Fruehauf Trailer Services

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 25, 2001

334 N.L.R.B. 344 (N.L.R.B. 2001)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 344
Fruehauf Trailer Services, Inc., a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of Wabash National Corporation and In-
ternational Association of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers, District Lodge 160, AFL–CIO,
affiliated with International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL–CIO.
Cases 19–CA–25715 and 19–CA–26262
June 25, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, TRUESDALE, AND
WALSH
On June 3, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Steven
Charno delivered a bench decision in this proceeding and
on June 18, 1999, he issued a decision and certification,
certifying the accuracy of that portion of the transcript
containing his decision, as amended, and issuing a rec-
ommended remedial order. The General Counsel and the
Charging Party each filed exceptions and supporting
briefs, and the Respondent filed limited cross-exceptions,
a supporting brief, and briefs in response to the General
Counsel’s and Charging Party’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only
to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order.
The primary issues raised by the Respondent’s and the
General Counsel’s exceptions are: (1) whether the judge
erred in finding that a settlement agreement did not en-
compass certain presettlement conduct; and (2) whether
the judge, having found no postsettlement unfair labor
practices, erred in failing to reinstate the settlement
agreement that the Regional Director had set aside. For
the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judge on both
issues.1
Background
The Respondent, an admitted successor employer, rec-
ognized the Union in April 1997 as the bargaining repre-
sentative of the service and maintenance employees em-
ployed at its Seattle, Washington facility. Although the
parties thereafter engaged in negotiations, they did not
reach agreement on a collective-bargaining agreement.
On January 23, 1998,2 the Union filed a charge in Case
19–CA–25715, alleging that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) by offering employees improved wages
and benefits if they decertified the Union, and violated
Section 8(a)(5) by bypassing the Union and dealing di-
rectly with employees. That charge was subsequently
amended on September 18, and settled by an informal
settlement agreement approved by the Regional Director
on October 2. In the settlement agreement, the Respon-
dent did not admit committing any unfair labor practices,
but agreed to post a notice stating that it would not “tell
employees that the only way to get a wage increase or
profit sharing is to go non-union”; that it would not “take
employees to our non-union facilities to induce bargain-
ing unit employees to decertify the Union”; and that it
would not “in any manner interfere with the exercise of
the [Section 7] rights by our employees.”

1 In its exceptions, the Charging Party contends that the judge erred
in failing to find lead man Rick Perkins to be a supervisor. We find no
merit in this contention.
2 All dates are in 1998, unless otherwise specified.
Thereafter, on November 23, a decertification petition
was filed in Case 19–RD–3392. On November 30, the
Respondent notified the Union by letter that it had re-
ceived the petition in Case 19–RD–3392, as well as a
copy of an employee petition rejecting the Union that
was signed by a majority of the unit employees. The
letter stated that the Respondent was “prevented by law”
from any further collective bargaining with the Union.
On December 10, the Union filed a charge in Case 19–
CA–26262, alleging that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain and violated Section
8(a)(1) by offering financial incentives to employees in
order to encourage decertification. The charge was sub-
sequently amended on January 21 and March 31, 1999.
On March 31, 1999, the General Counsel set aside the
October 2 settlement agreement and issued a consoli-
dated complaint in Cases 19–CA–25715 and 19–CA–
26262. The complaint alleged that in mid-November the
Respondent violated the terms of the settlement agree-
ment, and Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by offering em-
ployees a wage increase if they decertified the Union.
The complaint also alleged that the Respondent commit-
ted several presettlement violations of Section 8(a)(1)
and (5) by promising employees benefits and dealing
directly with them. Finally, the complaint alleged that
the Respondent committed a postsettlement violation of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing recognition from
the Union and refusing to bargain.
In his bench decision, the judge found that the Re-
spondent did not commit any presettlement or postset-
tlement violations of Section 8(a)(1). He further found,
however, that on September 18, 1998, the Respondent
bypassed the Union and dealt directly with employees in
violation of Section 8(a)(5) when a supervisor told an
employee that the supervisor would look into the matter
of providing a better medical program (the “bypassing”
violation). The judge rejected the Respondent’s argu-
ment that this allegation of presettlement conduct should
334 NLRB No. 50
FRUEHAUF TRAILER SERVICES 345
be dismissed on the ground that it was resolved by the
settlement agreement. The judge found instead that the
bypassing allegation was not within the scope of the set-
tlement agreement.
