Ex Parte Katz et al

13 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"
  2. Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.

    848 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 746 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Holding that evidence of routine business practice can be used to prove that a reference was accessible
  3. In re Kubin

    561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 134 times   10 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent invalid where an inherent benefit "is not an additional requirement imposed by the claims . . . but rather a property necessarily present" when the other limitations are satisfied
  4. Winner Intern. Royalty Corp. v. Wang

    202 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2000)   Cited 153 times
    Holding that "the admission of live testimony on all matters before the Board in a section 146 action, as in this case, makes a factfinder of the district court and requires a de novo trial"
  5. In re O'Farrell

    853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)   Cited 168 times   9 Legal Analyses
    Finding patent obvious where the prior art provided a "reasonable expectation of success"
  6. Ball Aerosol and Specialty v. Ltd. Brands

    555 F.3d 984 (Fed. Cir. 2009)   Cited 81 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding summary judgment of noninfringement to be appropriate where infringement required a particular product configuration but where there was no evidence that the infringing configuration had ever existed
  7. Syntex (U.S.A.) LLC v. Apotex, Inc.

    407 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005)   Cited 69 times
    Holding district court erred in not considering a reference that post-dates the priority date when it is relevant to what "was known in the art at the relevant time"
  8. In re Fritch

    972 F.2d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 30 times
    Stating "dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious"
  9. Application of Nomiya

    509 F.2d 566 (C.C.P.A. 1975)   Cited 28 times   1 Legal Analyses

    Patent Appeal No. 74-514. February 6, 1975. Paul M. Craig, Jr., Washington, D.C., attorney of record, for appellants. Joseph F. Nakamura, Washington, D.C., for the Commissioner of Patents; R. V. Lupo, Washington, D.C., of counsel. Appeal from the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Before MARKEY, Chief Judge, and RICH, BALDWIN, LANE and MILLER, Judges. RICH, Judge. This appeal is from the decision of the Patent Office Board of Appeals affirming the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 1-8 and 33

  10. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."
  11. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"
  12. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  13. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)