Hartmann Luggage Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 26, 1970

183 N.L.R.B. 1246 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

1246 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hartmann Luggage Company and Pauline Jordan.
Case 26-CA-3360
June 26, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS MCCULLOCH, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On February 11, 1970, Trial Examiner Laurence
A. Knapp issued his Decision in the above-entitled
proceeding, finding that the Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and de-
sist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion. The Trial Examiner also found that the
Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices and recommended that these allega-
tions of the complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, the
Respondent and the General Counsel filed excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and support-
ing briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, the
briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby
adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner as modified herein.
On March 15, 1969,' Mrs. Lillie Bradley applied
for reinstatement and asked for her former "trim-
mer" job in the mistaken belief that a trimmer job
had just been vacated. She was informed that no
job was available. On March 20, Mrs. Bradley
returned to the plant and asked for a separation slip
if she was not to go back to work at that time. Such
slip was given to her. On these facts the Trial Ex-
aminer concluded that Mrs. Bradley had sought
reinstatement "only" to her former trimmer job
and, by later asking for a separation slip, she had
given the Respondent reason to understand that she
was abandoning her request for such "limited"
reinstatement. The Trial Examiner, however, also
concluded that, even if her request could be said to
have been a continuing one, there is no evidence
that the Respondent filled any trimmer job after
March 15. The Trial Examiner therefore found that
the Respondent had not discriminated against Mrs.
Bradley when, during the period from April 14 to
July 15, the Respondent hired some 13 employees
to fill vacancies occurring during the period. Ap-
parently, it was conceded that Mrs. Bradley, like
the 9 other strikers who had sought reinstatement,
was qualified for one or another of the 13 vacan-
cies.
In The Laidlaw Corporation,' we observed that
the Supreme Court in N.L.R.B. v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co., Inc.,' pointed out that by virtue of Section 2(3)
of the Act an individual whose work ceases due to a
labor dispute remains an employee if he has not ob-
tained other regular and substantially equivalent
employment, and that, in the absence of a legiti-
mate business justification, failure to reinstate a
striker who applies for reinstatement is an unfair
labor practice without reference to intent or im-
proper motivation. In the instant proceeding, there
is no evidence that the Respondent had a legitimate
business justification for failing to recall Mrs.
Bradley, nor is there any showing that Mrs.
Bradley, at the time that positions became available
at the Respondent's plant, had obtained regular and
substantially equivalent employment. The Respon-
dent's apparent justification for failing to recall
Mrs. Bradley rests on the alleged reasonableness of
its belief that Mrs. Bradley had abandoned further
interest in employment with the Respondent. This
is what the Trial Examiner found. But, contrary to
the Trial Examiner, we think that Mrs. Bradley's
request for a separation slip is not, in the circum-
stances present here, reasonably to be understood
as an abandonment of any further interest in em-
ployment with the Respondent. An economic
striker offered proper reinstatement is free to
refuse reemployment and such refusal would re-
lieve an employer of any further obligation to rein-
state. But, in the instant case, Mrs. Bradley was not
offered reinstatement and her request for a separa-
tion slip on March 20 is not reasonably to be con-
strued as unequivocal notice that she was abandon-
ing all further interest in employment with the
Respondent.
Mrs. Bradley had hopefully sought employment
when she believed that a trimmer job had become
vacant. Her subsequent request for a separation slip
was prefaced by a clear indication that she had a
need and desire to return to work. Having no other
employment in hand, it makes no sense to say that
an employee would under such circumstances cut
All dates hereinafter are in 1969
' 171 NLRB No 175, enfd 414 F 2d 99 (C A 7)
389 U.S. 375.
183 NLRB No. 128
HARTMANN LUGGAGE COMPANY 1247
herself off from any chance to return to work o a
job in which she may have accumulated seniority or
other beneficial rights. It is clear that Mrs. Bradley
requested a separation slip in order to seek employ-
ment elsewhere, but absent evidence that she had
found regular and substantially equivalent employ-
ment, we are of the opinion that the Respondent
has not sustained the burden of showing a legiti-
mate business justification for failing to recall Mrs.
Bradley when jobs became available. While it is not
beyond the realm of probability that the Respon-
dent , in passing over Mrs . Bradley, did so in reprisal
for her participation in a strike , it is not necessary,
in view of the Supreme Court's ruling in Fleetwood,
to find unlawful motivation in order to find that the
Respondent discriminated against Mrs. Bradley.
Furthermore, we disagree with the Trial Ex-
aminer that it is reasonable to conclude that Mrs.
Bradley's request for her former job of "trimmer"
meant that she would reject any other offer of
equivalent employment. Accordingly, we find that
by failing to reinstate Mrs. Bradley the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
The Trial Examiner also found that the picket
line misconduct engaged in by strikers Pauline Jor-
dan, Onie Hodge, Lorene Taylor, and Guila Byers
afforded the Respondent legitimate and substantial
justification for not reinstating them. We find merit
in the General Counsel's exceptions to these
findings.
An examination of the various acts attributed to
the four aforementioned discriminatees reveals that
they fell into the following general classifications:
scattered instances of obscene statements and name
calling , isolated threats of personal injury, some of
them not directly attributable to the alleged dis-
criminatees, their presence in a group in which pro-
perty damage or yelling occurred, violation of a
state court injunction, mass picketing which briefly
blocked ingress and egress, and two minor incidents
of property damage.
Section 7's protection of employees who par-
ticipate in picket lines during legitimate lawful
strikes would be unduly jeopardized if any miscon-
duct on the picket line, without regard for the seri-
ousness of such conduct, were automatically to
constitute grounds for a refusal to reinstate strikers.
Meaningful protection in this case must require that
the relatively minor and isolated aforesaid incidents
of misconduct, a great many of which cannot be
imputed directly and personally to the alleged dis-
criminatees , do not remove the Act's protection
from the perpetrators, or suffice to legitimize a
failure to reinstate them. While we are in agree-
ment with the Trial Examiner that such conduct is
improper and not to be condoned, we do not find it
of such an egregious nature, under all the circum-
stances, as to forfeit the Section 7 protection ac-
corded employees who participate in lawful strikes.
