Haws, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Sep 11, 2008

18-CA-018611 (N.L.R.B. Sep. 11, 2008)

JD(SF)–36-08
Pleasant Hill, IA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
DIVISION OF JUDGES
Haws, Inc.
and Case 18-CA-18611
Carlos Jung, an Individual
and Case 18-CA-18666
Jeff Caulk, an Individual
Kristyn A. Meyers, Atty., NLRB Region 18,
Minneapolis, MN, for the General Counsel.
Scott J. Beattie, Atty., Peddicord, Wharton,
Spencer, Hook, Barron & Wegman, LLP,
Des Moines, IA, for the Respondent.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
WILLIAM L. SCHMIDT, Administrative Law Judge. I conducted the hearing in this
case in Des Moines, Iowa, on June 3, 2008,1 pursuant to the consolidated complaint (complaint)
and notice of hearing issued by the Regional Director for Region 18 of the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) on April 24. The complaint is based on a charges filed on
January 9 by Carlos Jung (Jung) and by Jeff Caulk (Caulk) on February 26.2
The complaint alleges that Haws, Inc. (Haws or Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by discharging Jung on December 12, by issuing Caulk a disciplinary write-up on
January 9, and initiating proceedings on January 18 to evict Caulk from his housing on
Respondent’s premises, which it provided to him as a part of his terms and conditions of
employment.3 The complaint also alleges that Respondent’s president Frank Sloan violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on January 9 when he told an employee: (1) another employee would
be evicted from his apartment because he had engaged in protected concerted activity; (2)
restricted an employee from talking to other employees at anytime during the workday or while
the employee was on company property; (3) threatened to evict an employee from a company-

1 Further dates that do not show the calendar year refer either to the last half of 2007 or the
first half of 2008.
2 Caulk amended his charge on March 31 and April 23.
3 This description of the eviction issue is derived from the General Counsel’s oral
amendment of complaint paragraph 6(c) at the hearing.
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provided apartment because the employee had engaged in protected concerted activity; (4)
questioned an employee about that employee’s protected concerted activity; and (5) threatened
an employee with unspecified reprisals if the employee played any role in the filing of an NLRB
charge against Respondent.
Respondent filed a timely answer in which it admitted the filing and service of the
respective charges, the complaint’s factual allegation concerning jurisdictional, and the
allegations that Frank Sloan (Sloan) and Colleen Adkins (Adkins) were supervisors and agents
within the meaning of Section 2(11) and 2(13) of the Act.4 However, the answer denies that
Jung and Caulk engaged the concerted activity alleged in complaint paragraph 4. It also denies
that Respondent engaged in any of the unfair labor practice conduct alleged in the complaint.
At the hearing all parties had the full opportunity to call and examine witnesses, to
introduce relevant documentary evidence, to argue procedural and substantive issues, and to
file post-hearing briefs. After carefully considering the hearing record in light of my credibility
determinations,5 and the arguments detailed in post-hearing briefs filed on behalf of the General
Counsel and the Respondent, I conclude that Respondent violated the Act in certain respects
based on the following
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction and Background
Respondent Haws is an Iowa corporation with an office and place of business at
Pleasant Hill, Iowa, a Des Moines suburb. Currently, it is engaged in wood recycling operations
that produce wood products used for manufacturing, landscaping, and livestock bedding.
During the calendar year prior to the issuance of the complaint, Respondent derived gross
revenues in excess of $500,000, and purchased and received at its Pleasant Hill facility goods
and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from locations outside the State of Iowa.
Accordingly, I find that Respondent meets the Board’s jurisdictional standards, and that it would
effectuate the purposes of the Act for the Board to resolve this labor dispute.
Respondent grew out of an entity know as Hawkeye Wood Shavings (Hawkeye) which
started operations in the 1960s selling and transporting wood shavings used for livestock and
poultry bedding. Sloan owns both entities.6 Initially Hawkeye obtained wood shavings from the
Pella Rollscreen Company (Pella). In about 1979, Hawkeye also began transporting Pella’s
windows from its various manufacturing plants to locations throughout the country. This

4 Sloan owns and serves as the president of Respondent and a related company discussed
below. Adkins serves in numerous managerial capacities, including human resources/safety
director, office manager, and dispatcher.
5 The following factors informed my credibility findings: the opportunity to be familiar with the
subjects covered by the testimony given, established or admitted facts, witness bias, testimonial
consistency, corroboration, the strength of any rebuttal evidence, inherent probabilities,
reasonable inferences available from the record as a whole, the weight of the evidence, and
witness demeanor. Critical credibility resolutions are explained in more detail below.
6 Hawkeye incorporated in 1979. The record does not show precisely when Sloan
established Respondent. However, when Haws came into being, it held title to the land and
buildings used in Sloan’s operations and Hawkeye held title to the fleet of tractors and trailers
used in Sloan’s transportation business. The two entities kept separate payrolls. Jung worked
on the Haws’ payroll; Caulk worked on Hawkeye’s.
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transportation business continued after Pella sold off its wood shavings to another company in
1989. Respondent continued its wood shavings and chips business using its own equipment
and raw materials acquired from other sources.7
Over the years, income from the hauling operations of Sloan’s enterprises dwarfed the
wood by-product business. During peak years, the transportation business derived annual
income ranging from $8,000,000 to $9,000,000 while the wood products business accounted for
about $3,000,000 annually. At one time, the two companies employed around 90 employees
(mostly drivers) and its fleet grew to 90 trucks or tractors and about 145-150 trailers.
Around April 2007, Pella began shifting its window transportation business to another
entity. By June 2007, this work had ceased entirely except for an occasional engagement when
Pella could not arrange for its new transporter to carry its windows. As Pella had been
Hawkeye’s largest customer, and as it had little hope of obtaining transportation business on a
similar scale, Sloan sold off all but 5 or 6 of its tractor-trailers and began laying off employees
associated with that business. In 2007 prior to the loss of its Pella window transportation
business, Haws and Hawkeye employed about 50 workers at Pleasant Hill. By the time of the
hearing, they employed about 9 or 10 employees.
