Component Bar Products, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 8, 2016

364 NLRB No. 140 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

364 NLRB No. 140
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Component Bar Products, Inc. and James R. Stout.
Case 14–CA–145064
November 8, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND MCFERRAN
On August 7, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Charles
J. Muhl issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent
filed a reply brief. The General Counsel filed cross-
exceptions with supporting argument, and the Respond-
ent filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions,
cross-exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the
judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions, to amend the

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
In addition, some of the Respondent’s exceptions allege that the
judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions demonstrate bias and preju-
dice. On careful examination of the judge’s decision and the entire
record, we are satisfied that the Respondent’s contentions are without
merit.
We agree with the judge’s application of Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004), to find that the Respondent violated
Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining overly broad handbook rules prohibiting
“insubordination or other disrespectful conduct” and “boisterous or
other disruptive activity in the workplace.” We note our dissenting
colleague’s view that the standard set forth in Lutheran Heritage should
be changed. We disagree with that view for the reasons stated in Wil-
liam Beaumont Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 162, slip op. at 2–6 (2016).
We also agree with the judge that employee James Stout engaged in
protected concerted activity when he called another employee to warn
the employee that his job was in jeopardy and that the Respondent
violated Sec. 8(a)(1) by discharging Stout for this activity. In so doing,
we agree with the judge, for the reasons he states, that Stout’s call to
the coworker constituted inherently concerted activity. We additionally
find that Stout acted concertedly under Meyers Industries, 281 NLRB
882 (1986) (Meyers II), affd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988). Stout called his
coworker to warn him that his job was in danger and to try to help him
retain his employment. By his actions, Stout sought to join together
with his coworker to help him avoid an adverse employment action and
thus engaged in concerted activity under Meyers II.
Further, we agree with the judge, for the reasons he states, that under
Continental Group, Inc., 357 NLRB 409 (2011), the Respondent vio-
lated Sec. 8(a)(1) by discharging Stout pursuant to the Respondent’s
remedy, and to adopt the recommended Order as modi-
fied and set forth in full below.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Component Bar Products, Inc., O’Fallon,
Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a rule in its employee handbook that
prohibits insubordination or other disrespectful conduct.
(b) Maintaining a rule in its employee handbook that
prohibits boisterous or disruptive activity in the work-
place.
(c) Enforcing or applying handbook rules in a manner
that restricts employees’ Section 7 activity, including by
asserting the rules as a basis for discharging an employee
for engaging in protected concerted activity.
(d) Telling employees that they or other employees
were discharged because they engaged in protected con-
certed activity.
(e) Discharging employees for engaging in protected
concerted activity.

unlawfully overbroad handbook rule prohibiting insubordination or
other disrespectful conduct.
Finally, the judge found that, during Stout’s unemployment compen-
sation proceeding, the Respondent asserted two handbook rules as the
basis for Stout’s discharge. Citing Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia,
above, the judge found that the Respondent applied these rules to re-
strict Stout’s Sec. 7 activity in violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) because the
conduct alleged to have violated the rules was protected concerted
activity. The Respondent excepts to the judge’s finding of this viola-
tion, but does not state, either in its exceptions or supporting brief, any
grounds on which this purportedly erroneous finding should be over-
turned. Therefore, in accordance with Sec. 102.46(b)(2) of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, this bare exception is disregarded. See Holsum
de Puerto Rico, Inc., 344 NLRB 694 fn.1 (2005), enfd. 456 F.3d 265
(1st Cir. 2006).
2 In accordance with our decision in AdvoServ of New Jersey, Inc.,
363 NLRB No. 143 (2016), we shall amend the judge’s recommended
tax compensation and Social Security reporting remedy. In addition, in
accordance with our recent decision in King Soopers, 364 NLRB No.
93 (2016), we amend the remedy to provide that the Respondent shall
compensate affected employees for their search-for-work and interim
employment expenses regardless of whether those expenses exceed
interim earnings. Search-for-work and interim employment expenses
shall be calculated separately from taxable net backpay, with interest at
the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), com-
pounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356
NLRB 6 (2010). For the reasons stated in his separate opinion
in King Soopers, above, slip op. at 9–16, Member Miscimarra would
adhere to the Board’s former approach, treating search-for-work and
interim employment expenses as an offset against interim earnings.
We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to reflect these
remedial changes, and to conform to the violations found and with the
Board’s standard remedial language. We shall substitute a new notice
to conform to the Order as modified.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
(f) Discharging employees pursuant to the unlawful
handbook rule prohibiting insubordination or other disre-
spectful conduct.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, rescind
or revise the handbook rule prohibiting insubordination
or other disrespectful conduct.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, rescind
or revise the handbook rule prohibiting boisterous or
disruptive activity in the workplace.
(c) Furnish all current employees with inserts for the
current employee handbook that (1) advise employees
that the unlawful rules prohibiting insubordination or
other disrespectful conduct and boisterous or disruptive
activity in the workplace have been rescinded, or (2)
provide lawfully worded provisions on adhesive backing
that will cover the unlawful provisions; or publish and
distribute to employees revised handbooks that (1) do not
contain the unlawful rules, or (2) provide lawfully word-
ed provisions.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
James Stout full reinstatement to his former job or, if that
job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi-
tion, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights
or privileges previously enjoyed.
(e) Make James Stout whole for any loss of earnings
and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimina-
tion against him, in the manner set forth in the remedy
section of the judge’s decision as amended by this deci-
sion.
(f) Compensate James Stout for the adverse tax conse-
quences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay award,
and file with the Regional Director of Region 14, within
21 days of the date the amount of backpay is fixed, either
by agreement or Board order, a report allocating the
backpay award to the appropriate calendar year.
(g) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge of
James Stout, and within 3 days thereafter, notify him in
writing that this has been done and that his unlawful dis-
charge will not be used against him in any way.
(h) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(i) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in O’Fallon, Missouri, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”3 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 14,
after being signed by the Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site,
and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent custom-
arily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material. If the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Re-
spondent at any time since July 26, 2014.
(j) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 14 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps the Respondent has taken to
comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 8, 2016
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
I concur with the majority’s finding that Charging Par-
ty James Stout engaged in protected concerted activity
under the standard set forth in Meyers Industries, 281

3 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
COMPONENT BAR PRODUCTS 3
NLRB 882 (1986) (Meyers II),1 when he telephoned fel-
low employee Shawn Burgess to warn him that his job
was in jeopardy, and I agree that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or Act) when it discharged Stout for doing so.2 I
also agree with the judge and my colleagues that the Re-
spondent violated NLRA Section 8(a)(1) by telling Bur-
gess that Stout was discharged for engaging in protected
concerted activity. I do not agree, however, that telling
Stout he was discharged for engaging in protected con-
certed activity constituted a separate violation of the Act.
“Merely advising employees of the reason for their dis-
charge is ‘part of the res gestae of the unlawful termina-
tion, and is subsumed by that violation.’” Triple Play
Sports Bar & Grille, 361 NLRB No. 31, slip op. at 9 fn.
2 (2014) (Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Benesight, Inc., 337 NLRB 282, 285 (2001) (Chair-
man Hurtgen, dissenting in part)). I also disagree with
the majority’s finding that Stout’s conduct was “inher-
ently” concerted, a theory I reject for the reasons set forth
in my separate opinions in Hoodview Vending Co., 362
NLRB No. 81, slip op. at 5–7 (2015) (Member Misci-
marra, dissenting), and Alternative Energy Applications,
Inc., 361 NLRB No. 139, slip op. at 7–8 (2014) (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part).3
Regarding the majority’s finding that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining two work rules—
prohibiting “[i]nsubordination or other disrespectful con-
duct” and “[b]oisterous or disruptive activity in the
workplace”—I disagree with those violation findings,
and I also disagree with the standard the judge and my
colleagues apply in reaching those findings. Applying

