Copeland Oil Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 25, 1966

157 N.L.R.B. 126 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
lectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con-
certed activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities.
WE WILL offer to each of the employees named below immediate and full
reinstatement or reemployment, as the case may be, to her former or substantially
equivalent position without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privi-
leges previously enjoyed, and make each whole for any loss of pay suffered as
a result of the discrimination against her, with interest thereon at the rate of
6 percent per annum.
Patricia Evans Mary Louise Thomas Mary Kaye Thomas
Dorothy C. Mattingly Mary Brady Roberts Lillian O'Daniel
All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remain-
ing members of the above-named IUE, or any other labor organization.
TELECOM, INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement or reemploy-
ment, as the case may be, upon application in accordance with the Selective Service
Act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, after discharge
from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted'for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Room 2407,
Federal Office Building, 550 Main Street, Cincinnati, Ohio, Telephone No. 684-3686.
Copeland Oil Co., Inc.; Metropolitan Petroleum Company, a
Division of the Pittston Company and Local 648, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America. Case No. 3-CA-2592. February 25, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On October 29, 1965, Trial Examiner Sidney J. Barban issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that Respondents
had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom, and take
certain affirmative action as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. He also found that Respondents had not engaged in certain
other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mended that such allegations be. dismissed. Thereafter, Respondents
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting
brief.'
1 Respondents have requested oral argument. Because, in our opinion, the record, the
Trial Examiner's Decision, and the exceptions and brief adequately set forth the issues
and the positions of the Respondents, this request is hereby denied.
157 NLRB No. 12.
COPELAND OIL CO., INC., ETC. 127
Pursuant to Section 3(b) of the Act, the National Labor Relations
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Members Brown and
Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The
rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and the brief, and the entire rec-
ord in this case, and hereby adopts the findings,2 conclusions, and rec-
ommendations of the Trial Examiner.
[The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order.-31
2 In the absence of exceptions , we adopt pro forma the Trial Examiner's dismissal of
that part of the complaint relating to the threat of loss of pension plan coverage at the
meeting of March 10, 1965.
8 The Local Union No. in paragraph 1(a) of the Trial Examiner 's Recommended
Order is amended to read : "Local 648."
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon charges filed on March 29, 1965, and thereafter amended, by the above-
named Charging Party, herein referred to as the Union, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board, herein referred to as the General Counsel, by the
Regional Director for Region 3 (Buffalo, New York), issued a complaint dated
May 5, 1965, against the above-named Respondents, herein referred to as the
Respondents. The complaint alleged that the Respondents had engaged in and were
engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act. Respondents duly filed an answer to the complaint,
which admitted certain allegations of the complaint, but denied the commission of
any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner Sidney J. Barban at
Plattsburgh, New York, on July 8, 1965. All parties appeared at the hearing and were
afforded full opportunity to participate, examine witnesses, and adduce relevant evi-
dence. Oral argument was waived. Briefs have been received from the General
Counsel and the Respondents and have been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record 1 in this case and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENTS
Metropolitan Petroleum Company, a division of ,the Pittston Company, herein
referred to as Metropolitan, and Copeland Oil Co., Inc., herein referred to as Cope-
land, at all times material to this matter have been, and are, affiliated businesses with
common ownership, directors, and operators, and constitute an integrated business
enterprise with a common labor policy affecting the employees of both Respondents.
At all times material to this matter, Copeland has been engaged at a terminal in
Plattsburgh, New York, which is the only operation involved herein, in the wholesale
distribution of petroleum products.
During the year prior to the issuance of the complaint, Copeland sold and dis-
tributed from its Plattsburgh operation to the U.S. Air Force Base at Plattsburgh,
New York, petroleum products of a value in excess of $50,000, which had a sub-
stantial impact on the national defense. During the same year metropolitan pur-
i General Counsel 's motion to correct the transcript' to' which no objection has been
filed, has been granted , In part, In a separate order, together with certain corrections
made on my own motion.
128 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
chased, transferred, and delivered to facilities maintained by it in the States of New
York, Connecticut, New Jersey, and Vermont petroleum products of a value in excess
of $50,000, which were transported to such facilities in interstate commerce.
It is admitted, and I find that Copeland and Metropolitan are each, individually,
and both, collectively, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The issues
The basic issue here is whether Respondents violated the Act by refusing to bargain
with the Union, upon request, and should, therefore, be ordered to recognize and
bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of certain of Respondents'
employees, even though the Union was unsuccessful in a Board election conducted
among these employees.
The General Counsel contends that Respondents were not in good faith in refusing
to'bargain with the Union, which had been designated by a majority of Respondents'
employees in the appropriate unit as their bargaining representative, and engaged in
activities which, in effect, violated the employees' rights, undermined the Union, and
made a fair election impossible.
The Respondents claim that employee designations of the Union were obtained at a
meeting on February 24, 1965, through coercion and misrepresentation, and under
the influence of alcoholic beverages, and are thus void; that Respondents engaged
in no activities violative of the Act; and that Respondents refused to bargain with
the Union in good-faith doubt that a majority of the employees desired the Union
to represent them.
