Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 6, 1965

152 N.L.R.B. 467 (N.L.R.B. 1965)

GLAZER'S WHOLESALE DRUG COMPANY, INC. 467
3. The above-named Union is and at all times material herein has been the
statutory representative of Respondent's employees in two units appropriate for col-
lective bargaining: (1) the over-the-road drivers working out of the Tupelo terminal;
and (2) the city drivers working out of the Tupelo terminal.
4. A preponderance of the evidence on the whole record does not support the
allegation of the complaint that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act by
changing the terms and conditions of employment of the drivers in the above units or
violated Section 8(a) (5) of the Act by doing so without notice to or consultation with
the Union.
5. A preponderance of the evidence supports the allegations of the complaint that
Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by threatening employees with loss
of employment if they remained members of the Union and by making promises
concerning their terms and conditions of employment in order to induce them to
withdraw from the Union.
6. A preponderance of the evidence supports the allegations of the complaint that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by bargaining with the
employees concerning their terms and conditions of employment including the terms
upon which they would and did agree to withdraw from the Union.
7. The unfair labor practices set forth in paragraphs 5 and 6 are unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire
record, it is recommended that the Board enter an order dismissing the complaint, as
amended.
Glazer's Wholesale Drug Company, Inc. and Dallas General
Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 745,
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America . Case No.
16-CA-099. May 6,1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On March 5, 1965, Trial Examiner Fannie M. Boyls issued her Deci-
sion in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set
forth in her attached Decision. The Trial Examiner further found
that the Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint and recommended that the complaint
be dismissed with respect thereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, and the entire record in this case,
152 NLRB No. 43.
468 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions,) and
recommendations.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recommended
by the Trial Examiner and orders that the Respondent, Glazer's
Wholesale Drug Company, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recom-
mended Order.
f i In the absence of exceptions thereto, the Board adopts, pro forma, the Trial Examiner's
inding that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act in discharg-
ing Ysidoro Sevilla
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge filed on August 6, 1964, and an amended charge filed on Septem-
ber 18, 1964, by Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union
No. 745, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein called the Union, a complaint was
issued on September 18, 1964, alleging that Respondent, Glazer's Wholesale Drug
Company, Inc., had engaged in conduct in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Respondent filed an answer, denying
that it had engaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged. A hearing was held
before Trial Examiner Fannie M. Boyls on November 23 and 24, 1964, at Dallas,
Texas. The parties waived oral argument at the conclusion of the hearing but all
parties thereafter filed briefs which I have carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in this case and from my observation of the witnesses and
their demeanor, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT
The complaint alleges, Respondent's answer admits, and I find, that Respondent is
a Texas corporation maintaining its principal office and place of business in Dallas,
Texas, and other plants or warehouses in other Texas cities. Respondent is engaged
in the importation and distribution of alcoholic beverages and at its Dallas plant in
the bottling and distribution of wine products. During the 12-month period preced-
ing the issuance of the complaint, a representative period, Respondent purchased,
transferred, and delivered to its Texas plants and warehouses, from points outside
the State of Texas, products and materials valued in excess of $50,000. Respondent
concedes and I find that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
If. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The complaint alleges,,the answer admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III -THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED
A. Background and issues
In late June 1964 Guadalupe Carreon, who worked as a driver in Respondent's
Dallas warehouse, sought out a union representative, obtained union authorization
cards, and signed up nine other employees who worked either at the warehouse or at
Respondent's general offices in Dallas, a few miles from the warehouse. On July 9
the Union wrote Respondent at its warehouse address, claiing to represent a major-
ity of the warehouse employees and requesting recognition.- This letter was received
a day or two later.
GLAZER'S WHOLESALE DRUG COMPANY, INC . 469
Carreon and two other employees, Ysidoro Sevilla and Cruz Dominguez, who had
signed union cards, were discharged during the latter part of July. The issues pre-
sented are whether these discharges were because of the employees' union member-
ship or activities, as the complaint alleges, or for cause, as Respondent asserts, and
whether Respondent otherwise engaged in unlawful acts by interrogating employees
regarding their union membership and sympathies or by threatening them with
reprisals for designating the Union as their bargaining representative.
B. The alleged interfe,ence, restraint, and coercion
1. Interrogation and threats attributed to Warehouse
Foreman Robert Wilonsky
According to Guadalupe Carreon, he was summoned to the office of his foreman,
Wilonsky, about July 17 -or 18. Wilonsky stated that he knew Carreon was in the
Union or had been approached by the union members. Carreon denied that this was
so, whereupon Wilonsky remarked that he did not know whether Carreon was lying
or "just covering up." He told Carreon that he was giving him a raise in pay and
doing all he could to see that Carreon made a good living for he knew that Carreon
had a wife and seven children to support. He warned Carreon that he had authority
to cut his hours to 40 a week if he joined the Union. As Respondent's records show,
Carreon had been working considerably more than 40 hours a week.)
Another employee, George Tolentino, testified that in July, a few days before
Carreon was fired, Wilonsky asked him, Tolentino, whether he had signed a union
card. When Tolentino replied in the affirmative, Wilonsky asked him who had given
him the card and Tolentino stated that Carreon had.
Employee Stevan Chavarria testified that Wilonsky talked to him about the Union
or questioned him about it on three occasions. The first occasion was about July 17
when Wilonsky stated that he had heard that the employees were organizing a union
and asked whether Chavarria was in it. Chavarria denied that he had joined
(though he in fact had done so). Wilonsky then remarked that he thought the colored
employees were starting the union movement because they usually started unions and
that he, Wilonsky, would have to get rid of them. He told Chavarria that if he heard
Chavarria was for the Union, he would have to let him go. At the same time
Wilonsky said that he was sure Carreon was in the Union. A few days later Wilonsky
informed Chavarria that he had heard that Chavarria was in the Union and that if he
was, he "could always back out of it"-that it would be better for him if he forgot
about the whole matter. On this occasion he named employees Carreon and Sevilla,
among other employees, as being in the Union, said that the Union was bad for
people, and predicted that the employees would get only 40 hours of work a week
under the Union. Several days later, Wilonsky again called Chavarria into his office
and accused him of being in the Union. Chavarria denied the charge. Thereupon,
Wilonsky remarked that he could always find out by giving Chavarria a lie detector
test.
