International Longshoremens's Association

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 6, 1960

127 N.L.R.B. 35 (N.L.R.B. 1960)

INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION (INDEPENDENT), ETC. 35
International Longshoremen 's Association (Independent) and
its Agents James T. Moock and Clifford Carter and Motor
Transport Labor Relations, Inc.
Local No. 1332, International Longshoremen's Association (Inde-
pendent) and its Agents Russell Williams and E . Carter Lyles
and Motor Transport Labor Relations, Inc. Cases Nos. 4-CD-37
and 4-CD-38. April 6, 1960
DECISION AND DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
This proceeding arises under Section 10(k) of the Act, which pro-
vides that "whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of
Section 8 ('b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and deter-
mine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have
arisen . . . ."
On March 17, 1959, Motor Transport Labor Relations, Inc., herein
called MTLR, filed with the Regional Director for the Fourth
Region charges against International Longshoremen's Association
,(Independent), its Local No. 1332, and certain of their agents, herein
jointly called the ILA. The charges alleged, in substance, that since
.on or about March 4,1959, the ILA induced ILA employees of various
pier operators on the Philadelphia waterfront to strike in order to
force trucking company members of the MTLR to assign particular
work to the ILA employees rather than to the trucking companies'
employees, who are members of various locals of International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America (Independent), herein called the Teamsters, in violation of
Section 8 (b) (4) (D) of the Act.
Thereafter, pursuant to Section 10(k) of the Act and Sections
102.79 and 102.80 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the Regional
Director investigated the charges, and, after consolidating the cases
for purposes of hearing, provided for a hearing upon due notice to all
-parties. The hearing was held before Daniel P. Dooley, hearing
,officer, on June 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 15, 16, 23, and 30, 1959, at Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania. All parties appeared at the hearing and were
afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and-to adduce evidence bearing on the issues. The rulings of
the hearing officer made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error
and are hereby affirmed. Thereafter, the ILA and MTLR filed briefs
with the Board.
Upon the entire record in these cases, the Board finds:
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS
The parties stipulated, and we find, that MTLR is an association of
motortruck carriers who are employers; that MTLR bargains with
127 NLRB No. 9.
36 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
labor organizations on behalf of its members; and that MTLR's 121
largest members annually receive $792,000,000 for services performed
in interstate commerce. Accordingly, we find that the employers who
comprise MTLR are engaged in commerce within the meaning of the
Act.
The parties also stipulated, and we find, that each employer on the
Philadelphia waterfront who employs members of ILA, Local 1332,
receives in excess of $100,000 annually for services performed in con-
nection with the transportation of goods in interstate and foreign
commerce, and that each of said employers is therefore engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The parties stipulated, and we find, that International Longshore-
men's Association (Independent), and its Local 1332, are labor or-
ganizations as defined in the Act.
III. THE DISPUTE
A. The facts
ILA "Carloaders," Local 1332, is the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative for the "carloaders" employed by the pier operators on the
Philadelphia waterfront, and various locals of the Teamsters, prin-
cipally Local 107, represent the drivers employed by the various
trucking companies which transport cargo to and from the Philadel-
phia waterfront. MTLR represents the trucking companies in col-
lective bargaining, and Philadelphia Marine Trade Association,
herein called PMTA, represents the pier operators in collective bar-
gaining. A current contract between the ILA and PMTA, effective
from October 1, 1956, to September 30, 1959, states that it "is meant
to cover the loading and unloading of railroad cars, trucks, teams,
lights, barges, transferring freight in and out of storage places, sort-
ing, piling and other miscellaneous work not performed by members
of the Deepsea and Coastwise Locals." 1 The ILA and PMTA have
had such a work coverage clause in their contracts since 1958. The
current contract between MTLR and the Teamsters contains no work
coverage clause with respect to waterfront work. However, the pier
operators have issued "tariffs" during the term of their current con-
tract with the ILA which state, in effect, that the loading and unload-
ing of trucks may be done by the truckers, and will be done by the
pier operators only "upon request" or "when requested."
The general function of the ILA "carloaders" is the handling of
cargo on the piers after it has been unloaded from ships and placed
on the piers or in storage, and the handling of cargo for export on the
I The latter locals have Jurisdiction over the actual loading and unloading of the
oceangoing ships.
INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION (INDEPENDENT), ETC. 37
piers before it is actually loaded on the ships. There are basically
two areas and types of this work which are involved here. First,
there is the loading and unloading of the trucks which is done in the
immediate vicinity of the tailgate of the trucks, within an area of
about 15 to 20 feet from the tailgate, and which is usually done by
hand. Second, there is the transporting of cargo to and from the
trucks which is done beyond that area on the pier, and sometimes
for considerable distances from the trucks, and which is usually done
mechanically with a so-called "forklift." The usual practice has been
for the ILA "carloaders" to handle the latter work. The ILA has
also handled about 75 percent of the tailgate loading and unloading
with the truckers doing the rest themselves with their Teamster em-
ployees. However, starting in 1956 there have been attempts, by
three of the truckers who do waterfront work, to do certain of their
own "forklift" work beyond the tailgate area with their Teamster
employees. The last of these attempts, which occurred in March
1959, resulted in work stoppages by the ILA which lasted only until
the truckers ceased their attempt to do "forklift" work beyond the
tailgate area; and it is these work stoppages which form the basis for
the 8(b) (4) (D) charges filed herein. Thus, the work in dispute is
the "forklift" work beyond the 15 to 20 foot tailgate areas, which
work the ILA claims is exclusively its, but .which the truckers con-
tend they can assign to their employees if they so choose.
It must be noted, in addition, that the ILA contract with PMTA
contains the following union-security clause : "As to any and all work
hereunder finally determined by duly constituted public authority
not to be subject to any statute forbidding a preferential hiring pro-
vision, the Employers agree to give a preference to carloaders who
are members of the Union in good standing. As to all other work,
the Employers agree to institute and maintain a union shop as shall
comply with Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act,
1947, or any amendment thereto."
B. Contentions of the parties
The ILA contends chiefly that it has a clearly defined contract right
to the disputed work under its contract with PMTA, the representa-
tive of the pier operators, and that the pier operators may not evade
this contract obligation by authorizing and permitting the truckers
to use their own employees for jobs covered by the ILA contract. It
contends further that such interpretation of the contract is also sup-
ported by the longstanding usual practice on the piers with respect to
the disputed work.
. MTLR contends chiefly that: (1) As a matter of past practice, and
under the "tariffs" issued by PMTA, it is "trucker's choice" as to
whether he wants to perform the disputed work with his own em-
38 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ployees or have the pier operator perform it with the ILA "carload-
ers"; (2) the ILA contract with PMTA does not contain a clearly
defined contract right to the work, because the PMTA attorney has
placed a contrary interpretation upon the contract; and (3) even if
the ILA has such a contract right vis-a-vis the pier operators, it is
not "binding" on the truckers. MTLR also urges the Board to hold
only that the ILA is not entitled to the disputed work, and not to
make an "assignment" of the work even to the Teamsters but to leave
the situation as "trucker's choice," particularly in view of the Federal
Maritime Board's general regulatory power over waterfront pier
operations.
C. Applicability of the statute
The charges, which were duly investigated by the Regional Di-
rector, allege a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the Act, and the
Regional Director was satisfied upon the basis of such investigation
that there was reasonable cause to believe that such violation has been
committed. Moreover, the record before us establishes that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the ILA induced and encouraged
employees of the pier operators to strike in order to force or require
the pier operators to assign the disputed "forklift" work to members
of the ILA although this work had been assigned to, and was being
performed by, employees of the trucking companies who were mem-
bers of the Teamsters. The Board has held that such factual circum-
stances are sufficient to invoke the Board's jurisdiction to hear and
determine a dispute within the meaning of Section 10(k) of the Act.2
Accordingly, we find that this is a dispute which is properly before
us for determination under Section 10(k) of the Act.
D. The merits of the dispute
The Board has held that a union does not violate section 8 (b) (4) (D)
by engaging in activity otherwise proscribed, if the assignment of
the disputed work which is protested is in derogation of a current
collective-bargaining contract which assigns the disputed work to the
striking union in clear and unambiguous terms 3 It is well estab-
lished, however, that a contractual claim to disputed work in favor
of the striking union, for 10 (k) purposes, may not serve that purpose
2 The Board has held that the coverage of Section 8(b) (4) (D) Is not limited to
employees of a particular employer , but also extends to an attempt, as here, to force the
indirect assignment of work from employees of one employer (the truck operator) to
employees of another employer (the pier operator). See, e.g , Local 562 , United Associa-
tion of Journeymen, etc (Northwest Heating Company ), 107 NLRB 542, 548, 549; United
Association of Journeymen , etc. (Carrier Corporation ), 111 NLRB 940, 944.