B. Events bearing on the Union's designation as bargaining representative
The record makes it clear that for a considerable period of time employees of
Respondents at the Plattsburgh terminal had been dissatisfied with what they consid-
ered arbitrary and unreasonable actions affecting their working conditions, on the part
of Respondents' dispatcher, Ken Besaw, who was, until March 15, 1965, a supervisor
of employees at the Plattsburgh facility. Although the president of Copeland, and its
former sole owner, Bert Copeland, had frequently urged the employees to come to him
with their problems, the record shows that management of Respondents were not
informed of this situation prior to March 1965. Instead, as a result of their intense
dissatisfaction with Besaw, and an uneasiness over job security, certain employees con-
tacted the Union and arranged for a meeting with Union Representative Mousseau, on
February 24, 1965. The evidence of the circumstances preceding this meeting indicate
an atmosphere among the employees generally favorable to joining the Union .2
According to the credited testimony of employee Ledwith, the employees attending
the February 24 meeting at the union hall advised Mousseau that their reason for want-
ing to join the Union arose from the trouble that they were going through with the dis-
patcher at the plant. As Ledwith testified, "After we hashed that all out, he [Mous-
seau] suggested it would probably be a good thing if we signed the cards that night
before anything else could come up, where this guy could give us some trouble. It
would protect us."
9 Employee James Lancto, a member of the Union , was asked to contact the Union and
to set up a meeting by employee Hiram Fisher , who told Lancto, "We would like to join
the Union ." Lancto and two other employees , Raymond Ledwith and Martin Shea,
jointly called Union Representative Mousseau to set a date for a meeting "to get all the
men together and see if they couldn 't join the Union ." Employee Ledwith , a witness for
Respondents , testified that some of the employees met at the plant before going to the
union meeting and that all the employees who attended "probably" went to the union
meeting to join, but wanted more information first. Employee Fisher , who did not make
a good impresssion as a witness , generally admits that the employees had talked among
themselves about joining the Union prior to the meeting of February 24. During the
last week in February , Supervisor Bodette heard from Dispatcher Besaw that some,of the
drivers were thinking about joining the Union.
COPELAND OIL CO., INC., ETC. 129
Thereafter, in discussing with the employees present what the Union could do for
them, Union Representative Mousseau went over contracts the Union had with other
employees, explaining job security, benefits (including the union pension plan, a copy
of which was distributed), and wage rates which he expected to secure for the employ-
ees. Mousseau told the employees that their rate was only 20 cents an hour below
the union rate, which he described as "very close."
The eight employees who attended the meeting a were provided with application for
membership cards, designating the Union as their collective-bargaining representative,
which each of them signed and left with Mousseau that evening.
It is contended, however, that these cards were obtained through coercive statements
and misrepresentations allegedly made by Mousseau at the meeting concerning the
amount of initiation fees that would have to be paid by employees executing cards that
night as compared to the amount that would be required of employees signing cards at
a later time. There is a considerable variation in the testimony of the witnesses as to
what Mousseau actually said at the meeting on this point.
Mousseau testified that he told the employees present that, although the normal
initiation fee was $100, their fee would be an "organizational fee" of $10, and that
"new employees" would be required to pay $100 after the contract was in effect.
Mousseau denied that he told the employees that they would be compelled to join
sooner or later, or within a 30- to 60-day period after an election was won by the Union.
He also denied telling the men that if they waited until after the contract was signed
their fee would be $100.
Lancto, who was already a member of the Union, testified that Mousseau said "dur-
ing negotiation of a contract, the fee was $10, but after the contract was negotiated,
it would be $100." He further testified that Mousseau did' not say that "employees have
to join the Union now or any other time."
Employee Bruso testified that he understood Mousseau to say that if the employees
joined then it would be $10, but if they joined later on, after the contract was signed, at
which time he understood they would be required to join, the fee would be $100; and
that he so advised Supervisor Bodette the following morning in answer to Bodette's
query as to why he had joined the Union.4
Employee Larabee testified that Mousseau said the organizational fee was $10, and
"anything after the contract was completed or negotiated, that it was a hundred
dollars."
Employee Fisher testified that Mousseau said "it was $10 that night and a hundred
dollars for any stragglers, after we had signed up." 5
Employee Ledwith testified that he was not certain about the difference in amounts
of initiation fees. Ledwith stated that Mousseau said, "if the election was won by the
Union, the men that hadn't signed up would probably have 30 days to sign up, or he
would have to talk to Mr. Copeland about either forcing them to sign or they would be
laid off, or something like that. I think it was either 30 or 60 days after the election
was over; that is if the Union had won."
Lastly, employee Geroux, who was rather vague on the point, testified that Mousseau
said, "There would be such a small fee at the time and so much later." Geroux said he
found out "later" that the amounts involved were $10 and $100.
Respondents' position, apparently, is that the testimony supports a finding that the
offer of a,$10 fee was conditioned on the employees signing cards "that night," and
that the higher fee would be in effect thereafter.6 I do not agree. There is no credible
3 James Lancto, Hiram Fisher, Ovid Covey, Raymond Ledwith, Martin Shea, Ronald
Larabee, Herbert Geroux, and Robert Bruso.
A Respondents ' brief asserts that Bruso 's understanding was merely that he would have
to pay $100 "later." On the basis of his entire testimony , however, it is found that his
understanding was as stated in the text above.
6 On 'cross-examination , with respect to the words "that night," Fisher testified, "He
[Mousseau ] said the way things are going at the plant-what we had been telling him.
It would, be better if we signed cards that night, right then."
6 Thus in its brief, Respondents argues ( p. 22) that "The men understood that the cost
of not signing a , card ' that night would be $90, and that they would have - to join the
union iooner or later " and that ( p. 26), "what accounts for [the] peculiarly
coercive aspect of the offer is the fact that the employees were made to understand that
it was conditioned on their signing that night ." At another point ( pp. 25-26) Respond-
ent argues , on, the basis of N.L.R.B. v. Gorbea, Perez t Marell, S. en O., 328 F. 2d 679
(C.A. 1), that this situation is thus "quite different from an offer to waive organizational
fees 'up'to ' and wtithin a reasonable time immediately after the election."
