Dayton Malleable, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 17, 1985

275 N.L.R.B. 707 (N.L.R.B. 1985)

DAYTON MALLEABLE, INC.
GHR Foundry Division of Dayton Malleable, Inc.
and United Electrical , Radio &. Machine Work-
ers of America, Local Union No. 765, UE. Case
9-CA-19029-1,-2
17 June 1985
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS -
HUNTER AND DENNIS
On 5 February 1985 Administrative Law Judge
Norman Zankel issued the attached supplemental
decision .' The Respondent filed exceptions and a
supporting brief.
The Board has considered the supplemental deci-
sion and the record in light of the exceptions and
brief and has decided to affirm the judge 's rulings,
findings , and conclusions only to the extent consist-
ent with this Decision and Order.2 -
Contrary to the judge, we find that the Respond-
ent did not violate the Act by refusing to bargain
with the Union regarding the effects of its 21 Janu-
ary 1983 plant shutdown.3 T
The evidence establishes that for several years
prior to the shutdown -of its Dayton, Ohio facility,,
on 21 January 1983 the Respondent experienced se-
rious financial difficulties. In October 1981 the Re-
spondent notified the Union that only a major cap-
ital investment and modifications in the parties' colt
lective-bargaining agreement could "save the GHR
facility."4 Thereafter , -the Respondent and the
Union met on numerous occasions to discuss the
Respondent 's proposals.
By letter of 1 October 1982 the Respondent ad-
vised the Union that the Respondent 's existence
was "in jeopardy" because of operating losses.
Thereafter, at a bargaining session on 25 October
1982, the Respondent advised the Union that a
shutdown was "imminent ." By letter of 29 Novem-
ber 1982 the Respondent advised the Union that on
approximately 14 January 1983 the Respondent's
facility would shut down and that the resulting
The judge's original decision issued on 9 January 1984 On 30 August
1984 the Board remanded this proceeding to the judge for issuance of a
supplemental decision -
2 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied
as the record, exceptions, and brief adequately present the issues and the
positions of the parties
No exceptions were filed to the judge's conclusions that the Re-
spondent did not violate the Act by refusing to ;bargain over the decision
allegedly to relocate unit work and by laying off employees following the
shutdown In the absence of exceptions to these conclusions, we find it
unnecessary to determine whether the Respondent effectuated only an in-
definite plant shutdown, as contended by the Respondent, rather than a
relocation and transfer of unit work Further, in the absence of excep-
tions to these conclusions, we also find it unnecessary to consider the
judge's discussion regarding the scope of Milwaukee Spring Division, 268
NLRB 601 (1984), and Otis Elevator Co, 269 NLRB 891 (1984)
The Respondent and the Union were parties to a collective-bargain-
ing agreement effective,1 June 1980 to 4 June 1983
707
layoff of employees would, be for an indefmite
period . In this letter - the Respondent indicated that -
no decision had been made whether the shutdown,
would become permanent and invited the Union to
discuss , the matter further if it - so desired. On 16
December 1982 the Respondent and the Union met
again . On this occasion the Union demanded con-
tinued recognition of the Union and asked that the
Respondent continue its insurance program. There
is no evidence that the Union asked the Respond-
ent to bargain over any specific matter regarding
the effects of the shutdown other than its demand
for continued recognition and continued applica-
tion of the insurance program . It is undisputed that
subsequent to the Union 's demand the Respondent
continued in effect all contractual provisions re-
garding pensions, layoffs, and other matters perti-
nent to the shutdown.. . , -
On 21 January 1983 the Respondent shut down
its facility and shortly thereafter laid off all em-
ployees . In April 1983 the Respondent and the
Union commenced negotiations for a collective-
bargaining agreement to succeed the expiring 1980-
1983 agreement.
