Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 7, 1938

10 N.L.R.B. 288 (N.L.R.B. 1938)

In the Matter Of FANNY FARMER CANDY SHOPS, INC. and CoRIRIITTEE
FOR INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Case No. C-532.-Decided December 7, 1938
Confectionery and Candy Manufacturing Industry-Interference, Restraint,
and Coercion: opposition to outside union expressed through suggestion that'
employees elect committee to bargain with respondent; inquiries as to activities
and membership-Company-Domi/iiated Union: employees' collective bargaining
committee initiated and sponsored by employer ; domination of and interference
with formation and administration, support ; participation and representation
on committee, of supervisory employee ; disestablished, as agency for collective
bargaining; contracts invalidated-Conti act: depriving employees of right to
strike and right to demand written contract or closed shop with outside union ;
individual contracts-Discrimination: discharges : for union activities ; charges
of, not sustained as to two employees-Renustatement Oidered-Back Pay:
awarded-Regular and Substantially Equivalent Employment-Employee Status.
Mr. Will Maslow, for the Board.
Mr. George D. Zahm, of New York City, for the respondent.
Liebman, Robbins & Pressman, by Mr. Milton B. Eulau, for the
C. I. O.
Mr. Richard Salant, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
STATEINIENT 01, THE CASE,
Upon charges and amended charges duly filed by the Committee
for Industrial Organization, herein called the C. I. 0., the National
Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by Elinore M. Her-
rick, Regional Director for the Second Region (New York City), issued
a complaint, dated December 23, 1937, against Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops, Inc., New York City, herein called the respondent, alleging
that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1),
(2), and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act.
The complaint alleged in substance (1) that the respondent discrimi-
nated in regard to hire and tenure of employment to discourage mem-
bership in a labor organization by discharging and refusing to
10 N. L. H B., No. 19.
288
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 289
reinstate certain named employees; (2) that the respondent domi-
nated and interfered with the formation and administration of a labor
organization known as the Collective Bargaining Committee of the Em-
ployees of Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., and contributed support
to it; and (3) that by these and other acts and conduct, the respondent
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. On December 23,
1937, copies of the complaint, accompanied by notice of hearing, were
duly served upon the respondent,' the C. I. 0., and the Collective
Bargaining Committee of the Employees of Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops, Inc., herein called the Committee.
On December 31, 1937, the respondent filed an answer denying
the alleged unfair labor practices and alleging as separate defenses
(1) that the respondent's business is not interstate in character or
effect; (2) that since the C. I. O. has no members among the em-
ployees of the respondent, it has no legal interest or authority to file
any charges with the Board; (3) that the respondent has presently
in effect valid collective bargaining agreements with its employees and
any attempt to interfere therewith would burden the business of the
respondent in violation of the intent of the Act; and (4) that the
charge does not contain the full name and address of the organization
making the charge, that the complaint contained unsupported allega-
tions not based upon properly filed charges with respect thereto, and
that all proceedings against respondent are irregular and void.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in New York City on
January 6, 7, and 8, 1938; before Joseph Maguire, the Trial Examiner
duly designated by the Board. The Board, the respondent, and the
C. I. O. were represented by counsel and participated in the hearing.
Although served with notice, the Committee did not appear at the
hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues
was afforded all the parties.
Prior to the hearing, the respondent filed a motion for a bill
of particulars concerning the amended charge and the complaint.
Prior to the opening of the hearing a bill of particulars was
furnished the respondent concerning the complaint but the motion
for a bill of particulars concerning the amended charge was denied
by the Trial Examiner. Counsel for the Board moved to strike out
the respondent's second and fourth defenses. The Trial Examiner
reserved decision and subsequently, in his Intermediate Report,
i The complaint served on December 23, 1937, was accompanied by a copy of the original
charge, dated September 9, 1937. An amended charge, including allegations of unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (2), bore September 21, 1937, as the
filing date A copy of this amended charge was served upon the respondent on December
28, 1937, with a duplicate of the complaint attached. There was no variation between
the complaints served on December 23 and December 28.
290 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
granted this motion. At the close of the Board's case, and again at
the end of respondent's case, the respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint. The motions were denied. At the close of the hearing,
counsel for the Board moved to amend the complaint to conform to
the evidence. It was stipulated that this motion was not intended
to add new unfair labor practices or to alter the theory of the old
charges, but only to correct inaccuracies as to date, name, and place.
There was no objection and the motion was granted. These rulings
are hereby affirmed.
On March 30, 1938, the Trial Examiner filed his Intermediate
Report, copies of which were duly served upon the respondent and
the Union, in which he found that the respondent had engaged in
unfair labor practices affecting commerce as alleged in the complaint,
except that the respondent had not engaged in unfair labor practices
by discharging George Galea and Joseph Damelio. He recom-
mended (1) that the respondent cease and desist from engaging in
the unfair labor practices; (2) that it reinstate with back pay the
employees found to have been discriminatorily discharged and not yet
reinstated; (3) that it give back pay to the employees found to have
been discriminatorily discharged but subsequently reinstated; (4)
that it cease and desist from recognizing the Committee and com-
pletely disestablish it as representative of employees of the respond-
ent; (5) that it cease and desist from giving effect to the individual
contracts of employment with its employees, and that it post proper
notices to such effect.
On April 20, 1938, the respondent filed exceptions to various rul-
ings of the Trial Examiner and to the Intermediate Report. Al-
though oral argument on the exceptions had been requested by the
respondent and argument was scheduled to be held before the Board.
on May 5, 1938, on May 4, 1938, counsel for the respondent waived
appearance and no argument was held. In lieu of oral argument
the respondent filed a brief. The Board has reviewed the rulings
of the Trial Examiner on objections to the admission of evidence and
on other motions not specifically mentioned above, and finds that no
prejudicial errors were committed. His rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board has also considered the exceptions to the Intermediate
Report and finds them to be without merit.
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the follow-
ing :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The respondent is a New York corporation with its principal
office and place of business in Rochester, New York, and is engaged
in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of candy, confectionery,
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 291
and related products. It has a factory in Brooklyn, New York,
as well as other factories in Rochester, New York; Cambridge,
Massachusetts; Detroit, Michigan; and Minneapolis, Minnesota.