1 Affd. sub nom. Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir 1987),
cert. denied 487 U.S. 1205 (1988).
2 Having found that Stout was unlawfully discharged for engaging
in protected concerted activity, I find it unnecessary to reach or pass on
the majority’s finding that Stout’s discharge was also unlawful under
Continental Group, Inc., 357 NLRB 409 (2011). Finding the discharge
unlawful on two grounds instead of one would not materially affect the
remedy.
3 As I explained in Hoodview Vending, the notion that conversations
about certain subjects are “inherently” concerted cannot be reconciled
with Meyers II, which requires that a conversation have an object of
group action in order to qualify as concerted activity. Meyers II distin-
guishes between conversations that look toward group action, which are
concerted, and mere griping, which is not. To deem a conversation
“inherently” concerted based solely on its subject matter erases this
distinction and thus contravenes Meyers II. In addition, the courts of
appeals have uniformly rejected the theory of “inherently” concerted
activity, see Trayco of South Carolina, Inc. v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 597 (4th
Cir. 1991), and Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center v.
NLRB, 81 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has criticized the theory as “nonsensical,”
“limitless,” and having “no good support in the law,” Aroostook Coun-
ty, 81 F.3d at 214. See Hoodview Vending, 362 NLRB No. 81, slip op.
at 5–6 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 NLRB 646
(2004) (Lutheran Heritage), the judge found the mainte-
nance of these rules unlawful on the basis that employees
would “reasonably construe” them to prohibit Section 7
activity.
Unlike my colleagues and the judge, I believe the
Board should not apply the “reasonably construe” stand-
ard. For the reasons I explained in William Beaumont
Hospital, 363 NLRB No. 162, slip op. at 7–24 (2016)
(Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting
in part), which are summarized below, I believe the Lu-
theran Heritage “reasonably construe” standard should
be overruled by the Board or repudiated by the courts. In
my view, the Board is required to evaluate an employer’s
workplace rules, policies and handbook provisions by
striking a “proper balance” that takes into account (i) the
legitimate justifications associated with the disputed
rules and (ii) any potential adverse impact on NLRA-
protected activity,4 and a “facially neutral” policy, rule or
handbook provision—defined as a rule that does not ex-
pressly restrict Section 7 activity, was not adopted in
response to NLRA-protected activity, and has not been
applied to restrict NLRA-protected activity—should be
declared unlawful only if the legitimate justifications an
employer may have for maintaining the rule are out-
weighed by its potential adverse impact on Section 7
activity. Applying this standard, I believe the Board
should find that the two rules described above are lawful.
A. The Board’s Lutheran Heritage “Reasonably Con-
strue” Test Should Be Overruled by the Board or Repu-
diated by the Courts
As addressed at greater length in my partial dissenting
opinion in William Beaumont,5 I believe that the Luther-
an Heritage “reasonably construe” test should be over-
ruled by the Board or repudiated by the courts. The “rea-
sonably construe” standard defies common sense and is
contrary to the Act in numerous respects. It entails a
single-minded consideration of NLRA-protected rights—
even though the risk of intruding on NLRA rights might

4 See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1967)
(referring to the Board’s “duty to strike the proper balance between . . .
asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee rights in
light of the Act and its policy”). In performing the balancing discussed
in the text, I believe the Board must also take into account other con-
siderations, which may include, depending on the case, reasonable
distinctions between types of rules and justifications, evidence regard-
ing the particular industry or work setting, specific events that may bear
on the disputed rule, and the possibility that the rule may be lawfully
maintained even though application of the rule against NLRA-protected
conduct may be unlawful. See William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 15,
18-20 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5 William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 8–10, 11–18 (Member
Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
be “comparatively slight”6—without taking into account
the many legitimate justifications associated with par-
ticular policies, rules and handbook provisions, which
may be associated with important justifications such as
preventing unlawful harassment, reducing the risk of
workplace violence, or avoiding potentially fatal acci-
dents. As I explained in William Beaumont:
 Lutheran Heritage is contrary to Supreme Court
precedent establishing that, whenever work re-
quirements are alleged to violate the NLRA, the
Board must give substantial consideration to the
justifications associated with the rule, rather than
only considering a rule’s potential adverse effect
on NLRA rights.7
 Lutheran Heritage is contradicted by the NLRB’s
own cases establishing that numerous work re-
quirements and restrictions are lawful—for exam-
ple, no-solicitation and no-distribution rules, off-
duty employee access rules, “just cause” provi-
sions and attendance requirements—
notwithstanding the fact that each would fail the
Lutheran Heritage “reasonably construe” test.8
 The Board has engaged in a balancing of compet-
ing interests—in the above cases and others span-
ning more than six decades—without disregarding

6 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, supra, 388 U.S. at 33–34.
7 See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797–798
(1945) (describing the need to balance the “undisputed right of self-
organization assured to employees” and “the equally undisputed right
of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments,” rights that
“are not unlimited in the sense that they can be exercised without re-
gard to any duty which the existence of rights in others may place upon
employer or employee,” because the “[o]pportunity to organize and
proper discipline are both essential elements in a balanced society”);
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 229 (1963) (referring to the
“delicate task” of “weighing the interests of employees in concerted
activity against the interest of the employer in operating his business in
a particular manner and of balancing . . . the intended consequences
upon employee rights against the business ends to be served by the
employer’s conduct”); Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 3–-34 (referring to the
Board’s “duty to strike the proper balance between . . . asserted busi-
ness justifications and the invasion of employee rights in light of the
Act and its policy”); Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47
(1942) (“[T]he Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the
policies of the [Act] so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other
and equally important Congressional objectives.”). Cf. First National
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 680–681 (1981) (“[T]he
Act is not intended to serve either party’s individual interest, but to
foster in a neutral manner a system in which the conflict between these
interests may be resolved.”). See generally William Beaumont, supra,
slip op. at 11–12 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
8 See William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 12 (Member Miscimarra,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
the justifications associated with particular rules
and requirements.9
 Under Lutheran Heritage, the Board has invalidat-
ed many facially neutral work rules merely be-
cause they are ambiguous. However, the Board’s
requirement of linguistic precision when applying
Lutheran Heritage is contrary to the permissive
treatment that Congress, the Board and the courts
have afforded to “just cause” provisions, benefit
plans, and other employment-related requirements
throughout the Act’s history.10 Moreover, given
that many ambiguities are inherent in the NLRA
itself, it is unreasonable to find that reasonable
work requirements violate the NLRA merely be-
cause employers cannot discharge the impossible
task of anticipating and carving out every possible
overlap with some potential NLRA-protected ac-
tivity.
 The Lutheran Heritage “reasonably construe” test
stems from several false premises that are contrary
to the NLRA, the most important of which is a
misguided belief that unless employers formulate
written policies, rules and handbooks that can nev-
er be construed in a manner that conflicts with
some type of hypothetical NLRA protection, em-
ployees are best served by not having employment
policies, rules and handbooks at all. In this re-
spect, Lutheran Heritage requires perfection that
literally has become the enemy of the good.11
 The Lutheran Heritage “reasonably construe” test
improperly limits the Board’s discretion, contrary
to the Board’s responsibility to apply the “general
provisions of the Act to the complexities of indus-
trial life.” 12 It does not permit the Board to afford
greater protection to those Section 7 activities that
are central to the Act (as compared to other types
of activity that may lie at the periphery of the Act
or rarely if ever occur), to make reasonable distinc-
tions among different types of justifications under-
lying particular rules, to differentiate between dif-
ferent industries or work settings, or to take into
account discrete events that, if considered, may

