Ex Parte Matsumoto

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

Aug 28, 2006

09929488 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 28, 2006)

The opinion in support of the decision being entered today was not
written for publication and is not binding precedent of the Board.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

__________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
__________

Ex parte KIMIKAZU MATSUMOTO
__________

Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488
__________

ON BRIEF
__________

Before THOMAS, JERRY SMITH, and MACDONALD, Administrative Patent
Judges.

JERRY SMITH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
examiner’s rejection of claims 1-17.
The disclosed invention pertains to an active matrix type liquid crystal
display device.

Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

2
Representative claim 1 is reproduced as follows:
1. An active matrix type liquid crystal display device comprising:
• a thin film transistor (TFT) substrate having a common wiring and a
source/drain wiring formed on a first substrate, said first substrate
being provided with an insulating film covering said common wiring
and said source/drain wiring, said insulating film being coated with a
first alignment layer;
• an opposite substrate, opposing to said TFT substrate, having a second
alignment layer formed on a second substrate;
• a liquid crystal held between said first alignment layer and said second
alignment layer; and
• a common electrode and a pixel electrode wired in parallel with each
other and being formed as parts of said common wiring and said
source/drain wiring, respectively, so that an angle made between a
direction in which said first alignment layer is subjected to an aligning
treatment and a direction in which said second alignment layer is
subjected to an aligning treatment is set to a value of 0.5 to 4.0
degrees, said value providing a setting that concurrently decreases a
threshold voltage between the pixel electrode and the common
electrode required to change a direction of said liquid crystal
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

3
therebetween, increases a response of switching of said liquid crystal,
and increases a luminance of said liquid crystal.

The examiner relies on the following references:
Baur et al. (Baur) 5,576,867 Nov. 19, 1996
Ohta et al. (Ohta ‘116) 6,266,116 Jul. 24, 2001
(filed Sep. 26, 1996)

Ohta et al. (Ohta ‘053) 6,532,053 Mar. 11, 2003
(PCT Pub. Date Jun. 25, 1998 (WO98/27454))

Admitted Prior Art (see instant specification, prior art figs. 1A and 1B; see
answer, page 7).

The following rejections are on appeal before us:
1. Claims 1-7 and 10-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the teachings of Baur [answer, pages 3-
7].
2. Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of Admitted Prior
Art [answer, pages 7-9].
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

4
3. Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of Ohta ‘053
[answer, pages 9-12].
4. Claims 1-7 and 10-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of
Ohta ‘116 [answer, pages 13-15].
5. Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of Ohta ‘116 and
further in view of Admitted Prior Art [answer, pages 16 and 17].
6. Claims 8 and 9 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of Ohta ‘116, and
further in view of Ohta ‘053 [answer, pages 18-21].

Rather than repeat the arguments of appellant or the examiner, we
make reference to the briefs and the answer for the respective details
thereof.
OPINION

We have carefully considered the subject matter on appeal, the
rejections advanced by the examiner and the evidence of obviousness relied
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

5
upon by the examiner as support for the rejections. We have, likewise,
reviewed and taken into consideration, in reaching our decision, the
appellant’s arguments set forth in the briefs along with the examiner’s
rationale in support of the rejections and arguments in rebuttal set forth in
the examiner’s answer. Only those arguments actually made by appellant
have been considered in this decision. Arguments which appellant could
have made but chose not to make in the briefs have not been considered
and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.§ 41.37(c) (1)(vii)(2004). See
also In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1368, 69 USPQ2d 1453, 1458 (Fed. Cir.
2004).

It is our view, after consideration of the record before us, that the
evidence relied upon supports each of the examiner’s rejections of the
claims on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is incumbent upon the
examiner to establish a factual basis to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1073, 5 USPQ2d 1596, 1598
(Fed. Cir. 1988). In so doing, the examiner is expected to make the factual
determinations set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

6
USPQ 459, 467 (1966). The examiner must articulate reasons for the
examiner’s decision. In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342, 61 USPQ2d 1430,
1433 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In particular, the examiner must show that there is a
teaching, motivation, or suggestion of a motivation to combine references
relied on as evidence of obviousness. Id. 277 F.3d at 1343, 61 USPQ2d at
1433-34. The examiner cannot simply reach conclusions based on the
examiner’s own understanding or experience - or on his or her assessment
of what would be basic knowledge or common sense. Rather, the examiner
must point to some concrete evidence in the record in support of these
findings.” In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1386, 59 USPQ2d 1693, 1697 (Fed.
Cir. 2001). Thus the examiner must not only assure that the requisite
findings are made, based on evidence of record, but must also explain the
reasoning by which the findings are deemed to support the examiner’s
conclusion. However, a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to combine the
relevant prior art teachings does not have to be found explicitly in the prior
art, as the teaching, motivation, or suggestion may be implicit from the prior
art as a whole, rather than expressly stated in the references. The test for
an implicit showing is what the combined teachings, knowledge of one of
ordinary skill in the art, and the nature of the problem to be solved as a
whole would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Kahn,
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