The respondent also operates retail stores for the sale of its products.
Each factory supplies its finished products to the respondent's retail
stores in its assigned geographical' area.
Only the Brooklyn factory is involved in this proceeding. In the
manufacture of its products at the Brooklyn factory, the respondent
purchases nuts, molasses, cocoanut oil, flavoring agents, and other
products. Eighty per cent of such raw materials, excluding sugar
and chocolate, are shipped to the Brooklyn plant from points outside
of New York State. The sugar and chocolate are refined or
manufactured, or both, in New York State, from - cocoa beans and
sugar shipped to New York State from sources outside the, State.
Twenty-five per cent -of the finished products manufactured in the
Brooklyn plant are shipped to retail stores of the respondent in the
District of Columbia, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The respond-
ent employs approximately 135 employees at the Brooklyn plant.
- IT. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
The Committee for Industrial Organization is a labor organiza-
tion. United Candy and Confectionery Workers,` Local No. 606,
herein called the United, is a labor organization affiliated with the
C. I. O. admitting to membership employees of the respondent. Ap-
plication cards seeking membership in the C. I..:O. and signed ,by
employees of the respondent were later transferred by the C. I. O.
to United.
The Collective Bargaining Committee of the Employees of Fanny
Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., is a labor organization designed to repre-
sent all the respondent's employees.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The discharges
Early in September 1937, Confectionery Workers Union of Greater
New York, herein called the Confectionery Workers, an unaffiliated
labor organization, began a campaign to organize the respondent's
employees for the purpose of dealing with the respondent concerning
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. On September
1 itnd 2, 1937, printed leaflets were distributed among the employees
of the respondent, announcing a meeting to be herd by the- Confec-
tionery Workers on the evening of September 2 at the Leiiruth Hall,
near the factory of respondent. Several employees understood that
the Confectionery Workers was affiliated with the C. I. 0., and it
292 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
appears that Frazini, the organizer of the Confectionery Workers,
did intend to affiliate with the C. I. O. The C. I. 0., however, subse-
quently refused to issue a charter to the Confectionery Workers.
Cronin, the general manager of the respondent's plant and a
minority stockholder, told individual employees that they could at-
tend the Lenruth Hall meeting, but warned them not to sign any-
thing, or pay any money, since Frazini had no charter and "might
be a fakir or something." Cronin admitted that he advised the
employees who were going to the meeting to "look up his (Frazini's)
police record before they paid any money over to Frazini." He
further testified that he did not know whether Frazini actually did
have a police record.
The Lenruth Hall meeting on September 2, 1937, was attended by
40 to 60 of the respondent's employees, including a number of fore-
men. On September 3, 1937, the clay following the Lenruth Hall
meeting, Cronin asked Durso, a foreman, whether he had gone to the
meeting and whether he "found out anything." Durso replied that
he went to the meeting "to find out for my own self what it was all
about." Although it is not clear that he received from Durso the
information he was seeking, it is clear from this incident that Cronin
was concerned about the Lenruth Hall meeting and made inquiries
about what had happened there. The discharges discussed below, oc-
curred on the three working days following the Lenruth Hall meeting.
David Sari began his employment With the respondent in Septem-
ber 1933. For the 2 years preceding his discharge, Sari worked stead-
ily as a candy maker's helper, at a weekly wage of $17. Sari attended
the Lenruth Hall meeting. At 3: 00 p. m. on September 3, the day
following the meeting, Cronin and Ironsides; the plant superintend-
ent, came to his department and talked with Russo, Sari's foreman.
Shortly thereafter, Russo came over to Sari and told him that he was
discharged. Sari testified that upon asking for the reason for his dis-
charge, Russo replied that Cronin had told him ' to let Sari go, and
that Cronin had said to Russo, "I warned you to tell your boys not
to attend." Sari further stated that Russo told him that Russo pro-
tested to' Cronin that he had attended the meeting himself, and that
Cronin answered, "let them go anyhow. Tell them we want men
here who have moustaches."
Cronin denied having made these remarks to Russo. Ironsides was
not called by the respondent to testify. In view of Cronin's opposi-
tion to the employees' actively participating in the meeting and in
view of Cronin's questioning Durso concerning who attended, we find
that Cronin's denials are not worthy of credence.
Russo denied both that Cronin had made such remarks to him and
that he reported the remarks to Sari. Russo attributed Sari's dis-
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 293
charge to several arguments he had had with Sari. Several weeks
prior to Sari's discharge, Sari and Russo had an argument relating to,
the proper time to remove the chocolate from the machines. Russo
admitted, however, that he had had no argument with Sari on the
day of the discharge, or since this disagreement of some weeks before.
Russo explained that he had not discharged Sari until September 3
because he had been "waiting for that word" from Cronin. Russo said
that "that word" finally arrived on September 3, when Cronin, while
passinb through Russo's department, asked Russo "how things were
going." Russo testified that he then told Cronin that things were
running smoothly except for trouble with Sari and Galea. Accord-
ing to Russo, Cronin then said, "All right, if you are head of the
department you don't have to tell me what to do. You know what
to do." It was on the basis of this statement, Russo testified, that
he finally discharged Sari and Galea.
The Trial Examiner, who had the opportunity of observing the
witnesses, resolved their conflicting testimony by finding that Sari had
been discharged because of his attendance at the Lenruth Hall meet-
ing. Examination of all the evidence satisfies us that his finding was
correct. It appears from Russo's own testimony that Cronin was ac-
customed almost daily to walk through the plant and ask the foreman
"how things were going." Yet it was not until the day following the
Lenruth Hall meeting, several weeks after the argument to which
Russo attributed the discharge, that Russo finally reported his trouble
with Sari to Cronin and received "that word" to discharge Sari.
These facts convince us of a causal connection between Sari's attend-
ance at the Lenruth Hall meeting and his discharge.
Russo also attributed Sari's discharge to the fact that Sari was
wont to smoke and read newspapers in the toilet during working
hours. Cronin, however, admitted that it was not until Russo's testi-
mony. at the hearing that he learned of Sari's alleged loafing in the
toilets.