130 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
evidence that Mousseau made the application of the $10 fee contingent on signing cards
"that night." Ledwith's testimony, previously noted, was that Mousseau suggested
that the employees sign cards that night to obtain immediate protection against the
dispatcher, "before anything else could come up, where this guy could give us some
trouble." 7 In fact, the credible testimony of Lancto, Bruso, and Larabee establishes
that the $100 fee would not become operative until after a contract was signed. Mous-
seau's testimony also is consistent with this finding, although it has a somewhat differ-
ent thrust. Ledwith's testimony likewise indicates his understanding that the employees
did not have to join the Union until Respondents had agreed to compulsory member-
ship, after an election won by the Union, his testimony briefly and succinctly describ-
ing the normal operation of a legal union-shop contract, although his timing is not pre-
cise. Of the two remaining witnesses, Geroux' testimony is not to the contrary and
that of Fisher has been discredited to the extent inconsistent with the credited
testimony.
Inasmuch as all of the authorities which have been cited, or which I have found,
would support the validity of authorization cards obtained in conjunction with an
offer to waive the imposition of more onerous fees until the effectuation of a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, see, i.e., Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO (Edro Corporation) v. N.L.R.B., 345 F. 2d 264 (C.A. 2); N.L.R.B. v.
Gorbea, Perez & Morell S. en C., supra, it is found that the cards obtained by the
Union at the meeting on February 24, 1965, are not invalidated on that ground.
Respondent further utges that the cards obtained at that meeting should be invali-
dated on the ground that they were obtained through misrepresentations on Mous-
seau's part and because some of the employees at the meeting had been drinking
beer.
In order to support its claim of misrepresentation of fees, Respondents urged me to
discredit Mousseau's testimony as to what he told the employees with respect to the
fees they would have to pay, but to credit this very same testimony as a truthful
statement of the Union's policy on fees.
With respect to the claim that the card signers were drinking, Fisher testified that
six or seven of those attending had "a little bit" to drink prior to coming to the hall,
brought some with them and "got another six pack over to the store " It was testi-
fied that employees at the meeting were drinking beer. Ledwith had one, two, or
three bottles to drink. Geroux had none. The other employees who testified were
not questioned on the point
These asserted reasons for invalidating the cards are not impressive. The evidence
certainly does not justify a finding of misrepresentation of fees on Mousseau's part,
nor do the circumstances indicate any reason that this might have been done. On
the contrary, all of the evidence is that the employees favored the Union, sought
out Mousseau, and voluntarily signed the union cards.8 Further, however, much
strict sobriety should be favored in these matters; there is no persuasive evidence in
this record that these cards were not signed with full knowledge and understanding
of their meaning and intent.
It is apparently undisputed that Carmen Merrill executed a,valid designation of
the Union as his bargaining representative on February 24, and that Edward Bashaw
did so on March 1, 1965.
The parties stipulated that as of February 26, 1965, the date of receipt of the
Union's letters to Respondents requesting recognition as the bargaining representa-
tive of Respondents' employees in the appropriate unit, the following nine employ-
ees were eligible members of the appropriate unit: Joseph Makara, Robert Bruso,
Hiram Fisher, Edward Bashaw, Martin Shea, Raymond Ledwith, Herbert Geroux,
Ovid Covey, and Carmen Merrill .9 General Counsel contends that Ronald Larabee
should also be considered an eligible employee since he was not terminated by
Respondents until about 5 p.m. on,February 26, 1965. The parties originally stipu-
7 To the extent Fisher 's testimony is inconsistent , it is not credited . It is noted, how-
ever, that on cross-examination Fisher's account appears to coincide with that of Ledwith.
s Bruso's statement to Bodette that he signed , in part, because of the possibility of
higher fees later has been noted. However, this was in reply to a direct question by his
supervisor , who Indicated that he was hurt by Bruso's action in joining the Union. On
the record as a whole , I find that Bruso's answer was Intended to mollify Bodette and
does not constitute proof that Bruso did not sign his card voluntarily.
°It was agreed, and I find, that the unit appropriate for collective bargaining pursuant
to Section 9(b) of the Act Is: All drivers, helpers, mechanics, and plant men employed by
Respondents at the Plattsburgh terminal, excluding all office clerical employees , guards,
professional employees , and supervisors as defined in the Act.
COPELAND OIL CO., INC., ETC. 131
lated that Wilcott Bashaw was a temporary employee and thus ineligible, and the
General Counsel and Charging Party later conceded that James Lancto and Delton
Clukey were in the same category.
Inasmuch as the Union was designated by no less than seven admittedly eligible
employees in the appropriate unit (Fisher, Ledwith, Shea, Geroux, Covey, Bruso,
and Merrill) as of February 26, there is no need to pass on the effect of the addi-
tional designations of Larabee, who was terminated that day, and Bashaw, who
signed later. It is clear that the Union was, on February 26, 1965, and at all times
material to this proceeding, the designated and selected representative of a majority
of Respondents' employees in the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining, and was and continues to be the exclusive representative of the employ-
ees in the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
2. Events bearing on Respondents' refusal to bargain with the Union
Respondents were quickly made aware that their employees had attended a union
meeting at which membership cards were signed. Employee Bruso testified that
the morning after the meeting (February 25), Supervisor Bodette asked him if he
had joined the Union. When Bruso replied that he had, Bodette asked why Bruso
had done so, because the two had gotten along fairly well. Bruso advised Bodette
that he "understood that-like when the contract was signed, that we would have
to join the Union if we hadn't already signed the cards," that the fee was $10 now
and would be $100 at the later time. Bruso also told Bodette that "when we were
at the Union hall, all the men had signed cards, so I signed with the rest of the
men."