Based on the foregoing we find that the Re-
spondent gave the Union ample and sufficient
notice of the impending shutdown and fulfilled its
obligation to bargain with the Union concerning.
the effects of its decision . Thus, the evidence estab-
lishes that over a period of many months preceding
the shutdown the Respondent was open and frank
with the Union regarding the likelihood of a shut-
down : Indeed, in October 1982 the Respondent ad-
vised the Union that a shutdown was-"imminent"
and in November 1982 expressly notified the Union
that a shutdown would occur the following Janu-
ary. Thereafter, the Union made no specific pro-
posals concerning - the effects of the shutdown on
the employees and requested only that the Re-
spondent honor its contractual commitments re-
garding recognition and insurance. The -Respondent
honored , these requests. -
In short , the Respondent (1) notified the Union
of the shutdown well in advance of its implementa-
tion , (2) gave the Union an opportunity to bargain
over the-effects of the shutdown, and (3) adequate-
ly ,responded to the limited demands made by the
Union during bargaining.' Although the judge
found that "little , if any , evidence demonstrates
[the parties],bargained over the effects of the termi-
nation ," it is not the Respondent's fault that the
Union made few specific proposals concerning the
effects of the shutdown and that little actual-bar-
gaining occurred . regarding effects . See, e .g., Penta-
lic Corp .; 194 NLRB 500 (1971). On the contrary,
the record establishes that the Respondent duly ap-
275 NLRB No. 99
708 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
prised the Union of the direction of its ' overall.op-
eration - that culminated in the shutdown of January
1983 • arid that the' Respondent satisfied its bargain-
ing obligation to -the Union during the -"critical
period as the shutdown approached . Accordingly,
we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
ORDER •
The complaint is dismissed. '
SUPPLEMENTAL- DECISION
NORMAN -ZANKEL,' Administrative Law Judge. On
January 9 , 1984, I issued an original decision in "this case.
Exceptions were - filed by the General Counsel , the Em-
ployer (Respondent), • - and the Union (the Charging
Party). i - . - - .
On August 30, 1984 , the -Board remanded -the proceed-.
ing to me to issue a. supplemental ' decision on the issues
in light of-the Board 's decisions in Milwaukee Spring, 268
NLRB . 601 (1984); herein Milwaukee II, and Otis Elevator
Co., 269 NLRB . 89,1 (1984), herein Otis IL - , . •
The remand order did not mandate that the hearing be
reopened .2 By letter dated September - 18, 1984,- the Em-
ployer 's attorney wrote me , in salient part , that the -Em-
ployer "suggest[s] that the hearing .. , .. be ,reopened"-- to
receive evidence ' of collective-bargaining negotiations
during and since the hearing before -me, evidence-of the
post-hearing use and operation of the facility from which
bargaining unit work was allegedly unlawfully removed
(GHR), and the facility to .which the work was -.trans-
ferred (Newnam), and evidence regarding disposition of
a' different unfair labor - practice charge ,. Case 9-CA-
20393-1,
I viewed the letter- from, the Employer 's attorney as a
motion , to reopen , the, record : Thus, I ordered all -parties
to, show cause , ; in -writing ,. why '-or , why, not ,- I, should
reopen , the record ., The General Counsel and, the Em-
ployer filed timely responses, due October 4 2,.,1984., The
General Counsel opposed the motion , while the Employ-
er supported'it.3
"I have considered - all the positions , -arguments, and
contentions contained ' in the parties ' documents , _in the
light of the Board 's directive in its remand - order ; and the
record , earlier developed . Based thereon I conclude - the
record , in its present state , contains all evidence germane
to the issues of the - complaint to enable -I me. to :. fully
i Since my decision issued; the name of . Dayton -Malleable ," Inc - was
changed to Amcast Industrial Corporation , , - ;",A, f,
2 Indeed, former Membei• . Zimmerman dissented , from the remand
order because " there is no claim that tie`record is deficient or that the
parties' positions are unknown :" (See remand 'order, August •30,` 1984,,un-
published in Board volumes ) '.i' . "
The above -described documents are received iri,evidence as ALJ ex-
hibits, as follows
ALJ Exh I The Board 's remand ordei, August 30, 1984
ALJ Exh 2 The Employer's motion to reopen record, September 18,
1984
ALJ Exh 3 The Show cause order , September 25, 1984 -
ALJ Exh 4 The,Employer 's show cause response , October , 10, 1984
ALJ Eali 5 The -General Counsel 's show cause response , October' 10,
1984 ' - I ' • . . -
