murphy Oil, supra, slip op. at 13 fn. 79;
Hills & Dales General Hospital, 360 NLRB No. 70, slip op.
at 1–2 (2014) (citing Lutheran Heritage Village Livonia, 343
NLRB 646, 646–647 (2004); Claremont Resort & Spa, 344
NLRB 832, 832 (2005)).
The Board has held repeatedly that broad language in defin-
ing the issues subject solely to arbitral resolution is reasonably
interpreted to encompass and prohibit the filing of unfair labor
practice charges. See, e.g., Supply Technologies, LLC, 359
NLRB No. 38, slip op. 1–4 (2012) (agreement mandating that
employees “bring any claim of any kind” including claims re-
lating to the application for employment, actual employment or

11 Mutual Promise to Resolve Claims by Binding Arbitration (quoted
in full supra).
12 Claims Covered by This Agreement (quoted supra).
13 Claims Not Covered by this Agreement, quoted in full above.
termination of employment must be remedied through alterna-
tive dispute resolution reasonably understood to prohibit filing
of unfair labor practice charges); 2 Sisters Food Group, 357
NLRB 1816, 1816–1817 (2011) (policy requiring that all em-
ployment disputes and claims be submitted to arbitration rea-
sonably understood to include filing of unfair labor practice
charges); U-Haul Co. of California, 347 NLRB 375, 377–378
(2006), enfd 255 F.Appx. 527 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (required arbi-
tration of all disputes relating to or arising out of employment
or termination including any legal or equitable claims or causes
of action recognized by local, state, or federal law or regulation
reasonably read to prohibit access to NLRB).
Moreover, as the General Counsel points out, when deter-
mining a reasonable interpretation, the Board does not presume
that employees have specialized legal knowledge. See, e.g., 2
Sisters Food Group, supra, 357 NLRB 1816, 1817, quoting U-
Haul, 347 NLRB at 377: “[T]he limiting language in the Re-
spondent’s arbitration policy does not by its terms specifically
exclude NLRB proceedings, and ‘most nonlawyer employees’
would not be sufficiently familiar with the limitations the Act
imposes on mandatory arbitration for the language to be effec-
tive.”
In Hooters of Ontario Mills, supra, 363 NLRB No. 2, the ar-
bitration agreement required that all claims between the em-
ployee and employer by decided exclusively by arbitration.
“Claims” were defined broadly and included any claim under
federal law or statute including claims of discrimination, retali-
ation, discharge, or for wages. The Board held that although the
language did not explicitly prohibit the filing of charges with
the Board, the broad language would be reasonably read by
employees to prohibit the filing of charges with the NLRB.
Hooters of Ontario Mills, supra, slip op. at 2. Although the
agreement excluded coverage of any dispute that cannot be
arbitrated as a matter of law, the Board held this did not save
the agreement because unfair labor practice charges filed with
the Board may be resolved by arbitration. Id.
Similarly, in Countrywide Financial Corp., 362 NLRB No.
165 (2015), the employer’s arbitration agreement was the ex-
clusive remedy for all claims or controversies including those
related to employment application, hiring, employment rela-
tionship, and termination. Claims for wages, contract breach,
discrimination, and violation of any federal statute, regulation,
or public policy were included by way of example. Based on
the breadth of the language encompassing claims under Federal
statutes and regulations, the Board found that this language
would reasonably be read to include alleged violations of the
Act. Slip op. at 2. Further, the Board rejected the employer’s
argument based upon a savings clause excluding arbitration if
prohibited by law. The Board found that unless the language
specifically excluded NLRB proceedings, most nonlawyer em-
ployees would not be sufficiently familiar with the limitations
the Act imposes on mandatory arbitration. Slip op. at 3. Thus,
the Board concluded that the agreement would reasonably be
read to prohibit access to the Board. Id.
