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Ex Parte Liang et al

13176078 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 18, 2013)
Ex Parte Liang et al

11 Cited authorities

  1. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch Lomb Inc.

    909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 318 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding § 271(c) codified common law doctrine prohibiting sale of "component" that "had no other use except with claimed product or process"

  2. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 150 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency

  3. In re Dillon

    919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 69 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding a prima facie case of obviousness where the prior art tri-orthoester compound was found to be equivalent to the claimed tetra-orthoester compound and the use of the tri-orthoester as a fuel additive was expected to produce essentially the same result as the use of the tetra-orthoester

  4. In re Kemps

    97 F.3d 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1996)   Cited 13 times
    Upholding board's fact finding under less deferential standard of review obviated need for deciding propriety of using the APA standards

  5. Application of Lintner

    458 F.2d 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1972)   Cited 24 times

    Patent Appeal No. 8718. May 4, 1972. Eugene F. Buell, Blenko Ziesenheim, Pittsburgh, Pa., William A. Smith, Jr., Smith, Michael, Bradford Gardiner, Washington, D.C., attorneys of record, for appellant. S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., for Commissioner of Patents. Raymond E. Martin, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals. Before RICH, ALMOND, BALDWIN and LANE, Associate Judges, and MALETZ, Judge, United States Customs Court, sitting by designation. LANE, Judge. This

  6. Application of Ratti

    270 F.2d 810 (C.C.P.A. 1959)   Cited 18 times

    Patent Appeal No. 6452. September 30, 1959. Cromwell, Greist Warden, Chicago, Ill. (Raymond L. Greist, Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellant. Clarence W. Moore, Washington, D.C. (S. Wm. Cochran, Washington, D.C., of counsel), for Commissioner of Patents. Before WORLEY, Chief Judge, RICH, MARTIN, and SMITH, Judges, and Judge WILLIAM H. KIRKPATRICK. United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, designated to participate in place of Judge O'Connell, pursuant to the

  7. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,132 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  8. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 6,000 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  9. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  10. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  11. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)