Turning to the withdrawal of recognition issue, the
judge considered whether the single bypassing violation
that he had found tainted the petition the Respondent
received in which a majority of employees stated that
they no longer wished to be represented by the Union.
Concluding that no nexus had been established between
the Respondent’s unfair labor practice and the Union’s
loss of support, the judge concluded that the Respondent
lawfully withdrew recognition from, and refused to bar-
gain with, the Union.
Finally, the judge addressed the Respondent’s conten-
tion that because no postsettlement violations had been
committed, the settlement agreement should be rein-
stated. The judge stated that if he “were to reverse the
Regional Director’s order there would [be] no effect,
remedial or otherwise, on the outcome of this proceed-
ing. I therefore find Respondent’s argument to be moot.”
Positions of the Parties
No exceptions were filed to the judge’s dismissal of
the unlawful withdrawal of recognition and refusal-to-
bargain allegation.
With respect to the one violation that the judge found,
the General Counsel concedes that it predated the settle-
ment, but argues that it was excluded from the settle-
ment. Contrary to his position at trial, the General Coun-
sel now asserts that the judge correctly found that no
postsettlement unfair labor practices had been commit-
ted. The General Counsel has also changed his position
on the issue of whether the settlement agreement was
properly set aside. In his exceptions, he contends that the
judge, having found no postsettlement violations, should
have reinstated the settlement agreement without making
any findings concerning the settled unfair labor practice
allegations.
In its limited cross-exceptions, the Respondent argues,
inter alia, that the judge erred by finding that the bypass-
ing allegation was not encompassed by the settlement
agreement. The Respondent reasserts its contention that
the settlement agreement should be reinstated.
Analysis
1. We address first the question of whether the judge
erred in finding that the bypassing allegation was not
within the scope of the settlement agreement. In Holly-
wood Roosevelt Hotel Co., 235 NLRB 1397 (1978), the
Board held that “a settlement agreement disposes of all
issues involving presettlement conduct unless prior viola-
tions of the Act were unknown to the General Counsel,
not readily discoverable by investigation, or specifically
reserved from the settlement by the mutual understand-
ing of the parties.” As stated above, the General Counsel
concedes that the bypassing violation that the judge
found predated the settlement, but contends that it was
excluded from the settlement. Therefore, the issue pre-
sented is whether the settlement agreement “specifically
reserved” the right to litigate the presettlement bypassing
allegation.
The “SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT” clause of the
settlement agreement in Case 19–CA–25715 states:

This Agreement settles only the allegations in the
above-captioned case(s), and does not constitute a
settlement of any other case(s) or matters. It does
not preclude persons from filing charges, the Gen-
eral Counsel from prosecuting complaints, or the
Board and the courts from finding violations with re-
spect to matters which precede the date of the ap-
proval of this Agreement regardless of whether such
matters are known to the General Counsel or are
readily discoverable. The General Counsel reserves
the right to use the evidence obtained in the investi-
gation and prosecution of the above-captioned
cases(s) for any relevant purpose in the litigation of
this or any other case(s), and a judge, the Board and
the courts may make findings of fact and/or conclu-
sions of law with respect to said evidence.

This language expressly states that the agreement set-
tles “only the allegations” in Case 19–CA–25715 and
would permit the General Counsel to proceed to litigate
any case that can properly be defined as an “other” case.
See B & K Builders, 325 NLRB 693–694 (1998) (con-
struing the same clause). Accordingly, we must decide
whether the bypassing allegation in question was one of
the settled allegations of Case 19–CA–25715.