Angeletta Espinoza and her husband, Leon, have been employed by Respondent for
14 years. She is a sister of the wife of Cruz Dominguez, whose alleged discriminatory
discharge on July 31, 1964, is in issue. She testified that about 2 weeks after
Dominguez had been discharged, Foreman Wilonsky asked her if her husband, Leon,
was involved in the Union. She replied that she did not know. He then asked, "Do
you know or don't you want to tell?" She assured him that she knew nothing.
Wilonsky then asked, "Did you hear that they let Cruz [Dominguez] go?" and admon-
ished her not to get Leon involved in the Union. I find that the admonition , occur-
ring in this context, constituted a warning to Espinoza that her husband, too, would
be discharged if he became involved in the Union.
Wilonsky categorically denied discussing the Union with any employees or ques-
tioning them about the Union. He testified that Vice President Irving Glazer
instructed him not to discuss this subject and that he obeyed those instructions.
Wilonsky impressed me as a witness determined to deny anything attributed to him
which might possibly involve his employer in an unfair labor practice. He did not
appear to be a frank witness. I was, on the other hand, impressed with the sincerity
of Carreon, Espinoza, and Tolentino and credit their testimony above set forth.
Respondent makes a special attack on the credibility of Chavarria, pointing out that
he was a friend of Carreon, had visited in the latter's home, and that Chavarria at
first denied , then later admitted having talked to Carreon about some of the matters
concerning which Chavarria testified. In evaluating Chavarria's testimony, I have
taken into consideration this inconsistency and also the fact that his testimony at
times appeared a little too opportune to be entirely credible. Although there is noth-
ing inherently incredible about his testimony, and I am convinced that Wilonsky did
470 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
interrogate him regarding the union movement , did speculate that the colored employ-
ees had started it, and did warn that he could ascertain the truth about whether
Chavarria had joined by giving him a lie detector test, I shall not otherwise rely upon
his testimony in making my findings herein.
2. Interrogation attributed to Regional Manager William McDonald
According to the undenied and credited testimony of Carreon, about July 20 or
several days after Foreman Wilonsky had spoken to him about the Union, Regional
Manager McDonald remarked to Carreon that he had heard that the place "was going
union" and asked him why he had joined the Union. Carreon denied having joined.
McDonald replied, "You are a good worker and I did not see why you had signed up
with the Union." Thereafter, McDonald again approached Carreon and asked why
he had joined the Union. Carreon responded, "What are you fishing fors" and
McDonald replied, "Oh, skip it," smiled and walked away.'
3. Interrogation attributed to Vice President Irving Glazer
Cruz Dominguez , whose discriminatory discharge of July 31 is discussed infra,
testified to a series of interrogations by Vice President Glazer as to what Dominguez
knew about the Union and as to strong pressures exerted upon Dominguez to ascer-
tain what he knew about the Union and its leadership . For reasons hereinafter
discussed , I credit Dominguez ' testimony in these respects.
On or about August 1, the day following Dominguez ' discharge , Glazer told
employee James Wilson , who had been employed by Respondent for over 30 years,
that Dominguez had been discharged for misappiopriating company funds . He then
asked Wilson whether he had signed a union card. Wilson replied that he had.
Pete Cuellar , another employee with more than 30 years' tenure with Respondent,
testified that on a date about which he could not be certain ( at first he placed it as
occurring before any of the three discharges but later placed it as a few days after
Dominguez ' discharge ), Glazer, in a routine conversation with him about the Union,
questioned him as to whether he knew anything about it . Cuellar replied that he
did not.
Glazer testified that following Dominguez ' discharge , Wilson told him that he,
Wilson , was a member of the Union , but Glazer denied otherwise discussing the
Union with any employee in the warehouse and denied knowing that any of the
employees in the warehouse or general offices were members of the Union . I do not
credit these denials. I credit instead the testimony of Dominguez , Wilson, and
Cuellar . Wilson particularly impressed me as being thoroughly honest and reliable;
and though Cuellar appeared uneasy and reluctant to testify , I am satisfied that his
testimony was substantially accurate.
4. Conclusion with respect to the alleged interference,
restraint, and coercion
The interrogation of the above-mentioned employees by Vice President Glazer,
Regional Manager McDonald, and Foreman Wilonsky regarding the union member-
ship or activities of such employees and of other employees occurring, as it did, in the
context of other unfair labor practices, the threat by Wilonsky to cut out overtime
work if the Union succeeded in organizing the employees, his threat to use a lie
detector test to force Chavarria to tell the truth about the Union, and his warning
to Espinoza that her husband Leon, like Dominguez, might be fired if he joined the
Union, unquestionably interfered with, restrained, and were in violation of Section
8(a)( I) of the Act.
C. The alleged discriminatory discharges
1. Ysidoro Sevilla
Sevilla had worked for Respondent upon three occasions, for a total of between 3
and 4 years prior to his discharge on July 23. He worked out of the warehouse,
under the direct supervision of Foreman Wilonsky, as a truckdriver. He joined the
Union sometime prior to July 14.
'It is also undenied and I find in accordance with credited testimony of employee
James T. Wilson, that in July, prior to the occurrence of any of the discharges here in
issue, McDonald asked Wilson if he had seen any of the union representatives around
the place. I do not, however, find anything unlawful in this type of interrogation
GLAZER'S WHOLESALE DRUG COMPANY , INC. 471
Normally, Sevilla made only local deliveries but he was occasionally sent on out-
of-town trips as a helper . According to his testimony , his first and only out-of-town
trip as a truckdriver was on a Friday, June 26 or July 3 ( 3 or 4 weeks prior to his
discharge on July 23 ). On this trip the engine of the truck he drove was burned out
and his responsibility for this damage was assigned to him as the reason for his
discharge.