7
441 F.3d 977, 987-88, 78 USPQ2d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006) citing In re
Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370, 55 USPQ2d 1313, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
See also In re Thrift, 298 F. 3d 1357, 1363, 63 USPQ2d 2002, 2008 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). These showings by the examiner are an essential part of
complying with the burden of presenting a prima facie case of obviousness.
Note In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445, 24 USPQ2d 1443, 1444 (Fed. Cir.
1992). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the applicant to
overcome the prima facie case with argument and/or evidence. Obviousness
is then determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and the relative
persuasiveness of the arguments. See Id.; In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038,
1039, 228 USPQ 685, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468,
1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d
1048, 1052, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA 1976).
At the outset, we note that we reference infra the corrected appeal
brief that was attached to the reply brief received on Jun. 21, 2005. In the
reply brief appellant admits that the term of art “tilt angle” was used
inadvertently in various locations within the original appeal brief (filed on
Feb. 7, 2005), when “twist angle” is the correct parameter of interest [reply
brief, page 2]. We note that the first page of the corrected appeal brief

Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

8
attached to the reply brief begins on page 5 of the reply brief. Therefore, we
will refer infra to specific pages of the corrected appeal brief using the page
numbering of the reply brief. We also note that a supplemental reply brief
was received on Dec. 6, 2005 that has been considered.
I. We consider first the examiner’s rejection of claims 1-7 and 10-17 as
being unpatentable over the teachings of Baur. Since appellant’s arguments
with respect to this rejection have treated these claims as a single group
which stand or fall together, we will consider independent claim 1 as the
representative claim for this rejection. See 37 C.F.R.§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii)
(2004).
Appellant argues that the examiner's position can only be described as
alleging obviousness because the narrow ranges (e.g., 0.5 to 4.0
degrees/1.5 to 2.0 degrees) for twist angle β prescribed in the instant
invention are included in the wider range of Baur (e.g., -15 to + 15 degrees)
[corrected brief, page 6, emphasis added]. In particular, appellant points to
MPEP §2131.03(II):
If the claims are directed to a narrow range, the reference
teaches a broad range, and there is evidence of unexpected
results within the claimed narrow range, depending on the other
facts of the case, it may be reasonable to conclude that the
narrow range is not disclosed with “sufficient specificity” to
constitute an anticipation of the claims. The unexpected results
may also render the claims unobvious.

Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

9
Appellant argues that the improved performance parameters identified
in instant specification (e.g., reduction of threshold voltage, increased
response time, and optimal luminance, while concurrently controlling
contrast degradation) satisfy the requirement for identifying the “unexpected
results” that occur for the narrow range of twist angle prescribed by the
instant invention [corrected brief, page 7]. Appellant concludes that the
engineering graphs of the figures of the instant specification provide
evidence of the unexpected results that are obtained when twist angle β is
set within the narrow ranges prescribed by the claimed invention [id.,
emphasis added].
In response, the examiner asserts that Baur teaches that appellant's
twist angle is a results effective variable wherein the teaching of Baur is
robust to explain to those of ordinary skill in the art that one can establish
appellant’s claimed twist angle as a matter of tuning for a particular
application, e.g., for a high ambient light or low ambient light application
[answer, page 21]. The examiner argues that it is clear from the prior art
that a plurality of parameters are adjusted as a set to achieve desired
results [id.]. The examiner asserts that Baur discloses a range of twist
angles that is wide enough to include a broad range of displays useful in a
broad range of applications [id.]. The examiner further asserts that simply
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

10
claiming a narrower range within the range of Baur is insufficient for
patentability [answer, page 22]. The examiner argues that it is clear from
Baur that increasing the twist angle to something greater than zero will
improve switching speed and reduce switching voltage, because the small
twist angle mechanically approaches the “on” condition (i.e., the twist turns
the pixel partially on) [id.]. The examiner notes that the penalty is reduced
contrast (i.e., moving further from the off state), but this is acceptable
especially for low ambient light applications due to the insensitivity of the
human eye. The examiner concludes that appellant’s specification and
figures do not show any unexpected results [id.].
We note that appellant has admitted that the narrow ranges (e.g., 0.5
to 4.0 degrees) for twist angle β prescribed in the instant invention are
included in the wider range of Baur (e.g., -15 to + 15 degrees) [corrected
brief, page 6; see also Baur at col. 13, lines 43 and 44]. The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recently reaffirmed that where the
claimed ranges are completely encompassed by the prior art, the conclusion
that the claims are prima facie obvious is even more compelling than in
cases of mere overlap. In re Harris, 409 F.3d 1339, 1341, 74 USPQ2d 1951,
1953 (Fed. Cir. 2005) citing In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330, 65
USPQ2d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003) [emphasis added]. The Court of
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