9 Id., slip op. at 12–13, 20–21 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
10 Id., slip op. at 8, 13–14 & fns. 29-31 (Member Miscimarra, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
11 Id., slip op. at 8, 13-15 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
12 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 236; see also NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266–267 (1975) (“The responsibility to
adapt the Act to changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the
Board.”).
COMPONENT BAR PRODUCTS 5
demonstrate that the justifications for certain work
requirements outweigh their potential impact on
some type of NLRA-protected activity.13
 If a particular work rule exists for important rea-
sons that require the Board to conclude that “the
rule on its face is not unlawful,”14 Lutheran Herit-
age fails to recognize that the Board may find that
the employer has violated Section 8(a)(1) by ap-
plying the rule to restrict NLRA-protected activi-
ty.15 Here as well, Lutheran Heritage prevents the
Board from discharging its duty to apply the “gen-
eral provisions of the Act to the complexities of
industrial life.”16
 The Lutheran Heritage “reasonably construe” test
has been exceptionally difficult to apply, many
Board decisions have disregarded important quali-
fications set forth in Lutheran Heritage itself,17
and Lutheran Heritage has consistently produced
arbitrary results.18

13 See William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 9, 15 (Member Misci-
marra, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14 Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center v. NLRB, 81
F.3d 209, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
15 In Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center, supra, the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated:
In the absence of any evidence that [the employer] is imposing an un-
reasonably broad interpretation of the rule upon employees, the
Board's determination to the contrary is unjustified. If an occasion
arises where [the employer] is attempting to use the rule as the basis
for imposing questionable restrictions upon employees' communica-
tions, the employees may seek review of the Company's actions at that
time. However, the rule on its face is not unlawful.
Id.; see also Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation v. NLRB,
253 F.3d 10, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that the Board cannot find a
facially neutral policy unlawful based upon “fanciful” speculation, and
the Board must “consider the context in which the rule was applied and
its actual impact on employees”). See William Beaumont, supra, slip
op. at 19–20 & fn. 60 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
16 NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 236; NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 266–267. See generally William Beau-
mont, supra, slip op. at 12 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
17 See William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 13–14 fn. 29; id., slip op.
at 18 fn. 55 (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
18 Compare Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation v. NLRB,
253 F.3d at 27 (finding it lawful to maintain rule prohibiting “abusive
or threatening language to anyone on company premises”) and Luther-
an Heritage, 343 NLRB at 646–647 (finding it lawful to maintain rule
prohibiting “abusive or profane language”) with Flamingo Hilton-
Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287 (1999) (finding it unlawful to maintain rule
prohibiting “loud, abusive or foul language”). Also, compare Palms
Hotel & Casino, 344 NLRB 1363, 1363 (2005) (finding it lawful to
maintain rule prohibiting “conduct which is . . . injurious, offensive,
threatening, intimidating, coercing, or interfering with” other employ-
ees) with Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998) (finding it
As I stated in William Beaumont, our experience with
the Lutheran Heritage “reasonably construe” standard
“has revealed its substantial limitations, as well as its
departure from the type of balancing required by Su-
preme Court precedent and the Board’s own decisions.”19
For the above reasons, Lutheran Heritage should be
overruled by the Board, and if the Board fails to do so, it
should be repudiated by the courts.
B. The Rules Prohibiting “Insubordination and Other
Disrespectful Conduct” and “Boisterous and Other Dis-
ruptive Conduct” Should Be Deemed Lawful
Turning first to the prohibition against
“[i]nsubordination and other disrespectful conduct,” this
rule cannot be regarded as an 8(a)(1) violation under the
balancing test set forth in William Beaumont. The risk of
this rule affecting the exercise of Section 7 rights is com-
paratively slight, since the rule is clearly aimed at unpro-
tected conduct; and the legitimate justifications for the
rule are substantial. Requiring that directives be obeyed
and disrespectful conduct avoided is essential for pre-
serving supervisory authority and maintaining order,
discipline, and production.
I would reach the same result under the Lutheran Her-
itage “reasonably construe” standard. Applying that
standard, the judge and my colleagues agree that em-
ployers may lawfully prohibit “insubordination,” but
they believe employees would reasonably construe “oth-
er disrespectful conduct” to include Section 7 activity. I
respectfully disagree. In context, I believe employees
would reasonably construe the phrase “other disrespect-
ful conduct” to refer to misconduct of the same kind or
nature as “insubordination,” and employees would not
interpret the rule as a prohibition against Section 7 activi-
ty. See Casino San Pablo, 361 NLRB No. 148, slip op.
at 10–11 (2014) (Member Johnson, dissenting in part);
see also Community Hospitals of Central California v.
NLRB, 335 F.3d 1079, 1088–1089 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(finding that “‘other disrespectful conduct’ . . . is clearly
conduct of a piece with ‘insubordination’” and character-

unlawful to maintain rule prohibiting “false, vicious, profane or mali-
cious statements”), enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See generally
William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 15–18 (Member Miscimarra,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In part, the arbitrary results
associated with application of the Lutheran Heritage “reasonably con-
strue” standard have resulted from many Board decisions that have
disregarded important qualifications set forth in Lutheran Heritage
itself. See William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 18 fn. 55 (Member
Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19 William Beaumont, supra, slip op. at 18 (Member Miscimarra,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
izing the Board’s contrary conclusion as “implausi-
ble”).20
The rule prohibiting “boisterous and other disruptive
conduct” presents a closer issue. Section 7 activity need
not be “boisterous” or “disruptive,” but it sometimes is.
Therefore, the existence of a rule banning “boisterous
and other disruptive conduct” has the potential to ad-
versely affect NLRA-protected activity. On the other
hand, this type of rule clearly applies most directly to the
enhancement of workplace productivity and safety—
which are both substantial interests, particularly in a
manufacturing facility such as the Respondent’s. Thus,
similar to a prohibition of roughhousing, this rule would
discourage conduct that could result in injury to the em-
ployee engaging in “boisterous” or “disruptive” behavior
and/or an injury to others.
On balance, especially because the Board at present is
merely considering maintenance of the rule (i.e., there is
no allegation that it expressly prohibits NLRA-protected
activity, or was adopted in response to such activity, or
has been applied against such activity), I would find the
legitimate interests advanced by the rule outweigh the
potential adverse impact of the rule on Section 7 activity.
In this regard, I note that the Board previously has found
similar language lawful. See Tradesmen International,
338 NLRB 460, 460–461 (2002) (finding lawful rule that
prohibited “disloyal, disruptive, competitive, or damag-
ing” conduct). Moreover, I believe a different situation
would likely be presented if we were evaluating the Re-
spondent’s application of the rule to restrict Section 7
activity, but that is not the case here. See fn. 15 supra.
Accordingly, as set forth above, I respectfully dissent
in part from, and I also concur in part with, the majori-
ty’s decision.
Dated, Washington, D.C. November 8, 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra Member
______________________________________
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