Examination of the original charge in Case 19–CA–
25715 reveals that it specifically alleged that the Re-
spondent unlawfully bypassed the Union by dealing di-
rectly with employees. By contrast, the charge and
amended charges filed in the “other” case in this consoli-
dated proceeding (Case 19–CA–26262) do not allege a
bypassing violation. Therefore, the conclusion is ines-
capable that the bypassing allegation in the General
Counsel’s consolidated complaint must have been based
on the charge filed in Case 19–CA–25715. Accordingly,
under the plain terms of the “scope of agreement” clause,
the bypassing allegation was encompassed within the
parties’ settlement agreement. Consequently, under Hol-
lywood Roosevelt, subsequent litigation of that allegation
is barred unless the settlement agreement was properly
set aside. To that question we now turn.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 346
2. As set forth above, the judge found that no postset-
tlement unfair labor practices had been committed, and
both the General Counsel and the Respondent are now in
agreement with that determination. In addition, both the
General Counsel and the Respondent contend that the
judge should have reinstated the October 2 settlement.
We find merit in this joint contention. As the Board said
in Shell Ray Mining, 286 NLRB 466 fn. 2 (1987), “[t]he
judge found, and we agree, that the Respondent did not
commit any unfair labor practices after the settlement
agreement . . . was approved. Under these circum-
stances, the judge should have reinstated the settlement
agreement and dismissed the complaint in its entirety.”
In rejecting as moot the Respondent’s request that the
settlement agreement be reinstated, the judge reasoned
that taking the requested action “would [have] no effect,
remedial or otherwise,” on the outcome of this case, be-
cause the settlement did not encompass the bypassing
allegation. However, we have determined, contrary to
the judge, that the settlement agreement did encompass
the bypassing allegation. Therefore, we conclude that
issue is not moot and that reinstating the settlement
agreement would have an effect on the outcome of this
proceeding by barring the judge’s finding of a bypassing
violation.
Summary
We have concluded, contrary to the judge, that the one
unfair labor practice that he found was encompassed
within the parties’ settlement. We have also concluded,
in agreement with the judge, that no postsettlement un-
fair labor practices were committed. Under these cir-
cumstances, we shall, in accordance with Board policy,
order that the settlement agreement be reinstated and the
consolidated complaint be dismissed. Shell Ray Mining,
supra. In so doing, we express no view on the merits of
the alleged unfair labor practices predating the settle-
ment. Ann’s Schneider Bakery, 259 NLRB 1151, 1160
(1982).
ORDER
It is ordered that the settlement agreement in Case 19–
CA–25715 is reinstated.
The complaint is dismissed.

Patrick Dunham, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Dennis R. Homerin, Esq. and Brian West Easley, Esq. (Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue), of Chicago, Illinois, for the Respon-
dent.
Ted Neima, of Sacramento, California, for the Charging Party.
DECISION AND CERTIFICATION
STEVEN M. CHARNO, Administrative Law Judge. This
case was tried before me in Seattle, Washington, on June 2–3,
1999. After oral argument, I issued a bench decision pursuant
to Section 102.35(a)(10) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations.
Appendix A is the portion of the transcript containing my deci-
sion,1 while Appendix B (omitted from publication) contains
corrections to that transcript. In accordance with Section
102.45 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, I certify the accu-
racy of the amended transcript containing my decision.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]

APPENDIX A
270
MR. NEIMA: I assume that means they had it here. Yes.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHARNO: Yes. That
it one of their exhibits in their bound volume—
MR. NEIMA: Yes.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHARNO: —that they
presented on the first day of the hearing.
MR. NEIMA: Okay. Stip.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHARNO: All right. I
think the record then is clear on that point. Any further clarifi-
cations?
MR. EASLEY: Not from Respondent, Your Honor.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHARNO: All right.
MR. DUNHAM: No.
MR. NEIMA: Nope.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHARNO: All right.
Hearing none, I'll give you my decision in this case.
Oral Decision and Findings of Fact
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CHARNO: In response
to charges timely filed by the International Association of Ma-
chinists and Aerospace Workers, Lodge 160, hereinafter the
Union, a complaint was issued on March 31, 1999 which al-
leged that Fruehauf Trailer Services, Inc., hereinafter Respon-
dent, had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National La-
bor Relations Act as amended, hereinafter the Act. Respon-
dent’s answer denied the commission of any unfair labor prac-
tice.
