Great Lakes Screw Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 27, 1967

164 N.L.R.B. 149 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 149
Great Lakes Screw Corporation and
International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders,
Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers,
AFL-CIO. Cases 13-CA-6770, 6925, 7024, 7079,
and 7130.
April 27, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN MCCULLOCH AND MEMBERS FANNING
AND JENKINS
On April 7, 1966, Trial Examiner Harry R. Hinkes
issued his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding,
finding that Respondent had engaged in and was
engaging in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the attached Trial Examiner's Decision. The Trial
Examiner also found that the Respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and
recommended that those allegations of the
complaint be dismissed. Thereafter, Respondent
filed exceptions and the Charging Party filed cross-
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and
supporting briefs. The General Counsel filed an
answer to Respondent's exceptions, brief in support
of the answer, cross-exceptions and amended cross-
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision, and a
brief in support of the amended cross-exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and, for the reasons
set forth below, finds that no prejudicial error was
committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The
Board has considered the Trial Examiner's Decision,
the exceptions and the briefs, and the entire record
in the case,' and hereby adopts the findings,
conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner, with the additions and modifications
noted below.
1. Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner's
actions, including the exclusion from the hearing of
Respondent's counsel John D. O'Brien,
demonstrated bias and prejudice that denied it due
process.2
In its brief, Respondent lists rulings and
credibility findings of the Trial Examiner that it
considers prejudicial. These include (a) his rulings
on subpenas, (b) his rulings on adverse witnesses,
(c) the evidentiary rulings, (d) his rulings on
objections, (e) his personal examination of
witnesses, (f) his rulings on amendments to the
pleadings, (g) his treatment of Respondent's
counsel, (h) his rulings on posthearing motions,
(i) his Decision, and (j) his rulings on Respondent's
motion for disqualification. In all, Respondent
contends that the entire hearing was dominated by
the Trial Examiner's bias which carried over into his
Decision. This contention is not supported by the
record.
Respondent's contention that the Trial Examiner
resorted to browbeating and castigation of its
counsel when they attempted to argue against his
granting of the General Counsel's subpena and his
denial of their requests for subpenas is without
foundation in the record. The Trial Examiner was
fair in hearing pertinent arguments from both sides
before making a decision on whether to grant or
deny a requested subpena, and it is not a denial of
due process that he curtailed repetitious argument.
Further, Respondent's reference in its brief to the
"twelve drawers of invoices, orders and the like"
supposedly subpenas by General Counsel, "[n]ot a
single one [of which] was thereafter referred to by
the General Counsel" neglects to add that most of
I As the record, exceptions, and briefs in our opinion
adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties, the
Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied.
On May 9, 1966, Respondent filed a motion to reopen the
record, to introduce into evidence the Annual Report of the Great
Lakes Screw Corporation's Profit-Sharing and Retirement Plan,
which Respondent submitted to the United States Department of
Labor. Replies in opposition to this motion were filed by the
Charging Party and the General Counsel. Respondent filed an
answer to the replies, and in turn General Counsel filed a reply to
Respondent's answer. Respondent's motion to reopen the record
is denied since the document it wishes to introduce is not relevant
to the issues involved herein.
2 On July 12, 1965, after approximately 13 days of hearing,
O'Brien was excluded from the hearing by the Trial Examiner.
The Trial Examiner then granted Respondent 1 week to appeal
his rulings to the Board. On July 14, Respondent requested that
the Board review the Trial Examiner's exclusionary order, and
that it be granted permission to file a brief. The Board granted
permission to file a brief on July 15. Thereafter, Respondent, on
July 26, 1965, filed a brief and appendix in support of appeal from
Trial Examiner's ruling excluding counsel from hearing. On
July 26, General Counsel filed a brief in support of Trial
Examiner's action. On October 8, 1965, the Board issued an order
granting Respondent's request for special permission to appeal
from the Trial Examiner's exclusionary ruling; the Board then
denied the appeal on the ground that the Trial Examiner did not
abuse his discretion and was acting within the scope of his
authority under Section 102.35 and 102.44(a) of the Board's Rules.
The hearing was resumed on October 11, 1965. On October 11,
1965, Respondent, on the basis of affidavits submitted by
Respondent's counsels John D. O'Brien and Charles J. Griffin,
Jr., filed a motion in which it requested that Harry R. Hinkes
withdraw as Trial Examiner from the above proceedings on the
ground of personal bias towards Respondent and its counsel. At
the hearing, on October 12, 1965, the Trial Examiner denied
Respondent's motion, ruling that the affidavits were not sufficient
on their face nor were they filed with due diligence. General
Counsel excepts to the failure of the Trial Examiner to consider
whether O'Brien's conduct, which resulted in his exclusion from
the hearing, amounted to misconduct before the Board of such
character as to warrant suspension or disbarment. Although we
find O'Brien's conduct at the hearing warrants our condemnation,
we do not rind it requires suspension or disbarment. See
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 542 (The Bell
Telephone Company of Pennsylvania), 144 NLRB 1351.
164 NLRB No. 20
150 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
this material, some of which went back 18 years, was
not in compliance with the subpena but resulted
from Respondent's unwillingness to cull the
personnel records for 1965 from the boxes of
"confetti."
Respondent contends there was prejudicial
treatment in the Trial Examiner's rulings that Olive
Stone, Charlotte Klaubo, Robert Barth, and Robert
Farkos could be examined by the General Counsel
under Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Charlotte Klaubo was not examined by
the General Counsel as an adverse witness. Further,
Respondent's brief ignores the testimony in the
record in which Olive Stone prior to her examination
under Rule 43(b) admitted that she had refused to
talk to General Counsel when he visited her home on
the morning of the hearing and at the hearing stated
on advice of counsel "I don't have to [testify] if I
don't want to." As for Personnel Director Robert
Barth and Factory Manager Robert Farkos, their
management positions with Respondent qualified
them for examination under Rule 43(b). Moreover,
Respondent's contention that the Trial Examiner
erred in not allowing it to examine Ernest Donnelly,
an alleged discriminatee, under Rule 43(b) is not
supported by the record which indicates no refusal
on the part of this witness to answer questions.
Respondent contends that, in his evidentiary
rulings, the Trial Examiner favored the General
Counsel. Thus, Respondent contends that the Trial
Examiner permitted the General Counsel to employ
a leading question in examining employee Wilbourn
and thereafter credited him, while similar use of a
leading question by Respondent in examining Barth
led to Barth's being discredited. We are uncertain as
to the nature of Respondent's argument. Obviously
it does not contend that the Trial Examiner, in
allowing both General Counsel and Respondent
freedom in the use of leading questions, was
indulging in bias and prejudice. Therefore, we are
left with the improbable proposition that the Trial
Examiner is biased for relying in part on Barth's
response to Respondent's leading question in
reaching the conclusion that Barth's explanations
were vacillating. A careful reading of the transcript
convinces us that the Trial Examiner was liberal in
his evidentiary rulings in order to expedite the
hearing, that there was no favoritism to either side,
and that Respondent's use of these rulings to sustain
its contention of bias and prejudice is groundless.
Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner
erred by refusing to sustain many of Respondent's
objections on the grounds that they were
"unwarranted" or "overly technical."
At the hearing, both General Counsel and
Respondent displayed zeal and ingenuity in pursuing
their cases as a result of which some objections were
overly technical and superfluous. The record
indicates that the Trial Examiner, in attempting to
maintain an orderly hearing, criticized both General
Counsel and Respondent for their unwarranted
objections. Moreover, at one point in the
proceedings, Respondent's counsel, in a
sympathetic reply to the Trial Examiner's comment
concerning the making of objections "merely
because they are technically objectionable," stated,
"Mr. Examiner, I agree with you, but we are faced
here with very competent counsel representing the
government."
Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner's
personal examination of some of the witnesses is
further evidence of bias and prejudice. There is
nothing in the record to sustain this contention. Out
of a total of approximately 82 witnesses called by
General Counsel and Respondent, Respondent
names 4 witnesses personally examined by the Trial
Examiner. The examination of witnesses by the Trial
Examiner was solely in the interest of clarifying
specific points and does not demonstrate either bias
or prejudgment of the case.
Respondent contends that the Trial Examiner's
bias and prejudice are exemplified by his permitting
General Counsel to amend the pleadings on four
different occasions over the objections of
Respondent while not granting Respondent
permission to amend its answer, and by the Trial
Examiner's rulings on Respondent's posthearing
motions. Section 102.17 of the Board's Rules and
Regulations, Series 8, as amended, states in part
that "Any ... complaint may be amended ... at the
hearing ... upon motion, by the Trial Examiner
designated to conduct the hearing." The record does
not indicate an abuse of the Trial Examiner's
discretion in his rulings on amendments. As for
Respondent's contention that the Trial Examiner
refused to hear its motion to amend its answer, the
transcript indicates that at the hearing Respondent
kept vacillating and could not decide whether to
amend its answer or not. Finally, the Trial Examiner
asked Respondent to take a position. Respondent
then withdrew its motion to amend.
In sustaining the Trial Examiner's refusal to grant
Respondent's motion to disqualify himself, the
Board relies solely on the failure of the record to
sustain the objections contained in the affidavits on
which the motion was based.
Even assuming that the Trial Examiner erred in
some of his rulings, such errors do not necessarily
require setting aside the Trial Examiner's Decision.
In deciding whether a fair hearing was held or
whether the Trial Examiner's rulings were so
prejudicial that there was a denial of due process,
the Board has adopted as its criterion Rule 61 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in
part "no error or defect in any ruling or order of the
court is ground for setting aside a verdict ... unless
refusal to take such action appears to the court
GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 151
inconsistent with substantial justice."3 Hence,
Respondent must show that the Trial Examiner's
rulings were prejudicial to its substantive rights.4
This Respondent has not done.
2. We affirm the 8(a)(1) findings of the Trial
Examiner and, in addition, are in agreement with the
General Counsel's exceptions that the following acts
of Respondent constituted violations of Section
8(a)(1):
(a) The statement by Plant Manager Farkos to
employee Chapman that "if the Union did come in
Farkos would be a negotiator and it would be a year,
or two before a contract would be signed."
(b) Farkos' statement to employee Rentner "to
tell Lundberg to take the badge off and he would get
two men on his shift like they had on the night shift."
(c) The response by Foreman Gerdzas on being
reminded by employee Story that only 2 weeks
earlier Gerdzas had praised Story's work, "Yes, but
under the circumstances we have got to review this
all again."
3. We find, in agreement with the General
Counsel, in view of the massive and deliberate unfair
labor practices committed by the Respondent, that
the conventional reinstatement, backpay, and
posting of notice requirements for 8(a)(3) and (1)
violations are not completely adequate to undo the
effect that these violations had upon Respondent's
employees.'
Thus, we have found that Respondent committed
21 violations of Section 8(a)(3) among which were the
unlawful mass discharge of 37 employees and the
transfer of 13 employees; that it committed 35
violations of Section 8(a)(1) including illegal threats,
interrogations, and acts of surveillance; and, in
addition, committed violations of Section 8(a)(2) and
(4). Accordingly, we shall require that Respondent,
in addition to posting the notice to employees
attached hereto at all places where notices to
employees are customarily placed, shall mail copies
thereof, after it has been signed by Respondent's
representative, to each of its employees. We shall
also require Respondent upon the request of- the
Union to give the Union and its representatives
reasonable access, for a period of 1 year beginning
with the issuance date of this Decision, to its bulletin
boards and other places where notices to employees
are customarily placed.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Great Lakes
Screw Corporation, Riverdale, Illinois, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action
set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order, as herein modified:
1. Delete paragraph 2(f). Renumber paragraph
2(g) as new paragraph 2(h). Add the following
paragraphs 2(f) and 2(g).
"(f) Copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix," to be furnished by the Regional
Director for Region 13, shall be signed by a
representative of the Respondent. Thereafter, a
copy shall be mailed by the Respondent to each of its
employees, and additional copies shall be posted by
it and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material."
"(g) Upon request of the Union, immediately
grant the Union and its representatives reasonable
access, for a 1-year period beginning with the
issuance date of this Decision, to its bulletin boards
and all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted."
2. Add the following, after the Armed Services
notification paragraph of the notice attached to the
Trial Examiner's Decision:
WE WILL grant the Union and its
representatives reasonable access for a 1-year
period to our bulletin boards and all places
where notices to our employees are customarily
posted.
3 Rule 61 of the FRCP, in full , reads as follows
No error in either admission or the exclusion of evidence
and no error or defeat in any ruling or order or in anything
done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground
for granting a new trial or setting aside a verdict or for
vacating , modifying , or otherwise disturbing a judgment or
order , unless refusal to take such action appears to the court
inconsistent with substantial justice The court at every stage
of the proceeding must disregard any error or defeat in the
proceeding which does not affect substantial rights of the
parties
4 Spector Freight System , Inc, 141 NLRB 1110 Crown
Corrugated Container , Inc , 123 NLRB 318
5 H W Elson Bottling Company, 155 NLRB 714 J. P Stevens
and Co ., Inc, 157 NLRB 869, and 163 NLRB 217
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HARRY R. HINKES, Trial Examiner: International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders,
Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, hereinafter
called the Union, on November 3, 1964, filed the original
charge in Case 13-CA-6770 against Great Lakes Screw
Corporation, hereinafter called the Employer, Company,
or Respondent, alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. This
charge was amended on December 11, 1964. On
February 2, 1965, Respondent, the Union, and the
Regional Director for Region 13 entered into an informal
settlement agreement wherein in consideration for the
withdrawal of the charges in that case Respondent
promised not to interrogate its employees, threaten them
with plant closure or reduction of wages or hours of work,
withhold or threaten to withhold merit increases, require
them to request return of their union cards, grant wage
increases, discharge or threaten to discharge them, or in
152 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce them.
Further, in settlement of 8(a)(3) charges, Respondent
agreed to reinstate, with backpay, employees Witkowski
and Nelson.
Less than 4 weeks later, on February 28, the original
charge in Case 13-CA-6925 was filed and amended
thereafter on March 29, April 5 and 28, and May 11,
alleging violations of Section 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) of the
Act. Thereupon, on May 11, the Regional Director for
Region 13 withdrew his approval of the settlement
agreement with the exception of the 8(a)(3) remedy. On
May 14, 1965, the complaint was issued. The original
charge in Case 13-CA-7024 was filed on May 14, 1965.
Additional charges in Cases 13-CA-7079 and 13-CA-7130
were filed on June 23, 1965, and August 13, 1965,
respectively. The complaint of May 14, 1965, was
amended on May 26, 1965, and further amended during
the hearing by certain additions.
Respondent made its answer to the complaint on June 9,
1965, and also at the hearing. These answers admitted the
timely filing and service of the charges, jurisdiction, labor
organization status of the Union, and supervisory status of
Robert Crawford, Jennings Crawford, Ford, Pavlov,
Insalata, Gerdzas, Erickson, Norman, Pozniak, and
Paravich. Respondent further admitted by its formal
answer and by the statement of counsel during the hearing
that during the last 3 months of 1964 it violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by:
1. Threatening its employees with loss of employment
and wages through discriminatory application of plant
rules and other reprisals.
2. Interrogating its employees.
3. Creating the impression that it kept under
surveillance the union activities of its employees and the
Union.
4. Soliciting and inducing employees to revoke their
union authorizations.
5. Soliciting and inducing employees to refrain from
wearing union buttons.
6. Instructing its employees to refrain from attending
union meetings.
7. Soliciting individual grievances from its employees
and promising to resolve these to employee's benefit.
8. Offering, promising, and granting its employees wage
increases and other benefits or improvements in their
terms and conditions of employment.
9. Keeping under surveillance the meeting places,
meetings, and activities of the Union and the union and
concerted activities of its employees.
10. Restricting the movement of its employees.
11. Prohibiting employees from communicating with
other persons in the plant.
12. Warning employees that attempts to bargain
through the Union would be futile.