Accordingly, we shall order the Respondent to rein-
state these employees.4
THE REMEDY
We have found in agreement with the Trial Ex-
aminer that the Respondent engaged in conduct
violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act and, ac-
cordingly, we adopt his remedial recommendations
in that regard. However, we have found, contrary
to the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent addi-
tionally violated Section 8(a)(3) by failing to rein-
state strikers Pauline Jordan, Onie Hodge, Lorene
Taylor, Lillie Bradley, and Guila Byers, and ac-
cordingly we shall order the Respondent to rein-
state them with backpay.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and upon the record as a whole, we shall substitute
the following conclusion for the Trial Examiner's
first Conclusion of Law:
1. By failing to reinstate Mrs. Dorothy Fisher,
Mrs. Vallie Brewington, Mrs. Elizabeth Reeves,
Mrs. Gertie Lee Farmer, Mrs. Pauline Jordan, Mrs.
Onie Hodge, Mrs. Lorene Taylor, Mrs. Guila Byers,
and Mrs. Lillie Bradley, the Respondent has dis-
criminated in regard to hire, tenure, and terms and
conditions of employment to discourage member-
ship in the Union, and thus has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner, as modified
herein, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Hartmann Luggage Company, Lebanon, Tennessee,
its officers, agents , successors , and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following paragraph for para-
graph 2(a) of the Recommended Order:
"(a) Offer to Mrs. Dorothy Fisher, Mrs. Vallie
Brewington , Mrs. Elizabeth Reeves, Mrs. Gertie
Lee Farmer , Mrs. Pauline Jordan, Mrs. Onie
' Terry Coach Industries , Inc., 166 NLRB 563, National Packing Com-
pany, Inc., 147 NLRB 446, remanded on other grounds 352 F.2d 482 (C.A
10), Stewart Hog Ring Company , Inc., 131 NLRB 310, H N Thayer Com-
pany, 99 NLRB 1122, Porto Rico Container Corporation , 89 NLRB 1570,
Kelco Corporation , 79 NLRB 759.
1248 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hodge, Mrs. Lorene Taylor, Mrs. Guila Byers, and
Mrs. Lillie Bradley immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority or other rights and
privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay
which they may have incurred by reason of the
Respondent 's discrimination against them, in ac-
cordance with the recommendation set forth in the
section of the Trial Examiner's Decision entitled
`The Remedy."'
2. Substitute the following paragraph for the
second indented paragraph in the Appendix at-
tached to the Trial Examiner's Decision:
WE WILL offer to Mrs. Dorothy Fisher, Mrs.
Vallie Brewington, Mrs. Elizabeth Reeves,
Mrs. Gertie Lee Farmer, Mrs. Pauline Jordan,
Mrs. Onie Hodge, Mrs. Lorene Taylor, Mrs.
Guila Byers, and Mrs. Lillie Bradley immediate
and full reinstatement to their former jobs or,
if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges, and will
make them whole for any loss of earnings suf-
fered as a result of discrimination against them.
MEMBER MCCULLOCH, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
While I concur in my colleagues ' findings and
conclusions in all other respects, I would affirm the
Trial Examiner's dismissal of the 8(a)(1) and (3)
allegations relating to Lillie Bradley, Pauline Jor-
dan, Lorene Taylor, and Guila Byers.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LAURANCE A. KNAPP , Trial Examiner : This case,
heard at Lebanon , Tennessee , on August 26-28,
1969, presents various questions springing from
Respondent 's failure to reinstate certain individuals
who participated in an economic strike of Respon-
dent 's employees .' Following the hearing , briefs
were filed by counsel for the General Counsel and
for Respondent.
Upon the entire record in the case , including my
observation of the demeanor of witnesses, I make
the following findings and conclusions:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. RESPONDENT 'S BUSINESS; THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent, a corporation, is engaged at
Lebanon, Tennessee, in the manufacture and sale
' A charge and an amended charge were served on Respondent on May 8
and June 25 , 1969, respectively The complaint, issued on June 27, 1969,
was thereafter amended, both before and at the hearing Respondent an-
of luggage. The complaint alleges, Respondent ad-
mits, and I find that during the 12 months preced-
ing issuance of the complaint herein, Respondent
received from points outside the State of Tennessee
materials, and shipped to points outside the State
finished products, valued in each case in excess of
$50,000. Respondent is engaged in commerce and
in activities affecting commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I
find that Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers and Tax-
icab Drivers Local Union No. 327, affiliated with
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
H. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Pertinent Background
In July 1967, the Board certified the Teamsters
Local Union referred to above (herein called the
Union) as the bargaining representative of Respon-
dent's production and maintenance employees at its
Lebanon plant. Following some months of incon-
clusive bargaining negotiations, the Union called a
strike which began on January 23, 1968. Shortly
thereafter Respondent resumed operations which
have since been stabilized at production and em-
ployment levels substantially lower than those
prevailing prior to the strike, but picketing was con-
tinued by some of the original strikers until some-
time in March 1969. With the cessation of this
picketing the strike apparently came to an end.
Two prior Board proceedings springing from
these main events throw some light on the matters
involved in this third case. In the first case, in-
stituted in May 1968, the Board, adopting the deci-
sion of Trial Examiner Kapell, dismissed for a
failure of proof the General Counsel's complaint
that in making certain layoffs just prior to the strike
Respondent had violated its bargaining obligation
to the Union and that the strike was a product of
this alleged unfair labor practice.2 In the second
case, instituted in June 1968, the Board, again
adopting a decision of Trial Examiner Kapell, held
the union responsible for such acts of picketing
strikers as mass picketing at plant entrances, injur-
ing and threatening to injure employees entering or
leaving the plant, damaging trucks and automobiles
entering or leaving the premises, and spreading
tacks at plant entrances, in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.3
Issues Presented in this Case
Turning to this case, when the last of the pickets
ceased picketing in March 1969, Respondent had a
swered the complaint as issued and as amended
' 173 NLRB 1254
' 173 NLRB 1403, enfd. as modified 419 F 2d 1282 (C A. 6)
HARTMANN LUGGAGE COMPANY
full employee complement ( apparently a mixture of
employees who had abandoned the strike and other
hires during the strike ) needed for the reduced
level of production then and since prevailing.'