Respondent employed Jung primarily as a welder-fabricator for about five years until his
final layoff in December 2007. His duties primarily involved fabricating replacement parts for
Respondent’s grinding machines and performing a variety of welding tasks on the Respondent’s
fleet of trucks and trailers. Jung also performed other miscellaneous duties Sloan assigned to
him. Thus, he recalled converting a moving van into a horse trailer, and fabricating a numerous
items used by Sloan’s daughter in her catering business. In addition, he also received a
number of handyman assignments such as roof repairs or helping other employees.
After Respondent lost its Pella business, it laid Jung off in April 2007. Several other
employees were let go in the first half of 2007.8 However, Haws recalled Jung about four weeks
later and he continued to work regularly up to November 12 when he left on a month-long
vacation.9 When Jung advised Adkins about his scheduled vacation, he told her that he would
be gone from November 12 through December 12 so she made a notation on her calendar that
he would return to work on December 13. Sloan too expected that Jung would return on
December 13. Sloan asserted that in the period before Jung left in November he had been
giving him odd jobs “just so he would be on the clock.” However, no evidence shows that either
Sloan or Adkins gave Jung any reason to anticipate that work would not be available upon his
return from vacation and no evidence shows that Sloan informed Adkins about his intention to
lay Jung off after he returned from vacation.
Hawkeye employed Caulk for over six years before he quit his employment in March
2008. His work involved maintaining Respondent’s hauling fleet. Although much of his work
involved replacing tires and tarps on the hauling fleet, too received miscellaneous assignments
from time to time. Caulk’s normal work hours ranged from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. but he also

7 One source included a wood-shavings operation in Montana that Sloan acquired in about
1989. That facility closed in 2008 prior to the hearing. When in operation, it baled shavings
acquired from Montana sawmills and shipped them to California and Nevada. No Montana
materials were ever shipped back to Iowa. The Montana facility does not figure in this case.
8 Respondent’s Exhibit Q shows two other April layoffs, nine in June and one in August.
9 Sloan claimed that Jung was recalled to work part-time. However, Jung’s time records
show that he averaged over 37 hours per week following his recall.
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entered into an agreement with Sloan to work as an on-call employee available to assist the
drivers at times outside his regular work day. In exchange, Sloan rented Caulk a home in which
to live located adjacent to the trailer shop for a rental price presumably below prevailing market
rates.
Sloan and Caulk signed two documents pertaining to the company housing. The first,
dated October 5, 2001, and handwritten on an invoice form states: “Agreed to pay $150 Per Wk
for 5 Weeks & then $90 per wk their (sic) after as long as he is Working for Hawkeye Wood.
When lease is over Jeff will get back $325.00 deposit if the Building is clean.”10 The second
document signed by Caulk is dated April 9, 2003. It establishes, in essence, the on-call quid pro
quo for Caulk’s use of the company house and further provides that he must remove himself
from the housing if and when he chooses not to work on-call. Purportedly, Sloan prepared the
April 2003 document to satisfy the City of Pleasant Hill’s prohibition against using the house as
a residence unless occupied by a worker employed in Respondent’s nearby operations due to
its location in an area zoned for industrial use only. Regardless of his on-call status, Caulk was
free to do as he pleased outside his regular work day without being tethered by a pager or a cell
phone for work reasons.
II. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. December 12, 2007: Jung’s Layoff
On December 12, Jung reported back to work from his month-long vacation. He
punched in at the Haws office around 7:20 a.m. Adkins told Jung to check with Caulk at the
trailer shop about trailers that required welding work. After Jung checked over his welding
equipment, he drove to the trailer shop located about a block away.
Meanwhile, Caulk arrived for work about 8 a.m. When he attempted to clock in, he
found the following note was attached to his time card: “Jeff Take tires off of 89 & patch. Do not
patch or use blue stuff. Don’t clock in per Frank. These tires have been flat for 3 days now.”11
Caulk, following these instructions, set off to repair the tires.
Jung arrived at the trailer shop shortly after Caulk began work on the flat tires.
Observing that Caulk appeared depressed, Jung asked him what was wrong. Caulk told Jung
that he had been told to repair the flat tires on his own time and that he wasn’t happy about it.
Jung asked Caulk if he wanted him to speak with Sloan about it. Caulk told Jung “that would be
okay.” The two workers then began talking about the welding work that needed to be done.
Sloan entered the shop while Jung and Caulk were still talking with one another. He told
the two men, “I don’t pay you guys to look out the window . . . What are you doing, showing him
where Vietnam is at?” Jung told Sloan that Caulk was just showing him the trailer that needed
welding. Jung then told Sloan that “it’s not right or fair for you to have him working off the clock
on your stuff.” According to Jung, Sloan became angry and responded with a raised voice, “You
can go back to Vietnam and get a job because we no longer have any work for you here. Go

10 Although Caulk testified that his rent was $350 per month, he also said that after he
missed payments for a five-month period beginning in November 2006, he arranged to have the
rent deducted from his pay “every week.” R88: 2-14.
11 The author of this note was never clearly established. However, at an unemployment
compensation hearing, Respondent’s counsel sought Caulk’s acknowledgment that Adkins
wrote the note. Respondent’s Exhibit W: 18-19.
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tell Colleen (Adkins) to lay you off.”12 Jung responded by saying he would do so “if that’s the
way you want it.” He then went to the fabrication shop, collected some personal tools, and
clocked out at 8:52 a.m.