11
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has also determined “[w]hen an applicant
seeks to overcome a prima facie case of obviousness by showing improved
performance in a range that is within or overlaps with a range disclosed in
the prior art, the applicant must ‘show that the range is critical, generally by
showing that the claimed range achieves unexpected results relative to the
prior art range.’ ” In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1469–70, 43 USPQ2d
1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1997), citing In re Woodruff, 919 F.2d 1575, 1578, 16
USPQ2d 1934, 1936 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has also found that a comparison to the closest prior art may provide
the requisite showing of unexpected results. In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699,
705, 222 USPQ 191, 196 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“When an article is said to
achieve unexpected (i.e. superior) results, those results must logically be
shown as superior compared to the results achieved with other [prior art]
articles … Moreover, an applicant relying on comparative tests to rebut a
prima facie case of obviousness must compare his claimed invention to the
closest prior art.”).
We note that appellant asserts that the engineering graphs of the
figures of the instant specification provide the evidence of the unexpected
results that are obtained when twist angle β is set within the narrow ranges
prescribed by the claimed invention [corrected brief, page 7]. Appellant
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

12
further points to the following sections of the instant specification as
allegedly showing unexpected results [supplemental reply brief, page 4, ¶1]:
Page 2, lines 1-6:
However, the IPS type LCD has such problems that the
response of the liquid crystal is slow because of the structure
thereof, and the threshold voltage necessary between the
electrodes for changing the direction of the liquid crystal
is high, and furthermore, the luminance of the display panel
is low.

Page 3, lines 9-17:
Accordingly, it has become clear that even when a strong electric field
is generated near the TFT substrate, a weak electric field
is generated near the opposite substrate, and therefore, it
takes substantially a long time to rotate the liquid crystal.
It has been understood that when the cell gap is 4.5 µm, when
comparing the electric field intensity near the TFT substrate
and the electric field intensity near the opposite substrate,
the latter one is about half of the previous one.

Page 7, lines 9-23:
In the IPS-LCD, this ununiformity of the electric field
in the cell thickness direction has been the cause of such
problems that the response of the liquid crystal is slow, and
the threshold voltage necessary between the electrodes for
changing the direction of the liquid crystal is high, and
furthermore, the luminance of the display panel is low.
In both of the conventional example 1 and the conventional
example 2 the electric field becomes weaker in proportion to
the distance from the surface of the TFT substrate in the cell
thickness direction, but the method that makes it possible
to easily rotate the liquid crystal near the CF substrate in
which the electric field is weakened is not shown. Accordingly,
the conventional IPS mode LCD has still had the above-described
problems, because of the ununiformity of the electric field
in the cell thickness direction.

In particular, we note that appellant has failed to provide evidence
(i.e., an affidavit or declaration of record) to show how these portions of the
specification compare the claimed instant invention results to the closest
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

13
prior art results [supplemental reply brief, page 4]. Significantly, we find
that these portions of the instant specification merely describe aspects of
conventional In-Plane-Switching (IPS) type liquid crystal displays.
Appellant further asserts that “unexpected results” are inherent in fig.
8 of the instant specification that shows a “sweet spot” at approximately
2.75 degrees of twist angle [supplemental reply brief, page 4]. We
disagree. In particular, we note that Baur explicitly discloses that a “liquid
crystal has a twistable structure and the amount of light transmission
through the liquid crystal depends on its degree of twist” [col. 3, lines 7-9].
We note that the amount of light transmission as a function of the twist
angle clearly affects the transmittance and contrast parameters. Therefore,
we agree with the examiner that the figures of the instant specification only
show expected results [see answer, pages 22 and 23]. Even if the figures of
the instant invention describe “actually-measured results,” as argued by
appellant [corrected brief, page 10], we note that appellant has failed to
provide evidence comparing the instant claimed invention to the closest prior
art to show that the results are unexpected compared to the prior art
results.
Objective evidence of unexpected results must be factually supported
by an appropriate affidavit or declaration to be of probative value. In re De
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