However , in the period of April 14-July 15, 1969,
Respondent hired some 13 female employees, ap-
parently to fill vacancies arising during this period.
The General Counsel contends that each of the 10
former female strikers named in the complaint was
qualified for one or another of these 13 positions,
and had applied for reinstatement before the cor-
responding position or positions were filled; and
that in passing over the 10 strikers Respondent in-
tentionally did so because of their prolonged par-
ticipation in the strike or, in any event , did so in
violation of their reinstatement rights as defined in
the Supreme Court's decision in N.L.R.B. v. Fleet-
wood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375, and that of the
Board in The Laidlaw Corporation , 171 NLRB No.
175 (June 13, 1968 ), enfd . 414 F.2d 99 (C.A. 7,
July 28 , 1969).
Respondent , denying any antistrike motivation,
asserts that it declined to reinstate the bulk of the
10 strikers because of their misconduct during the
strike and/or because, in some instances , they did
not occupy applicant status at the material times.
Respondent further contends that the Fleetwod and
Laidlaw decisions can have no applicability on any
view of this case due, essentially , to the length of
time ( more than 12 months ) between the com-
mencement of the strike and the strikers ' applica-
tions for reinstatement.
A. The Question of Intentional Discrimination
As expressed in his brief, the General Counsel's
main position is that , even in the absence of a
specific intent on Respondent 's part to discriminate
against them as strikers , Respondent 's failure to re-
call the 10 strikers as job openings developed in the
April-July period violated their reinstatement rights
as defined in the Fleetwood and Laidlaw decisions.
Nevertheless , in somewhat subordinate fashion,
counsel for the General Counsel argues for a find-
ing that Respondent passed over the 10 as a group
because of their prolonged strike ( picketing ) activi-
ty. I conclude that the evidence does not warrant
such a finding.
The General Counsel points to the fact that one
or another of the strikers had done work of the sort
covered by the jobs subsequently filled. But he
overlooks (1) the fact that some of these positions
were filled by experienced former employees and
(2) Respondent 's contentions and pertinent
evidence that it considered the bulk of the strikers
disqualified for reinstatement because of strike
misconduct . In short , this is not the simple case of
' Prior to the strike Respondent had about 130 production workers as
against about 75 utilized in the poststrike period.
' The positions filled subsequent to April 14 are shown on G .C. Exh. 2
Descriptions of their prior job experience are given in the testimony of the
1249
preferring new and inexperienced workers over ex-
perienced strikers otherwise unqualifiedly eligible
for reinstatement. Cf. the Board's Laidlaw decision,
supra, fn. 14. Counsel also refers to testimony as to
remarks separately made by Cady, Respondent's
director of manufacturing, to two of the strikers
(Brewington and Farmer), to the effect that he
could not see why they wanted to return to work
and that he did not think they would be satisfied if
they returned, in view of all that had happened dur-
ing the strike. But an examination of all the per-
tinent testimony of these two strikers and of Cady
shows that what he was referring to was the con-
siderable violence and other misconduct committed
by strikers during the strike, as found in the Board's
prior decision and as further found hereinafter (and
involving, incidentally, various of the 10 strikers).
In the circumstances, I consider the evidence insuf-
ficient to establish that Respondent entertained a
specific intention to discriminate against the 10, as
a group, merely because of their lawful strike ac-
tivity.
B. The Right to Reinstatement Viewed Apart From
Intentional Discrimination
In the period April 14 to July 15, 1969, Respon-
dent filled some 13 positions. At various junctures
in the period March 15 to June 30, 1969, the 10
strikers applied or sought to apply to return to
work. The evidence indicates that in the case of
most of the 10 strikers they were qualified by prior
experience for one or another of the jobs filled sub-
sequent to their applications or attempted ones.5
Respondent does not argue to the contrary so that
if this were all there were to the case one or
another of the strikers would be entitled to at least
those positions which were filled by newcomers to
Respondent's employ. But that is not all there is to
the case, in view of Respondent's further conten-
tions . These are (1) that the strikers had lost their
employee status at the time of their respective ap-
plications, due to lapse of time; (2) that the 10
were denied, or in any case were not entitled to,
reinstatement due to their misconduct during the
strike; and (3) that, in the case of 4 of the 10, they
had not made or had withdrawn applications to
return to work , and hence Respondent was not
obliged to consider them for reinstatement when
the job openings referred to were filled.
1. The question of the strikers ' loss of
employee status
Section 2(3) of the Act includes in the definition
of "employees" a striking worker" who has not ob-
tained any other regular and substantially
10 strikers and of a company official.
' That is, "any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or
in connection with, any current labor dispute. . "
1250 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
equivalent employment. On the basis of this reten-
tion of employee status the Supreme Court held in
Fleetwood and the Board held in Laidlaw that an
employer's refusal to reinstate economic strikers is
inherently discriminatory unless the employer
shows that his action was due to "legitimate and
substantial business justifications." But in neither of
the above cases was the Court or the Board called
upon to consider whether the retention of em-
ployee status by economic strikers is subject to
some absolute time limitation, a question this
Respondent does raise.