B. January 9, 2008: Caulk’s Write-Up
Two competing accounts emerged about the significant events of January 9. I have set
out below the reports provided by employees Caulk and Jung which I credit. I do not credit the
account provided by Sloan. Ultimately, I find that the chronological account of the day provided
by Caulk and Jung far more probable than Sloan’s story. In short, Caulk asserted that he
received an eviction notice before Jung arrived at Respondent’s property that day. Sloan said
the basis for the eviction notice came in the midst of Jung loading his welding equipment. At
best Respondent’s supervisor Jerry Hupp, failed to corroborate Sloan’s assertion when he
testified; at worst Hupp actually contradicted Sloan’s account. According to Hupp, Sloan arrived
while he and employee Ron Anderson (who did not testify) helped Jung load his heavy welder
onto his vehicle. Hupp said a brief conversation ensued in which Sloan “told Carlos that he just
needed to get his stuff and get off the property more or less” and then Sloan left. Hupp said
nothing about Sloan then asking Caulk whether he wanted to continue working on-call or Caulk
shouting a negative response back as Sloan claimed. Moreover, I find Sloan’s testimony that
Caulk told him he no longer wanted to work as an on-call employee contrived, self-serving, and
unbelievable in view of the more credible account provided by Caulk.
On the morning of January 9, Jung telephoned Respondent’s facility and spoke with
Sloan about coming to the premises to pick up his welders and the pickup truck which he left
there following his December layoff. Some banter ensued about a storage fee and when that
ended, Jung told Sloan he also wanted to discuss some “other issues of concern” and Sloan
asked what he had to say. Jung said that he was concerned about Sloan being fair to Caulk
“seeing how he is on call 24 hours” without any compensation for that duty. Jung then added
that Caulk had told him there he had worked “numerous hours” without receiving any pay.
When Jung finished, Sloan asked if he was “Jeff's attorney.” Jung said he was not, that he was
just a “former co-worker.” Jung said Sloan then began “hollering at Jeff” in a loud voice asking if
Caulk “had told (Jung) them (sic) things over the phone.” Jung heard Jeff acknowledge that he
had. Sloan then told Jung that he did not have anything else to speak to him about and the call
ended with Jung saying he would be "over shortly to get my weld(ing) equipment."13
After the call ended, Sloan took Caulk to the Adkins’ office about a block away. When
they arrived there, Sloan directed Adkins’s to prepare a “write-up” for Caulk. He told Adkins that
the write-up should state that Caulk has 30 days to get out of the house and that he should not

12 Sloan claimed that he told Jung about his layoff immediately before Jung said anything
about Caulk’s pay. R192: 17-25; R194: 4-15. I do not credit that claim. Jung and Caulk agree
that Sloan told Jung he could go back to Vietnam to find work immediately after Jung mentioned
Caulk’s pay problem. R29: 17-19; R64: 15-20; R79: 22-R80: 8; R95: 8-10. During his
testimony, Sloan again erroneously alluded to Jung’s vacation in Vietnam. R191: 24-25. Sloan
did not specifically deny making the Vietnam statement attributed to him. Had the events
occurred as described by Sloan, it seems very unlikely to me that he would have told Jung to go
back to Vietnam to find a job.
13 Sloan acknowledged that this telephone call occurred but he made no attempt to dispute
the account provided by Jung. Caulk, who answered the phone when Jung called, worked
nearby whole Sloan spoke with Jung. He recalled overhearing Sloan ask if Jung was Caulk’s
attorney but could recall little else about Sloan’s side of the conversation.
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be “talking to anybody” at the trailer shop office. Adkins gave the write-up to Caulk after she
finished. It stated:
Jeff Caulk told Carlos Jung (laid off employee) that he had to work for nothing that he
would not punch in when he was called. Jeff has permission to punch in whenever he
works on a vehicle or any unit, because he is on duty 24 hours a day because he lives
on the property for that reason. Carlos Jung went to the trailer shop and talked to Jeff
while Jeff was on the clock. Carlos has no business in the trailer shop while he was laid
off or no business talking to Jeff while he is on duty. Frank notified Jeff today 1-9-08 that
he has to move within the next 30 days. Jeff will be out of the house before Feb 8th,
2008. All outside possessions must be moved also. This is a warning that no loitering,
or discussion with other employees, laid-off, active or terminated will take place on this
property or while clocked in during working hours.
The eviction notice surprised Caulk. He claims that he never told Sloan that he no longer
wanted to serve as an on-call employee. He presumed that the last sentence of the write-up
addressed the December 12 conversation with Jung. Both Caulk and Jung denied that they had
spoken with each other in person after December 12.
Sloan was not present when Jung arrived at the trailer shop to collect his welding
machines. Supervisor Hupp and employee Anderson were present and volunteered to help
Jung load his heavy welders. Sloan arrived shortly before they finished. After making some
denigrating comments about Jung’s welding machines, Sloan then told Jung that he was “the
reason why Jeff is being evicted.” Jung warned Sloan to get an attorney because he intended
to go to the “Labor Board” before he went home. Sloan then left.
When Jung finished loading his welders, he asked Caulk to assist him by driving one of
his vehicles to his home. Caulk, who presumed that he did not have to work that afternoon,
agreed. Later that afternoon, Caulk accompanied Jung when he went to the Des Moines NLRB
office to file an unfair labor practice charge. Jung then drove Caulk back to his home located on
Respondent’s premises.
C. January 10, 2008: Caulk Written Up Again
Caulk surely sensed he would encounter difficulties when he went to the office to punch
in for work on January 10. He armed himself with a concealed tape recorder and turned it on
when he arrived at the office. This recording confirms that Adkins first asked if he had talked to
Sloan. A little later, Caulk and Adkins spoke to Sloan. In the conversation, Sloan quizzed Caulk
about his reasons for leaving work at 11: 15 a.m. on the previous day and not returning for work.