Bodette's testimony as to the conversation is not inconsistent generally with that
of Bruso, except with respect to the date of this conversation, which at one time, he
placed at March 3. Although I note that Bruso fixed the date in answering a leading
question, Bodette's testimony became so vague, confused, and unreliable on cross-
examination that his testimony is discredited wherever it differs from that of Bruso.
Respondents also seem to accept Bruso's dating of the conversation since it is urged
that Bodette reported this conversation to Copeland on March 1. Although Bodette
did not specifically affirm or deny that Bruso said "all the men had signed cards," his
testimony indicates that Bruso said he had joined with "the group."
The following day, Friday, February 24, according to the credited testimony of
Besaw , employee Clukey called Dispatcher Besaw on the telephone and asked if he
knew "the fellows had joined the Union." Besaw said that he did not. The next
day, Saturday, Besaw told Supervisor Cronin that he "thought the boys had joined
the Union." Cronin told Besaw that he didn't find this surprising, that this was
bound to come sooner or later.10
On the same Saturday, Besaw asked employee Edward Bashaw if he had signed a
card for the Union; Bashaw pulled out a card and said "not yet." About this same
time employee Covey approached Besaw and said that he hadn't signed a card. Cronin
testified that about this same time, employee Makara, one of the oldest employees
at the Plattsburgh terminal, who apparently enjoyed certain working conditions not
afforded the others, approached him to ask if he had to join the Union to work for
Respondents. Makara also spoke to Copeland, on Monday, March 1, about this
same matter . Makara was assured that he did not have to join the Union.
Besaw testified that during this period none of the men told him "that a majority of
the men wanted the Union, although there was talk of it at the time." Besaw also
testified that from pieces of information that he had, he "figured" that they all had
signed , up.
As previously noted, the Union, on February 25, sent letters to each of the
Respondents advising that a majority of "your employees have designated the Union
as their representative for the purpose of collective bargaining," and requested the
Respondents to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representative of
employees in a unit of "Drivers, Helpers, Mechanics and Plant Men and excluding
office and clerical employees, guards, professional employees and supervisors as
defined in the Act." This letter was never answered.
Plant Manager Copeland was at the offices of Metropolitan in New York on Fri-
day, February 26, when the letter from the Union was received and was advised of it
10 Clukey did not testify. Cronin testified only that no one told him that a majority of
the men wanted the Union. The dates found are based on an analysis of the whole record.
221-374-66-vol. 157-10
132 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
by a telephone call from Cronin. Copeland states that he consulted with James Fos-
ter, an official of Metropolitan and asked him to handle the situation, "because we
were not familiar with labor negotiations " 11
Copeland further testified that at the time he doubted that the Union represented
a majority of the employees. He stated as the only basis for this doubt that ". . . most
of these men had been with me for a long time. As far as I knew, the situation in
the plant-the drivers, the operating men-was fine, was going along satisfactorily.
Had no indication of any discontent whatsoever, and I just couldn't conceive that the
drivers had gone to the Union and asked the Union to represent them." He later
testified that further basis for his doubt of the Union's majority status was derived
from the information which he received from employee Makara, noted above, and
from information received during a meeting with Cronin and Besaw on March 1, as
well as an asserted doubt as to the composition of the unit.
On Monday, March 1, Copeland met with Cronin, Bodette , and Besaw to discuss
what had occurred.12
Copeland testified that at this meeting, Dispatcher Besaw told him that employee
Edward Bashaw had not joined the Union, that Besaw "thought" Covey had not
joined the Union, and that Besaw "was sure" Clukey had not joined the Union. He
further testified, in response to a leading question, that Bodette told him that "they
did not think that Bruso had joined the Union."
I find it difficult to credit this testimony in full. Thus, Bodette knew Bruso had
signed a union card prior to March 1, from his conversation with Bruso. Assuming
that it was this conversation which he reported to Copeland on March 1, as Respond-
ents argue in their brief, there is no reason to believe that Bodette falsely reported this
part of the conversation.
Further, Besaw, who has previously been found to be a credible witness, testified
that he told Copeland that so far as he knew, all but two of the men (obviously
Edward Bashaw and Covey) had joined the Union. Besaw did testify on cross-
examination that he had been previously told by Clukey that he was a member of the
union local at Albany, and, therefore, Besaw "knew" Clukey was not a member of
"this local." However, the fact that Clukey belonged to another local would indicate
that he would designate a sister union to represent him (as he did), rather than other-
wise, as Respondents appear to assert.
It also appears from Respondents' offer of proof that it was also estimated that
employee Wilcott Bashaw was against the Union because he belonged to "a different
union." On the list which Copeland asserted he made at the hearing, opposite Wilcott
Bashaw's name appear the words: "Belongs to Alb [undoubtedly Albany] union
leaving." Wilcott Bashaw, as previously noted, was stipulated to be an ineligible
temporary employee.
Bodette was not questioned about the meeting. Cronin was asked only one specific
question about the meeting : whether Besaw said anything at the meeting concerning
whether a majority of the men had signed cards, and answered equivocally, "He did
not answer that way."