Respondent's contention is that "an economic
striker ceases to be an employee when he has en-
gaged in an economic strike for more than twelve
months duration and during such period has been
permanently replaced." In support of this conten-
tion, Respondent argues that an economic striker's
employee status cannot be considered "vested in
him in perpetuity" and, proceeding from this
proposition, further argues, by analogy to one of
the provisions of Section 9(c)(3) of the Act, that a
12-month line should be drawn. This is the provi-
sion stating that economic strikers not entitled to
reinstatement may vote in an election conducted
within 12 months of the commencement of the
strike in question.7
The trouble with Respondent's argument is that
its underlying analogy is imperfect. For it is one
thing to grant or preserve for a 12-month period
the voting rights of striking workers who may never
return to work, and quite another to place such a
time limitation upon the statutory rights of strikers
to protection against discrimination in reinstate-
ment or reemployment. In the first situation the
limitation, as indicated in the legislative history, has
justifications in the uncertainty as to how the
available positions would eventually be filled as
between strikers and replacements, and in the dif-
ficulty and confusion which, as more and more time
passed, would increasingly complicate determina-
tion of the matter of voter eligibility and otherwise
impede the holding of a prompt election. These fac-
tors have no particular relevance to determination
of the question whether an employer has dis-
criminated against an economic striker following
his application to return to work. In regard to rein-
statement of an economic striker, the employer's
only obligation is to refrain from discriminatory
treatment and that obligation arises only after the
striker has applied for reinstatement . Observance of
this obligation by the employer in the course of his
subsequent additions of workers is in no perceptible
way rendered burdensome or inequitable to him or
to replacements or other existing personnel merely
because of the length of the strike in question or
because of the employer's antecedent lawful hire of
replacements during the strike.8
Finally, I consider it rather significant that Con-
gress has never seen fit to place upon the right of
economic strikers to freedom from discriminatory
treatment any specific time limit. What Congress
has refrained from doing directly, such as by
amendment to the definition of "employee" in Sec-
tion 2(3) of the Act,9 should not be indirectly im-
ported into the Act, and particularly not such a
sweeping limitation as Respondent advances.
2. The applicant status of certain strikers
a. Mrs. Vallie Brewington
Mrs. Brewington went to Respondent 's plant on
April 10 where she filled out an employment appli-
cation. Notified of this fact, Mr. Cady, Respon-
dent's director of manufacturing, called Mrs.
Brewington to his office for a talk, his purpose be-
ing, he testified, to "make her aware of the senti-
ments which prevailed [among other workers] in
the plant towards many of the strikers." Upon con-
sideration of the testimony of both Cady and Mrs.
Brewington as to what occurred during this inter-
view (their versions are similar in many respects
and in other particulars appear to complement
rather than conflict with each other), I find that the
following transpired. Cady opened the conversation
by stating that he did not understand why Mrs.
Brewington wanted to return to work or why "you
people" could ask him to take them back" after all
that she and her friends had done on the picket
line, and that he would be surprised if after a few
days someone in the plant did not "slap the fire out
of her." Cady went on to say that while "you all"
must have thought "we" were a bunch of "sons-of-
bitches" to do what they had done, Respondent
treated its employees fairly the same as before the
strike, and inquired how, in the circumstances, she
thought she could be satisfied in Respondent's em-
ploy and/or why she wanted to come back. Mrs.
Brewington explained that she had been unable to
find work elsewhere and Cady replied that Respon-
dent had no opening.
r In referring in Sec 9(c)(3) to economic strikers " not entitled to rein-
statement " it is clear that Congress had in mind primarily strikers whose
positi.,.is had been filled by replacements
8 Respondent cites C H Guenther & Son, Inc, 174 NLRB 1202, as
though in that case the Board held that the 12-month voting right period
was applicable also in unfair labor practice cases involving discrimination
in reinstatement of economic strikers In fact , however , what the Board
held was that , by analogy to Sec 9(c)(3), it would include economic
strikers along with replacements in determining whether a union 's majority
continued following a strike and the related question of the employer's
claim of a good-faith doubt of the union 's majority when he refused to bar-
gain at the strike's end
8 At the time of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Act, the House
Committee proposed various amendments to Sec . 2(3) of the Act which,
on bases other than time, would have brought about the termination of the
"employee" status of economic strikers . See House Report No 245, April
11, 1947, on H. R 3020 , 80th Cong., 1st Sess Congress rejected these
proposals.
1s Certain others of the 10 , including some of whom I find engaged in
disqualifying picket line misconduct (see below ), had filled out applica-
tions and had sought to see Cady on the previous day, April 9
HARTMANN LUGGAGE COMPANY 1251
According to Brewington, Cady then handed her
application to her, saying he did not know what she
wanted him to do with it, and she said she would
take it. According to Cady, he told Brewington she
could have her choice, i.e., that he would put her
application on file and consider it if anything
opened up or she could take the application with
her, and then she elected to take it with her and did
so. I credit Cady's version of these final events.
On the basis of these subsidiary findings, I con-
clude that Mrs. Brewington did not freely and
voluntarily withdraw her application. Cady
emphasized to Mrs. Brewington the distinct proba-
bility that she would be subjected to physical
violence if she were to return to work and gave her
no assurances that Respondent would afford her
necessary protection. Her taking back her applica-
tion must, therefore, be considered coerced and for
that reason be disregarded. Hence she occupies ap-
plicant status.
b. Mrs. Gertie Lee Farmer
On April 9, Mrs. Farmer went to the plant with
alleged discriminatees Jordan , Reeves, and Hodge
where they filled out applications given to them by
an office receptionist. The receptionist left the of-
fice twice. Returning the first time, she informed
the four that Mr. Cady would come out to see them
but, returning the second time, told them Cady was
not seeing anyone but would keep their applica-
tions in mind.
On April 10, the next day and the day of Cady's
interview with Mrs. Brewington (see above), Mrs.
Farmer called Cady by telephone. On the basis of
the testimony of both Mrs. Farmer and Cady, which
I consider as generally complementary , I find that
the following took place. After some preliminary
remarks, Cady told Farmer he did not understand
what "you ladies" were doing putting in applica-
tions, and questioned why they wanted to work for
the Company or why they would be satisfied after
all that had happened. Cady further stated that a lot
of people in the plant felt "mighty strongly" toward
"some of you." Following Cady's remarks, Mrs.
Farmer told him to tear up her application, that she
did not want to work there right then, and that she
would check with him later.
I consider Cady's remarks about the hostile
feelings of existing employees toward some strikers
arising from prior picketing activities as encom-
passing Mrs. Farmer and as constituting an implied
threat of mistreatment in the event she were to
return to work. Accordingly, I conclude, as in the
case of Mrs. Brewington, that withdrawal of her ap-
plication was not a free and voluntary act and that
she has applicant status.
c. Mrs. Dorothy Fisher
On April 9, Mrs. Fisher (and four other strikers
not involved in this case) went to Respondent's
plant where they told Ruby Wilson, secretary to
Respondent's Executive Vice President Strasinger,
that they wished to see Mr. Cady. Upon being in-
formed that Cady was busy they made known to
Mrs. Wilson their desire to put in applications. Mrs.