After a back and forth between the two men about that subject, Sloan gave detailed instructs to
Adkins about writing up Caulk for leaving work early without permission.14
During their exchange, Sloan pressed Caulk to explain what he had done the previous
afternoon. Apparently talking to Adkins and Caulk, Sloan said:

14 General Counsel makes no claim that the January 10 write up Caulk received is unlawful.
For that reason, I find it unnecessary to make any detailed findings or analysis concerning the
excuse Caulk gave for leaving early. However, I think Caulk’s excuse appears quite flimsy in
view of the number of prior warnings he received about leaving work without permission.
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And then you need to write down on there that we talked to him yesterday about his rent
and then he left with Carlos. So what happened with you and Carlos? Did you go to the
labor people?
Caulk never answered Sloan’s question about “the labor people.” Instead, he said simply, “Well
we uh I drove his white grey truck and he drove his white car and then he dropped me back.”
Sloan then pressed Caulk to make sure he understood that he had to move. Near the end of
their exchange, Sloan stated, “I’ll have to wait to see if I get a letter from the labor people to see
if you’re lying to me about going to the.” Before Sloan could finish, Caulk said “Okay.”
D. January 23, 2008: Caulk Served with an “Eviction Notice”
On January 23, a process server delivered a “30 DAY NOTICE OF TERMINATION”
(Notice) to Caulk. The Notice, dated January 18, and signed by an attorney in a nearby town on
behalf of “Haws, Inc.-Frank Sloan,” provides that his tenancy at the Respondent’s premises
would terminate on February 29. The body of the Notice states that it is provided pursuant to
Iowa Code §562.A34 (sic) and last line of the notice reiterates that “This action is being brought
under Iowa Code §562.A32” (sic).15
Caulk did not vacate the Respondent’s house as specified in the Notice. That being so,
the Respondent apparently filed an action for possession in a local court as Caulk admitted that
he received a notice requiring a court appearance on March 13. When Caulk went to court that
day, he entered into a stipulation to vacate the premises before April 1. The following day Caulk
quit his employment.
E. Analysis and Conclusions
1. Complaint Paragraphs 6(a) and 6(b).
These allegations address Jung’s layoff and Caulk’s January 9 disciplinary write-up.
The General Counsel contends that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it laid
Jung off and evicted Caulk from the company house because of their protected concerted
activities. Respondent argues that the evidence establishes that Sloan laid Jung off due to a
lack of work for him and before he learned about any concerted activity. Respondent also
argues that it withdrew Caulk’s housing benefit only after he opted out of the on-call duty that
went with it.
Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining or coercing
employees for exercising their Section 7 rights. Section 7, in effect, gives employees the right to
engage in union or other concerted activities “for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection.” An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by taking adverse action against
an employee for engaging in protected concerted activities. SKD Jonesville Division L.P., 340
NLRB 101, 103 (2003).
In cases of this type, the General Counsel has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer took the adverse action against its employees
because of activities protected by Section 7. The Board’s causation test, established in Wright
Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), approved in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S.
393 (1983), and modified in Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich

15 The reference to the Iowa Code should read 562A.34.
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Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994), requires that the General Counsel make an initial showing
sufficient to support an inference that the employee’s protected conduct motivated the adverse
action taken by the employer. Typically, the General Counsel must show that the employees in
question engaged in protected activity, and that the employer knew of, and was hostile toward,
that activity. Best Plumbing Supply, 310 NLRB 143 (1993). The timing of any adverse action,
though not conclusive, may well be significant factor in determining the motivation question.
Equitable Resources, 307 NLRB 730, 731 (1992).
If the General Counsel makes an initial showing of unlawful motivation, the burden of
persuasion shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the same action would have occurred
even in the absence of the protected conduct. North Carolina License Plate Agency #18, 346
NLRB 293 (2006). An employer cannot carry its burden of persuasion merely by showing that it
had some legitimate reason for taking the adverse action; instead, it must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the action would have taken place even without the
protected conduct. Id., 346 NLRB 294; Roure Bertrand Dupont, Inc., 271 NLRB 443 (1984).
Protected Concerted Activity: Both parties rely on Meyers Industries16 in fashioning
their respective arguments about the issue of protected concerted activities in this case.
Although Meyers seems to have become all-encompassing, that case focused on a narrow
situation that is distinguishable from this case. The Meyers litigation dealt with imputing
concerted activity to an individual who acts alone. That is not the situation here.
But there is dicta in Meyers II that is apt to the facts of this case. When the Board
decided Meyers II, it attempted, among other things, to square its holding in Meyers I with the
Supreme Court’s intervening decision in City Disposal.17 In doing so, Meyers II noted that the
five majority justices and the four dissenting justices in City Disposal approved a definition of
concerted activity “encompassing individual employee activity in which the employee acts as a
representative of at least one other employee.” Meyers II, 281 NLRB 885. Former NLRB
Chairman Donald Dotson, one of the chief proponents of the Meyers’ principle, recognized the
distinction between the situation of an employee who acts strictly on her/his own, and the type
of representational activity found here involving elements of prior collaboration and consent.
See Jhirmack Enterprises, 283 NLRB 609, fn. 5 (1987) (Meyers inapplicable to situations where
one employee acts in a representative capacity for the protection of another employee’s terms
and conditions of employment).
Here, Caulk, in effect, complained to Jung on December 12 about the requirement that
he work without pay. Jung offered to speak with Sloan about that requirement and Caulk
agreed. Moments later when Sloan appeared, Jung confronted him about the order that Caulk
work without pay. Later, in his January 9 telephone conversation with Sloan, Jung again
addressed the subject of Caulk’s pay, or lack thereof. I find the prior collaboration between
Jung and Caulk about this pay issue, a basic aspect of the employment relationship, and
actions taken subsequently by Jung following with Caulk’s consent amounts to concerted
activity within the meaning of Section 7.