Sevilla gave the following credited account of the incident and of his subsequent
discharge . The 1957 Chevrolet truck which Foreman Wilonsky assigned to him to
drive to Denison , Texas, had previously been turned over and Sevilla had heard that
Respondent had been having trouble with that truck . For this reason Sevilla asked
Wilonsky if the truck was in condition to make the trip and Wilonsky assured him
that it was. An experienced driver, Pete Cuellar, was assigned to follow him to
Denison in another truck. Enroute and before reaching Sherman, which is about 65
miles from Dallas, Sevilla heard a rear -end noise in the truck and stopped to investi-
gate. He found that the engine was hot. The temperature gauge on the truck was
not working and Sevilla had therefore not immediately been made aware of the hot
motor. Cuellar , who also stopped , advised Sevilla to drive on to a filling station
ahead. Sevilla did so. As he started putting water in the radiator , the motor died.
After the motor cooled, Sevilla attempted to crank the engine as Cuellar poured more
water in the radiator . They found leaks in the water hose and fixed the leaks. Sevilla
then started the motor again but when more water was put into the radiator , he heard
a popping noise, saw a hole in the engine , fitted a plug into the hole, then proceeded on
his way. He stopped in the next town and informed Cuellar that the truck was no
better. On Cuellar's advice , he telephoned the warehouse and Wilonsky sent a
mechanic to look at the truck and also sent another truck in which Sevilla continued
his trip to Denison. The damaged truck was towed back to the Dallas warehouse.
During the following week , Wilonsky informed Sevilla that the engine of the truck
was burned up and showed him the head which was cracked. It was several weeks
later, on July 23, following a conference in the office among Cuellar , Wilonsky, and
Finance Manager E. P. Furlong , that Sevilla was discharged . Furlong told Sevilla
that Foreman Wilonsky had recommended overlooking the incident in which the
truck engine was burned up but that it was company policy to insist on its equipment
being maintained and Furlong was unwilling to overlook the incident . Furlong
explained to Sevilla that he had just returned from his vacation and learned about the
truck.
Cuellar, the only witness besides Sevilla who could have testified about Sevilla's
and his own handling of the hot engine problem, was not questioned either by the
General Counsel or by Respondent about it. I therefore assume that , if questioned,
his account would have corroborated Sevilla's account ? I shall also assume, because
no evidence to the contrary appears, that the account given by Cuellar to Furlong was
in substantial accord with Sevilla's testimony regarding the matter , and that it was on
the basis of this account that Respondent deemed Sevilla to have been negligent and
responsible for the burned -up motor . It was apparently Furlong's position that when
Sevilla first became aware of the hot motor , he should have parked on the side of the
road and sent Cuellar for a repairman , for water or for whatever else might be
needed, and should not have attempted to drive further at that time . I cannot con-
clude that Furlong's position is unreasonable even though it was Cuellar , a driver of
more than 30 years' experience with Respondent , who advised Sevilla to drive on to
the next filling station . The loss to Respondent was substantial . Wilonsky estimated
that it would cost between $500 and $600 to replace the burned -out engine. More-
over, there is no suggestion in the record that this type of loss was covered by
insurance.
There are , of course , suspicious circumstances surrounding Sevilla's discharge. He
was not discharged until 3 or 4 weeks after he burned up the truck engine. The truck
incident occurred on June 26 or July 3; Furlong did not leave for his vacation until
July 8; Respondent received the Union 's request for recognition just after July 9;
Sevilla joined the Union prior to July 14; Furlong returned from his vacation on
July 20; and Sevilla's discharge occurred on July 23. This lapse of time between
Sevilla's offense and his discharge for that asserted reason is explained by Foreman
Wilonsky's testimony that he did not believe Sevilla should be discharged for the
offense and did not report the matter to Furlong until the latter returned from his
vacation . There is also the unexplained circumstance that Cuellar , who advised and
assisted Sevilla in handling the hot engine problem, does not appear to have been
2 Cuellar , who was called by the General Counsel and questioned about Vice President
Glazer's interrogation of him regarding his knowledge of the Union, appeared to be a
somewhat timid, if not reluctant , witness , as hereinbefore noted.
472 DECISIONS OF -NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
blamed or disciplined by Respondent for his part in handling the problem, and the
further circumstance that Furlong conferred with Cuellar, but not with Sevilla, before
deciding to discharge Sevilla. It seems only reasonable that Furlong should have
obtained Sevilla's version of the incident before discharging him.
On the other hand, I am not satisfied on the record before me that Respondent had
knowledge of Sevilla's union membership at the time it discharged him and this, of
course, is a necessary ingredient for any inference of unlawful motivation. Aside
from the testimony of Chavarria that Sevilla was one of the employees named by
Wilonsky about July 20 as being a member of the Union, there is no evidence of
knowledge by Respondent. As already indicated, I am not convinced that Chavarria
was an entirely credible witness and I am reluctant to rely on his testimony as a basis
for finding a knowledge by Respondent of Sevilla's union membership. But even if
I were to infer such knowledge, I am nevertheless not convinced that Respondent's
discharge of Sevilla under all the circumstances shown by the record was motivated
by his union membership rather than by the substantial financial loss to Respondent
caused by Sevilla's negligent handling of his truck. I find that the General Counsel
has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the discharge of Sevilla
was discriminatorily motivated.
2. Guadalupe Carreon
Carreon had worked for Respondent a total of about 41/2 years, his last employ-
ment being for about 3 years prior to his discharge on July 28. He worked out of the
warehouse as a truckdriver and deliveryman, making both out-of-town and local
deliveries and filling orders, lining up the merchandise and helping to load the trucks.
As already noted, Carreon is the employee who had sought out a union representative,
obtained union authorization cards, and signed up nine of his fellow employees.