$Radio A Television Broadcast Engineers Union, Local 1212, et at. (Columbia Broad-
casting System , Inc.), 114 NLRB 1354; International Longshoremen 's Association, Ind.,
et at. (Abraham Kaplan, et al. ), 116 NLRB 1533; Local No. 48, Sheet Metal Workers
International Association, AFL-CIO, et al. (Gadsden Heating and Sheet Metal Company),
119 NLRB 287.
INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION (INDEPENDENT), ETC. 391
if the contract contains a union-security clause which is patently
unlawful under Section 8 (a) (3).4 The union-security clause which
appears in the ILA's contract with the PMTA, involved in the present
case, is identical to one which the Board had before it in a previous
case involving another ILA local.' In that case the Board found the
provision of the clause for preferential hiring to be unlawful, because
the evidence showed that, despite the provision purportedly deferring
application of the preference system, the parties had been following-
an unlawful hiring practice under and by virtue of the contract, The-
Board thus concluded that the parties never intended to postpone-
operation of the preference system and that the preference clause-
was in fact designed to create present discriminatory conditions of
employment. The Board-although it indeed intimated that the'
clause was in fact unlawful 6-thus found no need to base its decision-
upon a determination of the issue as to whether the union-security
clause is unlawful upon its face. This latter is the question which,
now confronts us squarely in the present case.'
An examination of the ILA's union-security agreement with.
PMTA as it appears in the present proceeding,' discloses that the-
first sentence thereof provides for preferential hiring, but purports.
to be limited in its application to such work under the contract as,
may be "finally determined by duly constituted public authority" not
to be subject to a statutory prohibition. The second sentence, which,
applies to "all other work," provides for a union shop, but purports-
to comply with Section 8(a) (3) of the Act or its amendments. We
° United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices , etc. (Philadelphia Association),
108 NLRB 186, 200; United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices , etc. (Carrier
Corporation ), 111 NLRB 940, 945-946.
'Local 1566, International Longshoremen 's Association (Philadelphia Marine Trade
Association ), 122 NLRB 967.
6 See footnote 3 of Local 1566, International Longshoremen's Association (Philadelphia
Marine Trade Association ), 122 NLRB 967, where the Board said: "Moreover, we ob-
serve that the language of the quoted paragraph is so obscure that a workingman covered
by its provisions could hardly be expected to know when union membership was required)
and when it was not. The courts have said that a union-security clause should be
written in language that an ordinary workingman can readily understand . N.L,R.B. v.
Shuck Construction Co., 243 F. 2d 519 ( C.A. 9) ; Red Star Express Lines of Auburn, Inc.
v. N L.R B., 196 F. 2d 78 (C.A. 2).11
7 The parties have not, it is true, raised the issue of the lawfulness of the union-
security provisions, nor has any evidence been offered as to the parties ' practice under
this section of their contract. However, as the ILA here asserts and relies upon its
contract with PMTA as a principal basis for its claim to the disputed work, it is therefore
incumbent upon the Board to determine , upon a full examination of the contract, whether-
it meets the standards necessary to establish such a claim. See , for example , United'
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices (Philadelphia Association ), '108 NLRB 186,
199, where , in determining the merits of a similar claim of contractual work assignment'
in a 10 ( k) proceeding, the Board said, "For the contracts to insulate the [union's] actions,
two conditions must be satisfied : (1) The [union's] contracts must embrace the disputed-
rigging work , and (2 ) the contracts must otherwise be valid enforceable instruments."-
In that case , as in this , it does not appear that an issue as to the validity of the union-
security provision had been raised by the parties . Nevertheless , in the following the-
doctrine thus indicated , the Board examined the union-security clause and found that it
invalidated the contract as a basis for a 10(k) determination.