20 The rule at issue in Community Hospitals of Central California
prohibited “[i]nsubordination, refusing to follow directions, obey legit-
imate requests or orders, or other disrespectful conduct towards a ser-
vice integrator, service coordinator, or other individual.”
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule in our employee hand-
book that prohibits insubordination or other disrespectful
conduct.
WE WILL NOT maintain a rule in our employee hand-
book that prohibits boisterous or disruptive activity in the
workplace.
WE WILL NOT enforce or apply handbook rules in a
manner that restricts employees’ Section 7 activity, in-
cluding by asserting the rules as a basis for discharging
an employee for engaging in protected concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that they or other em-
ployees are discharged because they engaged in protected
concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT discharge you because you engage in
protected concerted activity with other employees.
WE WILL NOT discharge you pursuant to an unlawful
handbook rule prohibiting insubordination or other disre-
spectful conduct.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
rescind or revise the rule in our employee handbook that
prohibits insubordination or other disrespectful conduct.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
rescind or revise the rule in our employee handbook that
prohibits boisterous or disruptive activity in the work-
place.
WE WILL furnish all current employees with inserts for
the current employee handbook that (1) advise that the
unlawful provisions have been rescinded, or (2) provide
lawfully worded provisions on adhesive backing that will
cover the unlawful provisions; or publish and distribute
to employees revised employee handbooks that (1) do
not contain the unlawful provisions, or (2) provide law-
fully worded provisions.
WE WILL, within 14 days of the date of this Order, of-
fer James Stout full reinstatement to his former job or, if
that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
COMPONENT BAR PRODUCTS 7
position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make James Stout whole for any loss of earn-
ings and other benefits resulting from his unlawful dis-
charge, less any net interim earnings, plus interest, plus
reasonable search-for-work and interim employment
expenses.
WE WILL compensate James Stout for the adverse tax
consequences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay
award, and WE WILL file with the Regional Director for
Region 14, within 21 days of the date the amount of
backpay is fixed, either by agreement or Board order, a
report allocating the backpay award to the appropriate
calendar year.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful dis-
charge of James Stout, and WE WILL, within 3 days there-
after, notify him in writing that this has been done and
that the discharge will not be used against him in any
way.
COMPONENT BAR PRODUCTS, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/14–CA–145064 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Rochelle K. Balentine, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Terry L. Potter, Esq. (Husch Blackwell, LLP), of
St. Louis, Missouri, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CHARLES J. MUHL, Administrative Law Judge. This case
arises out of a phone conversation between two employees,
during which Charging Party James Stout told his coworker
Shawn Burgess that a supervisor was upset with Burgess and
Burgess might not have a job. The General Counsel’s com-
plaint principally alleges that the phone conversation constitut-
ed protected, concerted activity and Component Bar Products,
Inc. (the Respondent) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act), by discharging Stout because of
that activity. The Respondent denies that the conversation was
protected, and asserts it discharged Stout because he exceeded
his authority by telling Burgess he was fired.
I conducted a trial on the complaint on June 4, 2015, in St.
Louis, Missouri. I have considered the briefs filed by the par-
ties on July 9, 2015. I conclude that, pursuant to longstanding
Board precedent, Stout’s warning to Burgess that his job was at
risk constitutes protected, concerted activity. I also find that
the Respondent justified its discharge of Stout, in part, on his
protected conduct violating an unlawful disrespectful conduct
rule the Respondent maintained in its employee handbook.
Finally, I hold that the Respondent terminated Stout solely due
to his protected conduct. Accordingly, Stout’s discharge vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1).
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, I make the following findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent is engaged in the manufacture and sale of
precision machined products for the automotive and other in-
dustries from a facility in O’Fallon, Missouri. In conducting its
business operations, the Respondent annually sells and ships
from that facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly to
points outside the State of Missouri. As a result, and at all ma-
terial times, I find that the Respondent has been an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act and is subject to the Board’s jurisdiction, as
the Respondent admits in its answer to the complaint.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
At the Respondent’s manufacturing facility, James Stout be-
gan working as a quality technician, or roving parts inspector,
in July 2014. He was responsible for moving from machine to
machine and verifying the quality of parts being made by ma-
chine operators. The Respondent’s supervisors include Chief
Operating Officer Darrel Keesling; Plant Manager Charles
Grant Yeakey; Assistant Production Manager Steven Burke;
Night Supervisor Mike Pingle; and Human Resources Manager
Elizabeth Richards.
A. The Respondent’s “Personal Conduct & Disciplinary
Action” Policy
From March 13, 2014, through June 3, 2015, the Respondent
maintained a personal conduct and disciplinary action policy in
its associate handbook. The policy listed rules of conduct,
infractions of which subjected employees to discipline, up to
and including termination for a single offense. The examples
included:
 Insubordination or other disrespectful conduct
 Unauthorized disclosure of business “secrets” or con-
fidential information
 Boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace
 Violation of company policies
On August 1, 2014, Stout signed an acknowledgement form
indicating he had received a copy of the handbook and that it
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
was his responsibility to read and abide by the policies therein.1
On June 3, 2015, the day before the hearing in this case, the
Respondent posted a revised version of its handbook in the
employee break room at its O’Fallon facility.2 (R. Exh. 6.)
The Respondent deleted the boisterous activity and violation of
company policies rules. It also changed the insubordination
rule to read: “[b]eing insubordinate, threatening, intimidating,
disrespectful, or assaulting a manager/supervisor, co-worker,
customer or vendor will result in discipline.” Finally, the Re-
spondent added the following to the end of the policy: “None
of these rules or any provision of the handbook is intended to
interfere with employee's (sic) rights under the National Labor
Relations Act.”
B. The Respondent’s Discharge of James Stout
1. Stout’s phone call to operator Shawn Burgess on January 20
One of Stout’s coworkers at the Respondent’s facility was
operator Shawn Burgess, who was nicknamed “turbo” and “the
kid.” At the beginning of January, Burgess gave the Respond-
ent his 2-week notice after deciding to move to Michigan.
However, Burgess changed his mind and asked Plant Manager
Yeakey if he could revoke his resignation. Yeakey agreed and
Burgess was assigned to the night shift starting January 19.
On that date, Stout was working his regular, combined day
and night shift. Burgess did not show up for work. Stout asked
Pingle, the night supervisor, if Burgess came in. Pingle told
Stout no and that he had not heard from Burgess.
On January 20, Burgess again did not show up for work.
Stout asked Yeakey what was going on with the kid. Yeakey
responded what kid? When Stout said turbo, Yeakey respond-
ed “He doesn’t work here anymore.” (Tr. 26, 80.)
Worried about Burgess after what Yeakey said, Stout decid-
ed to call Burgess to suggest Burgess call in and try to save his
job. While working, Stout used his cell phone and called Bur-
gess at about 12:15 p.m. that day. Stout asked Burgess what
was going on with him. Burgess responded that he had been
sick. Stout responded, “I don’t think you have a job and
[Yeakey’s] upset with you.” (Tr. 28.) Burgess then asked
Stout what was going on and why Yeakey was upset with him.
Without waiting for Stout’s response, Burgess began hollering
that he had to call someone and hung up on Stout. The entire
conversation lasted about 2 minutes.3