Respondent further admits the execution of the
settlement agreement; the transfer (while denying the
discriminatory nature thereof) of employees Wilbourn,
Day, Story, Tulk, Guindon, Faron, Morris, Rito, Reynolds,
Fuqua, Older, Terry, and Whatley to other departments or
shifts in March 1965: the discharge (while denying the
discriminatory nature thereof), of employees Smith, Story,
Chapman, and Wilbourn; and the mass discharge (while
denying the discriminatory nature thereof) on March 29,
1965, of the 37 dischargees named in the complaint.
Respondent denies the supervisory and agency status of
Gowran, Stone, and Rapley; the threat by Norman on
December 6, 1964; the 8(a)(1) acts of Jennings Crawford on
or about December 15, 1964; the labor organization status
of, and the allegations concerning, the Employee Advisory
Committee; the alleged pre- and post-settlement violations
of Section 8(a)(3) and (4) of the Act; the alleged
postsettlement violations of Section 8(a)(1); the discharge
of employees Rentner, Casas, and Tulk; the suspension of
employees Sebolt and Day; the layoff of employee
McNanna; the obstruction of the Board hearing by
publishing a plant rule penalizing witnesses and by the
destruction of employee records and their replacement
with manufactured ones; and the discharge of Supervisor
Mann. Respondent further denies knowledge concerning
the allegation that its alleged agent Stone attempted to
alter or destroy certain records in violation of Section
8(a)(1).
I cannot agree with Respondent that it has not violated
the settlement agreement by its conduct after February 2,
1965. The findings below detail such violations.
Accordingly, I must consider both the presettlement and
postsettlement conduct of the Respondent in arriving at a
determination whether the allegations of the consolidated
complaint have been sustained. Larrance Tank
Corporation, 94 NLRB 352; Northern California District
Council of Hodcarriers, 154 NLRB 1384. The unfair labor
practices of the Respondent discussed below are set forth
in approximate chronological order.
On the issues thus joined hearings were held in Chicago,
Illinois, during much of June, July, and October, 1965. All
parties (except the Party of Interest) were represented
and afforded full opportunity to adduce evidence, examine
and cross-examine witnesses, and make oral argument.
The hearing was interrupted between July and October.
When the hearing resumed in October a motion to
disqualify the Trial Examiner was filed, accompanied by
affidavits, alleging certain behavior on the part of the Trial
Examiner indicating bias and prejudice. Section 102.37 of
the Rules and Regulations of NLRB requires the Trial
Examiner to disqualify himself "if, in the opinion of the
Trial Examiner, such affidavit is filed with due diligence
and is sufficient on its face." Upon being questioned by
me, counsel for the Respondent advised me that I was not
required to accept as a fact whatever was recited in the
affidavit. I then stated I had found at least one gross
distortion of fact in the motion. After examining the
allegations of that motion and the requirements of Section
102.37 of the Rules, I ruled that the affidavits were not
sufficient on their face nor were they filed with due
diligence and denied the motion to disqualify.
At the conclusion of the hearing the parties were invited
to file briefs and proposed findings and the maximum time
was allowed them for this purpose in view of the length of
the hearing and the complexity of the issues.
Nevertheless, only the General Counsel has submitted a
brief. The following findings of fact are based upon my
study of the extensive record in this proceeding, my close
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and an
examination of the only brief submitted for my guidance.'
' Following a motion to correct the transcript filed by some of the corrections proposed by Respondent, rejecting
Respondent, I issued an order correcting the transcript, adopting others, and adding some not proposed by the parties.
FINDINGS OF FACT
GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP.
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Great Lakes Screw Corporation is, and has been at all
times material herein, a corporation duly organized under,
and existing by virtue of, the laws of the State of Illinois.
At all times material herein, Respondent has maintained a
plant and place of business at 13631 South Halsted Street,
Riverdale, Illinois, and has been at all times material
herein engaged at its place of business in the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of screws and related products.
During the calendar year 1964 in the course and conduct of
its business operations, Respondent manufactured, sold,
and distributed products the gross value of which
exceeded $500,000. During the same period of time it
manufactured, sold, and distributed products valued in
excess of $50,000, which products were shipped from its
plant directly to States of the United States other than the
State of Illinois.
The complaint charges, the Respondent's answer
admits, and I find that the Respondent is now, and at all
times material herein has been, an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers , Iron Ship
Builders, Blacksmiths , Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO, is
now, and at all times material herein has been , a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
The complaint alleges that the Employee Advisory
Committee is, and at all times material herein has been, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act. Respondent ' s answer denies this allegation. An
Employee Grievance Committee was formed in 1958. It
was disbanded shortly after 1959 and resumed in 1962.
Subsequent to December 1964, the Committee was
renamed the Employee Advisory Committee.
Meetings were held by the Committee once a month on
average. Minutes of some of the meetings were received in
evidence . Management representatives explained that
meetings of the Committee are "used as an exchange of
ideas. The meeting can best be used as an effective means
of communication between employer-employee."
Procedures devised by the Respondent specifically
provide "Grievances of a general or group nature will be
aired at the monthly meetings attended by the elected
employee representatives and representatives of
management ." Among other things, the minutes show
discussions of the employees' parking lot and its
improvement , plans to improve the supply of hot water in
the locker room, plans to revise employees ' vacation
schedules , discussions of the amount of vacation pay, and
cost-of-living pay increases and differences in hourly rates
of pay in different departments , installation of additional
drinking fountains for employees , and similar matters.
Factory Manager Farkos testified that the workload study
made in the shaver department was in response to a
complaint from a committee representative.
I conclude that the function of the Committee was to
deal with management concerning grievances, labor
disputes , wages, and conditions of work and find that the
Employee Advisory Committee is, and all times material
herein has been, a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act . (Thompson Ramo Wooldridge,
Inc., 132 NLRB 993, enfd . 305 F . 2d 807 (C.A. 7).)
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Presettlement Activity
1. The motel incident
153
The Union began its organizational campaign in October
1964 by handbilling Respondent's plant. Respondent
reacted by admittedly prohibiting union supporters from
communicating with other persons, instructing its
employees to refrain from attending union meetings,
soliciting employees to revoke their union authorizations,
threatening its employees with loss of employment and
other reprisals for supporting the Union, and creating the
impression that union meetings and other concerted
activities of its employees were being kept under
surveillance. The Union, nevertheless, called an employee
meeting for October 25 at the Town and Country Motel.
Employee Olive Stone, whose duties include the authority
to make reservations for company personnel, made a
company reservation at the motel for that date at the
request of Personnel Director Travis. Although this
coincidence of the union meeting with Stone's reservation
for Personnel Director Travis would appear to be of no
significance, this conclusion is negated by subsequent
events.
Respondent admits surveillance of this union meeting.
The credible testimony of the manager of the motel reveals
that Travis was registered at the motel on October 25. On
the next day, October 26, 1964, Stone asked the motel
manager to change the name of Travis' registration or
destroy it. This the manager refused to do. Obviously,
Respondent was seeking to destroy evidence that its agent
was at the motel on the day of the union meeting. Such
evidence would be important in a charge of unlawful
surveillance and its destruction an impediment to the
Board's investigation of the charge. To that extent,
therefore, the attempted destruction of the registration
was an interference with the right of employees to a fair
appraisal of any charge of unfair labor practices by
destroying evidence which would be instrumental to an
order preventing unlawful surveillance by the Respondent.
(Bannon Mills, Inc., 146 NLRB 611, 627, 630; Certain-
Teed Products Corporation, 147 NLRB 1517; Duralite Co.,
Inc., 128 NLRB 648.)
Although Respondent denies any knowledge of Stone's
acts as well as her status as agent of the Respondent, the
record shows that she was the employee whose functions
included getting reservations for company officials and
that she had done so both before and after October 25,
1964. There was no apparent limitation upon her authority
as a reservation clerk. Although the record permits an
inference of her actual authority to request a change in
Respondent's registration at the motel, no such finding is
required here or under the Act. Under the ordinary
common law rules of agency, her apparent authority to so
act was sufficient to bind the Respondent and I so find.
International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. N.L.R.B.,
237 F.2d 545 (C.A.D.C.).
Respondent also seeks dismissal of this allegation of the
complaint because of a variance between it and the
evidence adduced. The attempted destruction of the motel
record occurred October 26, 1964; the original charge in
this proceeding was filed in November 1964. The
complaint alleges that Stone attempted to interfere with an
investigation conducted by the Board by attempting to
destroy the motel record. Respondent argues that since no
Board investigation had begun on October 26, Stone's
154 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
attempt to destroy the records could not have interfered
with any conducted Board investigation. I do not agree.
The destruction of a record may, and in this case, would
have interfered with the future Board investigation of a
charge of unlawful surveillance. The fact that the
investigation had not yet been conducted by the Board is
not material. The issue was completely litigated and
Respondent given all the time requested to present its
defense to the evidence adduced on the issue.
Southwestern of Dallas Optical Company, 153 NLRB 33.
2. Admitted 8(a)(1) violations
Respondent's unfair labor practices intensified in
November 1964. Admittedly, Foreman Norman threatened
the employees with loss of employment and wages,
discriminatory application of plant rules and other
reprisals if they gave support to the Union; he also created
the impression that Respondent kept under surveillance
the union meetings or other concerted activities of the
employees, and interrogated the employees concerning
their union membership. Company President Robert
Crawford, admittedly, also interrogated employees
similarly.
Nevertheless, some of Respondent's employees began
wearing union buttons early in December whereupon
Respondent's unfair labor practices multiplied.
Respondent admits that during December 1964:
1. Company President Crawford, Factory Manager
Farkos, and Superintendent Pavlov threatened the
employees with loss of employment and wages,
discriminatory application of plant rules, and other
reprisals if they gave assistance or support to the Union or
engaged in other concerted activities.
2. Plant Manager Farkos, Superintendent Pavlov, and
Foremen Norman and Paravich interrogated employees
concerning their union membership, activities, and
desires.
3. President Crawford and Factory Manager Farkos
solicited and induced employees to revoke their
authorizations of the Union.
4. President Crawford, Factory Manager Farkos, and
Superintendent Pavlov solicited and induced employees to
refrain from wearing union buttons.
5. Factory Manager Farkos, Superintendent Pavlov,
and Norman solicited individual grievances from
employees and promised to resolve the grievances to
employees' benefit if they refrained from becoming or
remaining members of the Union or giving assistance or
support to the Union.
6. President Crawford, Factory Manager Farkos,
Superintendent Pavlov, and Norman offered, promised,
and granted employees wage increases and other benefits
or improvements in their terms and conditions of
employment in order to induce them to refrain from
becoming union members or giving any assistance or
support to it.
7. Factory Manager Farkos and Foreman Norman
restricted the movement of the employees because they
gave assistance or support to the Union or in order to
induce them to refrain from giving assistance or support to
the Union.
8. Factory Manager Farkos prohibited employees from
communicating with other persons in the plant because
the restricted employees gave assistance or support to the
Union.
9. President Crawford and Superintendent Pavlov
warned employees that attempts to bargain through the
Union would be futile.
All the foregoing presettlement behavior was not only
admitted by Respondent but conceded by it as well to
constitute violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
3. Other presettlement violations
a. Jennings Crawford
There were other presettlement actions of the
Respondent which I find to have been in violation of the
Act. During the week following Thanksgiving 1964,
employee Gary Corder received a telephone call at his
home from Jennings Crawford, Respondent's executive
vice president. After identifying himself, Crawford asked
Corder if he knew who were involved with the Union; if he,
Crawford, could keep in touch with him; that he would
keep in touch with Corder; and hoped that he could rely on
Corder. Corder testified that one Allen Hanson had called
him previously, asking if Corder knew anything about the
Union and whether Jennings Crawford could call Corder.
Jennings Crawford, however, testified that Hanson told
him that Corder wanted to talk to one of the Crawfords and
that he called Corder in response. According to Jennings
Crawford, Corder was not at home at the time, so Jennings
told Mrs. Corder to have Gary call his telephone number
and Gary returned the call later. Respondent did not put
Hanson on the stand to corroborate Jennings Crawford's
statement that Corder wanted to talk to one of the
Crawfords. Instead Respondent called Mrs. Hanson who
testified that she told Jennings Crawford that Corder
wanted to talk to him. In a prehearing affidavit, however,
Mrs. Hanson had stated, "I don't remember him [Corder]
asking me to have Mr. Crawford call him or get in touch
with him." With such contradiction I cannot credit Mrs.
Hanson's testimony. Mrs. Corder also testified. She stated
that she had never taken a telephone number from
Crawford and given it to her husband. I find Mrs. Corder's
testimony to be credible and persuasive and corroborative
of Gary Corder's testimony. Corder's testimony is also
impressive because he was employed by the Respondent
at the time of the hearing and would be disinclined to
jeopardize his continued employment with the Respondent
by falsehood, particularly since he has paid no money or
dues to the Union at any time. I therefore credit the
testimony of Gary Corder rather than that of Jennings
Crawford, and find that Respondent unlawfully
interrogated Corder, created the impression that it was
about to engage in unlawful surveillance, and solicited the
employee to engage in such surveillance, all in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent seeks dismissal of this allegation of the
complaint on the ground of variance between the
pleadings and the proof. The complaint alleges that
Jennings Crawford interfered with Respondent's
employees' rights at an employee's home. The evidence
proves such interference by a telephone conversation
between Corder at his home and Jennings Crawford. I find
this difference between the complaint and proof to be
indistinguishable and, accordingly, reject this argument of
the Respondent.
b. Billy Spray
Employee Billy Spray began wearing a union button
shortly before December 8, 1964. On December 8,
GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP.
Foreman Norman asked Spray why he was wearing the
button. Several days later Norman told Spray he would
have to stay in his own department as long as he was
wearing the union button. He also said that when Spray
was wearing the union button in other departments he was
soliciting votes. When Spray denied soliciting votes on
company time, Norman replied, "As long as you are
wearing this union button you are soliciting union votes.
You are more or less a representative of the Union." Later
that month Spray was called into Farkos' office. Personnel
Director Travis was also present as well as employee
Maurice Chapman. Farkos wanted to know why Chapman
and Spray were wearing union buttons, and he told them
that President Crawford did not need Great Lakes Screw,
that he had other interests and was a wealthy man. On
several different occasions when Spray visited Farkos'
office, Farkos questioned Spray's reason for wearing the
union button and not pulling it off.
On one occasion in December 1964, Spray was using a
telephone on company property, something which he had
done frequently in the past and concerning which no
comments, rules, or prohibitions had been voiced. Shortly
after starting the telephone conversation, Spray was
approached by Foreman Norman who accused Spray of
being on the telephone too long. Angry at this criticism,
Spray went to Farkos and complained of Norman's
"riding" him. Spray asked Farkos if he wanted him to quit.
To which Farkos replied, "I would rather see you reform
than quit. I would rather see you pull that button off than
to see you quit." Since there was no criticism of Norman's
behavior, the fair inference from Farkos' language is that
the complained of treatment would continue unless Spray
took off his button. It should be noted at this point that the
Respondent has admitted Farkos was inducing employees
to refrain from wearing union buttons in December 1964 in
violation of Section 8(a)(1).
Spray obtained his union card from employee Phelps
who was discharged by the Respondent on December 11,
1964. On learning of Phelps' discharge, Spray went to
Farkos' office and offered to pull his union button off if
Farkos gave Phelps his job back. On the following
Monday, Spray went back to Farkos and repeated his
offer. Farkos then telephoned Phelps' home, stating that
Spray had convinced him to give Phelps another chance
and asking Phelps to come in. Spray then removed his
button. The climate then changed rather dramatically for
Spray. When Spray went to the same telephone to call the
same party that he had called when Norman had
reprimanded him, Farkos, seeing him, invited him to use
Farkos' telephone. Although Spray had told Farkos
previously that he had a "personal gripe" because he had
not received all of the 10-cent raise but only 5 cents of it, a
payroll change notice was put through on December 22
(after Spray had removed his union button), not only giving
Spray the 5-cent increase but making it retroactive to the
previous June 1. I find this retroactive pay increase the
result of Spray's removal of the union button and a
violation of Section 8(a)(3).