Wilson told them Respondent was not taking appli-
cations. The same group returned to the plant the
next day where they again told Mrs. Wilson they
wanted to see Cady. Mrs. Wilson again told them
that Cady was too busy to talk to them whereupon
a Mrs . Oakley, one of the group, reiterated the
desire of the group to submit applications. Mrs.
Wilson again told them Respondent was not accept-
ing applications. Mrs. Oakley then asked Mrs. Wil-
son to go see Cady and ask him if they could file
applications. Mrs. Wilson left the group and when
she returned informed them that Cady was not tak-
ing any applications that day.
I find the foregoing facts on the basis of Mrs.
Fisher's testimony, which I am moved to credit
since Mrs. Wilson did not take the stand and since
Cady's testimony is insufficient to overcome that of
Mrs. Fisher as to what the group was told on both
days by Mrs. Wilson."
Mrs. Fisher's two appearances at Respondent's
business office and the desire and intention she
manifested there to make an employment applica-
tion were obviously appropriate initial steps, and,
since Mrs . Wilson, without questioning the
procedure the ladies were following or referring
them to someone else, instead dealt with the ladies'
requests on Respondent's behalf in the manner
previously described. Mrs. Fisher was entitled to
rely on what Mrs. Wilson said and after two rebuffs
was not required to pursue the matter further.
Under the circumstances, she was to be treated as
though she had been given and filled out a formal
employment application, in line with Respondent's
standard practice, established by the testimony of
Mr. Strasinger, to hand out applications at its office
to anyone seeking employment.
d. Mrs. Lillie Bradley
On March 15, Mrs. Bradley telephoned to Cady
and asked him for reinstatement on her former
"trimmer" job, thinking, mistakenly, that a "trim-
mer" position had been occupied by an employee
who had just quit Respondent's employ. Cady told
her Respondent did not need any trimmers at that
time, as was the fact. On March 20, Mrs. Bradley
went to the plant where she told Cady that she
wanted a separation slip if she was not to go back
" Cady's testimony is that on April 9 he was told that this group wanted
to see him (without his being told or being aware that they were seeking to
return to work) and that he sent word back that he was too busy to see
them . Cady did not, however , testify concerning the events of April 10 as
described by Mrs. Fisher.
427-258 O-LT - 74 - 80
1252 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to work at that time. Cady said "Ok" and had a
separation slip prepared and given to her.
I find that Bradley sought reinstatement only to
her former "trimmer" job; and that when, after
learning that no such opening was then available,
she then requested a separation slip, she gave
Respondent reason to understand that she was
abandoning her request for such limited reinstate-
ment. Hence, I conclude that, absent some further
approach on her part to Respondent, she should
not be regarded as having continuing applicant
status. In any case, even if her request could be said
to have been a continuing one, there is no evidence
that Respondent filled any "trimmer" job after
March 15 and hence no basis for a finding of dis-
crimination against her.
C. The Misconduct Aspect of the Case
Respondent advances strike or picket line
misconduct both as a claimed reason for its failure
to reinstate most of the strikers and, in any case, as
disentitling them to the reinstatement remedy. In
support of these contentions Respondent adduced
evidence through the testimony of employees, su-
pervisors , and officials addressed to each of the
strikers except two, Bradley and Farmer. 12
As will be seen , quite consistently I credit the
testimony of Respondent 's witnesses as to the con-
duct they ascribed to particular strikers. Both on
the basis of demeanor and the overall surrounding
circumstances , that testimony seemed to me to be
highly credible as against such denials as the cor-
responding strikers entered . With respect to the
credibility of such denials , I have borne in mind the
very considerable volume of instances of violence,
threats, mass picketing , blocking entrances and
vehicles, throwing of tacks, etc ., in which picketing
strikers engaged in the early months of the strike
(January-April 1968) as set forth in the cor-
responding prior Board decision and as added to by
the evidence in this case ; that this extensive con-
duct took place in relatively small picketing areas
adjacent to Respondent's plant ; and that the
strikers named below were, with the exception of a
period of illness in one instance , on regular picket
duty during this period . In these circumstances, I
was and am distinctly and unfavorably impressed by
the general and sweeping way in which various of
the strikers sought to disclaim that they had en-
gaged in or had even seen picket line incidents, or
types of incidents , with which the records in the
prior case and this one are rather replete.
I turn now to consideration of the evidence relat-
ing to each of the eight strikers affected by this
misconduct question.
1. Mrs. Pauline Jordan
According to the testimony of Respondent's wit-
nesses:
a. On January 26, 1968, some 25-30 pickets
prevented a truck from entering Respondent 's plant
for some 7 to 10 minutes until dispersed by the po-
lice, and similarly temporarily blocked the exit of
the truck later. Jordan (as well as Mrs. Stubblefield
and Mrs. Fisher) was among this group of pickets.13
b. In February 1968, as employee Linda
Stephens and others were driving from Respon-
dent's plant, Jordan, on picket duty, called the
group "sons-of-bitches."
c. When Vice President Strasinger and President
Katz were leaving Respondent's plant in an au-
tomobile on February 6, 1968, Jordan (as well as
Mrs. Fisher) was among a group of pickets who,
hooting and yelling, blocked the exit, slowing the
car's departure.
d. Supervisor Mrs. Fleming, and Supervisor Mrs.
Harper worked late one day in the spring of 1968
when Mrs. Jordan was picketing. As the two super-
visors were leaving the premises Mrs. Jordan yelled
to them: "Why are you so late? Did you have to
stay in there and suck old Cady off before you
could go home?"
e. On April 4, 1968, employee Louise Gaston
left the plant in her car accompanied by other
female employees. While driving on the nearby
public highway a female striker named Eleanor Mc-
Carver threw a rock which hit her car. Gaston
drove on a short way and then stopped and got out
of her car to inspect the damage. At this point a
group of female strikers, including Jordan (and
Mrs. Byers and Mrs. Stubblefield) ran toward her
shouting that they were going to "get" her. Mrs.