comply with the remand order Accordingly _ the motion
to reopen the record , is denied
On the entire record , considered in the light of Mil-
waukee II and Otis III I find as follows -
1. JURISDICTION
- The Employer and Union are subject to the Act's ju-
risdiction, as more explicitly appears in my original deci-
sion. -
II. THE FACTS
I reaffirm and adopt all the factual findings and-con-
clusions which appear in sections II-A and B in my
original decision Those sections are incorporated herein
by reference, as if fully reported in this supplemental de-
cision. -
III. THE ALLEGED VIOLATIONS ,
The Employer is alleged to have violated the Act by
(1) unilaterally effecting a midterm modification of its
collective-bargaining agreement with the Union by de-
ciding to relocate bargaining unit work from- GHR to
Newnam and causing attendant layoffs of unit employees
without first affording the Union an opportunity to bar-
gain.over that decision, in violation of Section 8(a)(5),
(3), and (1) and independently,- in violation of Section
.8(d) of the-Act; and (2) failing and refusing to bargain
collectively with the Union over. the effects of the Janu-
ary 21, 1983 shutdown at GHR, in violation of Section
8(a)(5)-and-(1) of the Act.4 •
A Decision to Relocate
In my original decision, I found: -
(1) That the Employer's decision to shut down and re-
locate GHR operations was motivated by a desire to ex-
tricate itself from the economic terms of its current col-
lective-bargaining agreement.5 • - 4
(2) That 'the Employer and the Union had engaged in
extensive bargaining over the decision to shut down and
relocate the work. ' •
(3) • That the Employer nonetheless violated . Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (5) and Section 8(d) under the Los Ange-
les Marine principles. - '
`4 The complaint was, predicated largely on the legal theories enunci-
ated by the Board: in Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co, 235 NLRB 720
(1978), enfd 602 F 2d 1302 (9th Cir 1979), and Milwaukee Spring I, 265
NLRB 206 (1982) The analysis in my original decision-was based on
those cases as seminal 'authority -
However' in Milwaukee II, the Board overruled the principles con-
tained in Milwaukee J,) concluded that the Board's Los Angeles Marine de-
cision misapplied then . current Board law; and overruled that portion of
Los Angeles Marine that held respondent's transfer of work from one lo-
cation to another violated Secs 8(a)(5) and 8 (d) • - •
•
Otis=l7 likewise overruled the principle in Otis 1, 255 NLRB235, (1981),
which held a iespondeiit-violated Secs 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act by
discontinuing part of its operations at one facility and consolidating them
with work at a different facility
'The impact of Milwaukee II and Otis II will be considered, infra, in my
analysis section • '
5 In sec II,CI in'iny original decision , I enumerated the various fac-
tors which led to this conclusion
DAYTON MALLEABLE, INC - - • 709
B. Independent Violation of Section 8(d)
In my original decision, I' found that the "facts bf• this'
particular case 'support the proposition that the reloca-
tion decision was not amenable to effective collective-
bargaining because it represented a significant change in
the Employer's operations and lies at `the very core of
entrepreneurial control."' Therefore, I found no merit to
the claim that the Employer violated Section 8(d).6
C. Effects Bargaining
In my original decision , I found that the Employer
failed to bargain with the Union over the effects of the
decision to relocate , in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and
(1)oftheAct - -
I reaffirm , adopt , and incorporate herein , all my dis-
cussion , findings , and conclusions contained in section
II,C,2 of my original decision , only to the extent they are
consistent with , explanatory , and supportive of my addi-
tional analysis of this same issue , infra, in this supplemen-
tal decision. -
•IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Decision to Relocate - -
Factually, the instant case resembles Milwaukee 'II. In
Milwaukee 'II, the parties stipulated the relocation deci-
sion was economically motivated. Herein, I concluded
the overwhelming evidence shows that the Employer's
decision was motivated by identical economic consider-
ations, and I have so found. Also, in Milwaukee II, the
parties stipulated the Employer had satisfied its obliga-
tion to bargain over the -relocation decision. I have
found, herein, that the Union had not-requested such de-
cision bargaining and, in any, event, the length, scope,
and contents of the "concession" bargaining in which the
parties herein engaged -effectively satisfied the Employ-
er's duty to bargain over the decision (see original deci-
sion).