16 Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB 493 (1984) (Meyers I); remanded sub nom. Prill v. NLRB,
755 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 948 (1985); Meyers Industries, 281 NLRB
882 (1986) (Meyers II), affd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
17 NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822 (1984) (holding 5 to 4 that an individual
who invokes a collectively bargained right is engaged in concerted activity within the meaning of
Section 7).
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Citing the Yesterday’s Children,18 Respondent correctly notes that employee activity
must be both concerted and protected. The cited case alludes to conduct found unprotected
primarily because it involved a protest about the termination of a popular supervisor who was
not an employee within the meaning of the Act. In addition to that kind of situation, concerted
activity found unlawful, violent, in breach of contract, or otherwise indefensible also lacks
protection under Section 7. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962).
Respondent asserts that Caulk and Jung were not acting in concert because Caulk
admitted that “Jung never represented his interest.” Respondent’s Brief: 5. This claim grows
out of Caulk’s repeated, negative responses to questions as to whether Jung represented him
or served as his counsel. Caulk credibly explained his responses in the following exchange on
cross-examination (R139: 16-R140: 3):
Q Now during the conversation you had with Mr. Jung on December 12, the
morning of December 12, 2007, am I correct in stating you at no time asked him to
represent you?
A Represent me as counsel?
Q Represent you period.
A Inasmuch as he offered to speak to Mr. Sloan on my behalf and I said that was
all right.
Q But am I correct, sir, that I asked you that exact same question previously under
oath (at an unemployment compensation hearing) and you told me that he had never
represented you? Is that correct?
A It was my understanding at that time that you meant in regards to capacity as a
counsel as one would represent in a courtroom.
Later, Caulk, using his own terms, explained that on December 12 Jung “was just there to help
stick up for me.” R142: 25. Accordingly, I reject the claim that these two employees did not act
in concert.
Respondent asserts that Sloan “did not know that Jung was representing Caulk and he
(was) paying Caulk for all his time.” Respondent’s Brief: 5. Knowledge may be established by
circumstantial evidence. Needell and McGlone, 311 NLRB 455, 456 (1993). Here, it should
have been self-evident to Sloan on both occasions that Jung was acting in a representative
capacity on behalf of Caulk regarding his pay. Sloan’s own statement that Jung said to him in
December that “Jeff claims he’s not getting paid for his work” amounts to a tacit admission that
Jung was “sticking up” for Caulk. The essence of the words Jung spoke to Sloan in December
establish that Sloan knew or should have known about the concerted nature of the conduct
especially where, as here, their exchange occurred in Caulk’s presence. That is all that is
required. Dickens, Inc., 352 NLRB No. 84 (2008), slip op., fn 3. Accordingly, I find that Sloan
knew about the concerted character of Jung’s statements on both occasions.
In addition, Caulk’s January 9 write-up (as well as the argument alluded to in the
previous paragraph about “paying Caulk for all his time”) implies that the two employees had no
right to speak with each other while on duty and that Jung had no right to be on the premises
while laid off. But here, the work interruption to engage in concerted activity can be measured

18 Yesterday’s Children, Inc. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 1997) (employee’s concerted
activity in protest of a Section 2(11) supervisor’s firing held unprotected in the absence of a
showing that the supervisor’s discharge directly affected the wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of the employees’ employment.)
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in seconds rather than minutes or hours. Hence, any suggestion or claim that these two
employees lost the protection of the Act because they briefly stopped work to discuss Caulk’s
immediate pay issue and to politely address that matter with management clearly lacks merit.
See e.g., Pennypower Shopping News, Inc. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1984) (a walkout
by employees protesting their wage rates and other conditions of employment constitutes
protected activity); TPA, Inc., 337 NLRB 282 (2001) (“brief work stoppage here was protected”);
Liberty National Products, 314 NLRB 630 (1991), enfd. 73 F.3d 369 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
a work stoppage by unrepresented employees lasting 15-30 minutes was protected).
The claim in Caulk’s January 9 write-up that Jung had no business being on the
Respondent’s property also fails to establish that the two employees’ conduct on December 12
lacked protection under Section 7. Even by Sloan’s account about the sequence of events on
December 12, which I do not credit, establishes that the consultation between Caulk and Jung
had to have occurred before Sloan said anything to Jung of his layoff. Hence, that preparatory
aspect of the protected activity here occurred while both were invitees on Respondent’s
property by reason of their active employment status.
In addition, the protection the Act accords concerted activity would not be lost by reason
of the fact the Jung’s assertions on January 9 when he spoke by telephone to Sloan on Caulk’s
behalf may have been exaggerated or inaccurate. Thus, Jung charged that Caulk received no
extra compensation for his on-call status. Even counsel for General Counsel concedes that
Caulk, in exchange for his on-call designation, a below-market rental rate. And Jung’s claim
that Caulk had worked many times without pay may well have resulted at least in part from the
fact that Caulk admittedly chose not to travel the block or so to office where the time clock was
located when called by a driver after hours for work at the trailer shop located only a few feet
from his company housing. But the particular merits of employees' complaints are irrelevant in
determining whether their conduct is protected. Spinoza, Inc., 199 NLRB 525 (1972).
Accordingly, I find Jung’s protests to Sloan on December 12 and January 9 about Caulk working
without pay were protected and concerted.
The General Counsel Wright Line Case: Having concluded that Jung and Caulk
engaged in protected concerted activity the next two questions under a Wright Line analysis is
whether the General Counsel established that Respondent knew of the concerted activity and
took adverse action against either of the employees because of the animus Sloan harbored for
that protected activity. As to Jung first, I have concluded that both questions should be
answered affirmatively. The essence of Jung’s words to Sloan on December 12 exhibit that he
acted in a representative capacity on behalf of an employee other than himself. Sloan’s animus
toward Jung’s statement is exhibited by his angry tone and his immediate retribution. This swift
and decisive adverse action in direct response to the protected statement by Jung provides
compelling evidence about Sloan’s motivation. These facts have led me to conclude that Sloan
effectively terminated Jung on December 12 for his protected concerted activity, i.e., his faintly
impertinent complaint about Caulk’s unfair treatment.
