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Ex Parte Seo et al

13094940 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2019)
Ex Parte Seo et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. Shinseki v. Sanders

    556 U.S. 396 (2009)   Cited 4,675 times
    Holding that a "notice error" was harmless because the respondent "ha[d] not explained to the Veterans Court, to the Federal Circuit, or to us how the notice error to which he points could have made any difference"

  2. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  3. Catalina Market. Intern. v. Coolsavings.com

    289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 657 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "the claims, specification, and prosecution history of the041 patent demonstrate that the preamble phrase `located at predesignated sites such as consumer stores' is not a limitation of Claim 1," for "the applicant did not rely on this phrase to define its invention nor is the phrase essential to understand limitations or terms in the claim body"

  4. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi

    181 F.3d 865 (7th Cir. 1999)   Cited 193 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Refusing to consider arguments that were adopted by reference but not actually made in appellate briefs because "adoption by reference amounts to a self-help increase in the length of the appellate brief"

  5. In re Kahn

    441 F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006)   Cited 144 times   11 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the motivation-suggestion-teaching test, much like the analogous-art test, is used to defend against hindsight

  6. In re Chapman

    595 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2010)   Cited 12 times
    Remanding after correcting error in obviousness analysis

  7. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)