A conference call was held on May 28, 1999 during which
the
271
parties argued General Counsel’s motion in limine and the Un-
ion’s motions to quash and to reschedule the hearing. During
the call the parties were warned that the case might prove to be
an appropriate vehicle for oral argument and a bench decision.
At my request, General Counsel and Respondent thereafter
submitted legal authorities bearing on the motion in limine.
A hearing was held before me in Seattle, Washington on
June 2 and 3, 1999. At the conclusion of evidentiary presenta-
tions, oral argument was heard.
Respondent, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wabash
National Corporation, owns and operates a number of trailer
service and repair facilities throughout the country, including
one in Seattle, Washington.

1 I received the record on June 17, 1999.
FRUEHAUF TRAILER SERVICES 347
During the twelve months preceding issuance of the com-
plaint Respondent in the course of its business purchased and
received in Washington goods and materials valued in excess of
$50,000 from outside the state, or from suppliers within Wash-
ington who had received such goods and materials from outside
the state.
Respondent has admitted to be, and I find is, an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
The Union has admitted to be, and I find is, a labor organiza-
tion within the meaning of the Act.
The following facts were admitted or stipulated:
First, on April 16, 1997 Respondent purchased certain
272
assets of Fruehauf Trailer Corporation, hereinafter Fruehauf,
including a trailer sales and service facility in Seattle, Washing-
ton;
Second, on April 17, 1997 Respondent offered employment
to all of the employees previously employed by Fruehauf at the
Seattle, Washington facility, and hired a majority of those indi-
viduals;
Third, by a letter dated April 29, 1997 Respondent recog-
nized the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining represen-
tative of the employees in the following appropriate unit for the
purpose of collective bargaining: “All service and maintenance
employees, including lead men, at Respondent’s Seattle, Wash-
ington branch located at 9426 8th Avenue South, excluding
parts room, clerical, and supervisory employees as defined in
the Act.”
I therefore conclude that, based on Section 9(a) of the Act,
the Union has been the exclusive collective bargaining repre-
sentative of the unit employees.
A November 24, 1997 conversation between employee
Marvin Brown, who was the Union shop steward, and admitted
supervisor Brett Meeks is alleged by General Counsel to have
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Brown testified that, first,
he entered Meeks’ office and may have asked the latter about
wage increases and profit-sharing benefits enjoyed by employ-
ees at Respondent’s non-union facilities; second, in response to
273
Brown’s request for proof, Meeks suggested that Brown call
another branch; third, when Meeks thereafter made a call to the
comptroller of Respondent’s Portland facility, a call which
incidentally admittedly dealt with matters not related to the
Union, Meeks turned the phone over to Brown who inquired
about the benefits available in Portland. In response to a lead-
ing question, Brown ultimately confirmed, albeit with some
show of uncertainty, that Meeks had stated that the only way to
secure such benefits was to be non-union.
Given the context of this conversation, Brown’s demonstra-
bly weak memory, and his unsureness as to what was said, I do
not find his account to be persuasive. Accordingly, I shall rec-
ommend dismissal of the relevant allegation.
In January 1998 Respondent took two of its Seattle employ-
ees to its Portland facility. Meeks testified, with some signifi-
cant support from Brown, that, first, a major warrantee recall
for trailer roof repairs for Puget Sound Trucking was being
performed by Respondent’s Seattle and Portland facilities; sec-
ond, the Seattle facility was using tools and techniques unavail-
able to Portland; and third, the two employees selected for the
trip were highly experienced with these tools and techniques.
Shop Steward Brown, one of the two selected employees, and
Meeks disagreed as to the extent of the tool demonstration per-
formed in Portland.
Meeks’ account contained convincing detail, while Brown’s
274
was vague and unconvincing. I credit Meeks’ testimony that
the two Seattle employees engaged in at least a short demon-
stration of two different tools.