Respondent knew that Carreon was active in the union movement, for his foreman,
Wilonsky, in questioning Tolentino several days before Carreon's discharge about
who had given him the union card which he had signed, learned that Carreon had
done so. Moreover, it is undisputed that Respondent had heard of Carreon' s union
membership at least as early as July 20 (when Regional Manager McDonald told
Carreon that he was a good worker and knew his job well and that McDonald did
not know why he had wanted to join the Union).
Respondent discharged Carreon on July 28 for the asserted reason that his com-
mercial driver's license had expired. It is General Counsel's contention that Respond-
ent had requested Carreon to work long hours, refused to grant his request for time
off to get his license renewed, then had used his lapsed driver's license as a pretext
for discharging him because of his union membership and activities.
Carreon's testimony regarding the circumstances precipitating his discharge may
be summarized as follows: Several days after receiving a letter dated July 1, 1964,
from the Texas Department of Public Safety requesting him to appear at 9:30 a.m. on
July 9 for an interview, Carreon showed the letter to his foreman, Wilonsky, and
told him that he needed to go for the interview on July 8 (a Wednesday).3 Wilonsky
replied that Carreon was scheduled to drive to east Texas on that date and that he
could not be spared from work. On July 8 Carreon requested his wife to telephone
the Texas Department of Public Safety and notify it that he could not appear for an
interview on that date. She did telephone but was unable to reach the person who
had signed the letter. Carreon then proceeded to drive his truck to east Texas as
directed.
Carreon's driver's license, unless renewed, was due to expire on the following
Saturday, July It. The licensing office was open on Saturdays between 8 a.m. and
12 noon, but Carreon had to take his pregnant wife to a doctor on July 11 and did
not have time to see about the interview and renewal of his license then. On every
day thereafter (except Sundays) up to the date of his discharge, Carreon was required
to work.
s The letter appears to be a form letter with Carreon's name, address and the date and
place at which Carreon was to appear typed in. It recites in the form, inter aha, "that
several reports of traffic difficulties experienced by you during recent months have be-
come a part of your driver license file and appear to establish a basis for improvement
or corrective action" ; that in "an effort to determine the cause of such adverse driving
record and to review your current licensing status " the appointment for an interview
was being made. Apparently a driver is not called in for a consultation unless his
record shows as many as three traffic violations Respondent does not contend, how-
ever, that Carreon's traffic violations had anything to do with his discharge.
GLAZER'S WHOLESALE DRUG COMPANY, IN C. 473
Carreon received another form letter from the Texas Department of Public Safety,
dated July 17, notify him that he would have to appear in person at one of the depart-
ment's examining stations for a driver's test before his license could be renewed.
Carreon testified that 2 or 3 days after receiving this letter he showed it to Foreman
Wilonsky and told him he wanted time off to see about getting his driver's license
renewed. Wilonsky looked at the letter, laughed and said that the Company would
give him time off later when it could spare him. Several times thereafter Carreon
again asked for time off for this purpose and Wilonsky repeated, "Whenever we have
time you can go." Finally, on Tuesday, July 28, Carreon asked Wilonsky not to
require him to drive anymore until Carreon could get his license renewed, but
Wilonsky sent him on a local driving assignment anyway, saying that if Carreon
drove carefully, there would be no problem. Carreon then made a delivery of beer
to a local warehouse. While there he received a telephone call from Wilonsky
requesting him to return to Respondent's warehouse.
Carreon further testified that when he arrived back at Respondent's warehouse,
Wilonsky sent him to Branch Manager Furlong's office. Furlong asked for Carreon's
name, address, and his driver's license. When Carreon told Furlong that he did not
have a driver's license, Furlong replied that Carreon had been hired as a driver and
that since he did not have a driver's license, he could not remain in Respondent's
employ. Carreon explained that he had asked Wilonsky on several occasions for
time off so that he could take another test and get his license renewed. Furlong then
told Carreon to talk to Wilonsky and that it was up to Wilonsky to let him go for the
test if he wanted to. While Carreon was still in Furlong's office, Vice President Irving
Glazer walked in and asked Furlong what was wrong. Furlong replied, "We have a
man here who does not have a driver's license." Glazer then said, "Well, if he is
driving without a license, we cannot use him any more .... Get out." Carreon left
the plant after receiving his paycheck.
Carreon's account is in part supported by the testimony of James T. Wilson, an
over-the-road driver, who works out of the general offices but whose duties take him
to the warehouse occasionally, usually on Mondays. He testified that while at the
warehouse about a week before Carreon's discharge, he heard Wilonsky ask Car-
reon to drive a truck; that Carreon told Wilonsky he had a letter from the depart-
ment saying he had to take another examination before he could get his driver's
license renewed, and that Wilonsky said he would let Carreon go as soon as he had
time. As already noted, Wilson impressed me as a thoroughly reliable witness and
I credit his testimony .4
Foreman Wilonsky categorically denied that Carreon had ever shown him or told
him about either of the two letters from the Texas Department of Public Safety,
that Carreon had ever informed him of the expiration of his driver's license or
requested time off to get his license renewed, or that he knew Carreon had been
driving without his driver's license. As previously indicated, I do not find Wilonsky
to be a credible witness. I credit instead Carreon's account of the events leading up
to his discharge.
Furlong's and Glazer's account of the discharge interview was substantially as
related by Carreon. Furlong testified that he dismissed Carreon "on the spot" when
he ascertained that Carreon did not have a driver's license. Glazer testified that he
instructed Furlong to check on all the employees to be sure that they had driver's
licenses and that he concurred in Furlong's discharge of Carreon when it was dis-
covered that Carreon did not have a license. According to Glazer, after they had
left the office, Carreon told him that he had asked Wilonsky for time off so that he
could get his license renewed and that Wilonsky had refused to give him time off.
Glazer testified that he then called Wilonsky into the office and asked, in Carreon's
presence, if this were true and that Wilonsky denied that it was true. The latter
testimony was not corroborated by either Wilonsky or Carreon and I have some
doubt as to its accuracy, but assuming that it happened, this would not affect my
conclusion as to the motivation for Carreon's discharge.