8 See text under statement of facts, section A, supra.
40 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
find that these provisions are patently unlawful and not validated by
the deferral and savings clauses which they contain. We regard the
terms of this clause, which in its entirety purports to cover all work
subject to the contract,9 as vague and uninformative and aptly subject
to the condemnation of such a clause as insufficiently explicit in the
matter of the rights and obligations of employees affected by it, which
the Board has expressed in other cases.10
Most recently, in the Perry Coal case,ll the Board unanimously held
a union-security provision, less obviously involved and unclear than
that contained in the agreement in the present case, nevertheless to
be violative of the Act because it did not sufficiently inform the em-
ployees nor enable them adequately to appraise the union-security
requirements to which they must conform. The contract in that case
provided that "as a condition of employment employees shall be, or
become, members of the [union] to the extent and in the manner pro-
vided by law." The Board in that case said:
It is well settled that where, as here, a contract contains an un-
lawful provision, a general "savings clause" that does not specify
to what extent the provision is intended to be limited will not
purge such a provision of its illegal character. Thus, the quali-
fying language in this provision-"to the extent and in the man-
ner provided by law"-fails to set forth in clear and unambigu-
ous terms limitations on the requirement of union membership
that conform the provision to the union security standards of
Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. We do not believe that the burden of
statutory and judicial interpretation can reasonably be placed
upon an employee to be acted upon at his peril.
We are convinced that what the Board unanimously said in that case
is no less applicable here. Accordingly, we find that the union-
security clause in the present proceeding, which contains only gen-
eral "savings" provisions, fails to meet the standards required of such
an instrument, and is invalid.
We conclude, therefore, that any contractual claim to the disputed
"forklift" work which the ILA may have had under its contract
with PMTA may not be utilized for the purpose of establishing a
right to such work with respect to a 10 (k) proceeding. As the ILA
may thus not rely on any contractual claim to the disputed work, and
9 We do not agree with our dissenting colleagues that the "preferential hiring" and
"union -shop" provisions may be treated separately for purposes of determining the
validity of the union -security agreement as a whole . The provisions are necessarily
interrelated for, by the terms of the agreement , a determination of the applicability of
either provision in any given instance must depend upon an initial determination as to
which of the provisions covers the specific work , an interpretative requirement bringing
into play in every instance the entire union-security agreement.
io See cases cited in footnote 4, supra.
n Perry Coal Company, et el., 125 NLRB 1256.
0
INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION (INDEPENDENT), ETC. 41
as the ILA has no asserted right to such work under a Board order
or certification, we find that the ILA is not lawfully entitled to force
or require the pier operator members of PMTA to assign the dis-
puted work to ILA "carloaders" to the excludion of the Teamster em-
ployees of the trucking company members of MTLR.12
DETERMINATION OF DISPUTE
On the basis of the foregoing findings, and upon the entire record
in this case, the Board makes the following determination of dispute
pursuant to Section 10(k) of the Act:
1. International Longshoremen's Association (Independent), and
its agents James T. Moock and Clifford Carter, and its Local No. 1332,
and its agents Russell Williams and E. Carter Lyles, are not and have
not been entitled, by means proscribed by Section 8(b) (4) (D) of the
Act, to force or require the pier operator members of Philadelphia
Marine Trade Association to assign to ILA "carloaders," to the ex-
clusion of Teamster employees of the trucking company members of
Motor Transport Labor Relations, Inc., the work of loading and un-
loading of trucks on the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, waterfront by
the use of "forklifts" beyond the 15- to 20-foot "tailgate" area of the
trucks.
2. Within 10 days from this Decision and Determination of Dispute,
all Respondents shall notify in writing the Regional Director for the
Fourth Region of the National Labor Relations Board as to whether
they accept this Determination of Dispute, and as to whether they
will refrain from engaging in the conduct which the Board has found
herein that they are not lawfully entitled to engage in.
CHAIRMAN LEEDOM and MEMBER FANNING, dissenting :
As stated by our colleagues, it is now well established that a union
does not violate Section 8(b) (4) (D) by engaging in activity other-
wise proscribed, if the assignment of the disputed work which is
protested is in derogation of a current collective-bargaining agree-
ment which assigns the disputed work to the striking union in clear
and unambiguous terms.13 In the instant case, PMTA, whose pier
operator members have complete authority over the usage of the piers,
has a current contract with the ILA which assigns to the ILA the
work of all "loading and unloading of . . . trucks. . . ." As the dis-
puted "forklift" work is clearly one type of "loading and unloading of
trucks," the contract on its face assigns such work to the ILA in clear
' See Local 173, Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers' International 'Union, AFL-CIO, at al.
