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Ex Parte Hasse et al

11617938 (B.P.A.I. May. 1, 2012)
Ex Parte Hasse et al

12 Cited authorities

  1. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

    550 U.S. 398 (2007)   Cited 1,547 times   185 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, in an obviousness analysis, "[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it"

  2. Graham v. John Deere Co.

    383 U.S. 1 (1966)   Cited 3,179 times   68 Legal Analyses
    Holding commercial success is a "secondary consideration" suggesting nonobviousness

  3. Catalina Market. Intern. v. Coolsavings.com

    289 F.3d 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002)   Cited 657 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "the claims, specification, and prosecution history of the041 patent demonstrate that the preamble phrase `located at predesignated sites such as consumer stores' is not a limitation of Claim 1," for "the applicant did not rely on this phrase to define its invention nor is the phrase essential to understand limitations or terms in the claim body"

  4. In re Schreiber

    128 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997)   Cited 150 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that once the Examiner established a prima facie case of anticipation, the burden of proof was properly shifted to the inventor to rebut the finding of inherency

  5. Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. Cleveland Golf Co.

    242 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)   Cited 66 times
    Finding that preamble term limited claim because the term was used in the specification as well as in all of the claims

  6. In re Rijckaert

    9 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993)   Cited 22 times   4 Legal Analyses

    No. 93-1206. November 23, 1993. Edward W. Goodman, North American Philips Corp., of Tarrytown, NY, argued for appellant. With him on the brief was Algy Tamoshunas. Lee E. Barrett, Associate Sol., Office of the Sol., Arlington, VA, argued for appellee. With him on the brief was Fred E. McKelvey, Sol. Appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office. Before MAYER and LOURIE, Circuit Judges, and LAY, Senior Circuit Judge. Honorable Donald P. Lay, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the

  7. In re Gulack

    703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983)   Cited 31 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that even though the claim included printed matter, the printed matter was still entitled to patentable weight because there was a functional relationship between the printed matter and its underlying substrate

  8. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,130 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  9. Section 102 - Conditions for patentability; novelty

    35 U.S.C. § 102   Cited 5,997 times   1001 Legal Analyses
    Prohibiting the grant of a patent to one who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented"

  10. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  11. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  12. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)