In summary, Copeland's testimony was that he made up a list of the men which
was "our best estimate of who had or who had not signed. We estimated that five
men had signed, five had not signed, and two men were doubtful." The list showed
Shea, Geroux, Ledwith, Lancto, and Fisher under "Yes"; Makara, Wilcott Bashaw,
Edward Bashaw, Covey, and Clukey (whose name appears differently on the sheet
from the others ) as "No" ; and after a question mark , the names Bruso and Merrill.
u This statement seems particularly strange since Copeland also testified , in support of
the position that he had no union animus, that he had voluntarily recognized the Union
in 1951, after his four employees at the time advised him that they had joined the
Union, and thereafter had been under contract with the Union until 1956. It may be
that Copeland meant that he was unfamiliar with Board procedures and asked Foster to
handle those matters , which he did
v At the hearing , on motion of General Counsel , I rejected certain evidence, including
an offer of proof, of speculations among the supervisors at this meeting as to which em-
ployees had joined the Union. Both General Counsel and Respondents , in their briefs
have adverted , in one fashion or another , to this evidence , General Counsel - referring to
the speculative nature of Copeland ' s "alleged doubt of majority" and Respondents noting
the "estimates" made by Copeland at the meeting. Under the circumstances, I have
given full consideration to the rejected evidence and Respondents' offer of proof in
evaluating the events of this meeting.
COPELAND OIL CO., INC.,'ETC. 133
During this meeting Copeland also explained 'that he anticipated that this matter
would be taken to the Board which would conduct a vote among the employees, and,
at the end of the meeting, instructed Besaw, Cronin, and Bodette not to discuss any
facet of the union question with the men.
Very shortly thereafter the men were made aware, by methods not explicated in
the record, that Copeland was concerned as to the reason the men wanted a union.
Thus, Ledwith testified, "It had gotten back.to different ones that he, Copeland,
couldn't understand why we went Union because anything we ever asked for we
always got." The employees, at a meeting among themselves, considered that Cope-
land should have the right to know why they wanted the Union, and decided to ask
for a meeting with him. Ledwith, as spokesman for the employees, talked to Bodette
and Cronin concerning this and Cronin ascertained from Copeland that a meeting
between Copeland and the men could be held Wednesday night, March 3. I believe
that in the circumstances there can be no question that Copeland knew or very
strongly suspected the purpose of the employees in asking for the meeting, although
apparently a conscious effort was made not to mention the Union in connection with
this meeting. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the employees desired the meeting
to explain why they wanted the Union, Ledwith testified that he did not tell either
Bodette or Cronin the reason he was seeking the meeting "directly," because he fig-
ured this was a matter to be "hashed out" with Copeland. The omnipresence of the
union issue is pointed up, however, by the fact that when Cronin advised Ledwith
that the employees,could have a meeting with Copeland, be also stated that they
could not talk about the Union, the employees having "signed those cards, we can't
negotiate with you or talk anything about the Union." Copeland testified that the
Union was not discussed at the first meeting with the men.13
At this meeting with the employees on March 3, attended by Cronin and Cope-
land, the principal matter discussed was the employees' grievances with Besaw.
Fisher was the primary spokesman, but all of the employees spoke and, apparently,
most vehemently. , Besaw, who had been a supervisor for 10 years, was described
as arbitrary and unreasonable to the men, as well as discourteous and difficult in his
dealings with the customers. Copeland was informed in detail of Besaw's refusal to
permit vehicles to be properly maintained, rand, on occasion refusing to mark the
vehicles as required by law, his failure to'properly equip vehicles on the road, his
oppressive assignments to employees Besaw did not like , his alienation of customers,
and matters of a like character.
Copeland, who testified that he had no- :advance knowledge of this information
about Besaw, decided immediately, and advised the employees at the meeting, that
he would take Besaw out of the job of supervisor. He also appointed Fisher in charge
of maintenance of the equipment. Copeland also asked the employees why they had
allowed this matter to go on so long without advising him, stating that they knew
his "door is always open." They told Copeland that they were afraid of retaliation
by Besaw. Copeland assured them that there would be none, and, at Copeland's
suggestion, a meeting was set for the following week, on March 10, to check on the
situation.
Prior to the meeting on March 10, the employees again met among themselves and
decided to see if they could not obtain directly from the Respondents the wage
increases and other benefits that they wanted. According to Fisher, the employees
realized that Respondents could-not offer them benefits, but decided that if they pre-
sented their desires to Copeland, he would then be open to give them an answer.
A list of the items desired•by the employees was drawn up, which corresponded to
the benefits which Mousseau had said he hoped to get for them. This list was pre-
sented by Fisher at the meeting that evening between the employees , Copeland, and
Cronin. - '
The meeting on the evening of March 10 : was opened by Copeland inquiring as to
how matters had gone in ' respect to - Besaw and maintenance ' of vehicles since the
previous meeting. After being assured on this score ; Copeland , asked what else the
employees had on their minds. It was apparently at this point that Fisher presented
the list of things that the employees wanted. According to Cronin, it was made clear
that this was the list of things that Mousseau' had told the men that they might get
through the Union. Each of the items was discussed.
23 Ledwith , however , testified that at the end of the first meeting' with the men, Cope-
land advised the employees that there were good unions and bad unions 'and if they
wanted to go union they should mike sure and `pick a good one. 'The'statement is
similar to one Copeland clearly made at the 'end of a meeting the following week. It
is probable that Ledwith was mistaken as ' to the date.
134 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Copeland testified that at this point, "I said, `You realize that there is an election
pending.14 We can promise absolutely nothing. We are not allowed to.' I said I
would recommend to Metropolitan giving them what they wanted, but could promise
nothing."
Ledwith, on cross-examination, stated, ". , he [Copeland] told us it was out of his
hands; it would have to go through the New York office, and after the election was
over, if it went towards the Company, he would do all he could for us."
Fisher testified that Copeland said his hands were tied, that because of the election
he could not promise anything or do anything "until this thing is over with." On
cross-examination, Fisher stated that as far as he could recall, Copeland "said he
would recommend them to Metropolitan."
The testimony of Bruso and Edward Bashaw was to the same effect.