(Newark & Essex Plastering Co.), 121 NLRB 1094, 1107 , 1108. However , this finding Is
not to be construed as an "assignment" of the work in question to the Teamsters.
International Union of Operating Engineers , AFL-CIO, Local 181, at al, 121 NLRB '1072_
13 See cases cited in footnote 3, supra.
42 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and unambiguous terms. Moreover, the practice under the contract,
of the ILA doing all the disputed "forklift" work, except for the
periodic attempted "encroachments" by a few truckers which the ILA
always protested, lends further support to such an interpretation of
the contract.14 Accordingly, we would find that the ILA had a clear
and unambiguous contract right, supported by practice, to the dis-
puted "forklift" work.
Our colleagues do not dispute that the ILA had such a contract right
to the disputed work, but they find that the .union-security, clause in
the contract is unlawful, so as to nullify such right. We note first that
none of the parties raised the latter issue, apparently feeling that
there was no such issue, and it is only our colleagues who have injected
this issue into the case.15 In any event, we disagree with our colleagues
that the union-security clause involved should be found to be unlawful
on its face. Thus, as we read the clause, and as the Board has already
-interpreted the very same clause in the prior case alluded to by the
majority involving another Local of the ILA,16 the first sentence
in the clause, while providing for preference in hiring to union mem-
bers, does purport to defer operation of such preferential hiring until
it becomes legal. Moreover, consistent with such purported deferral,
the second sentence of the clause purports to institute in the interim
"a Union Shop as shall comply with Section 8 (a) (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act or any amendment thereto," which contains the
-necessary specific limitation to be lawful.17 Such a union-security
clause can hardly be construed as being unlawful on its face, and in
the prior case involving such a clause the Board did not find that it
was unlawful on its face. The worst that can be said for such a clause,
-as the Board further recognized in the prior case, is that it is not
19 In view of the clear language of the contract, and the supporting practice thereunder,
-we attach little weight to the unsupported contrary interpretation by the PMTA attorney,
particularly in view of the contradictory interpretation by the PMTA's own executive
secretary.
16 As indicated in the majority opinion, the only issue raised by the parties was whether
the ILA actually had a contract right to the disputed work
16 Local 1566 , International Longshoremen's Association (Philadelphia Marine Trade
Association ), 122 NLRB 967.
17 Cf. Perry Coal Company, supra, where , as described by the Board , there was only a
"vague and general" savings clause.
The majority states that this second sentence "provides for a union shop, but purports
-to comply with Section 8(a) (3) of the Act or its amendments ." While the exact meaning
and significance of this interpretation is not entirely clear to us , we think it obvious that
this sentence purports , as it states, to institute presently "a Union Shop as shall comply
with section 8(a) (3)," and not a union shop which only purports to comply with Section
8(a)(3). Moreover, contrary to the majority's charge that we have treated the two
sentences of the union-security clause separately in interpreting the clause, we believe
that our interpretation above is the only way in which the two sentences of the clause
may be read together as a whole, so as to have any meaning . It is rather the majority
-which treats the two sentences separately, and arrives at the anomalous interpretation
that the first sentence provides for "preferential hiring" which ordinarily connotes prehire
-union membership , and the second sentence provides for an altogether different "union
: shop" which ordinarily connotes posthire union membership.