The evening following his discharge Sari signed a C. I. O. appli-
cation card. On the next day he appeared in front of the plant to
solicit applications. These activities led Cronin to term Sari an
"agitator" in his testimony.
We find that the respondent discharged Sari because he attended
the Lenruth Hall meeting. We further find that by discharging Sari
on September 3, 1937, and refusing to reinstate him thereafter, the
respondent discriminated in regard to his hire and tenure of em-
ployment, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organization,
and interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Sari has
not found other employment since his discharge, although he has
147841-39-vol. 10-20
i
294 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
applied at three places. Sari desires to return to his former position
in the employ of the respondent.
George Galea began his employment with the respondent on Octo-
ber 7, 1935. For the year and a half prior to his discharge on Septem-
ber 3, 1937, he was employed as a candy maker's helper at $17 a week.
He testified that on September 2 Cronin told him he could go to
the Lenruth Hall meeting, but "don't sign anything. I'm the boss. I
will do the hiring and firing." On September 3, following the con-
ference between Russo, who was also Galea's foreman, Cronin, and
Ironsides, Russo told Galea that he was discharged. Galea testified
that Russo told him, at the time of his discharge, that he was dis-
,charged for "going to a union meeting," and that Cronin had told
Russo to discharge Galea for attending a meeting but to "blame it
on the argument." This testimony was denied by Cronin and Russo.
Russo's explanation of Galea's discharge was that Galea loafed and
had had an argument with Russo concerning an order which Galea
asserted required him to do "two things at once." Ironsides, the
superintendent, intervened in the argument and asked Russo to give
Galen another chance.
Immediately after his discharge, Galen signed a C. I. O. applica-
tion card. On September 28, Galea was rehired on promising Cronin
to obey the new superior to whom Galea was assigned. Galea tes-
tified that he had returned to work because of a telephone message
from Cronin requesting his return. Galea was insistent on this point.
On the next day of the hearing, however, Galea voluntarily returned
to the witness stand to retract this portion of his testimony and to
,explain that he had called on Cronin to request reinstatement.
The circumstances surrounding Galea's discharge create grave sus-
picion concerning the respondent's motives and reasons for such dis-
-charge. The argument to which Russo attributed Galea's discharge
had occurred a considerable period before the actual discharge. As
in the case of Sari, Russo had ample opportunity to dispense with
Galea's services, yet the discharge did not occur until the day fol-
lowing Galea's attendance at the Lenruth Hall meeting.
Finding, however, that Galea's retraction concerning the circum-
-stances surrounding his reinstatement "cast a cloud on the balance of
his testimony," the Trial Examiner dismissed the complaint with re-
spect to - Galea. Galea's testimony concerning his discharge is not
without corroboration by Sari. Although there is doubt whether
the Trial Examiner's finding and recommendation concerning Galea
are correct, we will not disturb them since the Union filed no excep-
tions to the Trial Examiner's findings and recommendations. We
will dismiss the allegations of the complaint that Galea was dis-
charged for Union membership or activity.
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 295
The discharges of Barbieri , Haigney , and Rizrrutto
Victor Barbieri began his employment with the respondent in
October 1932 . In 1933 he left the respondent 's employ for 5 months ;
again in 1936 he was absent because of a hand injury. Since his re-
turn in 1936 , he had been continuously employed by the respondent
until his discharge on September 3, 1937. At the time of his dis-
charge, Barbieri was earning $18 a week as an experienced candy
maker's helper.
On September 2, 1937, Barbieri attended the Lenruth Hall meet-
ing, at which he was elected chairman of the organizing committee.
At 4: 30 on the afternoon of September 3, Ironsides told Barbieri,
"You are discharged, Victor, I am sorry this had to happen. It is
none of my doings." There had been no complaints about Barbieri's
work. In fact, he had received a $1 a week increase in salary 2 months
before his discharge.
Immediately after his discharge, Barbieri signed a C. I. O. appli-
cation card. Several days later, Corsentino, an employee of the re-
spondent, visited Barbieri and told him that Cronin had acceded to
the employees' request that he be reinstated. On September 20, Cronin
rehired Barbieri, saying, "Let's forget about this . . . if you go up-
stairs and do your work, I'll give you a raise. " Two weeks later,
Barbieri received a $2 a week increase in salary.
Francis Haigney began his employment with the respondent on
October 1, 1934. Except for a 2-week lay-off in 1935, he worked con-
tinuously until the time of his discharge on September 3, 1937. At
the time of his discharge, Haigney was earning $19 a week in the
hard-candy miscellaneous department.
Haigney attended the Lenruth Hall meeting on September 2 and
was elected "assistant chairman or something." On September 3
Ironsides told Haigney that his services were "no longer required until
further notice ." When Haigney asked the reason , Ironsides gave no
answer.
Some weeks later, an employee of the respondent told Haigney to
report back to work. On September 21, subsequent to the C. I. O.'s
having filed charges with the Regional Director concerning these dis-
charges, Cronin rehired Haigney, telling him that he should "just go
back up and mind my own business" and "to tell the Board the truth
on going before it."
. Haigney obtained no other employment between the time of his
discharge and the time of his reinstatement . Late in August 1937,
he requested time off for the week beginning on September 12 so that
he could go on his honeymoon. This request had been refused by the
respondent. At the hearing, Haigney stated that he was "more inter-
296 NATIONAL I,AL3OR RELATIONS BOARD
ested in spending that week with his bride" than in returning to the
factory, and that in any event he would not have worked the week of
September 12. The Trial Examiner accordingly excluded that week
in computing the back pay due Haigney.
Michael Rizzutto had been employed by the respondent for 9 years
prior to his discharge on September 3. He had discontinued work on
2 occasions, but he had never been laid off. For the 3 or more years
prior to his discharge, Rizzutto had worked steadily in the hard-candy
miscellaneous department, of which he was foreman. At the time of
his discharge Rizzutto was earning $24 a week.
