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Ex Parte Firooznia et al

13469177 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 31, 2017)
Ex Parte Firooznia et al

10 Cited authorities

  1. Pfizer v. Apotex

    480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007)   Cited 380 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding the district court clearly erred when it failed to consider relevant prior art

  2. Johnston v. Ivac Corp.

    885 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Cited 266 times
    Holding that Section 112 "operates to cut back on the types of means which could literally satisfy the claim language" and thereby "restricts the scope of the literal claim language" by requiring the structures to appear in the specification

  3. In re Dillon

    919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990)   Cited 69 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Finding a prima facie case of obviousness where the prior art tri-orthoester compound was found to be equivalent to the claimed tetra-orthoester compound and the use of the tri-orthoester as a fuel additive was expected to produce essentially the same result as the use of the tetra-orthoester

  4. Application of Henze

    181 F.2d 196 (C.C.P.A. 1950)   Cited 26 times

    Patent Appeal No. 5659. Argued January 13, 1950. Decided April 3, 1950. Whittemore, Hulbert Belknap, Washington, D.C. (L. Gaylord Hulbert, Detroit, Mich., and George A. Degnan, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for appellant. E.L. Reynolds, Washington, D.C. (J. Schimmel, Washington, D.C., of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents. Before GARRETT, Chief Judge, and JACKSON, O'CONNELL and JOHNSON, Judges. JOHNSON, Judge. On May 15, 1944, the appellant filed an application in the United States Patent Office

  5. In re Hass

    141 F.2d 122 (C.C.P.A. 1944)   Cited 26 times

    Patent Appeal No. 4819. February 7, 1944. Appeal from the Board of Patent Appeals, Serial No. 333,443. Proceeding in the matter of the application of Henry B. Hass and another for a patent. From a decision affirming a decision of the Primary Examiner rejecting all of the claims of the application, the applicants appeal. Affirmed. See, also, 141 F.2d 127; 141 F.2d 130. Henry C. Parker, of Washington, D.C. (John Boyle, Jr., of Washington, D.C., of counsel), for appellants. W.W. Cochran, of Washington

  6. Section 103 - Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter

    35 U.S.C. § 103   Cited 6,129 times   479 Legal Analyses
    Holding the party seeking invalidity must prove "the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains."

  7. Section 6 - Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 6   Cited 186 times   63 Legal Analyses
    Giving the Director authority to designate "at least 3 members of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board" to review "[e]ach appeal, derivation proceeding, post-grant review, and inter partes review"

  8. Section 134 - Appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board

    35 U.S.C. § 134   Cited 98 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) PATENT APPLICANT.-An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. (b) PATENT OWNER.-A patent owner in a reexamination may appeal from the final rejection of any claim by the primary examiner to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, having once paid the fee for such appeal. 35 U.S.C. § 134 July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 801; Pub. L. 98-622

  9. Section 41.37 - Appeal brief

    37 C.F.R. § 41.37   Cited 32 times   25 Legal Analyses
    Requiring identification of support in specification and, for means-plus-function limitations, corresponding structure as well

  10. Section 1.136 - Extensions of time

    37 C.F.R. § 1.136   Cited 17 times   30 Legal Analyses

    (a) (1) If an applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in § 1.17(a) are filed, unless: (i) Applicant is notified otherwise in an Office action; (ii) The reply is a reply brief submitted pursuant to § 41.41 of this title; (iii)