Ex Parte Hirao et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 11, 2017

12955153 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 11, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/955,153 11/29/2010 Ryusuke HIRAO 20101684A 6959
513 7590 09/13/2017
WENDEROTH, LIND & PONACK, L.L.P.
1030 15th Street, N.W.,
Suite 400 East
Washington, DC 20005-1503
EXAMINER
MOMPER, ANNA M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3657
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/13/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ddalecki@wenderoth.com
eoa@ wenderoth. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RYUSUKE HIRAO, TAKASHINEZU,
NOBUYUKIICHIMARU, and TAKAHIDE KOBAYASHI
Appeal 2015-0072421
Application 12/955,1532
Technology Center 3600
Before KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
MATTHEW S. METERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1—3, 5—8, 13—15, and 17—20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Br.,” filed Feb. 3,
2015), and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed May 29, 2015) and Final
Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed July 10, 2014).
2 Appellants identify Hitachi Automotive Systems, Ltd. as the real party in
interest. Br. 2.
Appeal 2015-007242
Application 12/955,153
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention relates to “a suspension control
apparatus for a vehicle, which is mounted on, for example, a vehicle[,] such
as a four-wheel automobile[,] so as to be suitably used to damp the vibration
of a vehicle.” Spec. 11.
Claims 1,13, and 19 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A suspension control apparatus for a vehicle
comprising:
a damping-force adjustable shock absorber interposed
between a vehicle body and a wheel of a vehicle, and
a controller for variably controlling damping-force
characteristics of the damping-force adjustable shock absorber
between hard and soft,
the controller being configured to switch the damping-
force characteristics to a soft side before a direction of a stroke
of the damping-force adjustable shock absorber is reversed
between an extension stroke and a contraction stroke, and to
maintain the damping-force characteristics of the soft side until
after the direction of the stroke is reversed.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 2, 3, 8, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Takahashi (JP 5-169946 A, July 9, 1993) (translated into
English).
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Takahashi and Timoney (US 2007/0039790 Al, pub. Feb. 22, 2007).
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Takahashi and Uchino (US 2005/0178628 Al, pub. Aug. 18, 2005).
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Appeal 2015-007242
Application 12/955,153
Claims 7, 13—15, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Takahashi and Yamawaki ’589 (JP 2009-208589 A, Sept.
17, 2009)3.
ANALYSIS
Anticipation
Independent Claims 1 and 19, and Dependent Claims 2, 3, 8, and 20
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claims 1 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
because Takashi does not disclose “switching] the damping-force
characteristics to a soft side before a direction of a stroke of the damping-
force adjustable shock absorber is reversed between an extension stroke and
a contraction stroke, and to maintain the damping-force characteristics of the
soft side until after the direction of the stroke is reversed,” as recited in claim
1, and similarly recited in claim 19. See Br. 4—7. Instead, we agree with,
and adopt, the Examiner’s findings and claim interpretation set forth in
response to Appellants’ arguments at pages 10—15 of the Answer. We add
the following for emphasis.
Appellants’ arguments hinge on an interpretation of claims 1 and 19
that requires a particular manner of determining when a direction of a stroke
is about to be reversed, namely, determining when a difference between
sprung velocity and unsprung velocity, i.e., relative velocity, is zero. See
Appeal Br. 4—7. Appellants contend that Takahashi describes determining
3 The Examiner relies on Yamawaki (US 8,042,818 B2, iss. Oct. 25, 2011)
(hereinafter, “Yamawaki ’818”) as an English equivalent. We note,
however, that Yamawaki ’818 identifies JP 2008-053172, published March
4, 2008, as its foreign application priority data.
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Appeal 2015-007242
Application 12/955,153
reversal stroke based on sprung velocity alone, and not relative velocity. See
id. at 4—6.
As an initial matter, we agree with the Examiner’s interpretation of
the claim language as not reciting any particular manner for determining
when stroke direction is reversed. See Ans. 11. Instead, claim 1 recites that
the damping-force characteristics are switched “to a soft side before a
direction of a stroke of the damping-force adjustable shock absorber is
reversed between an extension stroke and a contraction stroke.” Claim 19
recites similar language.
Further, we disagree with Appellants’ contention that Takahashi
determines a reversal stroke time “based on sprung velocity alone.” Br. 5.