This factual posture triggers the Board's interpretation
of Section 8(d),7 as explicated in. Milwaukee II. There,
the Board provided a more limited meaning to Section
8(d) than had been applied in Milwaukee I, in terms of
employer constraints upon changes in employment con-
ditions, during the life of 'a collective-bargaining agree-
ment. •
Thus, under Milwaukee II, in situations where the col-
lective-bargaining agreement contains no express prohibi-
tion against an employer's contemplated changes in em-
ployment conditions, "the employer's obligation remains
6 I now disavow the basis of my earlier findings, as it is inconsistent
with the findings, that the decision to relocate was substantially based on,
and motivated by, a desire to reduce labor costs Thus, it is my intention
.to revoke the entirety of sec II-C (3) of my original decision and, to
substitute, the discussion and analysis regarding Sec 8(d) contained, infra,
in this supplemental decision -
? Sec 8(d) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that .."to,bargain • col-
lectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times, and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms-and
conditions of employment Provided, That where there is in effect a
collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affect-
ing commerce, the, duty to bargain, collectively shall also - mean that, no
party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract " .
the general one of bargaining in good faith-to impasse
over the subject before instituting -the proposed change.
Milwaukee II, 268 NLRB at 602. Clearly, if an, employer
satisfies that obligation, it is free, to implement its deci-
i-sion unrestrained'by Section 8(d).
-In Milwaukee II, the Board found it unnecessary to ad-
dress the question of whether the work relocation com-
prised ' a, mandatory bargaining subject, because, inter
alia, of the parties' stipulation that the respondent had
satisfied its obligation to bargain over the decision.
Based alone on my findings that the instant Employer
satisfied its bargaining -obligations, Milwaukee II dictates
that the` Employer did not refuse to bargain in violation
of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and, Section 8(d) of the Act.
Assuming, -arguendo, the aforementioned finding ulti-
mately is not, sustained, other principles. derived from
Milwaukee II and Otis II also militate against. a finding of
violation. The Board's Milwaukee II discussion of the
application of Section • 8(d) makes its clear' that if there is
no contractual provision' identified which requires bar-
gaining unit'work to remain'at a particular. location, then
the Union's consent,^ normally 'required by Section 8(d)
to a midterm modification, is not a prerequisite to exon-
eration of an employer that effectuates changes in em-
ployment conditions See Milwaukee' II, fn 16, 268
NLRB at' 605.
The 'parties' relevant 'collective-bargaining agreement
is'in evidence. (G.C.' Exh. 3)._ I have'searched, but in
vain, for a provision' requiring bargaining-unit work to
remain 'at GHR: None of the'parties has cited or referred
me to • such' a prrovision. - Although the instant agreement
does include recognition;` and specific wage 'and benefits
provisions, I find -- their ' contents - virtually identical to
similar clauses which the- Board;.in Milwaukee II, con-
cluded do "not state that the functions that the unit per-
forms must remain" at GHR. There;'-the Board expressly
declined to' imply the -existence of a' work-preservation
clause (Milwaukee •II,• 268 NLRB at 602). A fortiori, the
Board' treated the' decision` as a Inonmandatory subject
beyond the reach' of-Section 8(d)..
.'Viewed in this light; I conclude that the Employer did
not modify the GHR-Union collective-bargaining agree-
ment and consequently -did not violate 'Section -8(d) of
the Act when it-decided to relocate the work in question
to'Newnam '. . . - - •
Otis-II bears on my conclusion that the Employer sat-
isfied- his bargaining, obligation regarding the relocation
decision because, -in Otis 'II, the 'respondent conceded it
did not bargain to a good-faith 'impasse over its reloca-
tion -decision.:The Board, in Otis ,II directly treated the
subject of whether economically motivated decisions to
relocate -'(and' other' types''of management decisions) 'con-
stitute; mandatory- bargaining; subjects.' The Board noted
the-Supreme Court's decision in First. National Mainte-
nance. Corp. 'V.' -NLRB, 452"U.S"666=(1981),-had -excluded
management decisions such as plant relocations from, its
ruling (see fn;"22, First . National)
„
In Otis II, the Board declared that management deci-
sions "which affect the scope, direction, or nature of the
business"' are excluded from Section 8(d)-see Otis : .11,
269 NLRB at 893. `The Board then specifically enumerr
710 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ated types of decisions encompassed within the quoted
phrase-see Otis II, footnote 5. Included are-decisions
"to restructure or consolidate operations ... and -all
other decisions akin to the foregoing." " -
Herein, I conclude the facts reasonably support the
conclusion, which I make, that the Employer's decision