1 At the hearing, I granted counsel for the General Counsel’s oral
motion to amend the complaint to include allegations that the Respond-
ent’s maintenance of the boisterous activity rule, as well as its state-
ment in the handbook that “use of profanity is undesirable in all set-
tings,” both violated Sec. 8(a)(1). (Tr. 95–97.) In her posthearing
brief, counsel moved to withdraw the allegation regarding the profanity
rule, and I approve that withdrawal. I also grant counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel’s motion to correct pages 19 and 20 of the transcript to
insert a “yes” response at line 23 of p. 19 that was inadvertently omit-
ted.
2 All dates hereinafter are in 2015, unless otherwise specified.
3 Both Stout and Burgess testified credibly at the hearing concerning
what was said during their phone conversation. (Tr. 28, 52–53.) Their
accounts were consistent and contained no meaningful conflicts, even if
the exact words each recalled were not identical. Because Stout’s
testimony regarding the conversation is corroborated by his contempo-
Burgess then called the Respondent and left a voice message
saying twice that he did not appreciate an employee calling him
and telling him he was fired. Five minutes later, Burgess called
and spoke to Yeakey. Burgess repeated to Yeakey that he was
upset Stout had called him and told him he was fired. He told
Yeakey that it was management’s job, not an employee’s, to
make that kind of call.
2. The Respondent’s meetings with Stout
At 12:30 p.m. that same day, Yeakey and Burke met with
Stout. Yeakey asked Stout if he had called Burgess and Stout
said yes. Burke then asked Stout what he was doing calling
Burgess when he was not on break time. Stout told them he
made the call because, after Yeakey told Stout that Burgess did
not work there, Stout was worried about Burgess and wanted to
let him know what was going on. Stout also told Yeakey and
Burke that he knew Burgess had not called in and that he need-
ed to do so to save his job. Stout reiterated that he just told
Burgess he did not think Burgess had a job and Yeakey was
upset with him, and that was all he could say before Burgess
hung up on him. Yeakey told Stout he did not know what he
was going to do.4
Thereafter, Keesling, Richards, Yeakey, and Burke met to
discuss the situation. They talked about the fact that the inci-
dent “was causing a big to-do in the day’s activity.” (Tr. 93.)
This included Yeakey and Burke being pulled off the produc-
tion floor for these meetings. (Tr. 69, 74.) It also included a
couple of additional employees being informed about what had
occurred, due to security concerns related to a possibility that
an angry Burgess would show up at the workplace. (Tr. 68,
74.) Richards testified:
Everybody was just all up in arms. There was a lot of talk
that [Stout] had called [Burgess] and upset him, and there
were a lot of conversations with employees trying to find out
what had gone on. Everybody was trying to settle it down
and trying to figure out what happened.
Ultimately, they determined that Stout would be discharged for
“misconduct,” because he had involved himself in another em-
ployee’s personnel activities. (Tr. 93.)
Only 2 hours after Stout’s meeting with Burke and Yeakey,
Stout met with Keesling, Richards, Yeakey, and Burke. Kees-
ling said it had come to his attention that Stout called Burgess
and told him he was fired. Keesling then told Stout it was not
his place and none of his business to call anybody and tell them
they are fired. Keesling also stated that Burgess had called in
and interrupted business. Keesling told Stout both he and Bur-
gess were fired.

raneous submission to the Missouri Division of Employment Security
(R. Exh. 1), I specifically credit that testimony as the actual words said
during the January 20 phone conversation between Stout and Burgess.
4 I credit Stout’s testimony regarding what was said in this meeting.
(Tr. 28–29.) Initially in his testimony, Yeakey attempted to deny that
Stout told him he was trying to get Burgess to call Yeakey to save his
job. When confronted by counsel for the General Counsel with prior,
sworn testimony he gave during a hearing on Stout’s application for
unemployment benefits, Yeakey then changed course and conceded
that Stout told him this. (Tr. 81–82.)
COMPONENT BAR PRODUCTS 9
3. The Respondent’s subsequent assertions regarding
Stout’s discharge
On or about January 26, Stout called Keesling and asked
why he had been discharged. Keesling told Stout that it was
misconduct calling another employee and telling them that they
were fired.
On January 27, Richards submitted a written explanation on
behalf of the Respondent to the Missouri Division of Employ-
ment Security (MDES), which was handling Stout’s application
for unemployment benefits. (GC Exh. 4.) The explanation
stated:
Mr. Stout was terminated on January 20, 2015 for “miscon-
duct in the work place.”
Mr. Stout took improper action that was not his affair, called a
co-worker and told the co-worker he was fired. Per our Asso-
ciate Handbook: a.) Insubordination or other disrespectful
conduct is grounds for termination, b.) unauthorized disclo-
sure of business secrets or confidential information and c.) vi-
olation of company policies are grounds for dismissal.
Mr. Stout signed a document on 8/1/2014 stating he had read
the “Associate Handbook” and would abide to the company’s
rules and regulations.
In early February, Burgess went to pick up his belongings
and spoke to Yeakey. Burgess again said he was upset that
Stout, another employee, had called to tell him he did not have
a job anymore and the call should have come from manage-
ment. Yeakey responded, “yeah, that pissed me off too. I fired
him for it.” (Tr. 54.)
3. The Respondent’s alleged cell phone use policy
On March 17 during the hearing on Stout’s application for
unemployment benefits, the Respondent, through Richards,
stated for the first time that Stout was discharged, in part, for
using his cell phone while working. (Tr. 71–73.)
At the hearing in this case, witness testimony conflicted as to
whether the Respondent had a policy which banned employee
cell phone use on the job. Both Stout and Burgess testified that
the Respondent had no such policy and in fact, tolerated such
use. Stout stated that supervisors and employees often used
their phones during work to do things like order lunch, listen to
music, and text—all without repercussion. (Tr. 31–32, 35.) He
also described how he believed it was inappropriate for produc-
tion employees to talk on their phones during work time, but
that the Respondent had no company policy which prohibited
that conduct. (Tr. 32, 37.) Burgess stated that, when Burke
once observed him texting on his cell phone, Burke told him
that he was “not really going to bitch” about Burgess being on
his phone, as long as Burgess was not making a habit of it and
doing his job. (Tr. 57.)
I credit this testimony of Stout and Burgess, which I found
frank and believable. Moreover, Richards, the Respondent’s
own human resources manager, implicitly corroborated the
testimony. Richards testified that, during Stout’s unemploy-
ment benefits hearing, she stated only that the Respondent “dis-
courage[s] all use of cell phones during work hours.” (Tr. 72,
76.) This statement strongly suggests that no formal policy or
ban existed. Moreover, the Respondent presented no evidence
of a written cell phone use policy or records demonstrating
employees had been disciplined for improper cell phone use in
the past. Although the personal conduct policy prohibits “un-
authorized use of telephones, mail system, or other company
owned equipment,” the reference to “other company owned
equipment” establishes that the ban applies only to company
telephones, not employees’ personal cell phones.
I do not credit Yeakey’s testimony, which Stout denied, that
employees had to seek permission from a supervisor to make a
call during work, as well as that Stout was aware of this re-
quirement and had sought permission multiple times in the past.
(Tr. 35, 84–85.) Yeakey was openly hostile towards Stout on
the witness stand. He also testified evasively and inconsistently
concerning his conversations with Stout and the reason for his
discharge. (Tr. 79–83, 87–88.)
For all these reasons, I conclude that the Respondent does
not maintain or enforce any policy prohibiting employee cell
phone use while working.
Analysis
I. THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL’S COMPLAINT
ALLEGATIONS
In its brief, the Respondent asserts, without citation to any
Board law, that the General Counsel’s complaint should be
dismissed, because it does not set forth facts sufficient to show
that Stout was discharged for engaging in “inherently concert-
ed” activity.5 (R. Br., pp. 1–2, 9–10.) See Hoodview Vending
Co., 362 NLRB No. 81 (2015). The Respondent also takes
issue with the General Counsel not identifying legal theories in
the complaint, as well as adding, but not pleading, the “inher-
ently concerted” theory after the issuance of the complaint and
prior to the hearing.
Section 102.15 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations re-
quires the General Counsel to include in a complaint:
(a) a clear and concise statement of the facts upon which as-
sertion of jurisdiction by the Board is predicated, and (b) a
clear and concise description of the acts which are claimed to
constitute unfair labor practices, including, where known, the
approximate dates and places of such acts and the names of
respondent’s agents or other representatives by whom com-
mitted.
Complaint paragraph 6(B) alleges that the Respondent dis-
charged Stout on January 20, 2015, because he “engaged in
concerted activities with other employees for the purposes of
mutual aid and protection by actions and conduct including
talking to another employee about terms and conditions of em-
ployment, and to discourage employees from engaging in these
or other protected concerted activities.” (emphasis added) (GC