Norman's contradiction of Spray's testimony was
unconvincing. He first denied questioning Spray about
wearing a union button but later admitted asking him why
he put it on. He was in some doubt as to dates of his visits
with Spray. With respect to restricting Spray's movement
when he wore the union button, Norman first denied such
restriction, admitting only that he told Spray to spend
more time at his machine. Later he stated that he
155
requested Spray to stay by his machine. Norman also
testified that this instruction was given to Spray in mid-
November, although, according to Norman, Spray's
alleged absences from his machine did not start until early
December. Farkos' version of his conversations with Spray
are similarly unpersuasive. For the reasons discussed
later, I have placed little reliance upon the testimony of
Factory Manager Farkos. Farkos testified that when Spray
offered to remove his button if Phelps was reinstated,
Farkos replied, "No, I don't make deals." It should be
noted, however, that when Farkos testified about another
employee (Rentner), he said, "I listened to his complaint
on that merit increase. I said-I will make a deal with
you." Farkos claimed that Spray asked to speak to
President Crawford who later instructed Farkos to
reinstate Phelps. Crawford, however, was not asked about
this incident. Considering the credibility of Respondent's
witnesses and the demeanor of employee Spray, I am
convinced that the only credible version of the Spray story
is the one given by Spray and not the ones given by
Respondent's witnesses who contradicted themselves and
for whom corroboration, though available, was not
forthcoming.
c. Earl Casas and Ernie Donnelly
Ernie Donnelly was hired by the Respondent in
February 1964 and engaged in union activity in November
1964 soliciting union authorization cards. On
November 18, 1964, Foreman Norman called Donnelly to
the office and told him "I was informed that you are
pushing the Union...." "I am here to change your way of
thinking if you are...." "For instance , if they gave you a
dime raise , you would have to pay it all out in dues, the
Company would cut down to maybe 8 hours a day instead
of 9, you would lose your Saturday overtime, so what do
you gain? Nothing." I find these remarks by Norman to
Donnelly to be contrary to Section 8(a)(1) of the Act in that
they created the impression of surveillance and threatened
loss of wages as alleged in the complaint and admitted by
Respondent's answer.
Employee Earl Casas was hired in March 1964. He
began as a helper and was quickly promoted to setup
trainee. He received two pay increases and was praised by
two foremen. He began wearing a union button around
mid-November 1964. Later the same month , he had a
conversation with Norman, his foreman. Norman told him
that employee Spray had been pushing union buttons and
that Donnelly, who was Casas' operator, would not get far
as long as he had anything to do with the Union. He also
asked Casas why he was for the Union. Norman testified
that he did not engage in such conduct. Respondent's
answer, however, admits Norman's unlawful interrogation
of employees in November 1964 as well as illegal
surveillance by him at that time and I so find.
On December 9, 1964, Casas punched in at 7 a.m., his
starting time, and went to change clothes. Upon leaving
the locker room, he met a foreman who offered to buy him
a cup of coffee. He then headed for his machines where he
saw Norman standing . Norman asked him why his
machines were not running and when Casas replied that
he thought the helper was supposed to start the machines,
the foreman swore at him. Casas, angered, responded in
kind, whereupon the plant electrician, passing by, advised
Casas not to talk to a foreman that way and Casas went to
work. An hour or an hour and a half later, Norman told
156 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Casas he was wanted in the front office where he found
Travis and Farkos. Farkos asked Norman what had
happened and Norman said Casas had cursed him. Farkos
then told Casas, "We are going to have to let you go."
Casas offered to apologize in front of the whole plant to
keep his job but Farkos was unrelenting.
Norman testified that Casas used the obscenity, not he,
but admitted that he did not become disturbed by it. The
use of such language in the plant is a common occurrence
and Casas and Norman had used such language in their
conversations with each other when they were coworkers.
Moreover, Arlene Casas, Earl's mother, also employed by
the Respondent, spoke to President Crawford on the same
day about her son's discharge. Crawford conceded that
Norman had cursed first but went on to ask her if Earl
wore a union button, saying that he did not allow the boys
to wear union buttons in the plant and showed her a
collection of union buttons which he said he had taken
from the boys in the plant.
The Respondent's discharge of Earl Casas for the
alleged obscenity without any prior warning, in disregard
of the offer to apologize, and irrespective of the general
use of such language in the plant and particularly between
Norman and Casas, added to Crawford's explanation given
to Earl's mother, whose testimony is credited in this
respect, makes it obvious that Earl's obscenity was only a
pretextual cause for his discharge. Of real and immediate
concern to the Respondent was Earl's union membership
and activity. This conclusion is fortified by the
Respondent ' s admission that at this time it was soliciting
its employees to refrain from wearing the Union's buttons.
I find, therefore, that the discharge of Earl Casas was
violative of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act in that it was
discriminatorily aimed at discouraging membership in the
Union.
d. Maurice Chapman
Employee Maurice Chapman testified about a
conversation he had with Farkos in the early part of
November 1964 in which Farkos said he could not
understand why the employees were wearing union
buttons. A few days later, Farkos told Chapman that he
would not have to worry about his job if Chapman would
remove the union badge. Still later, Farkos told Chapman
that if the Union did come in, Farkos would be a negotiator
and it would be a year or 2 before a contract would be
signed. He also said that the Union had organized
Kentucky Screw, another plant formerly owned by
Crawford, but when the employees came to work the
following Monday, the machinery had been loaded upon
trailers, removed from Kentucky Screw, and moved to
Great Lakes Screw. These coercive statements were
denied by Farkos. It should be noted, however, that the
Respondent has formally admitted that Farkos threatened
the employees with loss of employment, interrogated
employees concerning their union membership, induced
employees to revoke their union authorizations, and
solicited employees to refrain from wearing the Union's
buttons, all in December 1964. I credit the testimony of
Chapman in any event rather than the testimony of Farkos
which I have found unreliable, as discussed later.
Chapman also had a conversation with Farkos about a
merit raise. Farkos told Chapman in mid-November that
Chapman had a merit raise coming but did not know
whether to give it to him because Chapman had worn a
union button. Respondent's knowledge of Chapman's
union interests is corroborated by Chester Mann, a former
foreman. He testified that Superintendent Ford asked him
if he saw anything in his department. When Mann
answered in the negative, Ford responded, "Do you mean
you didn't see Chapman wearing a union button? Are you
blind? You had better get on the ball." In December Mann
recommended six or seven employees, including
Chapman, for merit increases. Later, Ford told Mann that
all of the increases had gone through except Chapman's.
Still later, Personnel Manager Travis told Mann that
Farkos was holding Chapman's merit rating on his desk.2
Mann then went to Farkos who told him to tell Chapman
that "his raise was being held up until he came around to
thinking the way they wanted him to." Farkos admits
talking to Chapman about his merit increase but denies
the statement attributed to him by Foreman Mann. He
admitted, however, that "the papers had piled up" and
that he told Chapman he would get his raise when the
others did. The fact of the matter is that Chapman's
increase was made effective on the same date as the
others but was not approved on the same date as the
others. Respondent's records show that Chester Mann
prepared rating sheets on these employees on
December 7, 1964. All of them except Chapman's
contained a notation "OK 10" with the signature of Farkos
and Ford and the date December 8. Chapman's bears the
signature of Farkos and the date December 14 followed by
a notation over the signature of Ford "effective date
12/7/64." The payroll change notices for these employees
with the exception of Chapman's are dated "12/7/64" and
carry an effective date of "12/7/64." Chapman's payroll
change notice also carries an effective date of "12/7/64"
2 By motion filed December 29, 1965, Respondent seeks to
strike the testimony of Foreman Mann, as well as that of
employees Smith, Rentner, McNanna, Lundberg, and Donnelly,
concerning their conversations with, or admissions of, Personnel
.Manager Travis, who died on October 2, 1965. All of the subject
testimony was received during June and July 1965, while Travis
was alive. An Illinois statute provides:
... in every action , suit or proceeding a party to the same
who has contracted with an agent of the adverse party-the
agent having since died-shall not be a competent witness as
to any admission or conversation between himself and such
agent unless such admission or conversation with the said
deceased agent was had or made in the presence of a
surviving agent of such adverse party ....
Counsel for the General Counsel opposes this motion with a
memorandum of law. I have concluded that the motion to strike
most be denied:
1. The Illinois statute refers to contracting parties, a situation
which does not pertain to this proceeding.
2. The imcompentency must exist at the time of testifying,
which was not the case here . 97 CJS p. 557.
3. There were surviving agents present at the time Travis
spoke, such as secretaries and others.
4. The motion is not timely, having been made months after the
close of the hearing. At the time of Travis' death, the General
Counsel had not rested and Respondent had not begun its
defense, yet nothing was said about the testimony now objected
to.
5. Some of the employees involved were cross-examined by
counsel for the Respondent about their conversations with Travis,
indicating Respondent's waiver of their incompetency . Clarke v.
Storchak, 52 N.E. 2d 229:(322 U.S. 713).
6. Rules of evidence in the U.S. District Courts need be
followed only "so far as practicable.- Chun King Sales, Inc., 126
NLRB 851, 865.
GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 157
but is undated. Moreover, the payroll change notices are
approved by the initials "F. T." Chapman's notice appears
to have been initialed similarly. A handwriting expert,
however, testified that Chapman's notice was not initialed
by the same individual whose initials appear on the other
notices. I am convinced that the approval of Chapman's
wage increase was held up by Farkos and I credit the
testimony of Chapman and Mann indicating that the delay
was due to Farkos' dissatisfaction with Chapman's union
attitudes. I find, therefore, that the delay in approving the
wage increase was discriminatory to discourage
membership in the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(3).
e. The December 14 speech
On December 14, 1964, President Crawford made a
speech to the employees. Among other things he
announced a general wage increase and reminded them of
a union's attempt to organize Kentucky Screw and the
Company's response, removing the machinery and
transporting it to Great Lakes Screw. Again, Respondent's
answer specifically admits his unlawful threats of
unemployment, unlawful solicitation of employees to
revoke their union authorizations, unlawful promises of
wage increases, and unlawful warnings that attempts to
bargain through the Union would be futile, all on
December 14, 1964. Crawford testified that he had a plant
named Kentucky Screw but denied mentioning it in his
December speech. It should be noted that Crawford's
denial of any mention of Kentucky Screw was made when
called to testify on behalf of Respondent. Earlier, when
counsel for the General Counsel questioned him as a
managing agent of the Respondent, he could merely not
recall speaking of Kentucky Screw. Crawford's denial was
credibly contradicted, however, by many of the witnesses
who took the stand.
B. Postsettlement Activity
1. The new rules
On February 2, 1965, Respondent entered into the
settlement agreement previously described and on
February 3 posted the settlement notice. On the same day,
President Crawford again addressed the employees. In
this speech he announced new absentee rules whereby
three unexcused absences would result in a 1-week
suspension and four absences bring discharge . Prior to
this time Respondent's rule with respect to absenteeism
was much less specific, employees merely being subject to
discharge , after consideration of extenuating
circumstances, if absences happened at a rate of more
than 1 day per month. Crawford blamed the Union for the
new rules. As one employee, Carl Black, recalled,
Crawford said, "Everybody is not responsible because we
have to go by these rules, but the ones that-for the Union
are, and the rest of us have to suffer along with them."
Another witness, employee McNanna, remembered
Crawford saying, "It wasn't his doing but that was the way
that the men in the shop were bucking the Union. They
forced it upon him." Crawford denied making such
statements claiming that what he said was taken entirely
from a written text which was introduced in evidence.
There is no corroboration, however, of Crawford's
statement that what he told the employees was what was
written in the text not even by supervisory personnel,
some of whom were present at that speech. Moreover,
Crawford's demeanor on the stand did not lead me to
believe he would be apt to so discipline himself. He
showed no hesitancy in speaking up, in offering
unsolicited responses , and retorting sharply and,
sometimes, impertinently. Thus, at one point counsel for
the Respondent asked that I caution Crawford to answer
only when questions were asked and on another occasion
statements made by Crawford were stricken by me at the
request of Respondent's counsel as there was no question
pending at that time. In short, I cannot credit Crawford's
testimony that he spoke only from the written text rather
than spontaneously and impulsively very much as he did
on the witness stand.
Employee Day testified credibly that Crawford
"explained this meeting was called to explain there was a
new ruling on absenteeism and tardiness and these were
not his [Crawford's] rules, but he would enforce them.
These rules were handed down to him from the Labor
Relations Board and the Boilermakers Union and some of
youse [sic] out there." Later, Day testified, Ford, in the
presence of Factory Manager Farkos, told him "they didn't
like this paper work no more than we like having the rules,
but the Labor Relations decision that they should-that
this was the way it was going to be and they had to
correspond with it." This was not contradicted by Ford or
Farkos.
Farkos in his testimony attempted to rationalize the
institution of the new rules in February 1965. He allegedly
ordered a study of absenteeism in the summer of 1964 and
ordered the hire of extra employees because of it. He
admitted, however, that after August 1964 he never
checked on compliance with his order or whether extra
employees were hired. If absenteeism was the real cause
of the new rules in February 1965, Farkos would certainly
have exhibited a continuing interest between the summer
of 1964 and February 1965. His unfamiliarity with the
problem in the fall and winter of 1964, if there was a
problem, discredits the explanation for the institution of
the new rules. The credible testimony of the employees
who heard Crawford's speech on February 3,1965, clearly
establishes that the creation of these new rules was a
discriminatory change in a term or condition of
employment to hinder union organization and union
adherence by making it clear to the employees that the
Union was responsible for the imposition of harsher rules
and penalties.
2. Tulk, McCutcheon, Pierce, and Day
Following the posting of the settlement notice, more
employees began wearing union buttons. Edward Tulk had
worn a union button but removed it shortly before
Christmas 1964. When Nelson was reinstated in February
1965, Tulk put his button on again . Two or 3 days later,
Stanley Gowran, his foreman at the time, ordered Tulk to
stay in his department at all times except for coffee and to
go to the washroom. Gowran testified that he ordered Tulk
to stay in his department because he saw Tulk leaving his
department to visit other departments. This testimony,
however, is contradicted by Gowran's own writings. Thus,
Tulk's rating sheet executed by Gowran in December 1964
notes "spends time checking machines often" and rates
his conduct on the job "good." Likewise, the rating sheet,
approved March 1965, has Gowran's remark, "Usually on
the job at all times . conduct good on the job." I
conclude that Gowran's explanation is not credible, and
158 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that Tulk was discriminatorily restricted to his department
to discourage union membership in violation of Section
8(a)(3).
McCutcheon, employed by the Respondent since 1955,
put on a union button during the first week of February
1965. Shortly thereafter, Foreman Insalata called him to
the office and told him that since he was wearing the
button, he was to stay by his machine. Two or 3 days later,
Insalata asked him what he thought the Union was going to
get in the Company. Insalata also said that he, Insalata,
had helped organize motion picture unions ; that "they
went to any limit to get what they wanted" and that they
would ruin Great Lakes Screw. This time he "warned"
McCutcheon to stay right by his machine. Foreman
Insalata denied saying these things to McCutcheon, but I
do not credit his testimony in view of his obvious
unreliability as disclosed below concerning employee
Smith's discharge . During his 10 years of employment at
Respondent ' s plant , McCutcheon had never been so
restricted in his movements . Many witnesses , including
Farkos himself, testified that it was common practice in
the plant for employees to move about , away from their
machines and departments , and talk among themselves.
Farkos' testimony in this respect is interesting . After first
testifying that the workers "are always at their coffee
machines " and that he saw them congregating at their
coffee machines "virtually every time he walked through
the plant," he added, "I never noticed it specifically with
thought in mind that it was getting abused. The abuses
came when the Boilermakers came." This was in October
1964. Nevertheless, Farkos admitted that he did nothing
about this alleged abuse in October, November,
December, January, February, or March nor did any of his
superintendents or foremen report that the people were on
idle time. The only reasonable conclusion is that the
employees enjoyed a certain freedom of movement and
that the alleged abuse of such freedom testified to by
Farkos is incredible in view of his indifference for at least
6 months after he first was supposed to have noticed it and
the failure of his subordinates to report such abuses to
him.