Rizzutto attended the Lenruth Hall meeting on September 2 and
was elected a member of the organizing committee. The following
day Ironsides approached him and said, "I am sorry; I will let you
know on further notice." Rizzutto thereupon left the factory. Two
weeks later an employee of the respondent told Rizzutto to report
back to work. Rizzutto was rehired, and shortly afterwards received
a raise of $2 a week. Cronin, in his testimony, termed Rizzutto an
"agitator."
The respondent ascribed the discharges of Barbieri, Haigney and
Rizzutto to a "seasonal lull." The evidence does not sustain that con-
tention, but on the contrary shows that the Christmas rush in the
respondent's business begins just after Labor Day. Several of the
positions, left vacant as a result of the discharges, had to be filled by
transfers from other departments. One witness testified that oil.
September 7, because of the discharges "we were short-handed .. .
and we had to double up." As to Rizzutto, not only does the evidence
show that the hard-candy miscellaneous department is unaffected by
seasonal lulls, but he also was the foreman of the department and an
employee of long service who would not be the first one to be dis-
charged even, if a lull did occur. Haigney, too, was an employee of
several years' standing and was in the hard-candy miscellaneous de-
partment. Finally, Barbieri had never been laid off in his 5 years'
:'employ even though there had been seasonal lulls during that period.
Thus it appears not only that there was no lull at this time but that
these employees would be unaffected even if there had been a lull.
The respondent further contends that attendance at the Lenruth
Hall meeting was shown not to be a cause of these discharges, or of
the other discharges involved in this case, because between 40 to.
60 employees attended the meeting and yet only 8 were discharged.
The respondent argues that, therefore, attendance at the meeting
could not have been the reason for these discharges. Failure to,
discharge more employees is, however, a meager indication of good
faith. A judicious selection of discharges can discourage union
activity as effectively as wholesale discharges, and without such
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 297
dislocation to the respondent's operations as might attend the latter
course. That the other employees who attended the Lenruth Hall
meeting nevertheless retained their employment does not, under the
circumstances, show that the employees who were discharged were
discharged for reasons other than their union activities.
The circumstances disclosed by the record establish the discrimi-
natory nature of the discharges of Barbieri, Haigney and Rizzutto.
They had been in the respondent's employ for several years and had
been working steadily for, a long period prior to their discharge.
Their work was satisfactory. Each attended the Lenruth Hall
meeting and was elected to an office in the Confectionery Workers;
the very clay following this meeting, each was discharged without
explanation by the respondent. The close relationship in time be-
tween their activities at the meeting and.their discharges, coupled
with the respondent's failure to present any convincing reason for
the discharges, lead to the conclusion that Barbieri, Haigney, and
Rizzutto were discharged because they attended the Lenruth Hall
meeting.
We find that the respondent discharged Victor Barbieri, Francis
Haigney, and Michael Rizzutto, on September 3, 1937, because they
attended the Lenruth Hall meeting. We further find that the
respondent, by such discharges, discriminated in regard to hire and
tenure of employment, thereby discouraging membership in a labor
organization, and interfering with, restraining, and coercing its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act.
Anna Caputo began her employment with the respondent in Sep-
tember 1935. She did not work from March to August 1936, because
of an operation, but after August 1936, she worked steadily as a
feeder in the chocolate enrober department, earning $14 a week.
Caputo attended the Lenruth Hall meeting on September 2. On
September 3, after eating her lunch at her home near the factory,
she hurried back to the lunchroom on the sixth floor of the respond-
ent's plant and there solicited signatures to C. I. O. application
cards.
The testimony regarding the events and Caputo's conduct in the
lunchroom is somewhat conflicting. Mrs. May Leister, one of the
employees in the room, testified that Caputo had threatened that
if Leister did not sign, she would have to pay Caputo $10. Leister
also testified that Caputo had created a commotion in the room by
standing on tables and chairs and using abusive language. Caputo
denied this testimony. Leister herself retracted her testimony regard-
ing Caputo's standing on tables and chairs and generally modified
her testimony concerning the "commotion" allegedly created by
298 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Caputo. An employee testified that Caputo threatened her with the
loss of her job if she did not sign. This employee immediately
reported the activities of Caputo to a forelady.
Later that same afternoon, according to the testimony of Durso,
Caputo's foreman, Cronin came to Durso's department and asked,
"Who is Caputo in here? She is the one that tried to 'start the
trouble. I don't know anything about it. I heard it upstairs. She
is talking to two other people about union and stuff. I don't want
that going around the building. If they want to do anything like
that, let it be outside the building, not in here." Cronin had previ-
ously been advised of the happenings in the lunchroom by the
superintendent, to whom Cronin had said, "If that is what hap-
pened, discharge her right off the reel." At 4:30 p. m. on September
3 Ironsides discharged Caputo, saying, "It's not my doing; it's
Cronin's. I'm surprised at you; I never expected a thing like that
of you."
Immediately after her discharge Caputo signed a C. I. O. appli-
cation card. The following day she returned and handed out appli-
cation cards in front of the plant. Cronin came out to watch, and
then told Province Bier, who had also been discharged the previous
day and who was distributing the cards with Caputo, that Miss Bier
"could have her job back if she used her head and kept quiet." Bier
thereupon walked into the plant and resumed her job. Caputo then
requested permission of Cronin to go in and talk to the girls. Cronin
refused and stated that Caputo could never work for Fanny Farmer
as long as he was "boss of the concern." In his own testimony,
Cronin termed Caputo an "agitator."
The evidence supports the Trial Examiner's finding that Caputo
was discharged for her union activities. Durso, Caputo's foreman,
testified that he had always found her work satisfactory. The al-
leged "commotion" created by Caputo dissolved on closer examina-
tion to ordinary persuasion and solicitation during the lunch hour.
One of the employees, who admitted hostility to unions and who
accused Caputo of having threatened her with the loss of her job if
she did not sign a card, herself testified that Caputo spoke quietly.
Leister, who had testified to Caputo's alleged demand for $10 said
that she did not report this to Cronin until 2 weeks later. Further,
although she testified that other girls in the room heard Caputo's
threat, Leister's charge was unsupported by any other evidence.