In defending his discharge of Carreon for not having a commercial driver's license,
despite Carreon's explanation that Wilonsky would not give him time off to take the
test necessary for a renewal of his license, Furlong stated that Carreon could have
* There is also testimony by employee Chavarria that about 2 weeks before Carreon's
discharge, he heard Carreon ask Wilonsky for time off to get his license renewed and
heard Wilonsky reply, "Whenever we have time " Chavarria also testified that on the day
Carreon was discharged he heard Carreon protest against driving because his license had
expired, and that Wilonsky told him, "Go ahead anyway and just be careful." For
reasons already noted, I do not rely upon Chavarria's testimony in support of Carreon's
account of the events.
474 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
attended to this matter on Saturdays-since, according to Furlong , he did not work
on Saturdays-or in the morning before Carreon reported for work, as he was
habitually late for work. Respondent's records, however, do not bear out these
assertions. The payroll records show that Carreon worked every Saturday in July
prior to his discharge, except on July 11, when, as already stated, Carreon had to
take his wife to a doctor. These records show, moreover, that throughout July
Carreon worked extremely long hours. For the pay period ending July 9, he worked
731/2 hours, including 111/4 hours on Saturday, July 4; for the pay period ending
July 16, he worked 611/2 hours; for the pay period ending July 23, he worked 793/4
hours, including 81/z hours on Saturday, July 18; and for the next 4 days preceding
his discharge on July 29, he averaged over 11 hours a day, including 73/4 hours of
work on Saturday, July 25. These records also show that during July, there was
only I day when Carreon failed to report for work as late or later than 9 a.m , and
that on that single occasion, Saturday, July 18-when he reported at 9.54 a.m -he
had checked in at 3 a.m. that same morning after 231/4 hours of driving duty. Surely,
Respondent could not have expected him to attempt to take a driver's test between
8 and 9:54 a.m.on that morning.
In view of the entire record, including the fact that Carreon had started the union
movement and signed up most of his fellow drivers in the Union, that Respondent
had learned of Carreon's support of the Union and strongly opposed it, I have not
the slightest doubt that Respondent's discharge of him on July 28 for the asserted
reason that he did not have a driver's license, despite his protest that Foreman Wil-
onsky refused to give him time off to take his driver's test, was merely pretextual
and that the true reason for his discharge was his membership and leadership in the
union movement.
3. Cruz Dominguez
Prior to his discharge on July 31, Dominguez had been employed by Respondent
for 14 or 15 years. He was one of Respondent's two drivers who worked out of
the general offices, driving trucks both in the city and over the road. He was one of
the nine drivers who signed a union card at the request of Carreon.
Dominguez gave the following account of the events leading up to his discharge.
About 7:45 a m. on June 30, he was involved in an accident on the highway enroute
to Houston. While driving on a 4-lane divided highway, he looked in his rearview
mirror, preparatory to passing a State Highway Department truck, saw nothing, then
as he started pulling into the passing lane, he noticed a small station wagon in that
lane about to pass his truck. To avoid hitting the station wagon, Dominguez quickly
turned back into the lane in which he had been driving, but in doing so crashed into
the back of the Highway Department truck, causing substantial damage to the truck
he was driving. Dominguez inquired of the three men in the Highway Depart-
ment truck as to whether any of them were hurt and they assured him that they
were not. He then ascertained that no damage was done to the Highway Department
truck. From the nearest town he reported the accident to Respondent's traffic man-
ager, Marcel Lanier, then telephoned the highway patrol. He was given a ticket and
paid a fine of $20.50 for the negligent collision. Within a few days after the acci-
dent he made a written report regarding it in Respondent's office. The truck was
towed into Houston and repaired within about a week. During that week Domin-
guez assisted Wilson, the other over-the-road driver, and accompanied him on his
trips. He then resumed driving the repaired truck.
Dominguez further testified that on Tuesday, July 21, 3 weeks after the accident,
he saw Vice President Glazer in Respondent's sales office in Houston and Glazer
asked him if he "knew what was going around about the Union." Dominguez
replied that he knew nothing about the Union . On the same day, Dominguez drove
his loaded truck back to Dallas where part of the truck was unloaded and the
remainder of the load, destined for Fort Worth, remained on the truck. The truck
was scheduled to be loaded with additional liquor and sent to Fort Worth on Thurs-
day but the delivery was delayed until Tuesday of the next week and the truck was
then driven by Wilson instead of Dominguez . Wilson relayed a message to Domin-
guez that he was to report to the general offices on Tuesday. When Dominguez
reported , he first saw Traffic Manager Lanier who told Dominguez that he had
called the highway patrol and received a report on Dominguez' accident. Dominguez
then went into the office where Vice President Glazer was sitting. Glazer asked him
if he knew anything about the Union . Dominguez replied in the negative . Glazer
accused Dominguez of lying and told him to report to Lanier. When Dominguez
reported as requested , Lanier told him to return on the following day.
GLAZER 'S WHOLESALE DRUG COMPANY, INC. 475
According to Dominguez , on the next day, Wednesday , July 29, he returned to
the office and found Glazer there . Glazer stated that he wanted to find out the
truth about the Union. Dominguez said that he knew nothing about it . Glazer
retorted that Dominguez was lying; that he knew everything about it . Glazer said
that someone had informed him that Dominguez was the leader of the Union.
Dominguez replied, "I hope I did die if I was the leader of the Union." Glazer
then asked if Dominguez was sure he had nothing to do with the Union and whether
he would take a lie detector test. Dominguez said that he would take such a test.