Employee Pierce also began wearing a button in
February. Shortly thereafter, Insalata expressed his
surprise at Pierce's wearing a union button and told him,
"These guys are not going to tolerate you guys unionizing
this place . the same thing will happen to you as
happened before we had the other election." The record
indicates that shortly before a representation election held
at the Respondent's plant in 1962 , there was a mass
discharge . I find these comments to be clearly coercive in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) despite Insalata's denials of
such language which I do not credit in view of his
unreliability as disclosed in connection with the discharge
of employee Smith, below.
During the last week in February, employee Day also
began wearing a button . In early March, Insalata came up
behind him and when Day turned around , Insalata threw
his arms up in surprise . Looking at Day's union button he
asked, "What' s the matter, what happened , what's wrong
with ... [you] ?" adding, "You used to be a nice guy." I do
not find this comment coercive or threatening in violation
of Section 8(a)(1), but merely indicative of the union
animus on the part of Respondent' s agents.
3. James Lundberg
James Lundberg was hired by the Respondent in May
1962 and began wearing a union button on February 12,
1965. He was the first to wear a union button in his
department after the settlement agreement . Three days
later, his foreman , Eddie Adams , transferred him to a new
battery, consisting of two high - speed Hartford machines
and a Waterbury No. 20. These machines ran faster and
used bigger blanks than his previous machines, which
were Waterbury No. 10. These blanks were dumped in a
pan and were lifted to be emptied into a hopper. Each
panful weighed 50 to 60 pounds . No such lifting was
required on his previous battery.
Lundberg's new battery had previously been operated
by James Martin, who had injured his wrist while at work.
When Martin asked to be returned to his high-speed
machines , Foreman Adams said , "No," and told him that
he had a man whom he wanted to put on the high speeders.
Ray Rentner , a setup man on these high-speed
machines , told Foreman Adams that Lundberg was too
small a man to work that line. Adams retorted that if
Lundberg "couldn't handle it, he could quit ." Rentner also
reported this to Farkos who told him to tell Lundberg to
take the badge off and he would get two men on his shift
like they had on the night shift . Testimony by
Respondent ' s witnesses suggests that Lundberg's new
work was actually easier than his old work. Farkos
himself, however, in testifying about the switch between
Lundberg and Martin and his refusal to put Martin back on
his high -speed machines , said Martin "still hadn't been
formally taken off of light duty." Such a description of
Martin's work on the Waterbury 10's as "light duty"
makes the contention that the high speeders were even
easier to work on than Waterbury 10's quite incredible and
I reject the argument . I find Lundberg ' s transfer
discriminatorily motivated to discourage union
membership in violation of Section 8(a)(3).
Here too, Respondent claims a variance between
pleadings and proof and seeks dismissal of the allegation
of Lundberg' s transfer . The complaint charges a
discriminatory transfer of Lundberg to another department
or shift. Lundberg 's discriminatory transfer was to another
battery. The difference is slight and not meaningful.
Moreover, the issue was fully litigated . I, therefore , reject
this argument . See Southwestern of Dallas Optical Co.,
153 NLRB 33.
Charges regarding Lundberg 's transfer were filed on
February 25, 1965. Farkos testified that a week later,
seeing "that Lundberg had a lot of idle time," he told the
superintendent that he wanted "that man put to work."
Reference has been made to Farkos' testimony that he did
nothing about the idle time of employees between October
1964 and March 1965. Here, however, he went out of his
admitted course of conduct to see that Lundberg,
specifically , was put to work , demonstrating an obvious
discriminatory attitude , although not necessarily a
violation of the Act.
4. Foreman Mann
Chester Mann worked as a foreman for the Respondent
for 15-1/2 years before leaving the Company in February
1965. During his employment he attended supervisory
meetings. In his testimony he referred to such a meeting at
Jenny's Restaurant at which President Crawford told the
supervisory personnel present that he was going to "lay
down the law to the employees " and tell them he would
close the plant like he closed Kentucky Screw if they
insisted on forming a union . Mann was confused as to the
GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 159
date of this meeting, placing it in November or December
1964, instead of its actual date which was apparently early
February 1965. The confusion is further compounded by
the fact that Crawford's statement to the employees
concerning Kentucky Screw occurred on December 14,
1964, which was prior to the supervisory meeting at
Jenny's Restaurant in February 1965. I find Mann's
testimony with respect to the supervisory meeting at
Jenny's Restaurant unreliable and make no finding based
upon it.
Mann also testified about an emergency meeting of
foremen in January 1965 at which meeting Factory
Manager Farkos told the foremen that the Union was
getting to be a problem and estimated the Union's strength
at or about 100. Farkos also questioned each of the
foremen about the number of union members in their
departments and spoke of a rumor of a spy among the
salaried personnel. Farkos instructed the foremen to
"delve into the minds" of the employees and "stress the
point that unions were no good." Farkos admitted that
such a meeting was held and that he spoke of a rumor of a
spy being among the salaried personnel. Although Mann
testified that Farkos told the foremen the Company had
paid $100 and discovered the spy, Farkos denies such a
statement. He testified that he told the foremen that
information of this type was worth probably $100. When
pressed for an explanation of his reason for such a
statement, he attributed it to "unpremeditated ingenuity."
On balance, I credit Mann's version of this meeting and
find that Respondent instructed its supervisors to engage
in unlawful interrogation and surveillance in violation of
Section 8(a)(1).
Around the same time, Superintendent Ford upbraided
Mann for not noticing that employee Chapman was
wearing a union button, which incident has been
mentioned previously in connection with employee
Chapman. It was at this time that Mann was warned, "You
had better get on the ball." Such criticism is consistent
with the testimony that foremen were expected to report
the union supporters to management. Mann's failure to do
so occasioned the warning from Superintendent Ford.
Ford did not deny this incident and I credit the testimony
of Mann. I find that Ford's warning was an implied
instruction to Mann that he engage in surveillance of
employees' union activities and as such a violation of
Section 8(a)(1).
In the latter part of January 1965, Farkos told Mann he
was taking Chapman to his office. When Chapman failed
to return after some 25 minutes, Mann called Farkos to see
if Chapman was still there. Farkos answered, "Yes" and
slammed the receiver. Later both Ford and Farkos
criticized Mann for disturbing Farkos at a time when,
according to Mann's testimony, they were trying to get
Chapman straightened out about his union beliefs. Mann
concluded his testimony testifying that he was laid off for a
week on February 18 and was discharged when he
returned 1 day late. Although I credit Mann's testimony, I
find it insufficient to base a finding of an unlawful
discharge. Mann merely testified that he was reprimanded
for not noticing Chapman's union button. Thereafter, no
mention was made of this dereliction. Weeks later, he was
suspended. Mann did not give any details whatever of the
suspension interview. The causal connection between the
reprimand and the suspension is left to conjecture and
inference. Moreover, the discharge, according to Mann,
was for his failure to return to work when due. There is no
suggestion of any other reason for the discharge. I
therefore conclude that the General Counsel has not
sustained his burden of proving that Mann's suspension
and discharge were the result of his refusal to conduct
illegal surveillance for the Respondent.
5. Billy Wilbourn
Billy Wilbourn started to work for the Respondent in
November 1962 and transferred a year later to quality
control. For more than 2 years he worked as an inspector,
including final inspector in heat treat, final inspector in
headers, and final inspector in rollers. Respondent
stipulated that it had knowledge of Wilbourn's union
activity on October 25, 1964, the date that Wilbourn
attended the union meeting. Early in 1965, Quality Control
Manager Erickson asked Wilbourn to change from second
shift to day shift. Although Wilbourn told Erickson that he
did not want to work days because he had a part-time day
job and also had to take his children to school, he accepted
the switch because Erickson said it would be only
temporary. After 6 to 8 weeks of day work, he returned
again to the second shift. On March 19, 1965, Wilbourn
put on a union button. On the same day, Erickson told
Wilbourn that the Company was going to start transferring
its inspectors and that Wilbourn would go to day shift for
final inspection. Wilbourn objected and Erickson said,
"Don't give me any argument." Erickson also told him that
he would learn the final inspection from another inspector,
San Filippo. Erickson testified that this "rotation
program" continued, but later admitted, however, that
except for Inspector Prust, Wilbourn was the only
inspector transferred under this alleged program for "each
and every" inspector. Prust was so transferred for only 1
day to fill in for an absentee inspector. I find that the
reason advanced by Erickson for Wilbourn's transfer was
only pretextual, and that the real reason was Wilbourn's
union membership, in violation of Section 8(a)(3).
That night when Wilbourn punched out, Night
Superintendent Pozniak said to him, "Good luck on days,
Wilbourn. You will need it." Although little significance
might be attached to such a remark, subsequent events,
however, lead to a different conclusion. Workers on the
new shift made life very unpleasant for Wilbourn. San
Filippo called him a fink. Another employee called him a
Nazi, scum, and a communist. Leadman Konsacki
threatened to punch him in the nose. Stella Walters
refused to talk to him. Here, too, such behavior by fellow
employees would not ordinarily be indicative of any unfair
labor practices on the part of Respondent. Farkos'
explanation of the behavior, however, sheds a different
light. According to him, "Perhaps they thought he violated
a trust." With the added fact that Respondent knew of
Wilbourn's union activity and, according to the testimony
of Farkos and Pozniak, was receiving reports from
supervisors regarding union strength, with Farkos
maintaining a list of union supporters, it is quite likely that
the Respondent was aware of antiunion attitudes among
employees in Wilbourn's new day shift and used that
animosity of those employees toward Wilbourn.
San Filippo and Wilbourn had an argument on
March 22. Foreman Smith summoned Quality Control
Manager Erickson who heard San Filippo ask who was
going to strike the first blow. Wilbourn began to cry and
went to the washroom. Upon his return, Erickson asked
both men what had happened. Wilbourn was silent but
San Filippo complained that Wilbourn refused to do the
job San Filippo ordered him to do. Erickson then asked
Wilbourn if he still refused to do the job and Wilbourn's
160 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
response was to start doing the task in question. Erickson
made no inquiry to ascertain if San Filippo had given him
the whole, true story, not even asking the other supervisor
who was present. According to Erickson, San Filippo's
order to Wilbourn was to file blueprints after both he and
Wilbourn had used them. Although Wilbourn had been
transferred to learn final inspection from San Filippo, the
filing of blueprints was not a specialized operation in San
Filippo's department but was done in all departments and
it can be assumed that since Wilbourn had worked as a
final inspector, Erickson knew that, in this respect,
Wilbourn needed no instruction from San Filippo nor was
any order from San Filippo warranted. Erickson's
testimony in this respect is somewhat contradictory and
unclear. At first, he testified that Wilbourn had never been
a final inspector. Later, however, he admitted that
Wilbourn gave the "final okay" of the heat treat
department, the "only inspection" in headers, and the
"last inspection" in rollers.
In any event, Erickson reported the episode to Farkos.
First, Erickson testified that he was instructed by Farkos
to speak to San Filippo. Later he testified that Farkos
spoke to both men, telling Wilbourn to avoid getting into
arguments with other employees but telling San Filippo
merely to stop such argument on company time. This
disparate treatment was reflected in company records.
Previously, Wilbourn's relations with other employees
were considered satisfactory and he was rated as quiet and
having a very good disposition. Nevertheless, a written
reprimand was put into Wilbourn's file concerning the
March 22 incident. None of the other employees who had
threatened Wilbourn and called him various names had
written reprimands put in their files, not even employee
Dimitri, who, according to Farkos, had threatened to throw
Wilbourn into the hopper and who, Farkos knew, was big
enough to do it. The oral reprimand given San Filippo can
hardly be deemed any reprimand. Farkos testified that he
spoke to San Filippo about San Filippo's calling Wilbourn
a fink to which San Filippo replied, "Yes, we don't need
finks on the payroll." The response of Farkos was,
admittedly, simply, "I am inclined to agree with you. In
any event no more arguing on company time." This
disparity in reprimands for improper behavior is indicative
of Respondent's interference with, and coercion of,
Wilbourn in the exercise of his right to join the Union in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and I so find.
Wilbourn complained to Farkos about the harassment
he was experiencing. On the same day, Crawford spoke to
Wilbourn in the presence of San Filippo and Foreman
Insalata, and told Wilbourn, "I want to get you people like
me, to thinking like me."
On March 29, Respondent discharged some 37
employees. Erickson told Wilbourn that his job in
inspection had been eliminated but that he could exercise
his seniority and go back to material handling. This
resulted in a 47-cent-per-hour pay cut. On April 2,
Wilbourn was summoned to Farkos' office and was asked
by Farkos "What are you doing with those union buttons
on?" He also asked Wilbourn whether any employees in
his department were for the Union. When Wilbourn
answered, "None," Farkos said, "You are right." Farkos
also added, "The percentage is higher in the rollers but we
got rid of those guys." He also told Wilbourn that there
were a few left, naming employees Nelson, McCutcheon,
Gary, and Rentner. I find Farkos' comments to be coercive
and interfering in that it created the impression of
surveillance and threatened discharge, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1).
Farkos showed Wilbourn some union buttons in his desk
and told him, "It wouldn't be any reflection if you pull
yours off and go in there and put it on Vic's [Erickson's]
desk." When Wilbourn reminded him that he no longer
worked for Erickson, Farkos again told him "Go in there
and put them on his desk." This inducement to remove the
union button is also violative of Section 8(a)(1) in implying
rewards for so doing. Wilbourn promised to think it over
during the weekend and when he returned to work on
April 5, Foreman Pozniak told him that Farkos was waiting
for him. At this time Wilbourn told Farkos that he had
reasons for not pulling his union button off, one being that
seniority was not followed in that Stella Walters took over
his job in heat treatment. Wilbourn asked to see Jennings
Crawford and when he saw him the next day complained
about seniority not having been followed. Upon leaving
Crawford's office, Wilbourn was told by Farkos, "We are
getting rid of all the guys with buttons on ... I will be back
. to see if you have yours off," a remark that is plainly
threatening and violative of the Act. Although Farkos did
not come back, Jennings Crawford came to Wilbourn the
next day and said, "I see you don't have that button off
yet."
On April 8, Wilbourn was called to Personnel Director
Barth's office where Barth read him a statement accusing
him of engaging in arguments and soliciting union cards on
working time. The arguments referred to in this reprimand
were the events of March 22 described previously.
On April 15, one day after the Union handbilled the
plant, Foreman Orawiec told Wilbourn, "You will stay
here at your job at all times, you won't be running around,
you are nothing but a troublemaker and an instigator." I
find this restriction a violation of Section 8(a)(3) in that it
was a discriminatory change in a condition or term of
employment. Wilbourn told him he had taken about all he
could and asked for a temporary layoff until there was an
opening in inspection. Orawiec promised to see about it.
Orawiec admitted telling Wilbourn to stay at his machine
but denied that he called him an instigator or
troublemaker. Orawiec further testified that when another
employee complained that Wilbourn had spoken to him
about joining the Union, he told Wilbourn to leave the
people alone, even though the conversation took place
outside the plant. I find this restriction of communication
an interference with Wilbourn's rights in violation of
Section 8(a)(1). The next day Wilbourn asked Barth for a
layoff but was refused.
Wilbourn did not report for work on May 10, 11, or 12.
On May 12, he received a telephone call from Personnel
Director Barth asking him if he had quit. When Wilbourn
denied quitting and said he would be back in the morning,
Barth told him he would not find his timecard adding,
"You quit." Barth testified that when he called Wilbourn
he told him that his 3-day absence was an automatic
discharge under the new absentee rules. The rules,
however, provide for automatic discharge for "failure to
call in or otherwise notify the Personnel Department by the
3rd day." Here, however, Barth admits being notified by
Wilbourn on May 12, the 3rd day, that Wilbourn had not
quit. I find, therefore, that Wilbourn's discharge was not
pursuant to the absentee rules, but discriminatorily
motivated to discourage union membership in violation of
Section 8(a)(3). On May 15, Wilbourn went to Barth's
office where he spoke with both Barth and Farkos. They
informed him that they had an inquiry from another
company for which Wilbourn had gone to work and that
they were going to tell that company that they would not
GREAT LAKES SCREW CROP.
rehire Wilbourn because he had not given them enough
warning before he quit. Farkos also told Wilbourn that
they were going to make the Board hearing last for 6
months. Farkos' version is only slightly different. He
claims that he merely said that the hearing would last 6
months because the Board was persecuting the
Respondent. I credit Wilbourn's version of Farkos'
statement and find such statement to be violative of
Section 8(a)(1) in that it would tend to discourage union
activities of employees by delaying adjudication of alleged
wrongs committed by Respondent.