Cronin's remarks to Durso show that he was less disturbed by any
"commotion," than by the fact that Caputo had been active in the
lunchroom in behalf of the C. I. O. His indignation at Caputo's
C. I. O. activities within the plant was in marked contrast to the free
use he made of company time and property in creating the Commit-
tee, as discussed below. We find that even if Cronin believed that
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 299'
there actually was a commotion in the lunchroom, her activities,
rather than the methods she may have employed, were the reason for
Caputo's discharge.
We find that the respondent discharged Caputo because she at-
tended the Lenruth Hall meeting and engaged in other union activi-
ties. We further find that by the discharge of Caputo on September
3, 1937, the respondent discriminated in regard to her hire and tenure
of employment, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organi-
zation, and interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees
in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
In October 1937, Caputo obtained what she termed "regular" em-
ployment at another candy factory, earning amounts varying from
$13 to $15 a week. On December 24 she was discharged from this job.
She desires to return to the employ of the respondent. The re-
spondent contends that Caputo obtained substantially equivalent em-
ployment elsewhere and, therefore, had lost her status as an employee
of the respondent. While we do not concede that the obtaining of
other regular and substantially equivalent employment would deprive
the Board of power to reinstate an individual who had been dis-
charged for union activity, it should be noted that Caputo was not em-
ployed at the time of the hearing. We find that, since Caputo had
been employed elsewhere for only three months, since she was not
employed at the time of the hearing, and since she desired to be re-
instated by the respondent, she had not obtained regular and sub-
stantially equivalent employment and did not lose her status as an
employee of the respondent.
Frances Stallone had worked for the respondent prior to her dis-
charge on September 4, 1937, for 4 years, the last 2 steadily. At the
time of her discharge, she was earning $15 a week as a candy packer.
Stallone did not attend the Lenruth Hall meeting. On the eve-
ning of September 3, 1937, she signed a C. I. O. application card.
Although Stallone did not tell anyone that she signed the card, she
appeared in front of the respondent's plant before working hours on
September 4 and openly distributed C. I. O. application cards. Some
time later the same day, May Walker, Stallone's forelady, came to
her and said, "I have nothing to do with this. I have to discharge
you." May Walker was not called by the respondent to explain or
deny this statement and we find that she made it.
Stallonewaslater notified through her brother-in-law, Rizzutto, that
she should return to work. She was rehired on September 20. When
Stallone saw Ironsides at the plant on that day, he told her that she
could return to work under the same conditions as Rizzutto.
No explanation is offered by the respondent for Stallone's discharge.
The discharges discussed above occurred on September 3, the day after
the Lenruth Hall meeting. Stallone did not attend that meeting;
300 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
her first organizational work took place on September 4. The fact that
she was not discharged with the other employees on September 3, but
was discharged immediately after her distribution of the C. I. O.
cards on September 4, convinces us that she was discharged for her
union activities.
We find that the respondent discharged Stallone because she en-
gaged in union activities. We further find that by the discharge of
Stallone on September 4, 1937, the respondent discriminated in regard
to her hire and tenure of employment, thereby discouraging member-
ship in a. labor organization, and interfering with, restraining, and
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
Edward Nelson began his employment with the respondent on
August 3, 1937, as a candy maker's helper at $16 a week. He
attended the Lenruth Hall meeting on September 2, and on Sep-
tember 3 he signed a C. I. O. application card. On the morn-
ing of September 7 Ironsides asked Nelson whether he had signed
a union card, and Nelson told him that he had. Ironsides asked at
least two other employees the same question. In the afternoon of the
same day, Ironsides asked Nelson whether Nelson had told lum that
lie signed a card. When Nelson again said that he had, Ironsides re-
plied, "Check out, because you are finished; we cannot have you here
if you cannot stand on your own two feet instead of having a union
do it for you." Nelson then checked out and has not since been re-
hired. Neither Ironsides nor Groia, who was Nelson's foreman and
present at his discharge, was called by the respondent to testify con-
cerning the discharge.
The respondent attributed Nelson's discharge to the fact that he
had only recently been hired, that he had been hired only as a "tem-
porary" helper, and that Nelson was inexperienced. Nelson testified
that he understood his job was "permanent," and that he was aware of
no complaints about his work. No evidence was offered by the respond-
ent to show that Nelson's work was unsatisfactory. We find that the
reasons assigned by the respondent at the hearing for Nelson's dis-
charge were not the true reasons, and that the circumstances surround-
ing his discharge were substantially as testified to by Nelson.
We find that the respondent discharged Nelson because he attended
the Lenruth Hall meeting and joined the C. I. O. We further find that
by the discharge of Nelson on September 7, 1937, the respondent dis-
criminated in regard to his hire and tenure of employment, thereby
discouraging membership in a labor organization, and interfering with,
restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
Since his discharge on September 3 Nelson has worked intermittently
as a temporary shipyard worker, earning from $22 to $29 a week de-
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 301
pending on overtime. He desires to return to the employ of the
respondent because of the regularity of the work. -
Joseph Damelio began working for the respondent as a candy maker's
helper on August 31, 1937, about a week prior to his discharge. He
attended the Lenruth Hall meeting on September 2. On September 7,
the day after Labor Day, Damelio was asked by the plant superin-
tendent whether or not he had signed a C. I. O. card. Damelio replied
that he did not know. In fact, he had not signed a C. I. O. card. That
afternoon, Damelio was discharged. He admitted at the hearing that
Ironsides had said that he was being discharged because he was "not fit
as a candy maker's helper."
Damelio's own testimony and demeanor at the hearing indicated
his general incapability. He did not know the name or the address of
the person for whom he worked wheeling coal after his discharge, al-
though he had been employed there about a month. He could not
remember any part of recent and lengthy conversations had with him
because he was "looking around" and paying no attention. The Trial
Examiner found that the respondent discharged Damelio for unfitness,
and dismissed the allegations of the complaint with respect to
Damelio's discharge.
We find that the record does not support the allegations of the com-
plaint that Damelio was discharged for union membership or activity.