On the following day, July 30 , Glazer took Dominguez to Truth Verification, Inc.,
for a lie detector test. On the way there, according to Dominguez, Glazer told him
the test would be about the accident . The man who administered the test, Laurance
Mohn, questioned Dominguez about headlights , his truck , air cushions , whether
Dominguez was living in Texas, whether he eats breakfast , and about the accident .5
Thereafter, while Dominguez was still in Mohn 's office, the latter read to Dominguez
and obtained his signature on a typed statement , dated July 30, pertaining to the
July 30 accident, which described the accident substantially in accord with Domin-
guez' testimony with respect to it.6
After he had taken the lie detector test, Dominguez was brought back to Glazer's
office. Dominguez testified that Glazer again asked him to tell the truth about the
Union and Dominguez continued to disclaim any knowledge of it . After asking
Dominguez what the Union could do for him besides taking his dues, Glazer told
Dominguez to return on the next day.
On the following day, July 31, when Dominguez returned to Glazer's office, he
found Mohn there with Glazer. Mohn read to him another typed statement which
Dominguez signed. This statement recited that during Dominguez' employment
with the Company he had purchased several new cool seat cushions for his truck,
which Respondent had paid for, and that he had taken some of them for use in his
private car . Dominguez testified that during his last 2 years of truckdriving, he had
purchased about four air cushions for his truck on his company credit card, had
used one of the old cushions for his private car, and had left the other used cushions
in the warehouse and guessed that "some of the boys" had used them . Although the
statement he signed appears to be somewhat misleading , Mohn acknowledged that
it was the used cushions , not the new ones, which Dominguez had acknowledged
having used in his private car.
After Dominguez had signed the second statement , Glazer took him to the High-
way Department and requested an officer there to give Dominguez some reading
tests in connection with a driver's test. Despite the fact that he could not read
English , he passed the test, as Glazer described it, "with flying colors," the tester
expressing the view that Dominguez was well qualified to drive a truck . ? Glazer
then drove Dominguez back to the office and on the way, according to Domin-
guez, kept asking him for the truth . Glazer told Dominguez that he knew that
Wilson, the other over-the-road driver, was involved too. (Wilson, as Dominguez
knew, had not been involved in the accident and Glazer could only have been refer-
ring to Wilson's involvement in the Union.)
When they arrived at the general offices, Traffic Manager Lanier took Domin-
guez to lunch. This was the first time in his 15 years with Respondent that Lanier
had ever taken Dominguez to lunch. During lunch Lanier advised Dominguez that
if Glazer asked him anything , Dominguez should tell the truth. After lunch, as
Dominguez sat in the office of Warehouse Foreman Wilonsky for awhile looking at a
6 Mohn testified that as he administered the polygraph test to Dominguez, the latter
said that he was not feeling well and in fact appeared to be ill, but that Dominguez
wanted to continue with the tests. He further testified that he stopped the tests at
that point since there was nothing in the polygraphs to indicate that Dominguez was
not telling the truth.
O The statement, in part, recites that Dominguez believed the accident was his fault
and that he had been careless. Dominguez does not read or write English. He testified
that he did not believe that the statement just mentioned was read to him. He also testi-
fied at one point that he believed the accident was unavoidable and not his fault, but
at another point he acknowledged that he was at fault. These circumstances, I be-
lieve, reflect his uncertainty as to the proper conclusion to be drawn from the facts,
rather than an intent to misrepresent the facts
7 Glazer testified that he could not remember the date on which he took Dominguez
for the driver 's test and did not believe it was the day Dominguez was discharged.
Dominguez' testimony in regard to the sequence of events , however, appeared very clear
and convincing , and I credit it.
476 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
magazine, Glazer walked by and asked Dominguez if he had anything to tell. Domin-
guez replied that he did not. About 3.30 p.m., according to Dominguez, he decided
to tell the truth and went to Glazer's office where he informed Glazer that he had
signed "for the Union." Glazer asked if he knew what he had signed for and
Dominguez replied that he did. Glazer then asked who else had signed and Domin-
guez said that he did not know. Glazer inquired as to who had given Dominguez
the card which he had signed and Dominguez told him that Carreon had.
Dominguez then left Glazer's office and started looking at magazines again. His
back started hurting him, so he went to Lanier's office and asked if anyone could
take him to a doctor. Lanier replied that he "had a dirty deal to do," that he had to
discharge Dominguez. Dominguez asked for the reason and Lanier replied that it
was because of "the wreck."
Vice President Glazer's account is irreconcilable with that of Dominguez. He
testified that he did not "know" at the time of Dominguez' discharge on July 31
that he was a member of the Union and, indeed, did not "know" any of his employees
either at the warehouse or at the general offices were union members. He also testi-
fied that he never had any discussion "with any employee of the warehouse" as to
whether or not he belonged to the Union. He admitted, however, knowing about
the Union's letter of July 9, in which it claimed to represent a majority of the ware-
house employees. Although Glazer did not in specific terms deny that he had
repeatedly sought information from Dominguez as to what the latter knew about
the Union, as Dominguez testified, Glazer sought by his testimony to give the impres-
sion that he had not. Even if his testimony may be interpreted as denying that he
had such conversations, I do not credit it.
Glazer's account of the events leading to Dominguez' discharge is not very coher-
ent, but it appears to be substantially as follows: Glazer's duties pertain principally
to the sales end of the business and driving accidents are not in his "division" of
responsibility. He therefore had not heard about Dominguez' accident on June 30
until July 21, when Dominguez told him about it in Houston after Glazer had
bought Dominguez a cup of coffee. At that time Dominguez appeared nervous and
fearful that he might lose his job because of the accident. After listening to Domin-
guez, Glazer told him he would look into the matter.