Brown further testified that while in Portland he, first, ac-
cepted an invitation to attend a short meeting at which profit-
sharing checks were distributed; second, the amount of the
profit-sharing money per employee was $125 for a six-month
period; and third, he discovered through questioning Respon-
dent’s Portland management that non-union status and the at-
tendant lack of protection for probationary employees were
obvious drawbacks.
General Counsel contends that the two employees were sent
to Portland in order to encourage them to decertify the Union
by impliedly promising them benefits for so doing. Respon-
dent’s choice of the Union’s shop steward to go to Portland
makes little sense if Respondent’s intention was to secure de-
certification adherents. Conversely, Respondent’s choice of
Brown is eminently sensible if its objective was to have an
experience employee demonstrate tools with which he was
familiar. Of greater significance is the uncontested fact that
Respondent never promised profit-sharing benefits to either of
the Seattle employees if they got rid of the Union.
Based on all of the foregoing facts, I find that General Coun-
sel’s contention is not supported by the preponderance of the
evidence.
275
During a September 18, 1998 conversation between em-
ployee Jim Taylor and non-supervisory lead man Rick Perkins,
the latter convinced the former to distribute a decertification
petition by arguing that the Union was holding up a wage in-
crease and that employees would get a 50-cent increase when
decertification went through. Taylor so testified with convinc-
ing detail and with several admissions damaging to the Union’s
position. Perkins’ testimony was confused and self-
contradictory.
For the foregoing reasons, and based strongly on the de-
meanor of both witnesses while on the stand, I credit Taylor on
this point.
General Counsel contends that Perkins’ comments and ac-
tions were attributable to Meeks because the latter was present
during the conversation. There appears to be no contention that
Meeks actually took part in the conversation concerning wages,
profit sharing, or decertification. Taylor candidly admitted that
the conversation began when he and Perkins were alone; that
Meeks and the other lead man were periodically in and out of
the office during the conversation; that he believed Meeks was
present for some of the discussion; and that he could not recall,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 348
but thought Meeks was present during the discussion of pay.
Taylor’s account is simply too tentative and unsure to constitute
probative evidence.
Taylor also testified without controversion that he told
Meeks on September 18, 1998 that Respondent should offer a
276
better medical program, to which Meeks replied he would look
into the matter. These comments took place at a time when
Taylor had repeated made his personal dissatisfaction with
Respondent’s health plan known to the company’s manage-
ment. There is no evidence that any other employee was aware
of Meeks’ comment.
Based on the foregoing facts I conclude that Respondent by-
passed the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
During oral argument earlier today the Union raised for the
first time an argument that Perkins was one of Respondent’s
supervisors. This contention must be rejected for two reasons:
first, it would be a denial of Respondent’s right to due process
to raise the matter only after the evidentiary record was closed
and no chance to defend had been presented; second, the record
does not support the Union’s contention Perkins was shown to
have the same authority over employees as the other lead men
whom the Union admits were bargaining unit employees.
Employee Richard Kimberlin testified that he had a conver-
sation with Meeks at a point in time very close to the Septem-
ber 18, 1998 circulation of the decertification petition. During
this conversation Meeks commented to the effect that non-
union employees could receive a 50-cent raise and profit shar-
ing. Kimberlin was unsure of many of the details surrounding
this conversation, although he admitted that his questioning
may have elicited Meeks’ comment. Kimberlin’s
277
February 1999 affidavit contains no mention of such a com-
ment by Meeks. Meeks did not recall having such a conversa-
tion, but generally denied ever having made such a statement.
While my observation of the witnesses’ demeanor requires
me to credit Kimberlin over Meeks on the fact that such a con-
versation took place, Kimberlin’s testimony does not foreclose
the possibility that Meeks mention of the existence of differing
wages and benefits at the Respondent’s non-union facilities was
made in response to Kimberlin’s query. See Fabric Ware-
house, 294 NLRB 189 (1989). I therefore find that the prepon-
derance of probative evidence has not be shown to establish a
violation of the Act.
The record contains no probative evidence in support of the
complaint allegation that Meeks suggested in mid-November
1998 that employees might receive wage increases if they got
rid of the Union. I therefore reaffirm my earlier dismissal of
that allegation.