6. William Smith
Employee William Smith began working for the
Respondent in mid-January 1965, and was discharged on
March 26, 1965. At first, Insalata was his foreman. About a
week before his discharge, Eddie Adams became his
foreman. About 2 weeks before his discharge, Insalata had
praised Smith's work and informed him that he was
getting a merit increase of 10 cents per hour, showing
Smith a merit sheet that Insalata had prepared. Smith
began wearing a union button on March 22 and 2 days later
Night Superintendent Pozniak told him, "I see you got one
of the buttons." On March 26, shortly before quitting time,
Smith was called to Foreman Adams' office where Adams
informed him that he was discharged. Adams told Smith
that he had not slacked up on his work, that Smith's
working area was not dirty, and that Smith's performance
in any other respect was not bad, but Smith's "attitude"
had changed ever since Smith's wife was not hired by the
Respondent. Adams refused to explain in what way
Smith's attitude had changed. Smith returned to the plant
on the following Monday to pick up his check and while
there spoke to Personnel Manager Travis. Travis showed
him a note from Adams stating that Smith lacked
"potential for training." Company records, which might be
decisive on the issue of Smith's work performance, are,
unfortunately, missing. Personnel Director Barth testified
that he had seen a merit sheet on Smith which Foreman
Insalata had prepared but that Farkos had destroyed the
merit rating sheet about a week after the discharge. The
company wage record card on Smith has an entry dated
March 1, 1965, for an "automatic " increase . This wage
record card, however, was not Smith's original card but
was prepared in April after the Company had received the
charge concerning Smith's discharge. Barth further
admitted that when an employee was given a raise after 30
days' employment, as Smith was, it was a merit increase
and the words "merit increase" were placed on the wage
record card. In this instance, however, Farkos instructed
Barth to change the "merit increase" on the card to
"automatic increase." It must be concluded that Smith's
pay increase in March 1965 was a merit increase duly
recommended by his foreman and approved by
management and that Respondent, nevertheless, wished
to indicate that the increase was automatic rather than
merited in order to destroy evidence that Smith's work
performance was good rather than poor as claimed by
Respondent's witnesses. This would tend to interfere with
the freedom of employee Smith to vindicate his statutory
right in the manner provided by the Act and constitute a
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (Grand-Central
Chrysler, Inc., 155 NLRB 185; Jackson Tile
Manufacturing Company, 122 NLRB 764.)
161
The Respondent's position with respect to the cause for
Smith's discharge is difficult to ascertain. Inasmuch as no
brief has been filed by the Respondent, the record must be
relied upon to ascertain the alleged reason for the
discharge. At first it appeared that Respondent discharged
Smith for loafing because he was working on another job
and needed sleep. Counsel for the Respondent questioned
Smith about his working at Young Spring & Wire:
MR. O'BRIEN: Mr. Examiner, the relevance of the
questioning concerning Young Spring & Wire is as
follows:
When this witness applied for employment at Great
Lakes Screw Corporation, we will produce witnesses
to this effect, our law firm happens to represent
Young Spring & Wire, and this individual was
employed by Young Spring & Wire during the day
term and came to our place of employment and
worked the night term.
One of the reasons he was discharged was for
loafing on the job. We intend to show that he was
working for Young Spring & Wire from 8 a.m. until
3.30 p.m. in the afternoon and then came to Great
Lakes Screw at 4 p.m. in the afternoon thereby giving
him a small x number of hours of sleep.
I intend to show that he lied in the application on
two occasions when he was asked if he was employed
elsewhere .... [Emphasis supplied.]
Respondent's counsel went so far as to exclaim, "This
man is not telling the truth."
Then counsel for the General Counsel introduced into
evidence the personnel records of Young Spring & Wire
regarding Smith. Mr. O'Brien thereupon objected, saying,
"There is no issue pending as to whether or not William
Smith during the period of time in question in this
particular case was employed or was not employed at
Young Spring & Wire."
Respondent then apparently shifted its position with
respect to Smith's discharge. Foreman Insalata testified
that Tom Burke, his setup man, told him that Smith would
"never make it," whereupon, Insalata warned Smith and
asked Burke and the other setup man, Ricketts, to teach
Smith. After another week, according to Insalata, both
Ricketts and Burke told him that "Smith would never
make it." Then Insalata moved Smith to smaller machines
where he worked with setup men Morrett and Tijerina.
After 1 week with these setup men, Insalata testified that
Smith was reported by them as being slow. Once again
Insalata warned Smith. At the end of the next week,
Morrett and Tijerina allegedly again reported to Insalata
that Smith was too slow and would "never make it."
Insalata then transferred Smith to an even easier battery
where Pierce was setup man . Pierce allegedly told
Insalata after the first week that Smith was too slow,
whereupon Insalata warned Smith that if he "couldn't
make it here," he would have to let Smith go. In the middle
of the second week with Pierce, Smith was reported by
Pierce to Insalata as improving and Insalata conveyed that
message to Smith. Insalata then promised to recommend
Smith for a pay raise.
Insalata's testimony with respect to Smith's work
performance is completely discredited by the testimony of
the setup men involved. Burke testified that Smith never
worked for him and that he never made any derogatory
report to Insalata concerning him. Moreover, Burke was
called to the company office before these hearings began
and spoken to by Farkos and Attorney O'Brien, who
162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
informed him that Insalata had made a statement
concerning Smith's working for Burke and Burke's
complaint concerning Smith. Burke refused to verify such
a statement and he was told not to talk about it. Burke,
nevertheless, went to Insalata and told him he was wrong
about Smith's working for Burke. Insalata merely replied,
"I don't remember anything."
Burke worked for the Respondent from 1959 until
August 1965 when he quit. He still has two brothers
working for the Respondent.
Ricketts, who is still employed by the Respondent,
testified that Smith never worked on a battery on which
Ricketts was a setup man, that he never discussed Smith's
work with Insalata, and never made any derogatory remark
concerning Smith.
Pierce, who is still employed by the Respondent,
testified that Smith had worked on his battery but that he
told Insalata that Smith was a very good operator and
recommended his pay raise. Pierce even complained to
Insalata about Smith's discharge, to which Insalata replied
that he "didn't know what was going on any more," and he
"keeps his mouth shut now," waving a hand in front of his
mouth.
Morrett, who is still- employed by the Respondent,
testified that Smith worked for him about 2 weeks and
stated, "He was one of the best I ever had." He could not
recall discussing Smith with Insalata and denied making
any derogatory reports.
Tijerina, still employed by the Respondent, also testified
that Smith worked for him for 2 weeks but thought that
Smith was a "good" operator and denied making a
derogatory report concerning Smith.
I conclude that Insalata's testimony regarding Smith's
work performance is completely untrue.
Finally, Respondent's witnesses suggest that the reason
for Smith's discharge was that he was "goofing off."
Foreman Adams testified that one day after Smith put on a
union button, he noticed that Smith was goofing off and
that on the next two nights Smith did "leave the
department four or five times in a half night." Adams then
stated that Smith was discharged because "he was goofing
off too much, stayed away from his machine, sitting back
there on the work bench, his attitude had changed."
Adams admitted, however, that he never spoke to Smith
about his alleged dereliction but only waved to him to go
back to his machine, once on March 23, once on March 24,
and once on March 26, not, as first stated, four or five
times in a half night. According to Adams, Smith
immediately returned to his work on each occasion.
Adams' testimony is shaken also by certain other
contradictions. Thus, whereas Adams testified that
foremen do not need the approval of their superiors to
discharge probationary employees, Superintendent Ford,
however, testified that no employee is discharged unless
Farkos approves; Adams testified that after Smith's,
discharge he talked to nobody about it, but later corrected
himself by stating that he did talk to one of Respondent's
counsels but to no one else and then further changed his
testimony by admitting that he spoke to two other
counsels; Adams also testified that an employee would
need his permission to speak to any company official, but
Foreman Norman stated that employees did not need their
foreman's permission to visit Farkos; Adams was positive
that he had written the word "Unsatisfactory" and only
that word on Smith's termination report, but the
termination document contains no such word and does
contain much additional language.
I conclude that Adams' testimony must be discredited
as unreliable and that all the varying reasons for Smith's
discharge suggested or stated by counsel for the
Respondent or its witnesses were pretextual. The real
reason was Smith's union membership making his
discharge a violation of Section 8(a)(3).
7. Cingrani and Martin
Employee Cingrani, who was laid off on March 29,
began wearing a union button about 3 weeks before the
layoff. On the first day he wore the button, Pete Warino,
whom Cingrani described as an assistant foreman, told
Cingrani "I didn't know you were for the Union. . . . I
thought you were a good guy." Respondent contends that
Warino was not a supervisor. The record, however, clearly
establishes that Personnel Manager Travis told Cingrani
that Warino was assistant foreman and even wrote
Warino's name on his own calling card, designating
Warino as assistant and Insalata as foreman. In addition,
Respondent's own records in at least two instances show
Warino as foreman (G.C. Exh. 54 a and c). Nevertheless, I
find Warino's language insufficiently coercive or
threatening to base a finding of an 8(a)(1) violation.
Employee Martin was also discharged on March 29. He
began wearing a union button about 2 weeks before that.
Shortly after he put on the union button, he was called to
Foreman Insalata's office and was told by Insalata that he
was getting a pay raise which had been recommended
some time before. Insalata asked Martin why he was
wearing a union button. Martin told him that it was
because he had not received his raise when he was
supposed to and also because he had hurt his wrist while
working and "they wouldn't fix it." Insalata's version of
this conversation, although somewhat different than
Martin's, is not credited.
A few days later, Martin was called to Crawford's office
where Crawford, Farkos, and Barth were present..
Crawford asked Martin why he was wearing a button and
said that they were all shocked that he had a button on.
When Martin said that he was afraid to remove the button,
Crawford said he would see to it that no one would fire
Martin and he would guarantee that his wrist would be
fixed. Martin's version of Crawford's conversation is
denied by both Farkos and Barth but, significantly, not by
Crawford, who made no mention of the incident in his
testimony. This inducing language by Crawford I find to be
violative of Section 8(a)(1).
Martin was not rehired after the March 29 discharge.
Barth testified that in his application for employment,
Martin had falsified certain statements. At first, the
falsification, according to Barth, was Martin's answering
"No" to the question, "Do you have any physical
defects?" Barth admitted not knowing what Martin's
physical defect was but felt that since Martin had sued the
Company for an injury to one or both of his thumbs, that
his answer on the application for employment was
necessarily false. Later, Barth added the additional
explanation that Martin had falsified his education in
stating he had completed 2 years of high school. The
specific discrepancy, however, could not be recalled by
Barth. Still later, in response to leading questions by
counsel for the Respondent, Barth added that Martin had
falsified his application in omitting some of his former
GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 163
employers . These vacillating explanations given by Barth
for Respondent ' s failure to rehire Martin make his
testimony unreliable , and I find , therefore , that Martin was
not rehired because of his union membership , in violation
of Section 8(a)(3).
8. The mass discharge
On March 29, 1965, 37 employees were discharged and
13 employees were transferred . This was done without any
prior notice or warning and , in fact, contrary to
appearances created by Respondent . Thus, for example,
on February 2, 8, and 15, 1965, notices were posted in the
plant congratulating the slotter and roller departments on
setting production records. On March 17 and 24, 1965,
notices were posted informing the employees that
Saturday work would be necessary attributing the
necessity for overtime work to a high backlog of orders.
Between February 10 and March 23, Respondent hired 18
employees . Two women , Naleway and Filipiak, were hired
for specialty on March 23 . One day later, on March 24,
Martha Morrett and Edna Gary submitted bids for
operator jobs posted on the bulletin board and the change
of these employees to the roller department was made
effective March 29, 1965, the day 37 employees were
discharged and 13 others transferred.
a. Respondent 's alleged reasons
Respondent attempted to explain the mass discharge.
Here, too, however, the explanations are not consistent,
and in the absence of a brief explaining its position,
Respondent 's defense is difficult to understand . Thus, for
example, counsel for the Respondent , appearing on behalf
of the Respondent in a United States District Court, told
that court that the action was due to "poor business."
Factory Manager Farkos, however, testifying in this
proceeding, flatly contradicted that statement and said
that poor business had nothing to do with the discharges.
Instead , Farkos attributed the discharges to excessive idle
time among employees . However , as noted previously,
Farkos admitted that his foremen never reported idle time
to him . In fact , although Farkos himself allegedly noticed
idle time as early as October 1964 , he admitted doing
nothing about it for 6 months . Moreover , the employment
of additional employees as late as February and March
1965 is hardly consistent with a claim of idle time among
the regular employees . Respondent attempted to explain
the employment of new employees by testimony that the
foremen were unaware of the impending discharges and,
therefore , had no reason to withhold requests for new help.
This testimony , however , is negated by Barth's own
testimony at one point that the foremen were called in
prior to the discharge and manning charts were discussed
with them . Even if this consultation had not taken place,
the employment of additional new help would not have
occurred without specific approval of the front office, i.e.,
Barth and Farkos , who certainly were aware of the
impending discharges if, in fact, such discharges were
impending.
Respondent elaborated on this explanation of idle time.
It was brought about , Farkos testified , by "creeping
changes," which improve productivity . Farkos said that
these creeping changes affected "virtually all
departments . Specifically , the more dramatic changes
were in the tool rooms , headers, shavers , rollers and
machine repair." Farkos went on to explain in some detail
the creeping changes in the header department . Eighteen
employees were discharged in the roller department,
where, Farkos had told Wilbourn , there was a high
percentage of union members . Farkos had also told
employee Rentner that the union strength was about 90
and most of the 90 were in the roller department. No
employees were discharged in the header department
where, according to the credited testimony of employee
Tulk, no union buttons were seen . Of course, it cannot be
denied that creeping changes do affect productivity and
that there may have been some creeping changes in the
Respondent 's plant , but the testimony of Factory Manager
Farkos gives little factual basis for any conclusion that
creeping changes were the cause of the mass discharge.
He was apparently unaware of the changes made in
productivity and, in fact , had first heard of some of these
changes while preparing for the hearing in this proceeding.
Farkos also stated that the mass discharge was based, at
least partially , on three workload studies made by Barth.
In fact, however , only one workload study was made by
Barth and that was in the shaver department . In the roller
department , the workloads of only two employees were
studied and Barth observed that two setup men were
working less than full time there. There is no suggestion
that this constituted a workload study. Similarly, Barth
merely observed the work in the mill shank department
and orally reported the work of setup men to be about 60
percent.
b. Rollers
Nine employees were discharged from the day shift in
rollers. Of them , only two did not wear union buttons,
Clare and Phillips . The other seven , Lundberg (see B, 3,
supra), Cravens, F. Smith , Baratta , P. Kennedy , Martin,
and Cingrani (see B , 7, supra), had started to work for
Respondent in September 1964 or earlier and had received
merit ratings while so employed which varied from
satisfactory to very satisfactory in virtually all respects.