to relocate constituted a restructuring of its operations
or, at least, a decision "akin" to such an activity: This
conclusion is based on the following factors. First, the
acquisition of Newnam cost the Employer approximately
$4.2 million. Clearly, this purchase price required the
Employer's investment of a significant and sizeable
amount of capital (see Member Dennis' concurring opin-
ion, Otis II, 269 NLRB at 895). Next, in my original-de-
cision, I noted that Brunskill's November 29 letter to the
Union advised that the Employer would redistribute
tooling and ' equipment to other of its facilities, and
would also involve realignment-of its operations. I con-
cede there 'is no evidence to show the precise extent of
such redistribution of work or realignment . However, it
is equally clear that the record contains no challenge to
the accuracy of Brunskill's statement. In this posture; I
accept that statement as some evidence that the Employ-
er's decision to relocate also involved more extensive re=
structuring of operations than the mere transfer of work
to Newnam. _
Inasmuch as the totality of the record shows the es-
sence of the instant Employer's relocation decision falls
within the purview of decisions which Otis II excludes
from the reach of Section 8(d), the shutdown and reloca---
tion of work herein are not violative of Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.8
On all the foregoing,-I find that the Employei_,did•not
refuse to bargain, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
and 8(d) of the Act, over its decision to relocate -work to
Newnam.
B. The Shutdown and Layoffs
In 'my original decision ; - I found that the January 21,
1983 shutdown and layoff of employees comprised a vio-
lation of the Act. Milwaukee I and Los Angeles Marine
were the bases of this finding. As noted in footnote 4,
supra , both of these cases have been overruled in materi-
al respects by Milwaukee IL. . -
My. review of the two cases on which I previously
relied shows that the rationale for the 8(a)(3) violations
which resulted from the treatment accorded the unit em-
ployees affected by therelocation decisionsfwas predicat-
ed on a conclusion , expressed or implied , that the unlaw-
ful conduct was "inherently destructive" of employees'
statutory rights.
However , in Milwaukee II, involving a situation which
I have found parallels the instant case , the Board explic-
itly concluded that "there is no factual or legal basis for
finding that the consequent layoff of employees violated
Section 8(a)(3)" once it has been decided that no 8(a)(5)
8 I recognize my Otis II analysis ostensibly contradicts my findings
that the Employer satisfied its bargaining obligations , and that the reloca-
tion decision was motivated by a desire to reduce labor costs. Thus, I
emphasize that my Otis II analysis is set forth only as an alternative anal-
ysis,•in the event those two conclusions are, for some reason; not ulti-
mately sustained
violation resulted from the employer's actions regarding
the relocation decision-see Milwaukee, II, 268 NLRB, at
604. Applying that reasoning to the case at bar, I reverse
my previous finding that the employee layoff herein was
in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.9
C. Effects Bargaining
In section III-C, supra. I reaffirmed and incorporated
the contents of my original decision regarding the Gen-
eral Counsel's contention that the Employer unlawfully
failed to bargain over the effects of the January 21, 1983
shutdown. Some-additional discussion is necessary.
In Milwaukee II, the parties stipulated that the employ-
er was willing to engage in effects bargaining -with the
union . The Board was not faced-with an effects bargain-
ing issue . In Otis II, the complaint expressly alleged that
the respondent failed and refused to bargain over the ef-
fects of the decision to consolidate operations. The
Board, in Otis I, found merit to these "effects " allega-
tions, relying on its Otis I findings that the respondent
had refused to bargain over the consolidation decision.
In view of its reversal of violation findings, over'the deci-
sion to consolidate, in Otis II, the Board remanded the
issue of effects bargaining to its administrative law judge
for further consideration. - '
Cases decided by the Board after Otis II clearly, reflect
that decision has not altered an employer's obligation to
bargain over the effects of its decisions to relocate or
consolidate operations. In Columbia City Freight Lines,
271 NLRB 12 (1984), the Board affirmed its administra-
tive law, jjudge's. finding -that, though no refusal-to-bar-
gain violation occurred when the respondent decided to
consolidate operations, it nonetheless was obligated 'to
bargain over the effects of that decision. In Fraser Ship-
yards, 272 NLRB 496 (1984), the Board affirmed its 'ad-
ministrative law judge' s dismissal of both the allegation
that it unlawfully decided to close its machine shop and
also failed to bargain over the decision's effects. In af-
firming the dismissal, of these allegations, the Board rec-
ognized the existence of a duty to engage -in effects bar-
gaining , but-explicitly found that the respondent offered
the union an opportunity to pursue effects bargaining.