The facts before me are indistinguishable from those in
Hooters and Countrywide. Here, although the Arbitration
Agreement does not specifically preclude the filing of charges
with the NLRB, arbitration is nevertheless the sole and exclu-
JACK IN THE BOX, INC. 9
sive remedy for resolving any dispute now or in the future re-
garding employment or termination of employment. The specif-
ic exceptions to arbitration do not include filing charges with
the NLRB. The savings clause applies only to equal employ-
ment opportunity claims. Accordingly, I find that the Arbitra-
tion Agreement is reasonably read to preclude filing charges
with the NLRB. By maintaining the Arbitration Agreement,
Respondent has interfered with employees’ Section 7 right to
file charges with the Board and avail themselves of the Board’s
processes in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Alleged Unlawful Confidentiality Rule
The Arbitration Agreement contains the following confiden-
tiality language:
Confidentiality
The Arbitrator’s decision is confidential. Neither Employee
nor the Company may publicly disclose the terms of the
award unless:
 Agreed to in writing by the other party, or
 Subpoenaed by a court to testify, or
 Required by law
The General Counsel claims this clause interferes with em-
ployees’ Section 7 right to discuss their wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment by restricting employees
from publicly disclosing the terms of the arbitration awards.
Respondent points out that the confidentiality clause does not
explicitly or implicitly prohibit employees from disclosing the
terms of an arbitration award. Relying on OM 12–59, NLRB,
Operations Memorandum 07–27, Respondent also notes that
confidentiality clauses covering nondisclosure of the financial
terms of a non-Board settlement are generally allowed.
If a work rule would reasonably tend to chill employees in
the exercise of their Section 7 rights, it will violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. Hyundai America Shipping Agency, 357
NLRB 860, 861 (2011); Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824,
825 (1998), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999). A violation
may occur merely by maintenance of such a rule—even in the
absence of enforcement. Lafayette Park Hotel, supra; see also,
Cintas Corp., 344 NLRB 943 (2005), enfd.482 F.3d 463 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
A rule which explicitly restricts Section 7 rights is unlawful.
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004). In
the absence of explicit restriction, a violation will nevertheless
be found if (1) employees would reasonably construe the lan-
guage to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promul-
gated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been
applied to restrict Section 7 rights. Id. at 646–647. There is no
allegation that any of these rules were promulgated in response
to union activity or to restrict Section 7 rights. Thus, the sole
inquiry here is whether employees would reasonably construe
the language to prohibit Section 7 activity. In determining
whether a challenged rule is unlawful, the rule must be given a
reasonable reading and particular phrases may not be read in
isolation. Lafayette Park, supra, 326 NLRB at 825, 827. In
other words, there is no presumption of improper interference
with employee rights. Id.