Their termination notices, nevertheless , rated their ability
and conduct as fair or poor and on some of them , Foreman
Insalata had added that he would not reemploy that
person . The wage record cards for these seven employees
were marked prominently "Will Not Rehire ." Employee
Phillips, who was not a union button wearer, was hired by
the Respondent in December 1964 and was rated shortly
thereafter as unsatisfactory in attendance and punctuality
with a recommendation that a merit increase be withheld
in February 1965. He was again rated but even then his
rating sheet carried the notation , "Fair judgment and
ability." His termination notice, however , rated him as
excellent and Foreman Insalata stated thereon that he
would reemploy him. The Respondent ' s wage record is
marked , "Will Rehire ." The other nonbutton wearer,
Clare, went to work for the Respondent in 1962 and was
denied merit increases in February , May, June, and
August, 1963. He received a merit increase in January
1964 . Nevertheless, his termination notice in March 1965
rated his conduct as excellent and his production good,
together with Insalata's comment that he would rehire him
and the records of Respondent are so marked.
Nine employees were also discharged from the second
shift of the roller department , Kordiak, R. Taylor,
E. Taylor, Hickey , Carlson , D. Kennedy , Downey , Ruffalo,
and Warden. At least five of these nine were identified in
some fashion with the Union . Thus, Kordiak wore a union
button . R. Taylor signed a union card and discussed the
Union with E. Taylor and Hickey . Carlson signed a card
298-668 0-69-12
164 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and attended a union meeting . D. Kennedy is the brother
of Paul Kennedy, who wore a button on the day shift.
Respondent's records are marked, "Will Not Rehire," for
each of these nine men. Significantly , however, Foreman
Adams, who executed the termination notices of
R. Taylor, E. Taylor, Carlson, and D. Kennedy, marked
each one to indicate that he would reemploy them.
Nevertheless , the Respondent ' s wage record cards are
marked, "Will Not Rehire." Of particular interest is the
record of Kordiak, who began working for the Respondent
in September 1963. His merit rating sheets contain
Foreman Insalata 's comment that he was "one of my best
operators, always on the ball very good
operator-works up to the last minute." His termination
notice, nevertheless, rates his ability as fair and his
conduct poor.
c. Pointers
Nine employees were terminated in pointers, Anderson,
Barrett, Black, Brock-Jones, Donnelly, Kozik, Powell,
Truschka, and Turnbull. Of these, three, Donnelly, Black,
and Truschka, were known union adherents. Donnelly
began working for the Respondent in February 1964 (see
A, 3, c, supra) and received merit increases in March,
April, August, and November. At various times his
conduct was rated as "very satisfactory," "very good,"
"quiet-good disposition." His termination notices rate
his conduct as poor and Respondent's records are marked,
"Will Not Rehire." Kozik, who testified he never wore a
union button, went to work for the Respondent in February
1965, and was merit rated in March as unsatisfactory in
initiative and acceptance of responsibility. Even his
termination notice recites that he "believes in just getting
by." Respondent's records, nevertheless, state, "Will
Rehire." Black went to work for the Respondent in May
1964 and was rated satisfactory or very satisfactory in
June, September, and December, 1964. His record,
however, is marked, "Will Not Rehire." Anderson, who
was hired in March 1965, only 10 days before the layoff,
had his record marked, "Will Rehire." Truschka's
performance, like that of Black's, had always been
considered satisfactory or very satisfactory in all respects.
Nevertheless, Respondent's records are marked, "Will
Not Rehire."
d. Mill shank
Three employees were laid off in the mill shank
department, Miles, Witkowski, and Tulk. Witkowski is the
employee whom Respondent discharged in October 1964,
and who was reinstated in February 1965, by virtue of the
settlement agreement referred to earlier. He began
working for the Respondent in October 1962. One rating
form in April 1963 rated him unsatisfactory in initiative but
satisfactory or very satisfactory otherwise. Thereafter,
merit ratings in May, September, and December, 1963,
and March, May, and August, 1964, show him to be
satisfactory or very satisfactory in all respects. In October
1964, just prior to his alleged unlawful discharge, he was
rated unsatisfactory in ability to learn, attendance, and
punctuality. He was reinstated in February 1965 and
promoted to setup man in March 1965. His termination
notice in March 1965 rates his ability, conduct,
attendance , and punctuality as "fair" and his record is
marked , "Will Not Rehire."
Miles had worked for Respondent only slightly more
than 1 month when discharged.
The third employee dropped from mill shank, Tulk, like
Witkowski, was also promoted to setup man on March 15,
1965 (see B, 2, supra), but was demoted to operator in
slotters on March 29, 1965. One week later, Gowran, who
had been ill, returned to work and was put into slotters
making it necessary to eliminate one man from that
department. Tulk, having the least seniority in that
department, was let go. Respondent's records, however,
do not suggest that Tulk was replaced by Gowran. Instead,
they show Tulk's job "abolished," and that Tulk would not
be rehired.
e. Wire room
Two employees, Lussenhop and Waters, were
terminated in the wire room. Lussenhop, a union button
wearer, started to work for the Respondent in January
1964 and was rated satisfactory or very satisfactory in all
respects. One rating contained the comment "steady and
tries hard." Nevertheless, the wage record card states,
"Will Not Rehire." The other employee, Waters, started to
work for Respondent on March 12, 1965; 2 weeks before
the layoff. His wage record card, however, states, "Will
Rehire."
f. Toolroom
Two employees were laid off in the toolroom, Arlene
Casas and Mabel Smith. Arlene Casas is the mother of
Earl Casas referred to in section A, 3, c, above. Mabel
Smith is the mother of F. Smith, a button wearer who was
discharged from rollers on March 29, 1965. Mabel Smith
started to work for Respondent around May 1963 and was
merit rated in June, September, and December, 1963,
December 1964, and March 1965 as satisfactory or very
satisfactory. Her foreman noted on her termination notice
that he would reemploy her. Nevertheless, her wage
record card states, "Will Not Rehire." Mrs. Casas' wage
record card was similarly marked. Mabel Smith had
worked for more than a year in the specialty department
before being transferred to the toolroom in the latter part
of October 1964. 'Two new employees, Naleway and
Filipiak, were hired in the specialty department on
March 23, 1965. Mrs. Smith called her foreman, Pozniak,
to complain about these two new employees being kept on
despite her greater seniority in specialty. Pozniak
promised to look into it and called her back on March 31 to
tell her, "They were going to rehire me ... when things
settled down." Pozniak admitted that he promised to
check to see because she was a very good worker and that
he told Mrs. Smith that the job was eliminated. He did not
deny saying that Mrs. Smith would be recalled when
things settled down nor did he explain why Mrs. Smith was
not permitted to exercise her seniority in specialty.
g. Conclusions
The varying and sometimes contradictory reasons
advanced by the Respondent for the mass discharge of
March 29, 1965, are singularly unpersuasive. Reference
has already been made to the contradictory explanations
given by counsel for the Respondent and Factory Manager
Farkos regarding poor business. Similarly, the idle time
referred to by Farkos is effectively contradicted by his own
indifference to the alleged state of affairs as well as by the
failure of his .foremen to report such idle time to him.
Added to this unbelievable recitation is the continued
hiring of new employees despite the alleged imminence of
a mass discharge. Reference has already been made to the
GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP.
so-called creeping changes which were supposed to have
affected the header department dramatically. There,
however, no layoffs occurred. Reference should also be
made to Farkos' argument of "plant efficiency."
Comptroller Wooster stated that increases in labor costs
occurred primarily in the secondary production and
service departments, where, presumably, labor costs
savings should have been concentrated. The roller
department, where the greatest impact of the mass
discharge was felt, is, however, not a secondary
department.
The pattern in the mass discharge of March 29, 1965, is
not hard to perceive. Seniority may have been followed,
though not invariably, as in the case of Mabel Smith. But
more significantly, the discharges were concentrated
where there was union strength, and to the point where
union adherents were hit. Thus, in the roller day shift, the
discharge went far enough to reach Lundberg; in roller
second shift, it reached no further than Kordiak, a union
button wearer; in pointers it did not stop until it hit
Donnelly, the employee who, Norman predicted, would not
go far as long as he had anything to do with the Union; in
mill shank, Tulk and Witkowski, the only setup men
discharged, were hit; in the wire room it reached
Lussenhop, a union button wearer; and in the toolroom,
the only dischargees were the mothers of Earl Casas and
F. Smith, both union adherents. Moreover, the
Respondent's intentions were manifested only too plainly
by its notations on the wage records, showing, in general,
no intention to rehire the union supporters while favoring
others who were not suspect, even where such others had
little experience or bad work records.
9. C. Gordon Gary
Gary has been employed by the Respondent for more
than 12 years. On April 9, 1965, as he was entering the
plant, he accepted some union handbills from a man who
was passing them out in front of the plant. Later that day
Factory Manager Farkos approached Gary with one of the
handbills and asked Gary about a statement contained in
the handbill. When Gary disclaimed any knowledge,
Farkos told him that he ought to know, that Gary's name
was on the pamphlet. The handbill was signed organizing
committee but specified no names. Gary was wearing an
organizing committee union button. Farkos looked at the
button and again told Gary he ought to know. Farkos then
told him, "If we were to sue the Union, we could sue you
also, couldn't we?" I find this statement coercive and
intimidating, violative of Section 8(a)(1).
10. Story, Chapman, Day, and McNanna
Four employees, Story, Chapman, Day, and McNanna,
were discharged by the Respondent. The Respondent
contends that these discharges were occasioned by the
operation of the new absentee rules issued on February 3,
1965. Since I have already concluded that the new rules
were merely a device to hinder union organization by
making the employees think the Union and its
membership were responsible for the imposition of
harsher rules and more severe penalties, the discharges
made pursuant to those rules were illegal. Some
discussion of the circumstances surrounding the
discharges of these individuals is merited nevertheless.
165
a. Story
Employee Story began working for the Respondent in
February 1963, and began wearing a union button on
March 19, 1965. He had been absent from work on
March 16, 17, and 18. When he came to work on March 19,
Foreman Gerdzas sent him to Personnel where he was
asked for a doctor's excuse. Story visited the doctor and
returned with the doctor's statement that he was fit for
work. Later that day, while Story was at Gerdzas' desk,
another employee approached and said to Story, "You
stupid S.O.B., take that G-D-button off." Story asked if
he knew anything. about unions. When the employee
answered, "No," Story asked him to keep his opinions to
himself. Foreman Gerdzas then got up, looked at Story, and
told him there would be no union talk during company
time and that Story would have to keep his thoughts to
himself. Later the same day, Gerdzas told Story, "Since
you choose to express your political views in the form of
that button you are wearing," Story would have to remain
in the department at all times and could not use the
cafeteria. Moreover, Story would have to watch the quality
of his work. Story reminded Gerdzas that he had praised
Story's work only 2 weeks earlier, to which, Gerdzas
replied, "Yes, but under the circumstances we have got to
review all of this again." Story also asked Gerdzas if his
fellow workers were aware that they, like Story, could only
use certain coffee machines. To this, Gerdzas replied,
"No, but we are not talking about the other employees in
this department, we are talking about you, Mr. Story."
Gerdzas' version of the foregoing incident is not much
different. He admitted he saw Story wearing a badge,
whereupon, he told him "There are certain things you can
do and there are certain things that I can do." Gerdzas
explained, "I just wanted him to understand that wearing
a badge he was under certain conditions."
Story was absent due to illness on April 13, 14, 15, 16,
and 19. He notified Respondent of his illness on April 13.
When Story reported to work on April 20, Foreman Moritz
told him to get a doctor's statement: Story left the plant,
went to his doctor, and returned with the doctor's
statement. He was sent to Farkos' office and he gave
Farkos the doctor's statement. Farkos said, "I can't
understand how you can let those blankety-blank leeches
out there that are soliciting outside of our door put a ring in
your nose and lead you around this plant with a ring."
Story asked, "Are you referring to the Union, Mr.
Farkos?" to which Farkos replied, "You know blankety-
blank who I am referring to. Story said, "I take it you
mean you are referring to the Union." Farkos said, "You
can blankety-blank take it any way you want to." Story
then asked if he was going to be suspended for a week
because of his absences and was told that a decision had
not been reached. They then talked about Story's opinion
of how the plant was being run. Story mentioned some of
his dissatisfactions, after which he was told they had
decided to let him go and that he was being permanently
terminated. He was offered the opportunity to quit. When
he refused to quit voluntarily, he was fired.
Personnel Director Barth prepared a "Sequence of
Events" leading to discharge of L. Story. According to this
document, the cause of Story's discharge was the failure of
the doctor's statement to verify the fact that that Story had
been under a doctor's care and was unable to work plus
the fact that Story's absences had exceeded 6 percent for 6
months. The absentee rules state, "Any absence for
reasons of illness which extends 3 days or more must be
166 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
supported by a physician's statement upon return to
work." The rules make no mention of the penalty for
failure to supply the physician's statement. In this
instance, however, Story had been absent in March and
had supplied a doctor's statement similar to the one he
procured in April. This earlier statement was accepted by
the Respondent and there was no way that Story could
have anticipated the doctor's April statement was not
sufficient for the purpose. The rules also provide that for
the second absence of an employee he was to be given a
written warning, that his next offense would result in a 1-
week suspension without pay and for the third absence he
was to be suspended for 1 week. It was only after the
fourth absence, without notification to the Respondent,
that an employee was to be discharged. Here, apparently,
it was only Story's third absence which would not give rise
to his discharge but only to his suspension. The rules also
contain a provision that where an employee's absenteeism
is in excess of 6 percent of his scheduled workdays in a 6-
month period (which was the case with Story) "the
employee's records" are to be "discussed with him" and
"a determination will be made." These reviews, according
to the rule, would be made semiannually by the personnel
department. In the case of Story, however, there was no
semiannual review of his absentee record by the personnel
department. Even if we assume that the conversation
Farkos had with Story constituted a semiannual review by
the personnel department, it does not appear that the
determination to discharge him was made on the basis of
his record. An examination of his merit ratings in May and
August 1964 shows his work performance to be
satisfactory in all respects with a recommendation for a
merit increase by the foremen on each occasion. His
termination notice, however, like the termination notice of
many of the dischargees of March 29, rates his conduct as
poor. I find, therefore, that with respect to employee Story,
the new absentee rules of February 3, 1965, were not
followed by the Respondent.
b. Chapman, Day, and McNanna
These three employees were discharged on April 21,
September 9, and June 12, respectively. The discharges
were made under the new absentee rules of February 3,
1965. There is no evidence that the rules were not followed
in these three cases. Nevertheless, their discharge, I find,
was an 8(a)(3) violation. Respondent had falsely led these
and other employees to believe that the Union should be
blamed for the institution of the new rules. As a result,
employees dismissed under such rules would be inclined
to attribute their misfortune to the Union and, to that
extent, be discouraged from union membership, an 8(a)(3)
violation. In any event, the institution of the harsher
absentee and tardiness rules, with the blame put upon the
Union, was calculated or tended to interfere with, restrain,
and coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to
engage in union or concerted activity. As such, it was a
clear 8(a)(1) violation. The Board has held that where
employees lose their jobs by behavior of their employer
which violates Section 8(a)(1), the appropriate remedy is
8(a)(3) reinstatement and reimbursement, (see Ellis and
Watts Products Inc., infra), just as where an employer
violates Section 8(a)(5) resulting in the discharge of
employees, such implementation of the violation is a
violation of Section 8(a)(3), Fleming Manufacturing
Company, Inc., 119 NLRB 452.
11. Ray Rentner
Employee Rentner started working for the Respondent
in April 1953. He was promoted to setup man in 1955 and
worked for the Respondent, with the exception of 1 year's
absence, until April 26, 1965. Rentner attended a union
meeting in November 1964 and signed a union card around
that time. Rentner had injured his wrist on the job in
November 1963. He received treatment at the clinic to
which Respondent sends injured employees. On
February 22, 1965, Rentner reinjured his wrist while
attempting to assist Lundberg. He reported the injury to
Personnel Manager Travis and went to the company
doctor. On the Tuesday before March 15, Travis showed
Rentner a statement from the doctor which indicated
Rentner's wrist had no impairment, despite the fact that
the doctor had scheduled two more treatments. On
March 15, Rentner put on a union button. On the same
day, Foreman Adams asked Rentner if he wanted to see
President Crawford. Rentner replied, "No." In a few
minutes, President Crawford came out and asked Rentner
if Rentner wanted to see him. Rentner said "No," it was
too late. Crawford, looking directly at Rentner's union
badge, said, "I didn't think you would do that to me after
all I have done for you and your father before you."