B. The formation of the Committee; the contracts; interference,
restraint, and coercion
Immediately after the Lenruth Hall meeting on September 2 the
C. I. O. began to organize the employees of the respondent. On Sep-
tember 3, at 5: 30 p. in., the C. I. O. held an informal meeting near the
respondent's plant, and shortly thereafter informed the respondent that
it represented a majority of the respondent's workers.
On September 4, after lunch and after his conversation with Caputo,
referred to above, Cronin called a meeting in the plant, requesting all
employees to attend. At the meeting, Cronin spoke for about 15
minutes and stated that, although employees were free to join any
union they pleased, union membership was not and would not be a con-
dition requisite to employment in the plant. He stated that there was
no need for an outside union and that the plant would remain an open
shop.
On or about September 8 Cronin requested and obtained from a
police captain, who was a friend of Cronin's, "police protection" for
his workers. Two or three police cars responded to this request. Cronin
attributed both the September 4 meeting and the "police protection" to
the fact that 12 or 14 employees had complained to him that they were
being threatened by union organizers. Although the evidence showed
302 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that Cronin was very friendly with his employees, that he passed
through the factory daily, addressed the workers by their first names
and inquired about their families, he could not identify any of the em-
ployees who complained of the threats. The threats, he testified, were
not the kind that were "accompanied with a gun" but were statements
by C. I. O. organizers that the employees would lose their jobs if they
did not join the union.
On or about September 7 Cronin went to L. L. Balleisen. the in-
dustrial secretary of the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce, of which
the respondent had been a member for several years. Cronin dis-
cussed with Balleisen, whom he had known for some time, the dis-
turbance and unrest among the employees at the respondent's pl:, nt.
Balleisen showed Cronin several contracts which the other firms in
Brooklyn had with their employees and had found satisfactory.
Cronin looked over several of the contracts and picked out one which
he thought was fair. Cronin took this contract to his lawyer for
examination and possible redrafting.
On September 16 Cronin called a meeting of all the employees,
instructing the foremen to send them to the second floor of the plant.
The meeting began at 1: 30 p. in., and no more work was done that
day, although the employees received full pay. Cronin, reading from
a memorandum, stated that since many of the employees had asked
him about their rights under the Act, and since the C. I. O. had
notified him that it represented a majority of the workers in the plant,
"we are desirous of clarifying one or two points." Cronin then ad-
vised the employees that they had the right to bargain collectively;
stated his anxiety that they exercise this right and that he believed
in it; and pointed out that the respondent had always had pleasant
and peaceful relations with its employees, that it had always tried
to be fair and just, and that no one desired any trouble or interruption
of work. Cronin then read :
We are, therefore, going to make a suggestion to you which
you may or may not accept as you see fit. We would be pleased
to bargain collectively with a group of your fellow workers of
your own choosing, provided a majority of our employees so
desire. If you elect and choose such a committee, we would be
glad to negotiate and enter into a written contract with this
Committee on your behalf, and with each of you individually.
Cronin then stated that "we have no objections to your being in a
union or not, as you see fit" and that the respondent could not
discriminate because of union activities or membership. He an-
nounced, however, that while the respondent would enter into a con-
tract with its own employees, it would not have a closed shop or sign
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 303
a contract with any union, since that would be "contrary to the best
interests of the Company and the employees" and the Act did not
require it. Cronin further read that the contract which the respond-
ent would negotiate with the committee would cover rates of pay,
hours of work, "no lockouts or strikes," and peaceful settlement of
all disputes by mediation or arbitration. He concluded by pointing
out the follies of a strike, and stated :
No employee has to join a union in.order to work for Fanny
Farmer Candy Shops now or hereafter. No employee need pay
money or tribute to anyone in order to work for Fanny Farmer
Candy Shops now or hereafter. Do not be misled by what you
may hear from outsiders or fellow workers, as to the position
and policy of the Company. No one except the Management is
authorized to speak for the company.
After reading this statement, Cronin told the group that if a ma-
jority favored its contents, he should be notified. He then left the
room, leaving behind mimeographed copies of his statement. The
employees then gathered in groups to discuss the matter, and, ac-
cording to Cronin, between 1: 45 and 2:45 p. m.-or between 15 and
75 minutes after the meeting had originally begun-Cronin was noti-
fied that a majority favored his plan. The method of determining
the majority does not appear from the record, but there was no for-
mally conducted meeting and no secret vote.
On receiving the notification, Cronin suggested that each depart-
ment elect its own representatives. He sent to each department a type-
written letter, with appropriate blanks for the signatures of the
committeemen and the signatures of the individual employees. This
letter was a notification to Cronin that the employees had elected a
committee and authorized it to enter into a contract provided the con-
tract "contains substantially the provisions outlined by the
management."
Each department, in the presence of its foreman, then discussed the
situation generally and nominated representatives. The committee-
men were chosen by secret ballot, after which the letter, above re-
ferred to, was passed around to the employees to sign. The letter was
signed "practically 100 per cent," each man signing in full view of
the others. Although one witness testified that the letters were not
signed until 4 p. in. or after, Cronin himself stated at the hearing
that they were returned to him signed at 3 p. in.
The following day, September 17, the 7 committeemen, including a
foreman, who had been elected, met with Cronin in his office. Cronin
variously estimated the length of the meeting as 30 minutes and an
hour and three quarters. That the negotiations were perfunctory
304 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
appear from Cronin's own testimony. The only demands made by
the committee were for 4 weeks' vacation, honeymoons with pay, and
time and a third for overtime. The last request was granted. Cronin
himself testified that the committeemen were "in fact, acting indi-
vidually." The contract, previously prepared, according to Cronin,
by himself and his counsel, was then signed by the Committee. The
Committee has not met since.
A few days later, copies of the contract were given to the commit-
teemen to distribute among the individual employees. These were
signed by practically all the employees.
The contract, after reciting that it is the result of collective bar-
gaining and that it is between the respondent and the Committee and
"each and every one of the employees," provides for the continuance of
existing pay and hours of work, and time and a third for overtime.