5 The Respondent incorrectly states in its brief that it moved to dis-
miss the complaint at the hearing on this same basis. Rather, after
counsel for the General Counsel’s case-in-chief, the Respondent argued
that dismissal of the complaint was warranted, because the evidence
presented was insufficient to establish that Stout engaged in protected,
concerted activity and, in any event, Burgess had disavowed Stout’s
actions. (Tr. 90–91.) I denied that motion.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
Exh. 1(e).) This allegation contains a clear and concise de-
scription of the claimed unfair labor practice with respect to the
discharge and meets the requirements of Section 102.15.
Furthermore, the General Counsel was not required, in the
complaint or in any other discussion, to advise the Respondent
of the specific legal theories that would be advanced to estab-
lish Stout’s conduct was protected, concerted activity. Hawai-
ian Dredging Construction Co., 362 NLRB No. 10, slip op. at 2
fn. 6 (2015); see also Davis Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 2 F.3d
1162, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, prior to the hear-
ing, counsel for the General Counsel told the Respondent’s
counsel that she intended to argue Stout’s discharge was unlaw-
ful pursuant to both Hoodview Vending, supra, and The Conti-
nental Group, 357 NLRB 409 (2011). The facts addressing
both theories largely are the same and the Respondent had the
opportunity to present evidence and fully litigate both theories
at the hearing. The Respondent has identified no prejudice to
the presentation of its defense.
Finally, the Respondent argues that the complaint allegations
are insufficient under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), setting forth pleading requirements under
the federal rules. However, it long has been recognized that
Board proceedings are governed by the Administrative Proce-
dures Act and the Board’s Rules and Regulations, not the
FRCP. Armstrong Cork Co., 112 NLRB 1420, 1420–1421
(1955). Sections 101.10 and 102.39 of the Board’s Rules con-
tain the only references to the FRCP and dictate that federal
rules of evidence should control in NLRB proceedings, so far
as practicable.
Therefore, I conclude the General Counsel’s complaint com-
plies with Section 102.15 of the Board’s Rules and deny the
Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
II. THE RESPONDENT’S HANDBOOK RULES
The General Counsel’s amended complaint alleges that the
Respondent’s maintenance of rules prohibiting “insubordina-
tion and other disrespectful conduct” (disrespectful conduct
rule) and “boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace”
(boisterous activity rule) both violate Section 8(a)(1), because
employees reasonably could construe these bans to include
protected, Section 7 activity.
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) when it maintains a
work rule that reasonably tends to chill employees in the exer-
cise of their Section 7 rights. Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB 646, 646–647 (2004); Lafayette Park Ho-
tel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998). Where the rule is likely to
have a chilling effect on Section 7 rights, the maintenance of
the rule is an unfair labor practice, even absent evidence of
enforcement. In determining whether a challenged rule is un-
lawful, the rule must be given a reasonable reading, particular
phrases must not be read in isolation, and improper interference
with employee rights must not be presumed. The first area of
inquiry is whether the rule explicitly restricts activities protect-
ed by Section 7. If it does, the rule is unlawful. If it does not,
the rule is unlawful only upon the showing of one of the fol-
lowing: (1) employees would reasonably construe the language
to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was promulgated in
response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to
restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.
As to the Respondent’s disrespectful conduct rule, the Board
recently found facially unlawful a nearly identical rule which
prohibited “insubordination or other disrespectful conduct (in-
cluding failure to cooperate fully with security, supervisors, and
managers).” Casino San Pablo, 361 NLRB No. 148 (2014).
The Board noted that, although rules solely prohibiting “insub-
ordination” are lawful, the inclusion of “other disrespectful
conduct” encompassed Section 7 activity that supervisors may
perceive as an affront to their authority. This includes concert-
ed complaints about supervisors or working conditions. The
rule here is no different. Perhaps recognizing this, the Re-
spondent makes no argument in its brief as to why this rule is
lawful. Thus, the maintenance of the disrespectful conduct rule
violates Section 8(a)(1).
With respect to the boisterous activity rule, the Board again
had recent occasion to consider a similar rule regarding work-
place disruptions. In Purple Communications, Inc., 361 NLRB
No. 43, slip op. at 1, 6 (2014), the Board concluded that a rule
prohibiting employees from “causing, creating, or participating
in a disruption of any kind during working hours on Company
property” was unlawful. The Board noted that the rule there
covered employees’ protected right to engage in a work stop-
page, activity that unquestionably disrupts the workplace. The
broad ban on boisterous activity here likewise includes that and
other Section 7 conduct.
Despite subsequently deleting this prohibition in its hand-
book revision, the Respondent argues that the rule is lawful
pursuant to the Board’s decisions in Tradesmen International,
338 NLRB 460, 460–461 (2002) (rule prohibiting “disloyal,
disruptive, competitive, or damaging conduct”) and Lafayette
Park Hotel, supra, 326 NLRB at 825–826 (rule prohibiting
“[b]eing uncooperative with supervisors, employees, guests
and/or regulatory agencies or otherwise engaging in conduct
that does not support the [company’s] goals or objectives”). I
find these cases and the rules therein distinguishable. The
Tradesmen rule also contained specific examples of prohibited
conduct, including illegal acts in restraint of trade and employ-
ment with another organization while employed at the compa-
ny. The rule here contains no such examples or other limita-
tions. The Lafayette Park rule is targeted to conduct contradict-
ing the employer’s goals or objectives, limiting language that is
not a part of the broader rule here.
Therefore, I likewise conclude the maintenance of the bois-
terous activity rule violates Section 8(a)(1).
I also find that the Respondent did not effectively repudiate
its unlawful maintenance of these handbook rules. A proper
repudiation must be timely, unambiguous, specific in nature to
the coercive conduct, and free from other proscribed illegal
conduct. Boch Honda, 362 NLRB No. 83, slip op. at 1 fn. 3
(2015); Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138,
138–139 (1978). The repudiation also must be adequately pub-
lished to the employees involved, while giving them assurances
that, in the future, the employer will not interfere with the exer-
cise of their Section 7 rights. In this case, the Respondent did
nothing more than post its revised handbook in the employee
COMPONENT BAR PRODUCTS 11
break room, more than 4 months after Stout was discharged and
2 months after the complaint issued in this case. It provided no
notification to employees of the prior, unlawful handbook pro-
visions it maintained. The Respondent’s actions are insuffi-
cient to meet the Passavant Memorial repudiation require-
ments.
III. THE RESPONDENT’S DISCHARGE OF JAMES STOUT
The General Counsel advances two, separate legal theories in
support of the complaint’s allegation that the Respondent’s
discharge of Stout violated Section 8(a)(1). The first is that the
Respondent discharged Stout pursuant to its unlawful disre-
spectful conduct rule for activity that either was protected and
concerted, or otherwise implicates the concerns underlying
Section 7 of the Act. See The Continental Group, supra; Dou-
ble Eagle Hotel & Casino, 341 NLRB 112, 112 fn. 3 (2004).
Second, the General Counsel argues that Stout’s phone call to
Burgess constituted inherently concerted, and protected, activi-
ty and the Respondent unlawfully discharged Stout solely for
that phone call. Hoodview Vending Co., supra, 362 NLRB No.
81, slip op. at 1 fn. 1.
A. Stout’s Phone Conversation with Burgess Constituted Pro-
tected, Concerted Activity
Under either of the General Counsel’s theories, the case
hinges on whether Stout’s phone call to Burgess was protected
by the Act.
Section 7 of the Act protects employee conduct that is both
“concerted” and engaged in for “mutual aid and protection.”
More specifically, the Board repeatedly has held that an em-
ployee’s warning to another employee that the latter’s job is at
risk constitutes protected, concerted activity. Food Services of
America, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 123, slip op. at 2–4 (2014);
Tracer Protection Services, 328 NLRB 734, 740–741 (1999);
Jhirmack Enterprises, 283 NLRB 609, 609 fn. 2 (1987). In
Food Services, employee Rubio told her coworker Aparicio that
Aparicio might be discharged, because their supervisor had
criticized Aparicio’s job performance and berated Rubio for
recommending Aparicio for employment. In Jhirmack, em-
ployee Allison advised her coworker Ramsey about complaints
that other employees made to management about Ramsey’s job
performance. A common thread in both cases was that Rubio
and Allison were motivated to speak to their coworkers by a
desire to encourage them to take corrective action to retain their
employment. The Board concluded the employees were en-
gaged in protected, concerted activity when warning their
coworkers they might lose their jobs.
In light of this precedent, Stout’s conversation with Burgess
undoubtedly constitutes protected, concerted activity. Stout
told Burgess that Yeakey was upset with him and that Burgess