A similar conclusion is warranted about the events of January 9 where Sloan struck out
at Caulk immediately after Jung spoke to him again about Caulk’s pay situation. Sloan’s angry
demand to know of Caulk if Jung was his attorney again establishes that even Sloan could
recognize the representative, and hence concerted, character of Jung’s conduct. In addition,
where an employer's animus toward an employee begins in response to the employee's
protected activity, the Board will presume later animus derives from the earlier unless contrary
evidence presented. National Ass'n of Letters Carriers, 315 N.L.R.B. 1176, 1178 & n. 10
(1994). No evidence establishes that Sloan’s animus abated between December 12 and
January 9. The fact that Caulk’s January 9 write-up followed immediately after Jung spoke to
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Sloan strongly supports an inference that it too was motivated by Sloan’s hostility toward the
protected concerted activities of these two employees.
Respondent’s Burden of Persuasion: Respondent contends that Sloan decided to let
Jung go for business reasons before he returned from his vacation but was, in effect, caught
unprepared he returned from vacation a day early. According to Respondent, two factors drove
this decision. First, the general downturn in the Haws/Hawkeye business, including the steady
decline of its wood chip business and the loss of the Pella transportation business during the
first half of the 2007 calendar year which resulted in the layoff of several employees. Second,
by the time Jung retuned from vacation in December, Respondent began purchasing materials
that Jung previously fabricated and could not otherwise obtain enough welding materials to
keep Jung busy because its welding suppliers would no longer sell to Haws due to its overdue
bills. Having credited facts that strongly indicate that Jung was terminated so precipitously,
Respondent’s business justification claims are suspect from the outset.
Although there is no question that Respondent suffered a business downturn particularly
after the Pella transportation business evaporated, significant evidence shows that Jung largely
survived that downturn. Respondent let its dispatcher go in April and laid most of its remaining
drivers and mechanics off in late June. Even though Respondent laid Jung off for three or four
weeks in April, he was told he would be called back later. By June Jung had been recalled and
he worked nearly full time thereafter until he left for vacation more than five months later.19
Sloan claimed that even before Jung left for vacation, he was given odd jobs “just so he would
be on the clock.” (R191: 24-R192: 1) But I am dubious about according that fact, even if true,
significant weight where other credible evidence shows that Jung had always performed work
other than welding and Respondent hired another employee (Neil Richey) as a laborer the
month after it let Jung go.
Respondent asserts that it lacked welding work for Jung following his return in
December because it started purchasing tips for its Peterson grinder so it no longer needed to
have Jung fabricate those items as he had done previously and because it could no longer
obtain welding materials. As to the fabrication work, even the documentary evidence provided
by Respondent (Respondent’s Exhibit V) shows that it purchased tips as early as October 12, a
month before Jung left on vacation.20 No documentary evidence of any kind supports it Sloan’s
claims about unpaid bills for welding materials. In view of that, and as there is some evidence
that some incidental welding was performed by a variety of other workers or former workers, I
find the claim about the lack of welding materials unpersuasive.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Respondent failed to meet its burden of
persuasion as to Jung’s termination. Accordingly, I find Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by terminating Jung on December 12.

19 Sloan’s assertion that Jung was recalled from layoff for part-time work is belied by time
records showing that Jung worked nearly full time after his recall. (See GC Brief, Appendix A,
summarizing GC Exhibit 10.)
20 Although General Counsel made no attempt to rebut the evidence reflected in
Respondent’s Exhibit V, on its face the exhibit raises a significant question. The exhibit is
clearly not a regular invoice but a summary of Hawkeye’s “tip purchase history since last fall.”
Because of that qualified statement, the exhibit is ambiguous in that it fails to clearly state that it
is Hawkeye’s complete purchase history as Sloan’s testimony seems to imply.
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The evidence concerning Caulk’s January 9 write-up is similar in that it occurred as an
immediate and hostile reaction to another effort on Jung’s part to lodge a protest concerning
Caulk’s pay. As I have concluded that Sloan’s claim that Caulk opted out of the on-call work
which was a condition of the company housing amounts to a false pretext, I find that this write-
up was motivated by the employee’s protected concerted activities and, therefore, it violated
Section 8(a)(1) as alleged.
2. Complaint Paragraphs 5(a), 5(c) and 6(c).
These allegations address various aspects of Caulk’s eviction. The General Counsel
argues that Caulk’s arrangement for company housing was a term and condition of his
employment. Based on the April 2003 modification to Caulk’s rental agreement, I agree with
this contention.
Caulk’s October 2001 rental arrangement with Sloan describes a week-to-week tenancy
under Iowa law. The relevant portions of Iowa Code §562A.34 (entitled “Periodic tenancy –
holdover remedies”) provide:
1. The landlord or the tenant may terminate a week-to-week tenancy by a written notice
given to the other at least ten days prior to the termination date specified in the notice.
2. The landlord or the tenant may terminate a month–to–month tenancy by a written
notice given to the other at least thirty days prior to the periodic rental date specified in
the notice.
3. If the tenant remains in possession without the landlord’s consent after expiration of
the term of the rental agreement or its termination, the landlord may bring an action for
possession and if the tenant’s holdover is willful and not in good faith the landlord, in
addition, may recover the actual damages sustained by the landlord and reasonable
attorney’s fees. (Emphasis added)
The evidence shows that Caulk’s January 9 write-up (found above to have been
unlawfully motivated) clearly contained an effective notice terminating his week-to-week tenancy
under Iowa Code §562A.34(1). As such, it is more than a threat to evict as the complaint
alleges in paragraph 5(c). The second termination notice dated January 18 (and made the
subject of complaint paragraph 6(c)) appears to have been sent either out of an abundance of
caution or for some other undisclosed reason. Regardless, it does not amount to an initiation of
any “proceedings” as alleged in complaint paragraph 6(c) but is merely another termination
notice required under Iowa law in advance of commencing an action for possession.