The employer agreed not to cause a lock-out if the employees observed
the contract. In return, by paragraph fourth,,"The Employees agree
that henceforth and during the entire period of this agreement to
June 1, 1942, they or any of them will not go on strike." By para-
graph fifth it was provided that the employees were free to join or
refrain from joining any union, and that :
The Employees . . . shall not and have not the right to de-
mand a closed shop or a signed agreement by the Employer with
the Union. This does not in any way restrain the Employees
from having a union representing them or advising them in col-
lective bargaining, and the Employer has the absolute and un-
qualified right to hire or discharge any Employee or Employees
regardless of his or their affiliation or non-affiliation with any
union, except because of legitimate union activities conducted'
outside of company time or company property or because of affil-
iation with any union.
Discharges are not, however, to be the subject of arbitration and are
not to be questioned by the employees. Provisions are included to
allow for possible changes in the wage scale.
Almost all the employees of the respondent. signed these contracts
immediately. Several employees testified that it was made clear to
them that they did not have to sign, and that they fully understood
that their jobs were not dependent on their signing. On the other
hand, a few days after the contracts had been distributed, Ironsides,
the superintendent, asked Luff, an employee, why he had not signed,
and said, "... if you sign a contract and are not making $18 a week,
your salary will be raised to $18 and you will receive time and a third
for overtime." Luff was then told that he would not receive these
benefits unless he signed. He then said, "In. that case, I will sign it."
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 305
The entire sequence of events and the methods employed by the
respondent bear a close resemblance to those in Matter of David E.
Kennedy, Inc. and Isidore Greenberg.3 Although Cronin insisted
that he, with the aid of his counsel, had drafted the statement to the
employees, the "letter" signed by the committeemen and the em-
ployees, and the contract, these documents follow to a remarkable
extent, and often verbatim, like documents in the Kennedy case. The
Board, in that case, stated that the respondent's course of conduct
was calculated to initiate its own form of collective bargaining, to
discourage "outside" employee representation, and impose a contract
which did not result from the processes of collective bargaining which
the Act contemplates. These observations are equally applicable to
the instant case. True it is that in the instant case, the respondent
interspersed its statements to the employees more frequently than in
the Kennedy case with announcements that the employees could join
any outside union they pleased without danger of being discharged.
True it is also that there is no evidence of actual threats by the re-
spondent to employees other than Luff, to discharge or otherwise
penalize those who did not sign the contract. But it is nevertheless
clear that the entire plan was devised, initiated, and organized by the
respondent. The evidence fails entirely to show that the setting up
of the Committee, or the idea of an inside organization, arose from
the employees themselves. The statement to the employees of Sep-
tember 16 itself establishes that the Committee was the suggestion of
the respondent. By the statements of September 4 announcing the
needlessness of outside union, by the summoning of "police protec-
tion," by the discharges on September 3, 4, and 7, by the statement on
September 16 that the respondent would not deal or sign with an
outside union, by the reference on that date to the paying of "tribute"
to outside unions, the respondent abundantly indicated to its em-
ployees its hostility to outside unions. The clear expression of this
hostility, coupled with its wholly gratuitous suggestion, at a meeting
in the plant which the employees had to attend, that a committee be
formed within the company, left little' actual and unencumbered
choice to the employees. The frequent statements that the employees
were free to join outside unions disappear before the strength and
clarity of Cronin's other statements and conduct.
The circumstances surrounding the adoption of the suggested plan
indicate how far the will of the respondent had been imposed on its
employees. There was neither time nor opportunity for discussion
and expression of opinion. No secret vote was taken to ascertain
whether the employees approved of the plan ; there was no method
3 6 N. -L. R. B. 699. For other cases where very similar methods were pursued, and th
Board's conclusions thereon, see the cases there cited
306 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
provided for its rejection. The adoption of the plan, the securing
of the "letters," the election of the committeemen, the signing of the
letters by the employees, together consumed, according to Cronin, no
more than an hour and a quarter.
Of the contract signed by the Committee and the employees, we
reiterate what we said in the Kennedy case, that it
unquestionably did not result from the processes of collective
bargaining which the Act contemplates. It is apparent from the
record that the committee . . . did no more than go through the
form of bargaining . . . Its acquiescence without protest .. .
to a form of contract which deprived the employees of the rights
guaranteed by the Act confirms our conclusions that the com-
mittee acted as the tool of the respondent rather than as the
representative of the employees.
In Hatter of Atlas Bag and Burlap Company, Inc. and Milton
Rosenberg, Organizer, Burlap cC Cotton Bag Workers Local Union
No. ^?46i), affiliated with United Textile Workers Union,4 an almost
identical contract, suggested by L. L. Balleisen, was held by the Board
to deprive.
each employee who signs it of the right to strike . . . of the right
to demand recognition of any union by the employer, and of the
right to question discharges for any reason or no reason regard-
less of his affiliation or non-affiliation with any union. Despite
the lip-service rendered by the terms of the contract to the right
of an employee to join any union of his own choosing, the agree-
ment deprives each employee subscriber of the fundamental
rights inherent in union affiliation and activity-the right to
union recognition, which means the right to collective bargain-
ing, the right to concerted activities for'mutual aid or protection,
which is guaranteed to employees in Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act .. . It would be hard to devise a more
patently anti-union or "yellow-dog" contract, or one more dis-
couraging to membership in a labor organization.
This language is descriptive of the contract in the instant case.
We find that the respondent, by its activities described above, has
interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act; has dominated and
interfered with the formation and administration of the Collective
Bargaining Committee of the Employees of Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops, Inc., and has contributed support to it; and by such conduct
has discouraged union membership. We further find that the con-
tracts described above are invalid and of no effect.
4 1 N. L R. B. 292.