Instead, at paragraphs 4—6 Takahashi describes that known shock absorbers
control damping forces having sprung and unsprung components mixed;
whereas and Takahashi accurately detects sprung and unsprung states when
setting a damping coefficient. See also Takahashi, passim (describing
consideration of a direction and magnitude of acceleration signal Gi,
direction of sprung velocity, and direction of stroke in setting damping
coefficient).
The Examiner finds that Takahashi at paragraph 7 teaches setting
different damping coefficients for different stroke directions. Ans. 11. The
Examiner also finds that Takahashi takes both sprung and unsprung velocity
into account when determining whether to change a damping coefficient
based on a reversal of stroke account. See id. at 11—15. For example, the
Examiner finds that Takahashi describes setting a damping-force coefficient
to be low when a stroke is approaching its end, and reversal is imminent.
See Ans. 13; see also id. at 15 (describing an embodiment in which
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Appeal 2015-007242
Application 12/955,153
“Takahashi et al. determines the reversal of stroke between an extension and
a compression stroke in steps 103, 104[,] and changes the damping
coefficient to a low damping coefficient [Qor a [‘]soft characteristic[’)] in
step 107[,] and maintains that [low damping coefficient] until after the
direction of stroke is reversed in step 108”). Appellants fail to apprise us of
error in the Examiner’s finding that Takahashi meets the limitation for
switching the damping-force characteristics to a soft side before a direction
of a stroke of the damping-force adjustable shock absorber is reversed, as
recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claim 19.
Appellants provide graphs allegedly depicting “the relationship
between sprung velocity, unsprung velocity, and relative velocity in a typical
vehicle.” Br. 5 (Figs, la—2b). However, claims 1 and 19 do not require a
particular implementation for calculating a timing of stroke reversal.
Moreover, even if a determination regarding the relative velocity were
required by the claims, Appellants fail to provide the Board with any
information to appropriately assess these graphs, such as the source for the
graphs and the underlying data, and how the graphs relate to the Takahashi
reference. See id. at 5—6.
Appellants argue that Figure 14(a) of Takahashi depicts acceleration
Gi measured at the wheel (i.e., an unsprung side), and Figure 14(b) of
Takahashi depicts velocity Vo measured at the vehicle body (i.e., the sprung
side). Id. at 6—7 (citing Takahashi Figs. 14(a)—14(c), ^fl[ 43—51). Appellants
conclude that “[consequently, the period when the sprung velocity = 0 does
not necessarily indicate the reversal of the stroke (relative velocity = 0).
Id. at 7.
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Appeal 2015-007242
Application 12/955,153
Appellants’ argument is not persuasive at least because the claim does
not require any particular method for determining when a reversal of a
stroke occurs. Moreover, we disagree with Appellants’ contention that
Takahashi teaches measuring acceleration Gi at the wheel. To the contrary,
Takahashi describes that a “sprung acceleration sensor 3 is installed on the
sprung vehicle body.” Takahashi 119 (emphasis added). Sprung
acceleration sensor 3 outputs “sprung acceleration Go” to a high-pass filter 4,
and high-pass filter 4 outputs the high-frequency components of acceleration
Go as acceleration signal Gi. Id. Tflf 19-20. Acceleration signal Gi
represents an “unsprung resonance frequency component,” and is input to a
control unit 5. Id. 120.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent
claims 1 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 1 and 19, and dependent claims 2, 3, 8, and
20.
Obviousness
Dependent Claims 5—7
Claims 5—7 each depends from independent claim 1. Appellants do
not present any argument in support of the patentability of these dependent
claims except to assert that none of the additional references relied on in
rejecting these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) cures the alleged
deficiencies of Takahashi. Br. 8. We are not persuaded for the reasons set
forth above that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of dependent
claims 5—7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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Appeal 2015-007242
Application 12/955,153
Independent Claim 13, and Dependent Claims 14, 15, and 18
Independent claim 13 recites language substantially similar to claim 1.
Appellants assert that claim 13 is patentable for reasons similar to those set
forth with respect to claims 1 and 19. Br. 8. And Appellants assert that
Yamawaki does not cure the deficiencies of Takahashi. Id. We are not
persuaded for the reasons set forth above that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claims 1 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Therefore, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 13 and dependent claims 14, 15,
and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claim 17
Claim 17 depends from independent claim 13. Appellants do not
present any argument in support of the patentability of dependent claim 17
except to assert that Yamawaki and Timoney do not cure the deficiencies of
Takahashi. Br. 9. We are not persuaded for the reasons set forth above that
the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 17 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 3, 8, 19, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is reversed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 5—7, 13—15, 17, and 18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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