might not have a job. Stout did so out of a concern that Bur-
gess would be discharged and needed to call in to save his job,
a motivation he contemporaneously explained to Yeakey and
Burke in their meeting on January 20. The conversation be-
tween the two was inherently concerted, because it dealt with
Burgess’ job security. It also satisfied Section 7’s requirement
of “mutual aid and protection,” because Stout was attempting to
protect Burgess’ employment.
Relying on Alleluia Cushion Co., Inc., 221 NLRB 999, 1000
(1975), the Respondent argues that Stout’s conduct was not
concerted, because Burgess disavowed Stout’s actions. How-
ever, Alleluia is no longer valid precedent, as the Board over-
ruled it and adopted its current definition of concerted activity
in Meyers Industries, 268 NLRB 493, 496 (1984) (Meyers I),
and Meyers Industries, 281 NLRB 882 (1986) (Meyers II).
Whether or not Burgess disavowed Stout’s representations is
irrelevant to the legal issues presented here.
To the extent the Respondent’s argument suggests Stout’s
action was not concerted because Burgess responded angrily to
Stout telling him he might not have a job, the Board rejected
that argument in both Food Services and Jhirmack. The fact
that an employee’s statements annoy or disturb a coworker does
not render the conversation unprotected. Ryder Transporta-
tions Services, 341 NLRB 761, 761 (2004).
The Respondent also argues that the Board’s “inherently
concerted” activity doctrine cannot rationally coexist with the
definition of concerted activity adopted in Meyers I and Meyers
II, and urges me to follow the rejection of this doctrine by the
U.S. Courts of Appeals for both the D.C. and Fourth Circuits.
See Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center v.
NLRB, 81 F.3d 209, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Trayco of South
Carolina, Inc. v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1991) (un-
published disposition). I decline to do so. A judge’s duty is to
apply established Board precedent which the U.S. Supreme
Court has not reversed. Austin Fire Equipment, LLC, 360
NLRB No. 131, slip op. at 2 fn. 6 (2014). In Hoodview Vend-
ing, supra, a Board majority recently reaffirmed that discus-
sions about job security are inherently concerted and specifical-
ly rejected the Respondent’s argument.
As a result, I conclude that Stout’s conversation with Bur-
gess on January 20 constituted protected, concerted activity.
B. The Respondent’s Discharge of Stout Violates Section
8(a)(1) Pursuant to the Board’s “Double Eagle” Rule
Discipline imposed pursuant to an unlawfully overbroad rule
violates the Act in those situations in which an employee vio-
lated the rule by (1) engaging in protected conduct or (2) en-
gaging in conduct that otherwise implicates the concerns under-
lying Section 7 of the Act. Continental Group, Inc., 357 NLRB
409, 411–414; Double Eagle Hotel & Casino, supra. Here, the
Respondent justified its discharge of Stout, in part, on his
phone call to Burgess violating the unlawful disrespectful con-
duct rule. (GC Exh. 3.) As described above, Stout’s conduct
during that phone conversation was protected, concerted activi-
ty. Even if it was not, Stout’s conduct otherwise implicates the
concerns underlying Section 7, given that he made the call to
Burgess in an effort to assist Burgess in retaining his job. Thus,
the General Counsel has met the Double Eagle requirements.
Nonetheless, an employer can avoid liability for discipline
imposed pursuant to an overbroad rule if it can establish that
the employee’s conduct actually interfered with the employee’s
own work or that of other employees or otherwise actually
interfered with the employer’s operations, and that the interfer-
ence, rather than the violation of the rule, was the reason for the
discipline. The Continental Group, supra, at 413. The employ-
er bears the burden of asserting this affirmative defense and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
establishing that the employee’s interference with production
was the actual reason for the discipline. That burden only can
be met when an employer demonstrates that it contemporane-
ously cited the employee’s interference with production as a
reason for the discipline, not simply the violation of the over-
broad rule. Flex Frac Logistics, LLC, 360 NLRB No. 120, slip
op. at 2 fn. 5 (2014).
The Respondent contends that Stout’s phone call caused a
“vast disruption” to its operations on January 20 sufficient to
satisfy Double Eagle. I do not agree. The record fails to estab-
lish that Stout’s conduct actually interfered with his own or
other employees’ work. Stout made the phone call to Burgess
while working. However, the call lasted only a couple of
minutes, if that, a negligible amount of time. As to other em-
ployees’ work, Burgess was not working when Stout called
him. Since Stout was a roving inspector, his call could not
have interfered with other employees’ work at the time it was
made, because he was not employed on the manufacturing line.
The record also fails to establish that the Respondent’s oper-
ations were disrupted in any significant manner by Stout’s con-
duct. The Respondent had 70 to 75 employees working on
January 20, and the only two employees who were taken off the
floor as a result of the incident were Yeakey and Burke. As
supervisors, dealing with situations such as the one on January
20 logically would be part of their job duties. Moreover, the
total amount of time from when Stout called Burgess and the
Respondent discharged Stout was approximately 2 hours and
15 minutes, a very short period. The Respondent presented no
evidence of any other effects that this incident had on January
20, in particular on its actual production. Instead, its supervi-
sors offered only vague, nonspecific testimony about Stout
causing a “big to-do” and people being “up in arms.” I find
that testimony unconvincing.
Although the standard announced by the Board in Continen-
tal Group does not address what level of interference an em-
ployer must show to justify discipline issued pursuant to an
unlawful rule, I hold that any interference which occurred here
was de minimus and insufficient to enable the Respondent to
satisfy its Double Eagle burden.
Even if this disruption was deemed substantial enough, Bur-
gess—not Stout—caused the disruption. Burgess misinterpret-
ed what Stout told him during their phone call and then imme-
diately made two calls to Yeakey where he “raised hell a little
bit.” (Tr. 53–54.) The Respondent attempts to assign causation
for the disruption to Stout, by arguing that none of Burgess’
conduct would have occurred if Stout did not call Burgess and
warn him he might not have a job. By that logic, Yeakey
caused the disruption. Yeakey initiated the entire sequence of
events by telling Stout on January 20, in response to a benign
question, that Burgess “doesn’t work here anymore.” He told
Stout that before informing Burgess he had been discharged.
Stout would have had no opportunity to advise Burgess he
might not have a job, if Yeakey had not told him exactly that.
Yet Stout was discharged and Yeakey remains employed in a
supervisory capacity for the Respondent.
Finally, the record fails to establish that Stout’s interference
with production was the actual reason for the discipline. The
Respondent did not contemporaneously cite this as a basis for
Stout’s discharge. At the last January 20 meeting with Stout,
Keesling stated that Burgess, not Stout, had interrupted busi-
ness. Neither Keesling nor Yeakey mentioned disruption of
operations when explaining why Stout was discharged during
their respective conversations with Stout on January 26 and
with Yeakey in early February. The Respondent also did not
include disruption of operations as a basis for the discharge in
its written submissions to the MDES and the General Counsel
during the investigation of the underlying charge in this case.
(GC Exhs. 3, 4.)
For all these reasons, I conclude that the Respondent’s dis-
charge of Stout violated Section 8(a)(1), pursuant to the
Board’s Double Eagle rule.
C. The Respondent’s Discharge of Stout Also Violates Section
8(a)(1), Because Stout Was Terminated Solely for his Protect-
ed, Concerted Activity
Where the conduct for which an employer claims to have
discharged an employee is protected, concerted activity, the
discharge violates Section 8(a)(1) and no analysis pursuant to
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), is necessary. Neff-
Perkins Co., 315 NLRB 1229, 1229 fn. 2 (1994); Mast-
Advertising & Publishing, 304 NLRB 819 (1991). Although
not specifically arguing that a Wright Line analysis is appropri-
ate, the Respondent suggests in its brief that Stout was dis-
charged, in part, due to the alleged disruption to its operations,
as well as to Stout using his cell phone while working, on Janu-
ary 20.
I have concluded that the Respondent did not rely on a dis-
ruption of operations when deciding to terminate Stout, as well
as that it did not maintain or enforce any policy banning em-
ployee cell phone use while working. The latter finding neces-
sitates the conclusion that Stout’s use of his personal cell phone
to call Burgess while working played no role in his discharge.
Nonetheless, that conclusion is further supported by the Re-
spondent’s failure to contemporaneously cite Stout’s cell phone
use as a reason for his discharge. The only supervisor who
raised this issue was Burke in the initial, investigatory meeting.
Thereafter, Stout’s cell phone use was not mentioned in any
oral or written communication from the Respondent until the
March 17 hearing on Stout’s application for unemployment
benefits, nearly 2 months after his discharge.
Therefore, I find that the Respondent discharged Stout solely
due to the content of his phone conversation with Burgess.
Because that phone conversation was protected, the Respond-
ent’s discharge of Stout independently violates Section 8(a)(1),
irrespective of any Double Eagle violation.6