Respondent’s confidentiality clause explicitly requires that
employees not divulge the terms of any arbitration award. The
language, then, reasonably implies that employees cannot dis-
cuss with each other the facts of the case, the respective merits
of the parties positions, their motivation in seeking relief, or the
award rendered regarding any arbitration proceeding. The right
of employees to discuss such matters with each other lies at the
core of Section 7, which protects concerted activity for mutual
aid and protection. See, e.g., Professional Janitorial Service of
Houston, 363 NLRB No. 35, fn. 3 (2015); Rocky Mountain Eye
Center, P.C., 363 NLRB No. 34, fn. 1 (2015); Hyundai Ameri-
ca Shipping, 357 NLRB 860, 860 (2011), enf. in relevant part,
___ F.3d ___ (D.C. Cir. 2015); Double Eagle Hotel & Casino,
341 NLRB 112, 115 (2004), enfd 414 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir.
2005). Thus, I find that maintaining the confidentiality provi-
sion of the Arbitration Agreement, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By requiring employees to sign the Arbitration Agree-
ment as a condition of their employment and by maintaining
and enforcing the Arbitration Agreement, Respondent has inter-
fered with employees’ Section 7 rights to engage in collective
legal activity such as participating in collective and class action
in any forum. Thus, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. By requiring employees to sign the Arbitration Agree-
ment as a condition of their employment and by maintaining
and enforcing the Arbitration Agreement, Respondent has inter-
fered with employees’ Section 7 rights to file unfair labor prac-
tice charges with the Board and to avail themselves of the
Board’s processes in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. By requiring employees to sign the Arbitration Agree-
ment as a condition of their employment and by maintaining
and enforcing the Arbitration Agreement, Respondent has inter-
fered with employees’ Section 7 rights to discuss their wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with
others by restricting employees from publicly disclosing the
terms of arbitration awards.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, it is recommended that it be ordered to
cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent’s Arbitration Agreement re-
quires that employees waive their right to pursue class or col-
lective action claims in any forum, whether arbitral or judicial,
and may be reasonably interpreted as prohibiting employees
from filing unfair labor practice charges with the National La-
bor Relations Board, and may further be reasonably interpreted
as prohibiting employees from discussing their wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment with others by
restricting employees from publicly disclosing the terms of
arbitration awards, it is recommended that the Respondent be
ordered to rescind or revise the Arbitration Agreement and to
provide employees with specific notification that the Arbitra-
tion Agreement has been rescinded or revised.
Further, Respondent must post a notice in all locations where
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
the Arbitration Agreement was utilized. See, e.g., D. R. Horton,
Inc., supra, 357 NLRB 2277, 2289; U-Haul Co. of California,
supra, 347 NLRB at 375, fn.2; Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB
809, 812 (2005), enfd. in relevant part, 475 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir
2007).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended14
ORDER
The Respondent, Jack In the Box, Inc., nationwide including
a facility in San Jose, California, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining and/or enforcing its Arbitration Agreement
as a condition of employment thus requiring employees to
waive their right to pursue class or collective claims in all fo-
rums, whether arbitral or judicial.
(b) Maintaining and/or enforcing its Arbitration Agreement
as a condition of employment containing language that would
reasonably be understood to prohibit employees’ rights to file
unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations
Board or to access the Board’s processes.
(c) Maintaining and/or enforcing its Arbitration Agreement
as a condition of employment containing language that would
reasonably be understood to prohibit employees’ rights to dis-
cuss their wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment with others by restricting employees from publicly
disclosing the terms of arbitration awards.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the mandatory and binding Arbitration Agree-
ment or revise it to make clear to employees that the Arbitration
Agreement does not constitute (1) a waiver of their right to
maintain employment-related joint, class, or collective actions
in all forums, whether arbitral or judicial, (2) a prohibition of
access to the National Labor Relations Board or its processes,
and (3) does not preclude discussion of wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who were re-
quired to sign the Arbitration Agreement that it has been re-
scinded or revised and, if revised, provide them with a copy of
the revised agreement.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all of
its locations nationwide where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted, copies of the attached notice market “Appen-
dix.15 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional

14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
15 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
Director for Region 32, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email,
posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, dur-
ing the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facilities involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since July 26, 2014.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. December 1, 2015
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory Arbitration Agreement
that requires you, as a condition of employment, to waive the
right to maintain joint, class, or collective actions in all forums
whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory Arbitration Agreement
that you would reasonably understand prohibits you or restricts
your right to file charges with the National Labor Relations
Board or to use the processes of the National Labor Relations
Board.
WE WILL NOT maintain a mandatory Arbitration Agreement
which states that you agree that you may not publicly disclose
the terms of any arbitration award because this language would

ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
JACK IN THE BOX, INC. 11
reasonably be understood to prohibit you from discussing such
things as the facts of the case, circumstances surrounding the
case, tactics of the parties, or the outcome of the arbitration
proceeding in violation of your right to discuss your wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with
others.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain or coerce you in the exercise of your rights guaranteed
by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL rescind or revise our Arbitration Agreement
 to eliminate the waiver of your right to maintain joint,
class, or collective actions in all forums whether
arbitral or judicial;
 to eliminate language which would reasonably be un-
derstood to restrict your rights to file charges with
or to use the processes of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board; and
 to eliminate language which requires confidentiality
of the arbitration agreement and is reasonably un-
derstood to prohibit discussion wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.
WE WILL furnish all current employees with written notice
that the unlawful provisions have been rescinded or revised and
furnish them with copies of any such revisions.
JACK IN THE BOX, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/32-CA-145068 or by using the QR code be-
low. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half
Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273–
1940.