12978926 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 22, 2018)

Ex Parte Dinh-Trong et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 22, 2018

12978926 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 22, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/978,926 12/27/2010 48500 7590 03/26/2018 SHERIDAN ROSS P.C. 1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200 DENVER, CO 80202 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Trung Dinh-Trong UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 4366-893-E 2098 EXAMINER HEFFINGTON, JOHN M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2172 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/26/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): cjacquet@sheridanross.com pair_Avaya@firsttofile.com edocket@sheridanross.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Exparte TRUNG DINH-TRONG, BIRGIT GEPPERT, and FRANK ROESSLER Appeal2017-007572 1 Application 12/978,926 Technology Center 2100 Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1-20. See App. Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b). We REVERSE. 1 Avaya Inc. is identified as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal2017-007572 Application 12/978,926 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction The Application is directed to "suggesting or inserting an automated assistant in a graphical representation of a communication session based on similarity to a previous use context of the automated assistant." Spec. i-f 2. Claims 1, 10, and 16 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below for reference (emphasis added and referred to herein as the "comparing limitation"): 1. A method comprising: generating, via a processor, a first vector describing a current communication session, the first vector comprising at least one of a first time, a first communication session participant, a first communication mode, a first telephone number, a first device, or a first location; comparing the first vector with a second vector describing a past communication session associated with an automated assistant, to yield a comparison measurement that reflects how similar the current communication session is to the past communication session, wherein the second vector comprises at least one of a second time, a second communication session participant, a second communication mode, a second telephone number, a second device, or a second location; and when the comparison measurement meets a similarity threshold condition, suggesting the automated assistant to a user in the current communication session. The Examiner's Rejection Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Anderson (US 2003/0053615 Al; Mar. 20, 2003) and Tsukamoto (US 2006/0294099 Al; Dec. 28, 2006). Final Act. 3. 2 Appeal2017-007572 Application 12/978,926 ANALYSIS The Examiner finds Anderson teaches the comparing limitation of claim 1, because "[t]hroughout Anderson, the 'May-I-Help-You' (MIHU) system is described as offering live assistance .... wherein, making sales, i.e. customer purchases, or price negotiations are characteristics of the past and present sessions" (Ans. 4), and "[i]t is clear that the MIHU system of Anderson compares past session behaviors and current session behaviors to decide whether or not to offer help" (Ans. 6). See Anderson Fig. 4, i-fi-1 48, 59. Appellants argue the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 is in error because "[t]he Office Action appears to correlate the 'MIHU option' ... with the claimed automated assistant" (App. Br. 8), but "Anderson only teaches that a live customer service representative may be offered to assist a customer currently interacting with a web storefront" (Reply Br. 3). Appellants contend Anderson's teaching "[t]hat a customer has a contact history, or made a purchase in the last 30 days, has no bearing on whether the customer engaged in a past communication session" as claimed. Reply Br. 3. We are persuaded the Examiner erred. The Examiner finds Anderson teaches the determination to invoke the MIHU system is based on "current session attributes such as 'IF SHOPPING CART NOT EMPTY' and past session attributes such as 'IF BOUGHT SOMETHING IN THE PAST 30 DAYS."' Ans. 7 (citing Anderson Fig. 4). Claim 1, however, requires the past communication session is "associated with an automated assistant." We agree with Appellants that Anderson does not teach an automated assistant 3 Appeal2017-007572 Application 12/978,926 (e.g., Anderson's MIHU option) was invoked in any of the purchases of the past 30 days. See App. Br. 7-8. Thus, we find Anderson does not teach or suggest the comparing limitation of claim 1. The Examiner does not rely on Tsukamoto for this limitation. See Final Act. 7. As such, we are persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the cited references teach or suggest the limitations of claim 1, and the limitations similarly recited by independent claims 10 and 16. We do not sustain the Examiner's obviousness rejection of these claims, or the claims dependent thereon. DECISION The Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1-20 is reversed. REVERSED 4