14
Blauwe, 736 F.2d at 705, 222 USPQ at 196 (“It is well settled that
unexpected results must be established by factual evidence. Mere argument
or conclusory statements in the specification does not suffice.”) citing In re
Lindner, 457 f.2d 506, 508, 173 USPQ 356, 358 (CCPA 1972) [emphasis
added]. We note that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
further determined that arguments of counsel cannot take the place of
evidence in the record. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d at 1471, 43 USPQ2d at 1365
[emphasis added].
In the instant case, we note that appellant has failed to provide a
showing supported by an appropriate affidavit or declaration demonstrating
that the claimed range of 0.5 to 4.0 degrees of the second alignment layer is
critical and that it achieves unexpected results relative to the prior art range
disclosed by Baur. In particular, we note that there is no evidence appendix
contained within the brief. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.37(c)(1)(ix) and 41.33(d).
Therefore, we conclude that appellant’s assertions of unexpected results
constitute mere argument and conclusory statements in the specification
that cannot establish patentability. Accordingly, we will sustain the
examiner’s rejection of representative claim 1 for essentially the same
reasons argued by the examiner in the answer. Because we have
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

15
considered claim 1 as the representative claim for this rejection, we will also
sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 2-7 and 10-17.
We find that the examiner has clearly met his/her burden of
establishing that claims 1-7 and 10-17 are prima facie obvious by showing
(as admitted by appellant; see corrected brief, page 6) that the claimed
range of representative claim 1 is completely encompassed by the prior art.
See In re Harris, supra at 1341. Once the examiner has established a prima
facie case of obviousness, the burden then shifts to appellant to provide an
affidavit or declaration showing unexpected results, as discussed supra.
Because appellant has failed to provide evidence of unexpected results
associated with the claimed narrower range, we need not reach the other
arguments raised by appellant in the briefs asserting, inter alia, that Baur is
already optimized at a twist angle range of -15 to +15 degrees and
therefore there is no suggestion in the reference to separately adjust the
twist angle parameter [corrected brief, page 6]. Nevertheless, in order to
provide a complete response to appellant’s arguments, we disagree with
appellant’s assertion that there is no suggestion in the Baur reference to
separately adjust the twist angle parameter [id.]. In particular, we note
again that Baur explicitly discloses that a “liquid crystal has a twistable
structure and the amount of light transmission through the liquid crystal
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

16
depends on its degree of twist” [col. 3, lines 7-9, emphasis added].
Therefore, we find that Baur provides ample suggestion to an artisan to
adjust the twist angle to control the amount of light transmission through
the liquid crystal. Accordingly, we find that this explicit teaching by Baur
vitiates appellant’s contention that “Baur clearly teaches against using twist
angle β as the parameter to be adjusted [corrected brief, page 8].
With respect to rejections two through six (i.e., II, III, IV, V and VI as
addressed infra), we note that appellant’s arguments in the briefs are
directed entirely to the Baur reference that we have completely addressed
supra. With respect to rejections two through six, as discussed infra, we
note that arguments that appellant could have made but chose not to make
in the briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2004).

II. We consider next the examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 9 as being
unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of Admitted Prior Art
[answer, page 7].
We note that appellant has failed to specifically traverse this rejection
or point out any alleged differences between the claims and the Admitted
Prior Art (i.e., corresponding to prior art figs. 1A and 1B of the instant
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

17
specification) relied upon by the examiner to modify the primary Baur
reference. After carefully reviewing the evidence before us, we agree with
the examiner that instant prior art figs. 1A and 1B teach the instant claimed
limitations as being common features of a conventional prior art Thin Film
Transistor (TFT) display [answer, page 7]. Accordingly, we will sustain the
examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 9 as being unpatentable over the
teachings of Baur in view of Admitted Prior Art.

III. We consider next the examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 9 as being
unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of Ohta ‘053 [answer, page
9].
We note that appellant has failed to specifically traverse this rejection
or point out any alleged differences between the claims and the Ohta ‘053
reference relied upon by the examiner to modify the primary Baur reference.
After carefully reviewing the evidence before us, we agree with the examiner
that figs. 2 and 3 of Ohta ‘053 teach the instant claimed features as being
common features of a conventional prior art Thin Film Transistor (TFT)
display [answer, pages 9-12]. Accordingly, we will sustain the examiner’s
rejection of claims 8 and 9 as being unpatentable over the teachings of Baur
in view of Ohta ‘053.
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