As noted before, I do not credit Sloan’s claim that Caulk gave notice he no longer
wanted to work as an on-call employee, the quid pro quo for occupying company housing under
the October 2003 rental-agreement modification. Accordingly, I find Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it caused both termination notices to be served on Caulk in
retaliation for the protected activities of Caulk and Jung on December 12 and particularly during
Jung’s telephone call on January 9.
The General Counsel relies on the January 18 termination notice to claim that
Respondent “initiated proceedings” against Caulk and, citing ancient precedent, argues that
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Respondent violated 8(a)(1) by doing so.21 As shown above, Iowa Code §563A creates a
mandatory time period for notices seeking to terminate a tenancy but specifies separately that
the landlord must commence a subsequent action for possession if the tenant fails to comply
with the termination notice.
Although Caulk’s testimony makes clear that some sort of proceeding was eventually
commenced against him, the General Counsel adduced no evidence concerning the details of
any legal action, what it alleged, or where it may have been instituted.22 Absent that type of
evidence I cannot find that Respondent “initiated proceedings” as alleged in complaint
paragraph 6(c). Essentially, I have concluded that the General Counsel misunderstood the
character of the January 9 and January 18 termination notices for pleading purposes but I have
found them to be unlawful in any event because the issues surrounding them have been fully
litigated. Had counsel for the General Counsel adduced evidence about an action for
possession naming Caulk as a defendant as provided in Iowa law, I would have anticipated that
her brief also would have addressed the complicated questions posed by BE&K Construction
Company v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002). Since she did not, I have surmised that it was never
the General Counsel’s intention to plead a retaliatory court action against Caulk because of his
protected concerted activities.
Crediting Jung, as I do, I find General Counsel has proven the allegation in complaint
paragraph 5(a). The essence of that allegation is that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
when Sloan told Jung that he was the reason for Caulk’s eviction. Statements of this character
where an employer attempts to shift blame for its own unlawful conduct to an employee
because of their Section 7 activities would have a strong tendency to interfere with, coerce and
restrain employees who exercise those rights. I find Respondent did so here and violated
Section 8(a)(1), as alleged.
3. Complaint Allegation 5(b).
This allegation addresses the loitering and talking ban contained in Caulk’s January 9
write-up. The General Counsel argues that this portion of the write-up amounts to an overly
broad restriction that would interfere with employee Section 7 rights. Respondent argues that
this is merely a warning to Caulk because he failed to perform his duties during working hours
rather than a restriction imposed because of his concerted activities.
General Counsel’s allegation addresses the portion of the January 9 write-up prohibiting
loitering and talking with other employees “on (Respondent’s) property or while clocked in
during working hours.” Ordinarily, rules that bar employees from engaging in activities protected
by Section 7 on an employer’s property or during “working hours” are unlawful regardless of
motive. Counsel for the General Counsel obviously sees in Caulk’s January 9 write-up an
unlawful ban on loitering as she emphasizes cases where the Board found rules prohibiting
loitering on company property after hours unlawful. I think the General Counsel’s argument
about loitering fails to account for the particular circumstance found here.

21 Specifically, General Counsel cites Sellers Manufacturing, 92 NLRB 279 (1950) and Great
Western Mushroom, 27 NLRB 352 (1940). Neither case indicates that the evictions involved
were court ordered.
22 Ultimately, Caulk entered into a stipulation to vacate the company house by April 1 and
complied with that stipulation.
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In my judgment, the loitering here does not refer to after-work loitering on the
Respondent’s property. In Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 655 (2004), the
Board found that an anti-loitering rule violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because it would
reasonably chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. In so finding, the Board
explained that “employees could reasonably interpret the rule to prohibit them from lingering on
the [r]espondent’s premises after the end of a shift in order to engage in Sec[tion] 7 activities,
such as the discussion of workplace concerns.” Id. at 649 fn. 16.
Because Caulk lived in company housing, he undoubtedly spent many hours “loitering”
on company property following his regular workday both before and after this write-up. This so-
called rule contained in an employee disciplinary write-up came about after Sloan approached
Jung and Caulk talking with each other in the trailer shop on January 9. Sloan immediately
jumped to the erroneous conclusion that they were “loitering” rather than working. Loitering as
used in this context obviously refers to the situation giving rise to the use of the word, namely,
Sloan’s presumption that two employees were goofing off when they should have been working
because both were on the clock.
There is no evidence that Caulk showed his write-up to another employee or otherwise
publicized it in any manner. Therefore, unlike the situation in cases such as Lutheran Heritage
Village-Livonia, the loitering referred to here could not be reasonably construed to refer to
lingering around after hours to chat with other employees. In order to construe the loitering
reference here in the same manner as that case, one would have to examine the word in a
vacuum without any consideration for the setting where it arose. Accordingly, I find that the
General Counsel failed to establish that Respondent created a rule barring loitering in the
January 9 write-up that would interfere with its employees exercise of Section 7 rights.
However, Respondent did step over the line by barring Caulk from discussions “with
other employees . . . on this property or while clocked in during working hours.” The Board has
long construed broad rules barring conduct that could include Section 7 activities during work
hours, as opposed to work time, as presumptively invalid. Our Way, 268 NLRB 394 (1983),
citing Essex International, 211 NLRB 749 (1974), where the Board made clear that rules barring
protected activities during "working hours" are presumptively invalid because that term connotes
periods from the beginning to the end of work shifts that may include the employees' own time
whereas the words barring such activities during "working time" are presumptively valid because
that term connotes periods when employees are performing actual job duties, periods which do
not include the employees' own time such as lunch and break periods. Therefore, I find that the
prohibition against talking during work hours on company property found in Caulk’s January 9
write-up presumptively invalid and therefore, in violation of Section 8(a)(1).