Gaston got in her car and drove off.
f. On April 9, employee Betty Sue Christian
sought to enter the plant premises when her car was
surrounded and blocked by a group of some 30 or
more pickets who taunted her and kicked and
rocked her car. Noticing this situation, Mr. Cady
came to the scene, got behind the wheel of
Christian's car, and as he was driving into the
premises (with employee Christian lying down in
the front seat area) rocks were thrown at the car by
pickets, resulting in a broken windshield. Mrs. Jor-
dan (and Mrs. Stubblefield ) was among the group
of pickets present at the time of this incident. In ad-
dition, Mrs. Jordan hit the side of another car, en-
tering the premises at this same time, with a picket
sign.
g. On a day in April 1968, employee Atnip was
sweeping up tacks spread at a plant entrance. Mrs.
Jordan was walking the picket line at this point and
'= Respondent 's position as to these two is that they withdrew their appli-
cations, a position I have sustained as to Bradley but not as to Farmer See
supra
" For a further description of this incident , see the Board 's pnor deci-
sion, 173 NLRB 1403, sec B, 3
HARTMANN LUGGAGE COMPANY
said to Atnip that "if you s.o.bs. hadn't gone back
to work we would be in there working"; and also
said to Atnip that she ought to break her picket
sign over his head.
I have carefully considered the testimony of Mrs.
Jordan, which contains general denials that she en-
gaged in various types of activity and specific deni-
als that she participated in or witnessed various
specific incidents, in which, according to Respon-
dent's evidence, she was directly involved. Based
on demeanor observations and other criteria for
determining credibility, I am unable to credit her
testimony to the extent that it may fairly be said to
create a direct conflict with Respondent's evidence.
Accordingly, I credit the latter and find that she en-
gaged in the conduct enumerated in the preceding
subparagraphs.
2. Mrs. Irene Stubblefield
According to Respondent's witnesses:
a. Mrs. Stubblefield was among the pickets in-
volved in the truck blocking incident of January 26
previously described in subparagraph "a" under
section C, 1, above.
b. On the morning of the strike, January 23,
Mrs. Stubblefield was among some 30 pickets who
blocked the entrance to the employee parking lot,
preventing Mrs. Harper, a supervisor, from driving
her car into the parking lot. On this occasion, Mrs.
Stubblefield told Mrs. Harper she could go back
home-that there would be no work at the plant
that day. Mrs. Harper turned her car around and
went home.
c. The Board's prior decision describes two
separate but related incidents of assault committed
on April 8 by men strikers on nonstriking em-
ployees named Bane. 14 Mrs. Stubblefield was
among a large group of pickets who stood around
yelling and jeering as one or another of these as-
saults was committed.
d. Mrs. Stubblefield was among the group of
pickets who pursued Mrs. Gaston's car and
threatened her, as previously described in subpara-
graph "e" under section C, 1, above.
e. Mrs. Stubblefield was among the group of
pickets involved in the incident of car blocking and
terrorizing of Betty Sue Christian on April 9, previ-
ously described in subparagraph "f" under section
C, 1, above.
f. About April, while employee Atnip and a
Negro coworker were sweeping up nails and tacks
at a plant entrance, Mrs. Stubblefield said to them
"If it hadn't been for you black s.o.bs. we would
soon get this over with and get back in to work."
g. Sometime in the spring, Mrs. Stubblefield told
a salesman (for some third party) who was entering
the plant to tell a nonstriking employee named
Ashe, whom she described as a "two faced son-of-
a-bitch," that she would whip his ass (or would beat
1253
the hell out of him) when she got back to work.
The salesman relayed this message to Ashe.
By a combination of general and specific
testimony on direct and cross-examination, Mrs.
Stubblefield denied that she engaged in the various
items of conduct with which Respondent's evidence
charges her. She further testified that she did not
witness any blocking of cars, throwing of objects, or
cursing on the picket line, although she was a
picket line captain and was on full-time picket duty
from January 23 until about March 26, during
which period a considerable number of such in-
cidents occurred. I am of the opinion that Mrs.
Stubblefield was involved in and witnessed more
than she was willing to admit. For this reason and
since I see no reason to discredit Respondent's wit-
nesses, I credit their testimony and find that Mrs.
Stubblefield engaged in the conduct described in
the preceding subparagraphs.
3. Mrs. Onie Hodge
a. According to nonstriker Harris, who worked
for Respondent from the time the strike began until
about April 1968, he received a telephone call
about February 25 from Mrs. Hodge, his wife's
aunt, who told him that if he went back ( meaning, I
infer, continued) to work he would be stopped and
be black and blue; that no one was working at the
plant but a bunch of jailbirds and whores; and that
they ( meaning, I infer, the strikers) had already
broken a bunch of (automobile) windows and
although everything was then quiet it was going to
get rough again.
b. According to nonstriker Linda Stephens on an
occasion in the spring of 1968, three pickets, in-
cluding Mrs. Hodge and Mrs. Reeves, blocked her
from entering the plant for about 5 minutes by
walking back and forth across the front end of her
car so that she could not proceed without hitting
them.
Mrs. Hodge denied having threatened any em-
ployee in the manner described by Harris or having
ever blocked any cars. And although she appears to
have been on the picket line for the most part of
every day during the first several months of the
strike, she denied seeing any of various incidents
which took place during this period.
For reasons previously stated, I am distrustful of
Mrs. Hodge's testimony and find that she engaged
in the conduct described above.
4. Mrs. Lorene Taylor
According to Supervisors Martha Fleming and
Greely Ricketts, while riding to the plant in
Ricketts' car on January 29 they were blocked from
entering the plant premises by a large body of
pickets. While halted Mrs. Taylor stepped up to the
car and told Ricketts that they (meaning the
" See the Board 's decision, sec B, 12.
1254 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
strikers) were mad at him. He said he was sorry.
Mrs. Taylor said they were mad and were going to
stay mad. Ricketts said he was sorry to lose friends.