18
IV. We consider next the examiner’s rejection of claims 1-7 and 10-17 as
being unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of Ohta ‘116 [answer,
page 12]. We note that appellant has failed to specifically traverse this
rejection or point out any alleged differences between the claims and the
Ohta ‘116 reference relied upon by the examiner to modify Baur. Pursuant
to our authority under 37 C.F.R.§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2004), we will select
independent claim 1 as the representative claim for this rejection.
We note that the examiner admits that Baur does explicitly disclose a
range of 0.5 to 4.0 degrees [answer, page 12]. In particular, we note that
the examiner relies upon Ohta ‘116 as teaching a first embodiment (col. 4,
lines 32-34, col. 18, lines 58-62, and col. 19, lines 33-37) where an angle
made between a direction in which a first alignment layer is subjected to an
aligning treatment and a direction in which a second alignment layer is
subjected to an aligning treatment is set to a value of β within plus or minus
5 degrees of zero degrees (col. 8, lines 60-65, and col. 13, lines 39-44)
[answer, page 13]. The examiner further notes that this broader range
completely encompasses the claimed 0.5 to 4.0 degrees (claim 1) and 1.5 to
2.0 degrees (claim 2) to produce a display with a low dependence of image
contrast on viewing angle in a fixed driving voltage range (i.e., reduced
voltage with adequate response speed) [answer, page 13]. The examiner
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

19
asserts in the rejection that optimization of the results effective variable β to
comprise appellant’s ranges of 0.5 to 4.0 degrees and 1.5 to 2.0 degrees
would have been obvious to those having ordinary skill in the art of liquid
crystals [id.]. We note that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
found that “[s]electing a narrow range from within a somewhat broader
range disclosed in a prior art reference is no less obvious than identifying a
range that simply overlaps a disclosed range.” In re Peterson, 315 F.3d at
1329-30, 65 USPQ2d at 1382 (“In fact, when, […] , the claimed ranges are
completely encompassed by the prior art, the conclusion is even more
compelling than in cases of mere overlap. The normal desire of scientists or
artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the
motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the
optimum combination of percentages.”) [emphasis added].
In the instant case, we find that the examiner, as finder of fact, has
clearly met his/her burden of establishing a prima facie case of obviousness
with the findings set forth in the rejection that the broader range taught by
Ohta ‘116 completely encompasses the claimed range of 0.5 to 4.0 degrees
[answer, page 13; see also claim 1]. Accordingly, we will sustain the
examiner’s rejection of representative claim 1 as being unpatentable over
the teachings of Baur in view of Ohta ‘116 for essentially the same reasons
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

20
set forth by the examiner in the rejection. Because we have considered
claim 1 as the representative claim for this rejection, we will also sustain the
examiner’s rejection of claims 2-7 and 10-17.

V. We consider next the examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 9 as being
unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of Ohta ‘116 and further in
view of Admitted Prior Art [answer, page 16].
We note that appellant has failed to specifically traverse this rejection
or point out any alleged differences between the claims and the Ohta ‘116
reference and the Admitted Prior Art relied upon by the examiner to modify
the primary Baur reference [answer, pages 16 and 17]. After carefully
reviewing the evidence before us, we agree with the examiner that instant
prior art figs. 1A and 1B (i.e., Admitted Prior Art) teach the instant claimed
limitations as being common features of a conventional prior art Thin Film
Transistor (TFT) display [answer, pages 16 and 17]. Accordingly, we will
sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 9 as being unpatentable
over the teachings of Baur in view of Ohta ‘116 and further in view of
Admitted Prior Art.

Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

21
VI. Lastly, we consider the examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 9 as being
unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of Ohta ‘116, and further in
view of Ohta ‘053 [answer, page 18].
We note that appellant has failed to specifically traverse this rejection
or point out any alleged differences between the claims and the Ohta ‘116
and Ohta ‘053 references relied upon by the examiner to modify the primary
Baur reference [answer, pages 18-21]. After carefully reviewing the
evidence before us, we agree with the examiner that figs. 2 and 3 of Ohta
‘053 teach the instant claimed features as being common features of a
conventional prior art Thin Film Transistor (TFT) display [id.]. Accordingly,
we will sustain the examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 9 as being
unpatentable over the teachings of Baur in view of Ohta ‘116, and further in
view of Ohta ‘053.

In summary, we have sustained the examiner’s rejection of all claims
on appeal. Therefore, the decision of the examiner rejecting claims 1-17 is
affirmed.

Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

22
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED.

James D. Thomas )
Administrative Patent Judge )
)
)
) BOARD OF PATENT
Jerry Smith )
Administrative Patent Judge ) APPEALS AND
)
) INTERFERENCES
)
Allen R. MacDonald )
Administrative Patent Judge )

JR/SJC/kis
Appeal No. 2006-1654
Application No. 09/929,488

23
MCGINN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GROUP, P.L.L.C.
8321 OLD COURTHOUSE ROAD
SUITE 200
VIENNA, VA 22182-3817