Rentner said that he had put the badge on because of the
letter regarding his wrist, to which President Crawford
replied, "Well, remember, I got the ace in the hole." A few
days later Farkos asked Rentner why he was wearing a
union badge and added, "Don't you think I can have any
man's job out there with or without a union?" When
Rentner asked, "How?" Farkos replied, "It would be easy
to overlook the scrap of the set-up men" if he wanted to
"and we could pick up the scrap of one set-up man if we
wanted to." This language of Farkos is too clearly coercive
and violative of Section 8(a)(1) to require discussion.
When the company doctor told Rentner there was
nothing more he could do about Rentner's injured wrist,
Rentner told Farkos and Barth that he wanted to see his
own doctor. Farkos said that "under ordinary
circumstances" Rentner could go to his own doctor and
the Company would "pick up the tab," pay the hospital,
and pay for surgery worth $3,000. Rentner asked, "Do you
mean by this badge ordinary circumstances?" Farkos
replied, "Yes." Rentner, nevertheless, refused to remove
the badge. Farkos' version of this conversation is
somewhat different. He testified that he told Rentner,
"We pay for treatment. We pay for surgery if it is required.
If there is a disablement, also. But in you case I think you
need brain surgery and we are not paying one red cent."
He denied telling Rentner that under ordinary
circumstances the Company would give him $3,000 for
treatment saying, "I have no control of that." It is difficult
to reconcile his statement that he has no control over the
Company's paying $3,000 for treatment with his
statement, "We are not paying one red cent" for Rentner's
injury. I credit Rentner's testimony and find Farkos'
statement coercive in implying benefits for Rentner's
removal of the union button.
About 2 weeks later, Rentner spoke to Farkos and Barth
again, asking if he could go to his own doctor and Farkos
told him to go. Rentner left and when he returned, he told
his foreman, Insalata, that he had the name of a doctor and
would see him the following week. Insalata told him, "Go."
On April 22, Rentner told Insalata that he was to see the
doctor the next day and would have to leave around 11
GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP. 167
o'clock. Insalata said, "Okay." When Rentner reported to
work at 7 a.m. the next day, Insalata asked if he would be
leaving at 11, but less than 2 hours later, told Rentner that
he could not go but would have to see Superintendent
Ford. Ford refused to give him permission to leave and
suggested that he get an appointment at a nonwork time.
Rentner then made some calls and reported to Ford that
Saturday appointments were not possible. Nevertheless,
Ford refused Rentner permission to go during working
hours. Rentner punched out shortly after 11 o'clock telling
Farkos, Ford, and Barth that he was not quitting but that
he had to go to the doctor and would be back later that day,
if possible, and, if not, on Monday. When Rentner reported
in on Monday, his timecard was missing.
Superintendent Ford testified that it was Respondent's
practice to send ill or injured employees to the clinic and
then home if they were unable to work. There is no
explanation why Rentner was refused permission to see
his doctor. There is no suggestion that his attendance on
that day was indispensable to the Respondent and no
contradiction that he had notified the proper officials long
before the date of his appointment with the doctor. The
only conceivable opposition to Rentner's leaving work on
that day would be his failure to secure an appointment
with the doctor on a nonworkday. This was brought out in
this proceeding by testimony and documentary evidence
concerning the unemployment compensation hearing
which ensued following Rentner's termination. At the
unemployment compensation hearing Barth testified that
"We made an appointment for Saturday morning, May 22,
9 o'clock . . . for a fictitious person." Respondent's
Exhibit 6(c) is a "Sequence of Events" prepared by
Respondent for the unemployment compensation hearing.
It states in part:
R. Barth went to the State of Illinois Office at 117E.
154th Street, Harvey, Illinois to appeal ruling that
Rentner was eligible for unemployment
compensation. While at the office learned Rentner
admitted walking off the job, and his hand was not a
handicap. He answered yes to a question regarding
his physical ability to pursue his usual line of work.
He had his examination on 4-23-65, at the Zeitlin X-
Ray and Clinical Laboratory, at 55 E. Washington, by
Dr. Grossman. Upon return to the plant called Dr.
Grossman's office at 2:30 p.m. Asked for appointment
to have left hand X-rayed. First question receptionist
asked was, "Who is your lawyer?" Gave the name of
Jensen. After telling receptionist a weekday
appointment was impossible, got an appoinment for
Saturday morning on 5-22-65 at 9:00 a.m. This
appointment disproves Rentner's claim that he could
not get an appointment during the evening or on
Saturday. [Emphasis supplied.]
In this proceeding, however, Barth admitted that the
telephone call mentioned above was not made by him but
by Farkos and that the call was not made to Dr.
Grossman's office but to the Zeitlin X-Ray Laboratory.
Barth insisted, nevertheless, that "We got a Saturday
appointment" with Dr. Grossman. He also explained that
"We called Zeitlin Clinical Laboratory ... this was Dr.
Grossman at the Zeitlin Clinical Laboratory." Dr.
Grossman, however, testified that it is impossible to make
an appointment at his downtown office for Saturday
through him or his office girl and that the Zeitlin
Laboratory makes no appointments for him. Moreover, the
Zeitlin Laboratory could not make an appointment for him
on Saturday inasmuch as Dr. Grossman has office hours at
a different location on Saturdays. I credit the testimony of
Dr. Grossman and find that the Respondent never secured
an appointment for a fictitious person with Dr. Grossman
on Saturday, May 22, 1965. With such obvious
inconsistencies in statements by Respondent's agents
concerning Rentner's injury and doctor appointments,
their testimony regarding other aspects of their dealings
with Rentner are suspect and not worthy of credit.
I find, therefore, that Respondent deviated from its usual
practice and terms of employment in refusing Rentner
time off during working hours to see his own doctor and
that such discrimination was based upon Rentner's
adherence to the Union and, therefore a violation of
Section 8(a)(3).
12. The coloring book
In April 1965 a coloring. book was distributed to the
employees by Respondent's supervisors. Factory Manager
Farkos conceived the thought and made rough sketches of
the illustrations contained therein. On the first page, cash
prizes were offered to the children of the Respondent's
employees coloring the book. In the book are various
illustrations, some showing a "union boss," wearing flashy
stones in his shirt and sitting at a desk with stacks of
money in front of him as well as a champagne glass
emitting bubbles. One illustration shows the union boss
cutting out paper dolls and saying, "Give them the works.
I'll get them if it takes 100 years." Another sketch shows
the union boss saying, "Go get our lawyer. I am sure he
can make up some wild charges," and another illustration
shows the lawyer running to the N.L.R.B. A later sketch
shows the lawyer at a neighborhood tavern saying, "I'd
rather be chasing ambulances." To be eligible for the prize
the book had to be returned to the personnel department
together with the name of the employee-parent of the child
coloring the book.
The complaint alleges a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act by the publication and distribution of this coloring
book, in that it promised benefits to induce employees to
refrain from supporting the Union and interrogated them
concerning union membership. I do not agree. Although
the coloring book may have been in poor taste and
uncomplimentary to the Union, it did not constitute a
violation of Section 8(a)(1). The monetary benefit was
extended to children of all employees, regardless of union
attitude, and the interrogation, consisting entirely of the
child's name and his parent's name, was not unlawfully
coercive or threatening.
13. The absentee rule during these hearings
Reference has been made previously to the institution
and administration of new absentee rules on February 3,
1965, and the fact that they provide for graduated
penalties for absences such as oral reprimand, written
reprimand, suspension, and discharge. On June 17, 1965, 4
days before the commencement of hearings in this case,
Respondent posted a notice in its plant which read in part:
The attendance and tardiness rule will apply during
the course of this hearing. Those people that have
been subpenaed will be excused. However, a day of
absence will be charged.
Inasmuch as the Respondent did not subpena any
employees, the warning was necessarily directed to the
168 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees subpenaed by the Board. Such employees were
thereby advised that, depending upon the plateau they had
already reached under the absentee rule, their absences,
necessitated by compliance with the Board's subpenas,
could result in their suspension or even discharge. As
such, the notice discriminated against employees giving
testimony under the Act and, therefore, violative of
Section 8(a)(4).
The above-described notice was removed from the
bulletin board on June 22, 1965. It was admitted, however,
that the employees were not told that the notice of June 17
had been rescinded although Barth did notify a union
representative, who was not an employee of the
Respondent, that the rule was suspended. I find that the
offensive notice was not suspended or rescinded
effectively.
C. The Employee Advisory Committee
The complaint alleges that the Respondent has
dominated and interfered with the formation and
administration of the Employee Advisory Committee in
certain specified behavior. In response to the Trial
Examiner's Order, General Counsel submitted the names
of the Respondent's agents who committed the acts
specified in the complaint. One of the acts thus specified
was that the Respondent, through Supervisors Farkos,
Travis, and Barth, appointed employee representatives to
the Committee. No evidence was adduced to support such
an allegation and this particular allegation was dismissed
during the course of the hearing.
Respondent distributed an employee handbook which
among other things sets forth a grievance procedure.
President Crawford denied ever having anything to do
with the grievance committee. General Counsel's
Exhibit 13, however, was signed and approved by
President Crawford, Vice President Jennings Crawford,
and Factory Manager Farkos and it sets forth the purpose
of the plan, the scope of activity, the voting units, the
selection of employee representatives, their term of
service and other details concerning employee
representatives on that committee. As noted earlier, the
Employee Grievance Committee, which was formed in
1968 and reconstituted in 1962, was renamed the
Employee Advisory Committee in 1964. Employee
Chapman was elected a committee representative in
October 1964 by secret-ballot vote. The ballots were slips
of paper distributed by Foreman Mann who also counted
the ballots. At a subsequent election in December 1964,
Mann also distributed and collected the ballots.
Employees voted on working time and were paid their
regular wages.
The Committee has no offices, no funds, no treasurer,
and no equipment. Charlotte Klaubo, employed by the
Respondent as secretary to Factory Manager Farkos,
began attending meetings of the Committee in October
1964 where she took notes. After these meetings she typed
up these notes during her regular working hours and was
paid her regular salary while doing so. She performed
these duties approximately five times between October
1964 and June 1965.
Notices of committee meetings were posted on the
company bulletin board and committee employees were
paid their regular pay while attending meetings.
Respondent set the time for such meetings and they were
conducted by management officials.
I conclude that the activities of Respondent, by its
supervisory agents, constituted domination and
interference with a labor organization.
D. Credibility
Much of the above Findings of Fact is based upon the
testimony of the nonsupervisory employees. As noted from
time to time such testimony is irreconcilable with the
testimony of management officials. I have concluded that,
generally speaking, the version given here by the
nonsupervisory employees should be credited. During the
weeks of the hearing in this matter I have had ample
opportunity to observe and assay the demeanor of all of the
witnesses, both on and off the stand. Although many of the
workers had limited education and an inability to express
themselves adequately, their testimony conveyed a
sincerity that I was usually unable to find in the testimony
and behavior of Respondent's witnesses. Some of my
reasons for failing to credit the testimony of the
Respondent's witnesses have already been mentioned.
Nevertheless, a recapitulation of my dissatisfaction with
the testimony of Respondent's witnesses is merited at this
point.
Perhaps the chief witness for the Respondent was its
factory manager, Alexander Farkos, who is known as
Robert Farkos. The coloring book referred to in B, 12,
above, is his brainchild. It serves to demonstrate the deep
animosity of the Respondent and, specifically of Farkos, to
the union movement. His testimony, likewise, shows
evidence of an inclination to go to any lengths in
effectuating that animosity. Reference has already been
made to his destruction of William Smith's merit rating
sheet, and the instruction to change the noted "merit
increase" for Smith to "automatic increase." Similarly,
mention should be made of the forge initials of Chapman's
payroll change notice. In addition, Farkos' testimony was
self-contradictory in a number of instances. It should be
remembered that he was the one who would not make
deals when talking to one employee but would make deals
when talking to another employee. He was also the one
who purported to be disturbed by the idle time of
employees, yet he was the one who admitted doing nothing
about it for 6 months. He was the one who testified of
dramatic changes brought about by creeping changes in
headers, yet he was the one who ordered no reduction of
personnel in that department. He was also the one who
told Rentner that Rentner would not get one red cent for
his injured wrist while in the same breath telling him that
he (Farkos) had no control over payments to Rentner.
Farkos even seemed unable to supply a firm and
dependable answer on his own education, testifying first
that he needed a half dozen lab courses, then changing it
to a dozen courses, and finally admitting that he did not
know just how many he needed.
Another important witness for the Respondent was
Personnel Director Barth. Reference has previsouly been
made to his lack of credibility as evidenced by the
statements made by him to the unemployment
compensation authorities in connection with the claim of
employee Rentner. In that proceeding he was unhesitant
in stating that he had called Doctor Grossman. At this
hearing he was just as sure that it was Farkos, not he, who
had called the Zeitlin Clinic and not Doctor Grossman.
Notice shoudld also be taken of his contradictions. Thus,
at one point he testified to meeting with foremen
concerning the mass discharges prior to March 29. At
another point, however, he testified that he did not meet
GREAT LAKES SCREW CORP.
with the foremen to discuss the impending discharges.
This elasticity with the truth is also revealed by other
actions. He admitted sending letters of reference inquiring
about Respondent's former employees. Although these
letters were mailed months after their discharge, they
stated that the employee "has been employed by this
Company" and not "had been." Similarly, although he
testified that the dischargees were offered reemployment
by the letter of June 11, a careful reading of the letter
makes it quite clear that it is only an offer to apply for
employment and not an offer of employment.
The testimony of the chief executive of the Respondent,
its president, Bob Crawford, also contains inconsistencies.
Reference has already been made to his testimonial
inconsistency concerning his mention of the Kentucky
Screw Plant as well as to his seeming ignorance of a
substantial layoff at Great Lakes as recently as 1962.
Similarly, notice is taken of his denial while on the stand
that he told a Mr. Brayman of a 10-week backlog of orders.
Mr. Brayman's associate, however, testified that he was
present when Crawford made such a statement. There is
no reason to doubt the accuracy of this contradiction.
The testimony of Foremen Adams and Insalata was also
unreliable. Both of these men testified concerning Smith's
poor work performance. In the case of Insalata, his version
was overwhelming discredited by the testimony of the
very men he claimed to have relied upon, men who were
either still employed by the Respondent and, therefore,
not apt to dispute the word of their foreman unjustifiably
or who had left the employ of the Respondent voluntarily
and on good terms and, therefore, without reason to be
biased. Adams like others mentioned previously, also
showed a certain elasticity with facts, first testifying that
Smith left his department "four or five times in a half
night" and later changing it to once on each of 3 nights. In
addition, his testimony was incorrect in a number of
instances if we accept the testimony of other witnesses for
the Respondent, referred to earlier.
In summary, the testimony of Respondent's witnesses,
from company president to foreman, proved unreliable.
Moreover, their demeanor on the stand, which the printed
record reflects only partially, confirmed that conclusion.
E. Concluding Findings
As found above, Respondent has engaged in a variety
and multiplicity of unfair labor practices between
February 2, 1965, the date of the settlement agreement,
and May 11, 1965, the date on which the Regional Director
withdrew the approval of the settlement agreement. I
conclude that the withdrawal of the approval was
warranted. Accordingly, the presettlement conduct of the
Respondent may be used not only as background evidence
bearing upon Respondent's postsettlement conduct, but
also on the merits as evidence of the unlawful
presettlement activity.