On November 23, 1998 Perkins filed a decertification peti-
tion in Case 19–RD–3392 with an appended showing of interest
signed by twenty of the twenty-four unit employees. On No-
vember 30th counsel for Respondent wrote a letter to the Union
which referenced receipt of a petition signed by a majority of
the unit employees as evidence of the Union’s lack of majority
support. Explicitly as a consequence of this perceived lack of
majority, the letter refused to further participate in
278
collective bargaining with the Union, canceled future contract
negotiating sessions, and refused to respond to the Unions in-
formation requests.
General Counsel argues that this letter constituted an unlaw-
ful refusal to bargain and an implicit withdrawal of recognition.
Respondent demurs. I conclude that Respondent has not been
shown to have withdrawn all of the elements of recognition, but
that its letter clearly constitutes an ongoing refusal to bargain
with the Union. The remaining question for decision in this
case is whether Respondent was justified in so doing.
When Respondent recognized the Union subsequent to pur-
chasing Fruehauf’s assets and hiring a majority of its predeces-
sor’s employees, the Union was entitled to a presumption of
majority support. Respondent can rebut this presumption and
withdraw recognition or refuse to bargain if it can establish
either that the Union did not, in fact, enjoy majority support, or
that Respondent had a good-faith doubt founded on a sufficient
objective basis of the Union’s lack of majority support. The
record contains probative evidence that Respondent had an
objective basis for good-faith doubt that the Union no longer
possessed majority status in the form of “a copy of a petition,
signed by a majority of employees in the bargaining unit, stat-
ing that the employees no longer want [the] Union to represent
them.” See Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB 78, 81, 85
279
(1984).
The Board, however, has long held that an employer is not
free to withdraw recognition from a union while there are pend-
ing unfair labor practices which are unremedied. At the same
time, the Board has found that not every unfair labor practice
will be of the character that taints the employer’s withdrawal of
recognition or refusal to bargain. As the Board stated in Lee
Lumber & Building Material Corp., 322 NLRB 175 (1996), “In
cases involving unfair labor practices other than a general re-
fusal to recognize and bargain, there must specific proof of a
causal relationship between the unfair labor practice and the
ensuing events indicating a loss of support.”
The case before me involves a single bypassing violation
consisting of a single comment to a single employee with no
evidence that any other bargaining unit employee ever learned
of the comment. This is not the type of refusal to bargain found
to have a “significant continuing detrimental impact on em-
ployees, causing them to become disaffected from the Union”
which was discussed in Lee Lumber & Building Material
Corp., supra. Accordingly, it must be determined whether there
is specific proof that the violation found herein caused a major-
ity of bargaining unit employees to sign the decertification
petition. There is no such proof in the record.
Accordingly, I find that a nexus between Respondent’s un-
fair labor practice and the Union’s loss of support has not
280
been demonstrated. See Quazite Corp., 323 NLRB 511 (1997).
I therefore conclude that Respondent’s reliance on the fact that
FRUEHAUF TRAILER SERVICES 349
a majority of its employees no longer wished to be represented
by the Union was not tainted by the unfair labor practice found
herein. Based on the foregoing I further conclude that Respon-
dent lawfully suspended bargaining on November 30, 1998.
Finally we reach Respondent’s argument that because there
has been no demonstration of an unfair labor practice postdat-
ing the settlement agreement in Case 19–CA–25715, the Re-
gional Director’s order setting aside that agreement should be
reversed and the settlement agreement reinstated. See United
States Gypsum, 284 NLRB 4 (1987).
The January 23, 1998 charge and the September 18, 1998
amended charge in 19–CA–25715 appear to encompass all of
the violations of Section 8(a)(1) alleged to have occurred prior
to the execution of the settlement agreement by the parties on
September 15, 1998, but those charges make no reference to the
8(a)(5) bypassing violation found herein. Accordingly, if I
were to reverse the Regional Director’s order there would no
effect, remedial or otherwise, on the outcome of this hearing. I
therefore find Respondent’s argument to be moot.
An appropriate order will issue upon my receipt of the tran-
script.
Any questions?
MR. DUNHAM: Nope.