During the course of this meeting, Copeland asked the men why they had gone to
the Union, but states he received no satisfactory answer. He told the employees
several times during the meeting that if they had any complaints, they should come
to him or appoint a man to come to see him, as his door was always open.
Toward the end of the meeting, an employee raised a question as to the Respond-
ents' pension plan. Copeland read from a booklet describing the plan, including the
statement that, "If an otherwise eligible employee becomes covered by a retirement
plan provided by a collective bargaining agreement, he will cease to receive benefits
under this plan." During a discussion of the comparative benefits of Respondents'
plan and the Union's plan (a booklet describing the Union's plan had been given the
employees by Mousseau), Copeland told two employees they would be "crazy" to
throw that many years of service away.15
At the end of this meeting, Copeland advised the employees that if they felt it was
in their best interest to join the Union, they should do so; that, so far as he was
concerned, no one would be discriminated against because they had joined the Union.
On March 22, 1965, the Regional Director conducted an election among the
employees in the appropriate unit. The tally of ballots shows that of approximately
12 eligible employees, 3 votes were cast for the Union, 7 against, and 2 were
challenged.
The day after the election Cronin had a conversation with Fisher in which he told
Fisher that effective the following week, "the boys were going to get the things they
asked for." At least some of these benefits went into effect the Friday following the
election.
The Union filed timely objections to the election, and in his report on objections
issued May 3, 1965, the Regional Director found merit in some of the objections, set
the election aside, and held the matter in abeyance due to the pendency of charges
in the instant matter. Since the close of the hearing in this proceeding, I have
received a stipulation from the parties advising that the Regional Director had
approved, on June 16, 1965, the Union's request to withdraw its petition in Case
No. 3-RC-359416
3. Conclusions
It has long been well settled that where an employer bases its refusal to bargain
with a union, designated by its employees, upon an asserted good-faith doubt of the
Union's majority status, such assertion must not only be founded upon reasonable
grounds in the circumstances, but the assertion of good faith must not be raised in
a context inconsistent with the claim. Hammond & Irving, Incorporated, 154 NLRB
1071; Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664. Thus, an employer who
seeks to rely on the results of a Board election as demonstrating the desires of its
"The Union's petition for certification was filed and docketed, as Case No. 3-RC-3594,
on March 2, 1965 (however, apparently , it was first received by the Board's Regional
Office on February 26, 1965) and notification was received by the Respondents on March 3.
An agreement for consent election was executed by the Respondents on March 12.
a; In his affidavit given to General Counsel , Copeland stated that he explained to the
employees that "if there is a collective bargaining agreement they are not covered under
the [Respondents '] pension plan ." General Counsel requests that this be held to be
an admission against interest, threatening " loss of coverage if the Union became the con-
tractual representative." I disagree . It is undisputed that Copeland read the material
from the booklet, and there is no reason to believe that the affidavit is anything but an
incomplete summary.
'- In accordance with the motion of the General Counsel and the stipulation of the
parties, the stipulation , dated August 10, 1965, is received as General Counsel's Ex-
hibit 14, and the attached affidavit of service is received as General Counsel's Exhibit 14a.
COPELAND OIL CO., INC., ETC. 135
employees must not at the same time have engaged in conduct which made the hold-
ing of a free and fair election among those employees impossible. Irving Air Chute
Co., Inc. N.L.R.B., 350 F. 2d 176 (C.A. 2); The Colson Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 347
F. 2d 128 (C.A. 8).
It is clear that the conduct of the Respondents in this matter does not meet these
standards. Assuming that Respondents' Manager Copeland was well justified, when
first apprised of the Union's claim of representation, in doubting, in the absence of
any information of employee discontent, that the claim was supported by the employ-
ees; by the time he had returned to Plattsburgh, both Supervisors Bodette and Besaw
were in possession of information that was highly persuasive that a majority of the
employees had affiliated with the Union. Besaw so informed Copeland at the meet-
ing on March 1.
At this meeting Respondents had reasonable grounds to doubt that Makara, Edward
Bashaw, and Covey had signed cards for the Union. Respondents' conclusions as to
the desires of the remaining employees have purely speculative bases. Copeland,
himself, refers to them as "estimates."
Although Copeland included all 12 employees in his estimates, he also testified
that he had doubts as to who should be included in the unit. However, the elimina-
tion of the three employees stipulated to be temporary (Lancto, Clukey, and Wilcott
Bashaw) would leave nine employees, of whom only three had informed Respondents
that they had not signed cards.
Respondents also contend that they were justified in doubting the Union's majority
status because of alleged indications of coercion in statements made by Makara and
Bruso. Aside from the fact that this position is not legally supportable as previously
discussed, the record indicates that this factor did not figure significantly, if at all,
in Respondents' evaluation of the situation.
Nevertheless, even though the nature of Respondents' doubt of the Union's major-
ity status as of March 1 was at best speculative, if there were no other evidence on
the issue but this, Respondents might have been justified in awaiting an election to
settle the issue. See John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 NLRB 99. However this is not the
full extent of the proof in this matter.
Thus, the revelations made at the March 3 meeting of the employees' deepseated
discontent with and resentment of Dispatcher Besaw clearly invalidated Copeland's
stated major basis for doubting that the employees wanted a union, i.e., that the
employees had not indicated to him any discontent, and served to support the infor-
mation already at hand that a majority of the employees favored the Union.
In this connection, however, Respondents contend that the employees sought the
meetings of March 3 and 10, did not advise Copeland at these meetings of their affilia-
tion with the Union and sought to deal with Respondents directly, and that these
actions were therefore inconsistent with a desire to be represented by the Union.