1. Section 8(a)(1)
The Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)' of the Act in the
following instances:
a. The attempted destruction of motel records showing
the presence of Respondent's personnel director on the
day of the union meeting;
b. Jennings Crawford's interrogation of Corder and
the impression and solicitation of surveillance therein;
c. Norman's interrogation of Spray concerning union
desires;
169
d. Farkos' similar interrogation of Spray;
e. Farkos' request that Spray remove his union button;
f. Farkos' change of attitude on Spray's telephone calls
after Spray's removal of the union button, as an
inducement to Spray for not supporting the Union;
g. Norman's interrogation of Donnelly, threatening loss
of wages;
h. Norman's conversation with Earl Casas implying
surveillance and threats;
i. Crawford's conversation with Arlene Casas
concerning Earl's discharge and prohibiting union button
wearing;
j. Farkos' promises of job security to Chapman;
k. Farkos' threats of plant closing to Chapman;
1. Crawford's speech of December 14 threatening plant
closing and announcing a general wage increase;
in. The institution of new absentee rules because of the
Union;
n. Insalata 's threat of discharge to Pierce;
o. Farkos' instruction to supervisors to engage in
surveillance;
p. Superintendent Ford's reprimand of Foreman Mann
for not reporting union button wearers;
q. Farkos' reprimand of Wilbourn:
r. Farkos' conversation with Wilbourn creating the
impression of surveillance;
s. Farkos' request to Wilbourn to put his union button
on Erickson's desk;
t. Farkos' threat of discharge to Wilbourn for failure to
remove the button;
u. Orawiec's restriction of Wilbourn's union talk:
v. Farkos' threat to Wilbourn to make the NLRB
hearing last 6 months;
w. Farkos' destruction of Smith's merit sheet and the
alteration of his wage record card;
x. Crawford's interrogation of Martin;
y. Crawford's promises of benefits to Martin;
z. Farkos' threat to sue Gary;
aa. Gerdzas' restriction of Story's union talk;
bb. Crawford's remark to Rentner about wearing a
union badge:
cc. Farkos' threat of discharge to Rentner;
dd. Farkos' refusal to pay for Rentner's medical
expenses implying union membership as the reason;
ee. The various incidents of unfair labor practices
alleged in paragraph VII of the complaint, admitted in the
Respondent's answer and not specifically listed above.
2. Section 8(a)(2)
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(2) of the Act by its
domination and interference with the formation and
administration of the Employee Advisory Committee and
by its support of it. Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc.,
supra; Texas Bolt Co., 135 NLRB 1188.
3. Section 8(a)(3)
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act in the
following instances; (a) Norman's restriction of Spray's
movement; (b) Farkos' grant of a retroactive pay increase
to Spray after removal of the union button; (c) Farkos'
discharge of Earl Casas: (d) Farkos' delay in approving
Chapman's pay increase; (e) Gowran's restriction of
Tulk's movement; (f) Insalata's restriction of
McCutcheon' s movement ; (g) Adams transfer of
Lundberg; (h) Erickson's transfer of Wilbourn;
(i) Wilbourn's cut in pay; (j) Orawiec's restriction of
Wilbourn's movement; (k) Farkos' dismissal of Wilbourn:
170 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(1) Adams' dismissal of Smith; (m) Barth's refusal to rehire
Martin; (n) the mass discharge of 37 employees in
March 29, 1965; (o) the transfer of 13 employees on
March 29, 1965; (p) the discharge of Story; (q) the
discharge of Chapman; (r) the discharge of Day; (s) the
discharge of McNanna; (t) the refusal to allow Rentner
time off to see a doctor: and (u) the discharge of Rentner.
4. Section 8(a)(4)
Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(4) of the Act by its
institution of a plant rule concerning absenteeism of its
employees who appear as witnesses at a Board hearing.
5. Allegations dismissed
The following portions of the complaint are dismissed
for failure of proof:
a. Paragraph VII (a), Item: Stangley Gowran-October
1964: (e), Item: Stanley Gowran-October 1964.
b. Paragraph?X (b)-the appointment of committee
representatives by Farkos.
c. Paragraph XI (a)-Bill Sebolt.
d. Paragraph XIV (b), Item: Tom Ford-February 15,
1965: (n)-the discharge of Foreman Mann.
e. Paragraph XVI (a) and (b), Items: Bill Sebolt: (a)
Item: Carsten Nelson.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint, I shall
recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action.
Having found that Respondent has discriminated in
regard to the tenure or terms or conditions of employment
to discourage membership in the Union, I shall
recommend that the Respondent be ordered to offer such
employees immediate and full reinstatement to their
former or substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to the seniority and other rights and privileges,
and to make them whole for any loss of earnings they may
have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them
by payment to them of the sum of money equal to the
amount they normally would have earned as wages from
the dates of their discharges or demotions to the date of
the offer of reinstatement less their net earnings , to which
should be added interest at the rate of 6 percent per
annum in accordance with the provisions set forth in F. W.
Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, and Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
3 It appears that some of the employees discharged, demoted,
or transferred may have already been reemployed by the
Respondent, but it is not clear that such rehirings have been with
restoration of seniority and other rights or to the same position
such employee held at the time of the discriminatory action.
In those instances where the discrimination consists of a
change in the condition of employment without any loss of
pay, I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to
offer such employees immediate and full reinstatement to
their former or substantially equivalent positions, without
prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges,
and to discontinue any discriminatory term or condition of
employment.3
Although not all of the employees discharged, demoted,
or transferred were union members, the order
recommends reinstatement and restoration for all. In Ellis
and Watts Products, Inc., 130 NLRB 1216, enfd. 297 F.2d
576 (C.A. 6), Respondent argued that since its layoff was
according to seniority it could not be said it discriminated
against employees unlawfully. The Board rejected this
argument, pointing out that there (as here) Respondent
knew that the bulk of the employees affected supported
the Union.
... The layoff was made to discourage union activity
and in such circumstances the layoff of the entire
group must be regarded as discriminatory and in
violation of Section 8(a)(3). Moreover, whether or not
the Respondent had knowledge of the individual
employee's union activity, it is clear that the layoff
was calculated to or tended to interfere with, restrain,
and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to
engage in union or concerted activity. Thus, whether
or not the layoff was discriminatory, it was clearly an
infringement of employees' rights guaranteed in
Section 7 of the Act and thus in violation of Section
8(a)(1). The appropriate remedy in either case wherein
a layoff constitutes the unfair labor practice includes
reinstatement of the employees who were the victims
of the layoff and their reimbursement for loss of
earnings.
I shall also recommend that Respondent discontinue its
domination and support of the Employees' Advisory
Committee.
Having found that the absentee plant rule concerning
witnesses attending Board hearings is a violation of the
Act, I shall recommend the Respondent be ordered to
cease and desist maintaining such a rule and notify its
employees that such rule has been rescinded.4 Similarly,
since I have found the absentee rule of February 3, 1965,
to have been promulgated by the Respondent to interfere
with the exercise of the rights guaranteed to its employees
under Section 7 of the Act, I shall recommend that the
Respondent be ordered to notify each and every employee
that the Union is not and has not been responsible for the
Company's absentee and tardiness rule. I shall also
recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and
desist in its various acts of interference, restraint, and
coercion practices upon the employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act as found above.
Inasmuch as the Respondent has engaged in substantial
violations of the Act in a variety of ways and since I am of
the opinion that there exists a danger of the commission of
other unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that the
Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from infringing
in any other manner upon the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
Resolution of such problems are left to review upon compliance.
4 Although the illegal rule has been rescinded by the
Respondent , a cease -and-desist order is appropriate. G & W
Electric Specialty Company, 154 NLRB 1136.
GREAT LAKES
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing , it is recommended that
the Respondent , Great Lakes Screw Corporation, its
officers , agents , successors, and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
( a) Threatening its employees with loss of employment
and wages and other reprisals for engaging in union
activities.
(b) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their
union activities.
(c) Surveillance or creating the impression of
surveillance of the union meetings and activities.
(d) Unlawfully soliciting employees to revoke their
union authorization, to refrain from wearing union buttons,
and from attending union meetings.
(e) Promising financial and other benefits to employees
if they refrain from supporting the Union or to induce them
to do so.
(f) Unlawfully restricting its employees from freedom of
movement or communicating with other persons because
of their support of the Union or to induce them to refrain
from supporting the Union.
(g) Warning employees that attempts to bargain
through the Union would be futile.
(h) Interfering with and obstructing a Board
investigation by causing the alteration or destruction of
records or attempting to do so.
(i) Dominating and interfering with the formation and
administration of the Employees ' Advisory Committee and
rendering unlawful support to said organization.
(j) Changing the terms or conditions of employment of
the employees as a reprisal for engaging in union activities
or to induce them to forego union activities.
(k) Instituting plant rules and disciplinary procedures
affecting employees for assisting the Union or to induce
them to refrain from so doing.
(1) Instituting and applying a no-solicitation rule
discriminatorily.
(m) Instituting and applying a plant rule which
penalizes witnesses appearing at a Board hearing.
(n) Instructing employees to report the union activities
and attitudes of other employees so as to interfere with the
exercise of self-organizing rights of such employees.
(o) Discouraging membership in the International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders,
Blacksmiths , Forgers and Helpers , AFL-CIO, by
discriminating against employees in regard to the hire and
tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment.
(p) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to
self-organization , to form labor organizations, to join or
assist International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron
Ship Builders , Blacksmiths , Forgers and Helpers,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, and to engage in
any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or any other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities , except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as
modified by the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer the following employees immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
SCREW CORP. 171
positions as of the date indicated opposite each of their
names below , without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make such
employees whole for any loss that they may have suffered
by reason of the discrimination against them in the manner
set forth in the section of the above Decision entitled,
"The Remedy":
C. Anderson March 29, 1965
V. Baratta March 29, 1965
D. Barrett March 29, 1965
C. Black March 29, 1965
'P. Brock-Jones March 29, 1965
R. Carlson March 29, 1965
A. Casas March 29, 1965
Earl Casas December 9, 1964
H. Case March 29, 1965
Maurice Chapman April 21, 1965
D. Cingrani March 29, 1965
B. Clare March 29, 1965
J. Cravens March 29, 1965
Dennis Day March 30, 1965
E. Donnelly March 29, 1965
W. Downey March 29, 1965
D. Evans March 29, 1965
J. Faron March 29, 1965
P. Fuqua March 29, 1965
H. Guindon March 29, 1965
T. Hickey March 29, 1965
D. Kennedy March 29, 1965
P. Kennedy March 29, 1965
M. Kordiak March 29, 1965
F. Kozik March 29, 1965
James Lundberg February 15, 1965
W. Lussenhop March 29, 1965
F. Martin March 29, 1965
Don McNanna May 3, 1965
B. Miles March 29, 1965
R. Morris March 29, 1965
D. Older March 29, 1965
J. Phillips March 29, 1965
C. Powell March 29, 1965
Ray Rentner April 26, 1965
R. Reynolds March 29, 1965
M. Rito March 29, 1965
F. Smith March 29, 1965
M. Smith March 29, 1965
William Smith, Jr. March 26, 1965
Lee Story March 29, 1965
H. Struthers March 29, 1965
E. Taylor March 29, 1965
R. Taylor March 29, 1965
A. Terry March 29, 1965
B. Truschka March 29, 1965
Edward Tulk March 29, 1965
J. Turnbull March 29, 1965
D. Warden March 29, 1965
R. Waters March 29, 1965
B. Whatley March 29, 1965
Bill Wilbourn March 22, 1965
J. Witkowski March 29, 1965
(b) Notify the above-named employees if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States of their
right to full reinstatement upon application in accordance
with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
(c) Notify the employees by posting in conspicuous
places in its plant, including all places where notices to
172 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees are customarily posted, an announcement that
the Union was not responsible for the institution of its
absentee and tardiness rule of February 3, 1965.
(d) Notify each and every employee that absence and
tardiness resulting from an employee's attendance at an
NLRB hearing pursuant to a subpena served upon him
shall be excused and not counted as an absence or
tardiness under any rule of the Company.
(e) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records necessary to determination of compliance with
paragraphs (a) and (b) above.
(f) Post in conspicuous places in its place of business,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix."5 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the
Regional Director for Region 13, after being duly signed by
Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for at least 60 consecutive days thereafter. Steps should be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20
days from the receipt of this Decision,. what steps
Respondent has taken to comply herewith.6
5 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice. In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order."
8 In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read: "Notify said
Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify out
employees that:
WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of employment
or wages or other reprisals for engaging in union
activity.
WE WILL NOT interrogate you coercively
concerning union activities.
WE WILL NOT engage in surveillance of, or create
the impression of surveillance of, union meetings and
activities.
WE WILL NOT unlawfully solicit you to revoke your
union authorization, to refrain from wearing union
buttons, and from attending union meetings.
WE WILL NOT offer financial or other benefits to
you nor restrict your freedom of movement or
communication with other persons nor change your
terms or conditions of employment nor institute plant
rules and disciplinary procedures, either because you
support the Union or to induce you to refrain from
supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT warn you that attempts to bargain
through the Union would be futile.
WE WILL NOT interfere with or obstruct Board
investigations by causing the alteration or destruction
of records or attempting to do so.
WE WILL NOT dominate or interfere with the
formation and administration of the Employees'
Advisory Committee or any other labor organization
nor render unlawful support to it.
WE WILL NOT institute or apply a no-solicitation
rule discriminatorily.
WE WILL NOT institute or apply any plant rule
which penalizes witnesses appearing at a Board
hearing.
WE WILL NOT instruct employees to report the
union activities or attitudes of other employees so as
to interfere with the exercise of self-organizing rights
of such employees.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship
Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers,
AFL-CIO, by discriminating against employees in
regard to the hire and tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights to
self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join
or assist International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and
Helpers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization,
and to engage in any other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or any other mutual
aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such
activities, except to the extent that such rights may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act as modified by
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959.
WE WILL offer the following employees immediate
and full reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions as of the date indicated opposite
each of their names below without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed and make such employees whole for any loss
they may have suffered by reason of the
hdi i i i ion aga nst t em:scr m nat
C. Anderson March 29, 1965
V. Baratta March 29, 1965
D. Barrett March 29, 1965
C. Black March 29, 1965
P. Brock-Jones March 29, 1965
R. Carlson March 29, 1965
A. Casas March 29, 1965
Earl Casas December 9, 1964
H. Case March 29, 1965
Maurice Chapman April 21, 1965
D. Cingrani March 29, 1965
B. Clare March 29, 1965
J. Cravens March 29, 1965
Dennis Day March 30, 1965
E. Donnelly March 29, 1965
W. Downey March 29, 1965
D. Evans March 29, 1965
J. Faron March 29, 1965
P. Fuqua March 29, 1965
H. Guindon March 29, 1965
T. Hickey March 29, 1965
GREAT LAKES
D. Kennedy March 29, 1965
P. Kennedy March 29, 1965
M. Kordiak March 29, 1965
F. Kozik March 29, 1965
James Lundberg February 15, 1965
W. Lussenhop March 29, 1965
F. Martin March 29, 1965
Don McNanna May 3, 1965
B. Miles March 29, 1965
R. Morris March 29, 1965
D. Older March 29, 1965
J. Phillips March 29, 1965
C. Powell March 29, 1965
Ray Rentner April 26, 1965
R. Reynolds March 29, 1965
M. Rito March 29, 1965
F. Smith March 29, 1965
M. Smith March 29, 1965
William Smith , Jr. March 26, 1965
Lee Story March 29, 1965
H. Struthers March 29, 1965
E. Taylor March 29, 1965
R. Taylor March 29, 1965
A. Terry March 29, 1965
B. Truschka March 29, 1965
Edward Tulk March 29, 1965
J. Turnbull March 29, 1965
D. Warden March 29, 1965
R. Waters March 29, 1965
B. Whatley March 29, 1965
Bill Wilbourn March 22, 1965
J. Witkowski March 29, 1965
WE WILL notify the above-named employees if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
SCREW CORP. 173
States of their right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service
Act and the Universal Military Training and Service
Act, as amended, after discharge from the Armed
Forces.
The Union was not responsible for the institution of the
absentee and tardiness rule of February 3, 1965.
Absences and tardiness resulting from your attendance
at a Board hearing pursuant to a subpena served upon you
shall be excused and not counted as an absence or
tardiness under any rule of the Company.
All of our employees are free to become or remain, or
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the
above-named labor organization or any other labor
organization.
GREAT LAKES SCREW
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, 881 U.S.
Courthouse & Federal Office Building, 219 South
Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604, Telephone
828-7597.