DECISIONS AND ORDERS
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
307
We find that the activities of the respondent set forth in Section
III above, occurring in connection with its operations described in
Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to
trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to
lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce, and the
free flow of commerce.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the respondent has dominated and interfered
with the formation and administration of the Collective Bargaining
Committee of the Employees of Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.,
and has contributed support to it, and that the Committee is incapable
of serving the respondent's employees as their genuine representative
for the purposes of collective bargaining, we will, in order to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act, order the respondent to withdraw all
recognition from the Committee and to disestablish it as representa-
tive of any of respondent's employees for the purpose of dealing with
the respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes, rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
Since we have found that the contracts signed by the Committee
and the individual employees are invalid and of no effect, we will
order the respondent to cease giving any effect to them. We will also
order the respondent to desist from in any manner interfering with,
restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
We have found that the respondent discharged and refused to rein-
state David Sari, Anna Caputo, and Edward Nelson because of their
union activities. Since their discharges constitute an unfair labor
practice, we will order the respondent to offer them reinstatement and
to make them whole for any loss of pay they have suffered by reason
of their respective discharges by payment to each of them of a sum
equal to the amount which he or she normally would have earned as
wages from the date of his or her discharge to the date of the offer of
reinstatement less his net earnings 5 during said period. Since we
have also found that the respondent discriminatorily discharged Vic-
tor Barbieri, Michael Rizzutto, Francis Haigney, and Frances Stallone
for union activities, we will order the respondent to make them whole
for any loss of pay they may have suffered during the period from the
date of their discharge to the date of their reinstatement, by payment
5 By net earnings" is meant earnings , less expenses , such as transportation, room, and
board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working elsewhere
than for the respondent, which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful discharge
and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere. See Matter of Crossett
Lumber Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Lumber
and Sawmill Workers Union, Local 2590, 8 N. L R B 440
308 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to each of them of a sum computed in the manner set forth above, ex-
cept that in the case of Francis Haigney, the period between Septem-
ber 12 and September 19, inclusive, shall not be considered in com--
puting the amount of his back pay.
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire
record in the case, the Board makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Committee for Industrial Organization, and the Collective
Bargaining Committee of the Employees of Fanny Farmer Candy
Shops, Inc., are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2
(5) of the Act.
2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment
of David Sari, Victor Barbieri, Michael Rizzutto, Francis Haigney,
Anna Caputo, Frances Stallone, and Edward Nelson, and each of
them, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organization, the
-respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act.
3. By dominating and interfering with the formation and adminis-
tration of the Collective Bargaining Committee of the Employees of
Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc:, and by contributing support to it,
the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (2) of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the
respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices,
within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of
-the Act.
6. The respondent by discharging George Galea and Joseph Damelio,
has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8 (1) and (3) of the Act.
ORDER
Upon the basis of the findings of fact and conclusions of law and
pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent,
Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., Brooklyn, New York, and its offi-
cers, successors, and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Dominating or interfering with the administration of the Col-
lective Bargaining Committee of the Employees of Fanny Farmer
Candy Shops, Inc., or with the formation or administration of any
DECISIONS AND ORDERS 309
other labor organization of its employees , and from contributing sup-
port to the Collective Bargaining Committee of the Employees of
Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., or any other labor organization
of its employees ;
(b) Discouraging membership in United Candy and Confectionery
Workers Union, Local No. 606, or any other labor organization of its
employees by discharging, laying off, refusing to reinstate , or other-
wise discriminating against its employees in regard to hire and tenure
,of employment, or any term or condition of employment;
(c) Giving effect to the contracts made with the Collective Bargain-
ing Committee of the Employees of Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.,
on September 17, 1937, and to the individual contracts made with the
employees thereafter;
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining , or coercing
its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to
form , join, or assist labor organizations , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection , as. guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer Anna Caputo, Edward Nelson, and David Sari, imme-
diate and full reinstatement to their former , or substantially equiv-
alent, positions without prejudice to their seniority and other rights
and privileges ;
(b) Make whole Anna Caputo, Edward Nelson, and David Sari,
for any loss of pay they have suffered by reason of the respondent's
discriminatory acts, by payment to each of them of a sum of money
equal to' that which each would normally have earned as wages from
the date of his or her discharge to the date of the respondent's offer
of reinstatement less his or her net earnings a during said period;
(c) Make whole Michael Rizzutto , Frances Stallone , and Victor
Barbieri for any loss of pay they have suffered by reason of the re-
spondent 's discriminatory acts, by payment to each of them of a sum
of money equal to that which each would normally have earned from
the date of his or her discharge to the date of the respondent 's offer of
reinstatement less his ' or her net earnings 6 during said period;
(d) Make whole Francis Haigney for any loss of pay he has suf-
fered by reason of the respondent 's discriminatory acts by payment to
him of a sum equal to that which he would have earned from the
date of his discharge to September 11, 1937 , inclusive , and- from Sep-
tember 20, 1937 , to the date of the respondent 's offer of reinstatement
less his net earnings 6 during said periods;
° See footnote 5.
147841-39-vol 10--21
310 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD -
(e) Withdraw all recognition from the Collective Bargaining
Committee of the Employees of Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.,
as a representative of any of its employees for the purpose of dealing
with the respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes, rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of work, and
completely disestablish the Collective Bargaining Committee of the
Employees of Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., as such representa-
tive ;
(f) Personally inform in writing each of its employees who has
entered into the individual contract of employment, that the obtain-
ing of such contract by the respondent constituted an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act,
that therefore the respondent is obliged to discontinue such contract
as a term or condition of employment and to desist from in any
manner enforcing or attempting to enforce such contract, and that
said contract is void and of no effect;
(g) Immediately post notices in conspicuous places throughout its
plant and maintain such notices for a period of at least thirty (30)
consecutive days,,stating (1) that the respondent will cease and desist
in the manner aforesaid; (2) that the respondent withdraws and
will refrain from all recognition of the Collective Bargaining Com-
mittee of the Employees of Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., as a
representative of any of its employees and completely disestablish
it as such representative; and (3) that the contract made with the
Collective Bargaining Committee of the Employees of Fanny Farmer
Candy Shops, Inc., on September 17, 1937, and the individual
contracts made with its employees thereafter are void and of no
effect;
(h) Notify the Regional Director for the Second Region in writ-
ing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the
respondent has taken to comply therewith.
AND rr Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint in so far as it alleges
that the respondent has discouraged membership in a labor organiza-
tion by discrimination in regard to the hire and tenure of employ-
ment of George Galea and Joseph Damelio be, and it hereby is,
dismissed.