In my original decision herein, I found that the Union,
on October 25 and again on December 16, 1982, request-
ed the Employer to engage in bargaining over the effects
of its decision to relocate work to Newnam. I also found
that the Employer failed to comply. No party :has come
forward with an assertion that anything occurred after
the hearing closed which bears on this-particular issue.1°
s In so holding , I have also considered that it was neither alleged, nor
proved , that (1) the Employer engaged in any , conduct independently
violative of Section 8(a)(1),-and (2) the record contains no other evidence
of employer hostility to the Union - -
. 10 In making this observation , I am mindful of the Employer's asser-
tion contained in its show cause response (ALJ Exh 4) that "subsequent
conduct of the Charging Party proves that effects bargaining was not
sought until at the instance of your Honor was such a demand made, and
that in fact the parties negotiated for a new collective -bargaining agree-
ment covering all proposals made by both sides to the negotiations which
efforts resulted in an impasse "
First, however the Union's request for effects bargaining was designed
does not, in my view , alter the evidence which shows the Employer did
Continued
DAYTON MALLEABLE, INC. 711
Accordingly, based on the reaffirmation of my original
findings and conclusions, I again find that the Employ-
er's failure to afford the,Union an opportunity to bargain
over the effects of its relocation decision constitutes a re-
fusal to bargain, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act. -
;REVISED AND AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAWi'
1: GHR Foundry` Division of Dayton Malleable, Inc.
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
'2: United Electrical, Radio &,Machine Workers of
America, Local'Union No. 765, UE is a labor-organiza-
tion-within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. .
3. All production and maintenance employees, includ-
ing maintenance stockroom • and shop clerical employees
at GHR's facility located at 400 Detrick St., Dayton,
Ohio; but excluding all office clerical employees, co-op
students, student engineers, technical ^ employees, profes-
sional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act constitute a unit appropriate for collective bar-
gaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of.the Act.
4. The Employer has not violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) or Section 8(d) of the Act by failing and refusing to
bargain with the Union over,its decision-to relocate bar-
gaining unit work to Newnam.
not comply with such requests before the hearing closed Second, wheth-
er or not effects bargaining was pursued in connection with efforts to ne-
gotiate a new collective-bargaining agreement is a matter for the compli-
ance stage of these proceedings under the framework of my Order, infra,
patterned after ' the Board 's order in Columbia City Freight Lines, supra-
Neither of these arguments affects either • my denial of the motion to
reopen the record or my findings regarding effects bargaining
i i These Conclusions of Law are, intended to supplant those which aie
contained in my ongmal ' decision - -' -
5. The Employer has not violated the Act in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) by laying-off its GHR employ-
ees on and after January 21, 1983. -
6. The Employer has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act by failing and refusing to bargain with the
Union over the effects of its-decision to relocate its work
to Newnam.
7. The above unfair labor practice affects commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Employer engaged in a certain
unfair labor practice, I find it necessary to order it to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. -
More specifically, the Employer's failure to engage in
effects bargaining shall be remedied by an order identical
to that provided by the Board to remedy the same viola-
tion in Columbia City Freight Lines, supra, 271 NLRB at
13. Also, the Employer shall be ordered to disseminate
the results of this litigation to all affected employees by
mailing copies of. a - "Notice to Employees" to them.
Maxwell's Plum,,256 NLRB 211 (1981); Whitehall Pack-
ing Co., 257 NLRB 193 (1981).
I, find no probative evidence that the Employer's con-
duct was egregious or that the Employer has a proclivity
to violate the Act. Accordingly; I conclude a broad pro-
scriptive order is unnecessary (Hickmott Foods), 242
NLRB 1357'(1979). Thus, the Employer shall be ordered
to cease and desist from, in any like or related manner,
interfering with, restraining , or coercing employees in
the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
[Recommended Order omitted-from:publication.]-