Mrs. Taylor said it would be a shame for them to
have to kill him (or they hated to kill him) because
he was too young to die but it seemed like they
were going to be forced to do so. (On the next day,
and succeeding ones, Ricketts was the victim of
threats, assault, and car damage at the hands of
pickets as found in the Board's prior decision.) 15
Mrs. Taylor denied that she had threatened to
kill a supervisor and, although she was on picket
line duty much of the time in the early months of
the strike, denied that she saw, for example, any in-
stances of blocking traffic to and from the plant or
participated in or saw any kind of picket line
misconduct. I credit Respondent's evidence and
find that she made the threats to Ricketts' life
described in Respondent 's evidence.
5. Mrs. Guila Byers
a. According to Respondent's witness Gaston,
Mrs. Byers was among the pickets who on April 4
chased her car and threatened to "get her," after a
rock thrown by another striker had hit her car (see
subparagraph "e" under section C, 1, above).
b. According to Respondent's witness Mrs.
West, as her husband was driving her home from
the plant one day in the spring of 1968, Mrs. Byers,
who was walking the picket line , made the motions
of reaching into her pocket and of throwing
something ( I infer in the path of the car ). When the
Wests reached their home they had a flat tire with
two nails in it.
c. Mrs . Byers was one of a large number of
pickets who, as a group , blocked the entrance to
the employees ' parking lot on January 23, the first
day of the strike. As Foreman Barnes drew up to
this entrance someone in the group told him that
neither he nor anyone else was going in to work. He
then eased his car forward whereupon all of the
pickets moved out of the way except Mrs. Byers,
who held onto the front of his car as it proceeded
ahead and then moved to one side.16
Mrs. Byers denied that she ever chased a car,
ever dropped tacks in a plant entryway or made any
gestures of throwing tacks or anything, or ever at-
tempted to block any automobile from entering
plant premises. But her further testimony strongly
indicates that she was engaged in mass picketing
which blocked the employees' entrance on January
23 on the occasion of the Barnes incident. On all of
the pertinent testimony, I am satisfied that the
testimony of Respondent's witnesses should be
credited over that of Mrs. Byers and find that she
18 See 173 NLRB 1403, sec 111, B, 5 and 9.
10 In connection with this incident Mrs. Byers lodged with the local
authorities a complaint of assault against Barnes After a trial in a local
court, this complaint was dismissed
11 If this were the only instance of alleged tack or nail throwing, I would
engaged in the conduct ascribed as her in Respon-
dent's evidence, and including a finding that she
threw nails in front of the Wests' car. 17
6. Mrs. Dorothy Fisher
Respondent's evidence concerning Mrs. Fisher is
that on two occasions she engaged in mass picket-
ing which delayed entry or exit at Respondent's
plant entrances, and that on a third occasion she
walked the picket line in such a fashion as to delay
employee Gaston's car from emerging from plant
premises.
Mrs. Fisher denied that she was involved in one
of these incidents and otherwise denied generally
that she ever blocked entry to or exit from plant
premises. Considering all of her testimony on cross-
examination as to what she did or saw, I would be
somewhat reluctant to find that she engaged in no
such incidents. But I see no necessity to resolve this
conflict since I am of the opinion that the conduct
ascribed to her in Respondent's evidence is not suf-
ficiently serious misconduct to disentitle her to
reinstatement.
7. Mrs. Vallie Brewington
According to Respondent' s witnesses:
a. On an occasion in the spring of 1968 Mrs.
Brewington walked the picket line in such a way as
to prevent employee Linda Stephens' car from leav-
ing the plant premises for several minutes.
b. As Supervisor Ricketts was driving into the of-
fice parking lot on February 9, a picket named Rex
LaFever (or LaFeber) threw a steel bolt into
Ricketts' car, hitting Ricketts.18 LaFever then left
the scene , walking and then running to a picketers'
tent near Respondent 's premises . As he neared the
tent, Mrs. Brewington took his picket sign from him
and took his place on the picket line.
Mrs. Brewington denied having blocked Linda
Stephens' car, denied seeing the bolt-throwing in-
cident , and denied that in connection with this in-
cident LaFever gave her his picket sign.
On consideration of all the pertinent testimony, I
credit Respondent 's evidence. In connection with
the LaFever incident, Respondent contends that
Mrs. Brewington took possession of LaFever's
picket sign in order to enable LaFever to escape
detection , But it would require more, in my
judgment, than the mere facts that LaFever passed
his sign to Mrs. Brewington and that she took his
place on the picket line to establish such "cover-
up" complicity on her part; hence, I decline to
make the suggested finding.
be hesitant to make the latter finding My hesitance is, however, overcome
by the fact that placing nails or tacks at plant entrances was not an uncom-
mon tactic of the pickets as found in the Board 's prior decision
11 This incident is also described in the Board's prior decision , 173 NLRB
1403, 1405.
HARTMANN LUGGAGE COMPANY 1255
8. Mrs. Elizabeth Reeves
According to Respondent's witness Linda
Stephens, Mrs. Reeves participated with Mrs.
Hodge in preventing Mrs. Stephens from entering
Respondent's premises for a few minutes on one
occasion (see subparagraph "b" under section C, 3,
above). Mrs. Reeves denied that she ever at-
tempted to block or blocked any car from entering
the plant premises. I consider it unnecessary to
resolve this conflict since even if Respondent's
evidence were credited it would be insufficient to
establish serious disqualifying misconduct on Mrs.
Reeves' part.
9. Mrs . Lillie Bradley; Mrs. Gertie Lee Farmer
Respondent adduced no evidence of misconduct
on the part of these two strikers.
Conclusions Respecting Misconduct
On the basis of the foregoing findings , I conclude
that the conduct engaged in by strikers Jordan,
Stubblefield , Hodge, Taylor, and Byers ( 1) afforded
Respondent legitimate and substantial justification
for not reinstating them and (2 ) in any case con-
stitutes serious misconduct disentitling them to the
benefit of a reinstatement order . In so concluding, I
rely particularly on these ladies' various threats of
personal injury to others. I reach contrary conclu-
sions with respect to Mrs . Fisher, Mrs. Brewington,
Mrs. Reeves , and Mrs . Bradley. t0 In the case of
Mrs. Farmer , whom Respondent does not claim was
not reinstated on account of misconduct, I find that
she did not engage in conduct disqualifying her for
reinstatement.
