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Ex Parte Klaffenbach et al

14072859 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 4, 2017)
Ex Parte Klaffenbach et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. Typhoon Touch Technologies v. Dell, Inc.

    659 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 203 times
    Holding that a patent applicant narrowed its application in a response to the examiner's rejection on prior art grounds

  2. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch Lomb Inc.

    909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 317 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding § 271(c) codified common law doctrine prohibiting sale of "component" that "had no other use except with claimed product or process"

  3. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 150 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency

  4. In re Robertson

    169 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 1999)   Cited 65 times
    Holding that inherent anticipation requires more than mere probability or possibility that the missing descriptive materials are present in the prior art

  5. In re Jung

    637 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011)   Cited 24 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding the prima facie case during patent examination “is merely a procedural device that enables an appropriate shift of the burden of production” from the PTO to the patent applicant

  6. In re Hyatt

    211 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 36 times
    Rejecting Hyatt's claim that the Board failed to analyze the claims on an element-by-element and claim-by-claim basis and affirming the Board's anticipation determination

  7. Hyatt v. Dudas

    492 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 22 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Upholding the patent examiner's initial rejection in which the examiner found failure to satisfy the written description requirement because “the written description did not support the particular claimed combination of elements”— i.e., “while each element may be individually described in the specification, the deficiency was the lack of adequate description of their combination ”

  8. Application of Best

    562 F.2d 1252 (C.C.P.A. 1977)   Cited 18 times   4 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 77-509. October 13, 1977. Richard G. Miller, New York City, attorney of record, for appellants, James C. Arvantes, Arlington, Va., of counsel. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents, Gerald H. Bjorge, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, C.J., RICH, BALDWIN and LANE, JJ., and FORD, J., United States Customs Court. MARKEY, Chief Judge. Appeal from the decision of the Patent and Trademark

  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,994 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)