However, as has been found, the employees asked for the meeting of March 3 for
the purpose of advising Respondents of their reason for going to the Union, in
response to their understanding that this was a matter in which Respondents' Man-
ager Copeland was interested. It is certainly clear enough that practically the only
topic discussed at this meeting, the employees' discontent with Besaw, was the reason
which motivated them in seeking out the Union in the first instance. Although it
appears that, at the Respondents' request, specific reference to the Union was stu-
diously avoided, as has been previously found, Respondents undoubtedly were aware
of the employees' purpose in asking for the meeting.
It is also plain that at the end of the meeting on March 3, Respondents had adjusted
or promised to adjust those working conditions which had originally driven the
employees to the Union. The following meeting, set for March 10, to give the
employees an opportunity to assure themselves that Copeland's promised actions were
carried out, was suggested by Copeland, himself.
At the meeting of March 10, having already secured the major objective which they
had sought through the Union, the employees sought from the Respondents the
remaining benefits which the Union had stated it would seek for them. Copeland,
while stating that he could promise nothing and could do nothing until the election
proceeding was over, nevertheless advised the employees that he would recommend
that the parent corporation, Metropolitan, grant their requests.
Respondents argue that this statement was a carefully and plainly qualified, indefi-
nite and spontaneous reply to the men's demands, and thus cannot be said to reflect
any intent to undercut the Union's position.
I cannot agree. The employees' requests were placed before Copeland as the bene-
fits that the Union had promised to seek from Respondents. Copeland advised the
employees that he would recommend that Respondents grant these benefits. The
136 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
obvious thrust of this action is revealed by the testimony of employee Ledwith,
Respondents' witness, that his recollection of Copeland's commitment was that if the
Union were defeated in the election, Copeland would do everything he could to see
that the employees received the benefits they wanted.
There can be no question that this was a promise of benefit.' The substantiality
of the promise could be well apprehended by employees who but a week before had
found that they had but to ask in order to receive., That the promise accurately fore-
told the event is proved by the event itself.
Nor may these actions of the Respondents in violation of the Act be excused on
the basis that the employees requested such actions. As the Supreme Court said in
a somewhat similar situation, in Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 321
U.S. 78, 687:
Petitioner [the employer] was not relieved from its obligations [merely]
because the employees asked that they be disregarded. The statute was enacted
in the public interest for the protection of the employees' right to collective
bargaining and it may not be ignored by the employer, even though the employ-
ees consent, . . . or the employees suggest the conduct found to be an unfair
labor practice, . at least where the employer is in a position to secure any
advantage from these practices, ... '
From these facts and on the record as a whole, it is found that the Respondents,
by their conduct and activities in promising and granting their employees benefits
and improvements in their working conditions to discourage them from joining or
supporting the Union,17 by negotiating directly with their employees in respect to
wages and working conditions in order to undermine the Union, and by urging and
inducing their employees to deal directly with Respondents concerning their griev-
ances rather than through the Union,18 interfered with, restrained, and coerced
employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7' of the Act and thus vio-
lated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
It is further found, on the basis of this record, that Respondents lacked a good-
faith doubt of the Union's majority status and by its actions sought to and did under-
mine the Union's status and made the conduct of a free and fair representation
election impossible in the circumstances. By its conduct, therefore, Respondents
refused to bargain with the duly designated representative of its employees in an
appropriate unit in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Irving Air
Chute Company, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., supra, Colson Corporation v. N.L.R.B., supra,
and cases cited therein.
A number of subsidiary contentions made by Respondents, not specifically referred
to, are dealt with in the cases cited and the discussion of the evidence above. Respond-
ents' chief reliance appears to be on the decision and opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Flomatic
Corp., 347 F. 2d 74 (C.A. 2). In that case, Respondents argue, the court held that
a refusal-to-bargain remedy is not appropriate in a situation in which the employer's
interference with the employees' right to choose or reject representation is de mini-
mus. This decision, however, was distinguished by the court in the Irving Air Chute
17 Respondents correctly note that the granting of benefits after the election did not, of
itself, affect the results of the election They nevertheless constituted the fulfillment of
the promise by which Respondents did affect the election and were a reward for voting
against the Union, thereby dissuading employees from future union activities, and thus
violated the Act. Northwest Engineering Co., 148 NLRB 1136 As Respondents further
note, General Counsel conceded at the hearing that he was not claiming the transfer of
Dispatcher Besaw from his supervisory position to be an unfair labor practice, and no
finding is therefore made as to this transfer.
Ls Respondents contend that the employees had always been encouraged to bring
grievances to Copeland's attention and that this should not be considered a violation.
While a mere invitation to employees to discuss problems with management might not
violate the Act, see Orkin Exterminating Company of Kansas, Inc., 136 NLRB 630, 639,
Respondents' statements in this matter, In the context of Respondents' other actions, were
clearly designed to induce and encourage rejection of the Union which had been designated
by the employees, rather than mere communication with Respondents See N L It B v.
Larry Paul Oldsmobile Co., Inc., 316 F. 2d 595, 597 (C A. 7) ; N.L R.B. v. Firedoor Corpo-
ration of America, 291 F. 2d 328, 330 (C.A. 2) ; Cactus Petroleum, Inc., 134 NLRB 1254,
1261. Nor is the impact of Respondents' actions lessened by the fact that, in the same
meeting in which it was made plain•to the employees that they would receive the benefits
desired-without a union, the employees were also assured that Respondents had no
objection to their joining the Union.
COPELAND OIL CO., INC., ETC. 137
case, in which a refusal-to-bargain remedy was held appropriate, on the ground,
inter alia, that to hold otherwise "would be manifestly unfair to the Union since it
would allow the Company to reap the benefits of its anti-union acts ...." See also
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. N.L.R.B., supra. In this matter, I believe, for the rea-
sons stated, that the Respondents' actions were not de mimmus, and that the situa-
tion presented falls more properly within the rationale of the decision in Irving Air
Chute than that of Flomatic, as has been found.