INT'L LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION ( INDEPENDENT ), ETC. 43
couched in language that an ordinary working man could readily
understand so as to be ambiguous to such an individual; that such
ambiguity gives rise to the suspicion that the parties may have never
really intended to defer operation of preferential hiring; and that it
is therefore necessary to examine extrinsic evidence of the actual prac-
tice of the parties under the clause to determine the real intent of the
parties. As this extrinsic evidence in the prior case showed that the
parties had been following a present practice of preferential hiring,
the Board drew the permissible inference that despite the deferral
language the parties never really intended to postpone operation
of the preference clause, and accordingly found that the preference
clause was designed to create present discriminatory conditions of
employment so as to be unlawful. Thus, we have here a purported
"deferred" union-security clause which the Board previously did not
find to be unlawful on its face, but only found to be unlawful on the
ground that there was evidence of a discriminatory practice under the
clause which warranted the inference that it was intended to be dis-
criminatory. No basis exists for an entirely different finding here that
the self-same clause is unlawful on its face.'8 Accordingly, as the
union-security clause here may not properly be found to be "patently"
unlawful, it may not serve to nullify the ILA's otherwise valid con-
tract right to the disputed work.19 Moreover, as there is no evidence
of actual practice under the clause or other extrinsic evidence to show
that the parties did not really intend their purported deferral of pref-
erential hiring,20 there is not even this lesser basis of the prior case for
finding the clause unlawful.2i
Accordingly, we would find that the ILA had a contract right to
the disputed work, unaffected by the contract's union-security clause,
which right it could lawfully attempt to enforce by strike action, and
that the pier operators could not evade this work assignment by giving
"tariff" authorizations to the truckers to do such work and thus in
' See also Sterling Faucet Company, 108 NLRB 778, 780-783, where the Board similarly
did not find an ambiguous "deferral" clause unlawful on its face , but found it necessary
to look at extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties , and found such clause
not to be unlawful in the light of such extrinsic evidence. Cf. Perry Coal Company,
supra, relied on by the majority, where it could not be said that the union-security
clause involved even purported to comply with Section 8(a) (3), in view of only a "vague
and general" savings clause. In the instant case, as pointed out above, the union-
security clause at least purports to defer preferential hiring until it becomes legal and
to comply with Section 8(a) (3) in the interim, and therefore cannot be found unlawful
on its face.
39 As stated by the majority, the Board has held that an otherwise valid contract right
to disputed work for Section 10(k) purposes may be nullified only if the contract contains
a "patently" unlawful union -security clause.
'As indicated above, the parties did not even raise the issue of the union -security
clause.
= The fact that there was such evidence in the prior case with respect to another
local of the ILA Is not, of course, controlling here.
44 . DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
effect transferring to another group of employees work to which the
ILA had an exclusive contract right as
za Cf. Local No. 4 8, Sheet Metal Workers International Association, AFL-CIO, et al.,
supra, where the Board held that a corporation could not evade a contract work assign-
ment by transferring the work tda partnership which had the same ownership.
While the ILA also may have had an exclusive contract right to the "tailgate" work
under the contract , and may have waived such right by agreeing with the Teamsters to
"concurrent jurisdiction" over such work and by actually permitting Teamster employees
of the truckers to do 25 percent of such work , such a waiver could not affect its exclusive
contract right to the disputed "forklift" work, any encroachment upon which it always
resisted , and which therefore was not waived . See National Association of Broadcast
Engineers, etc. (National Broadcasting Company, Inc.), '105 NLRB 355, 363-365, where
the Board held that , although the striking union waived whatever contractual rights it
may have had to part of a contract work assignment, it retained its unwaived contract
right to the remainder of the contract work assignment which was in dispute.
Allen-Bradley Company and Tool and Die Makers, Lodge No. 78,.
International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO. Case No.
13-CA-3308. April 6, 1960
DECISION AND ORDER
Upon charges duly filed by Tool and Die Makers, Lodge No. 78,
International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO (herein called the
Union), the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,
by the Regional Director for the Thirteenth Region, issued a com-
plaint dated August 27, 1959, against Allen-Bradley Company
(herein called the Respondent), alleging that the Respondent had
engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a) (1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Copies of the charge,
complaint, and notice of hearing before a Trial Examiner were duly
served upon the Respondent and the Charging Party.
With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges,
in substance, that the Union was and is the exclusive representative
of all toolroom employees of the Employer in an appropriate unit,
and that on May 21 and June 18, 1959, and at all times thereafter,
Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain collectively with the Union.
Respondent's answer, filed September 23, 1959, admits certain
jurisdictional and factual allegations of the complaint, but denies the
commission of unfair labor practices.
On December 14, 1959, all parties to this proceeding entered into a
stipulation of facts, and on the same date jointly moved to transfer
this proceeding directly to the Board for findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and decision and order. The motion states that the parties
have waived their rights to a hearing before a Trial Examiner, and to
the issuance of an Intermediate Report. The motion provides further
127 NLRB No. 8.