D. Conclusions as to Discrimination
I find that Respondent has met its burden of
establishing that its failure to reinstate strikers Jor-
dan, Stubblefield , Hodge , Taylor, and Byers was
based on legitimate and substantial business
reasons, i.e., their serious misconduct during the
strike as previously found , and hence its action in
their cases was not discriminatory . I further find
that Respondent did not discriminate against Mrs.
Bradley because she withdrew her request to return
to work , and because her request was limited to
reinstatement as a "trimmer " and no trimmer posi-
tion was subsequently filled . As to Brewington,
Reeves, Fisher , and Farmer , Respondent does not
deny that a job or jobs each was capable of per-
forming was filled subsequent to their respective ap-
plications20 nor did Respondent seek to establish
that it employed others than these four because of
the latter 's equal or superior qualifications . Rather
it defends its action on the basis of alleged miscon-
duct ( in the cases of Brewington , Reeves, and
Fisher ), and on the basis of an alleged application
withdrawal in the case of Mrs . Farmer . Having
found against Respondent in these respects , it fol-
lows that Respondent did not sustain its burden of
establishing that it had legitimate and substantial
business reasons for not offering them reinstate-
ment and, hence, in hiring nonstrikers in their stead
Respondent violated their rights to reinstatement
under the principles announced in the Fleetwood
and Laidlaw decisions, regardless of union or
striker animus.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the
record as a whole, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By failing to reinstate Mrs. Dorothy Fisher,
Mrs. Vallie Brewington, Mrs. Elizabeth Reeves, and
Mrs. Gertie Lee Farmer, as hereinabove found,
Respondent has discriminated in regard to hire,
tenure, or terms or conditions of employment to
discourage membership in the Union, and thus has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. By such discrimination Respondent has inter-
fered with, restrained, and coerced employees in
the exercise of their Section 7 rights and thus has
engaged in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. The aforesaid are unfair labor practices af-
fecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. Respondent has not engaged in any unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint not specifi-
cally found herein.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices in violation of Sections
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, my Recommended
Order requires it to cease and desist therefrom and
to take certain affirmative action designed to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that Respondent's failure to rein-
state Mrs. Fisher, Mrs. Brewington, Mrs. Reeves,
and Mrs. Farmer violated the Act, my Recom-
mended Order provides that Respondent offer each
of these employees immediate and full reinstate-
ment to her former or a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to her seniority or other
rights and privileges , and make each whole for any
loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of
the discriminatory failure to reinstate her by pay-
19 I include Mrs Bradley in these findings in case my finding that she is
not entitled to applicant status should be reversed.
f0 While the matter is probably unimportant since each of these four was
qualified to fill I or another of the 13 subsequent openings shown on G.C.
Exh. 2, the record shows that various of the persons hired as shown on this
list subsequently left Respondent 's employ , thus creating additional vacan-
cies.
1256 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ment to her of a sum of money equal to that which
she normally would have earned as wages from the
date of the discriminatory failure to reinstate her to
the date of Respondent's offer of reinstatement,
less her net earnings during such period, with
backpay and interest thereon computed in the
manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.,
138 NLRB 716. Upon this record it is not possible
to determine when the backpay period should be
deemed to have begun in respect of each of the
four discriminatees , i.e., it is not possible to deter-
mine which of the 13 vacancies listed on General
Counsel's Exhibit 2 would have been offered to the
respective discriminatees on a nondiscriminatory
basis of selection. This is due in part to the fact that
the descriptions of their prior experience given by
some of the discriminatees do not in all cases fit
with the terminology used to describe the vacancies
on the exhibit referred to, in part to the fact that
some of the discriminatees appear to be qualified
for more than one of the vacancies, and in part to
an overlapping of previous experience as among
them. Hence this matter must be left to resolution
in the compliance stage of the proceedings.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and the entire record in the case,
and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby issue
the following:
RECOMMENDED ORDER
The Respondent, Hartmann Luggage Company,
Lebanon, Tennessee, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Helpers and Taxicab Drivers Local
Union No. 327, affiliated with the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, or any other
labor organization, by discrimination in regard to
reinstatement, hire tenure, or any term or condition
of employment.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering
with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex-
ercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer to Mrs. Dorothy Fisher, Mrs. Vallie
Brewington , Mrs. Elizabeth Reeves, and Mrs. Ger-
tie Lee Farmer immediate and full reinstatement to
their former or substantially equivalent positions,
r' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings , conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
that the Board 's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals , the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na-
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
or privileges, and make them whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered by reason of the
discrimination against them in the manner set forth
in the section of this decision entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) Notify the above-named employees if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of their right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act, as amended, after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents , for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Recomme31ded Order.
(d) Post at its Lebanon, Tennessee, plant copies
of the attached notice marked "Appendix. "21 Co-
pies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 26, after being duly
signed by the Respondent's representative, shall be
posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon-
dent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26,
in writing , within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.22
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act
not found herein.
tional Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read " Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the Regional Director for
Region 26 , in writing, within 10 days from the date of this Order , what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Helpers and Taxicab
Drivers Local Union No. 327, affilaiated with
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
HARTMANN LUGGAGE COMPANY
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, or any other labor organization, by
discrimination in regard to reinstatement, hire,
tenure, or any term or condition of employ-
ment.
WE WILL offer to Mrs . Dorothy Fisher, Mrs.
Vallie Brewington , Mrs. Elizabeth Reeves, and
Mrs. Gertie Lee Farmer immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges , and will
make them whole for any loss of earnings suf-
fered as a result of discrimination against them.
WE WILL notify the above -named employees
if presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States of their right to full reinstate-
ment upon application in accordance with the
Selective Service Act and the Universal Milita-
ry Training and Service Act, as amended, after
discharge from the Armed Forces.
All of our employees are free to become or
remain or to refrain from becoming or remaining
1257
members of the above-named Union or any other
labor organization.
Dated By
HARTMANN LUGGAGE
COMPANY
(Employer)
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board 's Office, 746 Federal Office Building, 167
North Main Street , Memphis, Tennessee 38103,
Telephone 901-534-3161.