There remains • to be considered General Counsel's contention that Respondents
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by (1) Besaw's interrogation of Bashaw and
Bodette's interrogation of Bruso; and (2) the alleged threat to discontinue pension
benefits if the Union became the collective-bargaining representative.
Although the facts of the two instances of interrogation are noted in General
Counsel's brief, these matters are not argued therein. The facts present a borderline
question, and in another context, I would be inclined to the view that these instances
of interrogation should not be held to be coercive. However, the interrogation of
Bruso certainly was cast in a form designed to make him concerned about his rela-
tionship with his supervisor and to answer in a form designed to appease his superior.
Further, Respondents' attempt to rely on part of Bruso's answer, while rejecting his
statement that he had signed for the Union, leads me to the conviction that the inter-
rogation was not used by Respondents for a proper purpose and therefore should
be found to violate 8 (a) (1) and a remedy ordered.19
With respect to the pension issue, the proof is that the employees were told that
any eligible employee who was covered by pension plan in a collective-bargaining
agreement would not be covered by Respondents' plan, not that Respondents' plan
would be withdrawn merely on selection of the Union. This was not improper. It
is also clear that in comparing the Respondents' plan with the Union's plan, Cope-
land told certain employees that their years of service made Respondents' plan valu-
able to them. The latter statement was certainly protected under Section 8(c) of
the Act. I will, therefore, recommend the dismissal of the allegations of the com-
plaint that Respondents violated the Act by threatening their employees with loss
of pension plan coverage if the Union became their contractual collective-bargaining
representative.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondents set forth in section III, above, occurring in connec-
tion with the operations of Respondents as described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several
States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondents engaged in unfair labor practices in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, it will be recommended that the
Respondents cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirmative action designed
to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire case , I make the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondents, and each of them, are engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 648, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. The unit appropriate for collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act is that set forth in footnote 9 above.
4. On February 25, 1965, and at all times thereafter, the Union was, and continues
to be, the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
'- It Is noted that during the meeting of March 10, Copeland admits interrogating the
employees as to their' reasons for going to the Union. This, however, has not been
alleged in the complaint or urged on me as a separate violation of the Act, but was
developed as^dart of the proof of other alleged violations. Respondents have not dis-
cussed the issue' in their, brieft. Under the circumstances, I make no finding with respect
to this'item of interrogation as a•separate violation of the Act.
138 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5. Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a) (1) and (5) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire
record in this case, I recommend that Copeland Oil Co., Inc.; Metropolitan Petro-
leum Company, a division of the Pittston Company, their officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to recognize and bargain collectively with Local 684, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, as
the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the unit herein found
appropriate.
(b) Promising or granting employee benefits in order to discourage union activi-
ties or membership among their employees.
(c) Engaging in bargaining directly with employees in derogation of the exclusive
bargaining status of the Union.
(d) Changing any term or condition of employment without first affording the
Union a reasonable opportunity to bargain thereon.
(e) Interrogating their employees concerning their union activities in a manner
violative of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employ-
ees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which I find will effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the above-named labor organization
as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit herein found appropriate
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms or condi-
tions of employment, and, if an agreement is reached, embody such understanding
in a signed agreement.
(b) Post at its terminal in Plattsburgh, New York, copies of the attached notice
marked "Appendix." 20 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Direc-
tor for Region 3, shall, after being signed by Respondents' representative, be posted
by the Respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 3, in writing, within 20 days from
the receipt of this Decision and Recommended Order, what steps have been taken to
comply herewith 21
x In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
211n the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board, this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Local 648, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America,
as the exclusive bargaining representative of all our employees in the appropri-
ate bargaining unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment,
and other terms and conditions of employment , and, if an agreement is reached,
embody such understanding in a signed agreement.
DAVID SHOE CO., INC. 139
The appropriate bargaining unit is:
All drivers , helpers, mechanics , and plant men excluding all office clerical
employees , guards , professional employees , and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
WE WILL NOT promise or grant employee benefits in order to discourage union
activities or membership among our employees.
WE WILL NOT engage in bargaining directly with employees in derogation of
the exclusive bargaining status of the Union.
WE WILL NOT change any term or condition of employment without first
affording the Union a reasonable opportunity to bargain thereon.
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning their union activities in a
manner violative of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain , or coerce
our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization , to form labor
organizations , to join or assist Local 648, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor
organization , to bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing,
or to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection.
All our employees are free to become, remain , or refrain from becoming or remain-
ing, members of Local 648, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America , or any other labor organization.
COPELAND OIL CO., INC.; METROPOLITAN PETROLEUM COMPANY,
A DIVISION OF THE PITTSTON COMPANY,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) ( tle)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its pro-
visions, they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Fourth
Floor, The 120 Building , 120 Delaware Avenue , Buffalo , New York, Telephone No.
842-3112.
David Shoe Co., Inc. and United Shoe Workers of America, AFL-
CIO. Case No. 1-CA-4901. February 25, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On September 20, 1965, Trial Examiner Louis Libbin issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,
and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's Deci-
sion . With respect to certain other unfair labor practice allegations,.
the Trial Examiner recommended that they he dismissed. There-
after, Counsel for the Respondent and the General Counsel filed.
exceptions to the Trial Examiner 's Decision and supporting briefs,
and the Respondent filed a brief in reply to that of the General
Counsel.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the National
Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with
157 NLRB No. 15.