4. Complaint Allegation 5(d): The Interrogation
General Counsel avers in complaint paragraph 5(d) the Respondent unlawfully
interrogated Caulk on January 10 in an effort to learn, in effect, if Caulk and Jung had gone to
the NLRB the previous afternoon. Respondent appears to misconstrue this allegation as a
claim that the January 10 disciplinary action was unlawful. I do not construe the allegation in
that manner and as noted the General Counsel makes no claim of that sort. Instead, this
allegation alludes only to a single question Sloan asked during a disciplinary conference.
The proper test for determining whether an employer’s interrogation of an employee
violates Section 8(a)(1) is whether, under the circumstances, the interrogation reasonably
tended to restrain or interfere with the employees’ exercise of the rights guaranteed them under
the Act. United Services Automobile Assn., 340 NLRB 784, 786 (2003). Relevant factors in
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making this determination include the background, the information sought, the questioner, and
the place and method of interrogation. Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB 1217, 1218 (1985).
I find Sloan’s attempt to learn from Caulk if he had gone to the “labor people” the
previous afternoon was the type of coercive questioning barred by Section 8(a)(1). Sloan,
Haws’ owner, sought the information in the course of hostile, disciplinary meeting with Caulk,
and apparently noting Caulk’s evasive answer, warned that he would wait to see if Caulk was
lying to him. In this context, I conclude that Caulk could easily conclude that further retribution
would be taken against him if Sloan learned that he had gone to the NLRB office as Jung had
threatened to do the day before.23 Accordingly, I find this questioning violated Section 8(a)(1).
Clear Pine Moldings, Inc. v NLRB, 632 F.2d 721, 724–25 (9th Cir. 1980).
Conclusions of Law
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
2(6) and 2(7) of the Act.
2. By terminating Carlos Jung on December 12, by terminating Jeff Caulk’s rental
agreement on January 9 and again on January 18, by issuing a write-up to Jeff Caulk on
January 9, by establishing an overly broad prohibition against employee protected activity on
company property on January 9, and by coercively questioning Jeff Caulk about his protected
concerted activities on January 10, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.24
The Respondent, having terminated Carlos Jung in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, will be ordered to offer him immediate reinstatement to his former position, and if that
position no longer exists, then to a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to his
seniority, pay and benefits. In addition, Respondent will be order to make Jung whole for any
loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a calendar quarterly basis from date of his
termination to the date of proper offer of reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as
prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New
Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
Respondent will also be ordered to expunge from any of its records any reference to
Carlos Jung’s termination on December 12, 2007, and to Jeff Caulk’s write-up on January 9,
2008, and notify them each in writing that the respective actions pertaining to them have been

23 In my judgment, this questioning also enhances the credibility of Jung’s account
concerning the events of the previous day.
24 As Jeff Caulk voluntarily quit his employment with Respondent in March, the General
Counsel seeks no affirmative action in connection with the termination of his rental agreement.
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taken and that any evidence related to those matters will not be considered in any future
personnel action affecting them. Sterling Sugars, Inc., 261 NLRB 472 (1982).
Finally, Respondent must post the customary notice to employees I have attached as
the Appendix informing them of the outcome of this matter.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended
ORDER
The Respondent, Haws, Inc., Pleasant Hill, Iowa, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Terminating or writing-up any employee because they engage in protected concerted
activities within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act.
(b) Terminating a rental housing arrangement provided to any employee as a term or
condition of employment because of their activities protected by Section 7 of the Act.
(c) Prohibiting employees from talking with each other on company property except
during times when they are actually scheduled to be working.
(d) Coercively questioning employees about activities protected by Section 7 of the Act.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Carlos Jung full reinstatement to his
former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed by him.
(b) Make Carlos Jung whole with interest for any loss of earnings and other benefits
suffered because of the discrimination against him in the manner set forth in the Remedy
section of this decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from its files any reference to
Carlos Jung’s December 12 termination, and notify him in writing that this action has
been taken and that this layoff will not be used against him in any future personnel
actions.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from its files any references to the
disciplinary write-up issued to Jeff Caulk on January 9, 2008, and notify him in writing
that this action has been taken and that this discipline will not be used against him in any
way.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by
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the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of
such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay
due under this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in Pleasant Hill, Iowa,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.” Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. If this Order is enforced by a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading
“POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD” shall read
“POSTED PURSUANT TO A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS ENFORCING AN ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD.” Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that,
during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by the Respondent at any time since January 9, 2008.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated: Washington, D.C., September 11, 2008.
____________________
William L. Schmidt
Administrative Law Judge
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and
has ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT discharge or discipline our employees because they engage in activities
protected by federal law.
WE WILL NOT terminate a rental housing agreement with any employee provided as a
term of employment because they engage in activities protected by federal law.
WE WILL NOT prohibit employees from talking with each other on company property
during times when they are not actually scheduled to be working.
WE WILL NOT question our employees in an effort to learn about their activities
protected by federal law.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by federal law.
WE WILL offer Carlos Jung immediate and full reinstatement to his former position as
provided in the remedy section of the NLRB’s decision in this case.
WE WILL make Carlos Jung whole, with interest, for any loss of earnings and other
benefits resulting from his December 12, 2007, layoff.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to our layoff of Carlos Jung and WE
WILL notify him in writing that this action has been taken and that this layoff will not be
used against him in any future personnel actions.
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WE WILL remove from our files any references to the disciplinary write-up issued to Jeff
Caulk on January 9, 2008, and WE WILL notify him in writing that this action has been
taken and that this discipline will not be used against him in any way.
HAWS, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
330 South Second Avenue, Towle Building, Suite 790
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401-2221
Hours: 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
612-348-1757.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 612-348-1770.