According to Glazer, when he returned to Dallas he investigated the accident
and Dominguez' previous record with Respondent He learned from the records
available, including the insurance report and the traffic ticket given Dominguez,
that: Dominguez had a negligent collision; Dominguez had previously been involved
in a "misappropriation" of company funds; 8 there had been reports about Dominguez
speeding (but there were no written records of such reports); Dominguez had used
his company credit card to purchase five seat cushions within a short period of time;
and Dominguez could not read or write English. He called Dominguez in for an
interview in order to learn the truth and, although Dominguez had given inconsistent
accounts of the accident, he finally conceded that he had been negligent and that the
accident was his fault. Glazer then decided to send Dominguez to Truth Verifica-
tion, Inc., for a lie detector test to verify what Dominguez had told him, and Domin-
guez agreed to go. After the lie detector operator had read the statements which
Dominguez signed, Dominguez appeared "very sorry and very shook up" and Glazer
felt sorry for him. When asked by the Trial Examiner what inconsistent accounts
Dominguez had given about the accident which led Glazer to subject him to the lie
detector test, Glazer appeared flustered and hesitated before replying that one ver-
sion given by Dominguez was that he had been sleepy and did not see "the guy"
(apparently referring to the driver of the station wagon), but Glazer could not
remember any other version.
Glazer explained that he took Dominguez for a driver's test because he felt that
Respondent had perhaps been at fault in assigning Dominguez work for which he
was not qualified because of his illiteracy. He did not explain how illiteracy could
possibly have had anything to do with any of Dominguez' shortcomings during his
15 years of employment with Respondent. Glazer further testified that he recom-
mended to Traffic Manager Lanier that Dominguez be discharged. He did not
explain why, since he was recommending Dominguez' discharge, he had bothered to
s The so-called "misappropriation" to which Glazer referred was the acceptance by
Dominguez of cash discounts on the purchase of gasoline from Phillips Petroleum Com-
pany, instead of having these discounts credited on the gasoline charge tickets. When
it came to the attention of Traffic Manager Lanier several months before the accident
that Dominguez was doing this, Lanier told Dominguez that it "definitely was against
company policy for any driver to take any cash discount" and thereafter Dominguez
had all the discounts put on the charge tickets
GLAZER'S WHOLESALE DRUG COMPANY , INC . 477
take Dominguez to the Highway Department for a driver's test. From my observa-
tion of Glazer as he testified, as well as from a careful analysis of the record of his
testimony, I am not persuaded that he was telling the truth insofar as his account is
inconsistent with that of Dominguez.
Lanier testified that he is the person who decided to and did discharge Dominguez
and that his reason for doing so, and which he stated to Dominguez, was Dominguez'
reckless and careless driving and his dishonesty. He at first testified that the specific
dishonesty to which he was referring was Dominguez' purchase of more air cushions
than were needed for his truck, and his appropriation to his own use of the used air
cushions. However, in answer to leading questions of his counsel, he later testified
that he was also referring to the cash discount incident herembefore mentioned.
Lanier testified that Respondent's comptroller, O'Shea, keeps him informed of any
purchases by employees which appear to be out of the ordinary, and that he, Lanier,
knew of the purchases by Dominguez of the excessive number of air seat cushions
for 2 or 3 weeks before discharging him but said nothing to him about the matter.
Lanier disclaimed any knowledge of union activities at the plant but he did acknowl-
edge having heard a discussion in the office about the Union's letter requesting
recognition.
Lanier at first placed the date on which he took Dominguez to lunch as 4 or 5
days before Dominguez' discharge, but on cross-examination, conceded that it could
have been on the day Dominguez was discharged-as Dominguez testified-or a
day or two before.° During lunch, according to Lanier, he kept asking Dominguez
to tell the truth about the accident because he wanted to know all the details; how-
ever, Lanier acknowledged that he had no reason to believe that Dominguez had
not told the truth to him or anyone else about the accident. Lanier explained that
when he asked Dominguez in specific terms whether the accident was his fault,
Dominguez at first expressed the view that it was not, then later conceded that it
must have been his fault because he had been driving too close to the highway truck.
Lanier conceded that Dominguez had given him a report of the accident on June 30,
the day it occuried, and that Dominguez had thereafter made out a report of the
accident which should be on file in Respondent's office. Lanier testified, however,
that he had not looked at the report and was not familiar with it.
Lanier further testified that since about April 1964 he had been receiving reports
from Respondent's various branch managers that Dominguez had been driving care-
lessly-following too closely or cutting in and out of traffic-but that he did not
mention this to Dominguez, at least before the discharge interview. No branch
manager was called to substantiate Lanier's testimony. I have serious doubts as to
whether any such oral reports were made.
There are facets of the testimony of both Lanier and Glazer which appear to me
to be inherently incredible. Lanier furnished no explanation as to why he waited
3 weeks or a month after the accident to start questioning Dominguez about it, or
what occasioned his sudden interest in learning more about it, or why he did not
even attempt to familiarize himself with what had already been reported by Domin-
guez in his accident report and to the insurance company. Nor could he explain
why he did not question Dominguez concerning the air cushions when his attention
was called to the matter several weeks befoie Dominguez' discharge. Nor does it
appear credible that Lanier would have urged Dominguez to tell the truth about the
accident when he conceded he had no reason to believe that Dominguez had failed
to tell the truth, or that he should have insisted on Dominguez' drawing a legal
conclusion as to whether or not he was at fault under the circumstances Dominguez
had related. Lanier testified that he did not know about the lie detector test given
Dominguez. This, too, seems to me as incredible in view of the fact that Glazer
and Lanier had been consulting with each other about Dominguez.
I am convinced that Dominguez' account of the events leading up to his discharge
is substantially correct. I find shocking the extreme pressures put upon him to force
him to divulge what he knew about the Union and its leadership. It appears obvious
to me that the collision occurring a month before the discharge, the purchase of an
excessive number of air cushions between June 1963 and April 1964, which came to
Lanier's attention several weeks before the discharge and Dominguez' acknowledg-
ment that he used one or more of the old cushions in his own car, were not in fact
the true reasons for Dominguez' discharge. Respondent's knowledge of these mat-
ters served as a lever in its attempts to force Dominguez to divulge all he knew about
the Union and its leadership; and when Dominguez, under great pressure, finally
6I credit Dominguez' clear and convincing testimony that this event occurred on the day
of Dominguez ' discharge.
478 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
agreed to tell the truth about the Union but disclosed only that he had signed a union
card and that Carreon (who had already been discriminatorily discharged) had
given him the card , Respondent , I am convinced , believed that he was still not
divulging all he knew about the Union , and thereupon decided for this reason and
because of his union membership to use all adverse information about him which
it could uncover as a pretext for his discharge . I find that Glazer , in requesting
Dominguez to take a lie detector test, was not motivated by a desire to learn the
truth about the accident or any other matter about which he had questioned Domin-
guez, but was motivated instead by the twofold purpose of intimidating him into
divulging all he knew about the Union and of possibly discovering some reason
other than the stale accident incident as a plausible pretext for discharging him. I
find also that Glazer's decision , after learning the results of the lie detector test, to
take Dominguez to the State Highway Department for reading tests in connection
with testing his ability as a driver , was also for the dual purpose of coercing him
into disclosing the union activities of himself and his fellow employees , and of pos-
sibly supplying a convincing pretext for discharging him. Since Glazer knew that
Dominguez could not read or write English, it is a reasonable inference that in
requesting the Highway Department official to give Dominguez reading tests, Glazer
hoped that Dominguez would fail the tests and thereby furnish a more plausible pre-
text for the planned discharge.
I find that Respondent discharged Dominguez because of his union membership
and Respondent's belief that he had not fully disclosed to it all he knew about the
Union and its leadership . In reaching this conclusion , I do not mean to imply that
it would have been unreasonable for Respondent to have discharged Dominguez
because of the collision or because of the petty dishonesty in which he concededly
engaged . I conclude , rather, that these misfeasances , which occurred prior to
Respondent 's knowledge of any union activity at the plant , were not the true reasons.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By coercively interrogating employees regarding the union membership and
activities of themselves and other employees , and by threatening discharge and other
reprisals against employees for joining or supporting the Union, Respondent has
interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(a) (1).
2. Respondent , by discharging Guadalupe Carreon and Cruz Dominguez because
of their union membership and activities , violated Section 8(a) (3) and ( 1) of the
Act.
3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
4. A preponderance of the evidence does not support the allegation of the com-
plaint that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by reason of its
discharge of Ysidoro Sevilla.
THE REMEDY
It having been found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, my Recommended Order will
require that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
To remedy the discriminatory discharges of Carreon and Dominguez , Respond-
ent will be required to offer them reinstatement and make them whole for any loss
of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them in the
manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289, with interest on
backpay computed in the manner described in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138
NLRB 716. The record shows, with respect to Carreon, that he had made no
attempt prior to the hearing to take his driving test and get his commercial driver's
license renewed. Respondent 's obligation to reinstate him will be conditioned on
his furnishing Respondent with evidence that he has a commercial driver 's license
after Respondent offers to reinstate him.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , it is hereby recommended that Respondent , Glazer's
Wholesale Drug Company , Inc., its officers , agents, successors , and assigns, shall:
GLAZER'S WHOLESALE DRUG COMPANY, INC. 479
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and
Helpers Local Union No. 745, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor orga-
nization , by discharging or in any other manner discriminating in regard to the hire
or tenure of employment of any employee or any term or condition of his employ-
ment.
(b) Interrogating employees about their union membership, activities, or sympa-
thies in a manner constituting interference, restraint, or coercion, in violation of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
(c) Threatening employees with discharge or other reprisals for engaging in union
activities.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Offer Guadalupe Carreon and Cruz Dominguez immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss of pay
they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them, in the manner
set forth in the section above entitled "The Remedy"; provided, however, that
Respondent's obligation to reinstate Carreon shall cease if, after receiving Respond-
ent's offer of reinstatement, he does not present to Respondent evidence that he has a
commercial driver's license.
(b) Notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the Armed Forces
of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application in accord-
ance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and Service
Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the National Labor Relations
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security
payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to determine the amount of backpay due and the right of reinstatement
under this Recommended Order.
(d) Post at its warehouse and general offices in Dallas, Texas, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 10 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by
the Regional Director for Region 16, shall, after being signed by the Respondent's
authorized representatives, be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be
maintained by it for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered , defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(e) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of
the receipt of this Recommended Order , what steps Respondent has taken to com-
ply herewith 11
The complaint, insofar as it alleges that Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (3) and
(1) of the Act by discharging Ysidoro Sevilla, is hereby dismissed.
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , the words "a
Decision and Order " shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice . In the further event that the Board 's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United
States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a
Decision and Order."
"In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director , In writing , within 10 days
from the date of this Order , what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activity on behalf of Dallas
General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 745, affiliated
with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen
480 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and Helpers of America , or any other labor organization of our employees, by
discharging or in any other manner discriminating in regard to their hire or
tenure of employment , or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning their union membership,
activities , or sympathies in violation of Section 8 (a) (i) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with discharge or other reprisals for engag-.
ing in union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce employ-
ees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Guadalupe Carreon and Cruz Dominguez immediate and full
reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions , and make
them whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of our dis-
crimination against them ; provided , that our obligation to reinstate Carreon
will cease if, after he receives our offer of reinstatement , he does not present us
with evidence that he has a commercial driver's license.
GLAZER'S WHOLESALE DRUG COMPANY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employees if they are presently serving
in the Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act of 1948, as. amended , after discharge from the Armed
Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Sixth
Floor, Meacham Building, 110 West Fifth Street, Fort Worth, Texas , Telephone No..
Edison 5-4211 , Extension 2131 , if they have any question concerning this notice or
compliance with its provisions.
Liberty Scrap Materials, Inc., Absorbent Sanitary Wiper Com-
pany, and American Barrel & Cooperage Company and Ice,
Storage, Scrap Material & Grain Warehousemen 's Local Union
No. 105, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen , and Helpers of America . Case No.
9-CA-3P285. May 7,1965
DECISION AND ORDER
On February 3, 1965, Trial Examiner Frederick U. Reel issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ents had engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, and recommending
that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Decision. The Trial Examiner further
found that the Respondents had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint, and recommended that those
allegations be dismissed. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed limited
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.
The Respondents filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision
and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
152 NLRB No. 47.