6 The finding that Stout’s discharge was unlawful would hold, even
pursuant to a Wright Line analysis. The General Counsel established
that Stout’s protected conduct was a motivating factor for his discharge.
However, the Respondent did not present any evidence to demonstrate
it would have discharged Stout due to his use of a cell phone while
working or because he caused a disruption. The record contains no
testimony or documents indicating the Respondent discharged employ-
ees in the past for this conduct. In addition, the Respondent asserted
these justifications long after Stout’s discharge. Such shifting explana-
tions are indicative of an unlawful motive under Wright Line.
COMPONENT BAR PRODUCTS 13
IV. THE REMAINING COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS
The General Counsel’s complaint also alleges that three
statements by the Respondent’s supervisors to employees were
coercive and independently violated Section 8(a)(1). The al-
leged violations are: (1) Keesling’s statement to Stout in the
January 20 meeting that it was not his place and none of his
business to call anybody and tell them they are fired; (2) Kees-
ling’s statement to Stout on or about January 26 that it was
misconduct to call another employee and tell them they were
fired; and (3) Yeakey’s statement to Burgess in early February
that Stout was fired for making the call to Burgess and telling
Burgess he did not have a job anymore.
Employer statements that link an employee’s discharge to
the employee’s protected, concerted activity independently
violate Section 8(a)(1), even when the discharge itself is found
unlawful. A violation occurs when the employee who is dis-
charged is told that his or her protected activity was the reason
for the discharge. See, e.g., Triple Play Sports Bar & Grille,
361 NLRB No. 31, slip op. at 1 fn. 2 (2014) (telling employees
that Facebook activity, which was protected, was the reason for
their discharges); Benesight, Inc., 337 NLRB 282, 283–284
(2001) (telling employee that she had been insubordinate and
was terminated, due to her prior participation in a protected
work stoppage). A violation likewise occurs when an employer
tells employees that another employee has been discharged for
activity that is protected by the Act. Extreme Building Services
Corp., 349 NLRB 914, 914 fn. 3 (2007) (telling employees that
another employee was discharged, because the employee was a
member of the union).
In all three statements involved here, the Respondent’s su-
pervisors told either Stout or Burgess that Stout had been dis-
charged due to the content of his phone conversation with Bur-
gess. Because that phone conversation was protected, concert-
ed activity, the statements linking Stout’s discharge to that
activity also independently violate the Act.
Finally, the General Counsel’s complaint alleges that the Re-
spondent applied two of its handbook rules to restrict the exer-
cise of Section 7 rights, and the rules are unlawful pursuant to
the third prong of the Lutheran Heritage standard. In its sub-
mission to the MDES, the Respondent cited violations of its
handbook rules prohibiting insubordination and other disre-
spectful conduct and unauthorized disclosure of business se-
crets or confidential information as bases for its discharge of
Stout. However, the conduct alleged to have violated these
rules is protected, concerted activity. Thus, the Respondent
used these rules to restrict Stout’s Section 7 activity and that
application renders both rules unlawful under the third prong of
Lutheran Heritage. The Sheraton Anchorage, 362 NLRB No.
123 (2015), incorporating by reference The Sheraton Anchor-
age, 359 NLRB 574, 575–576 (2013); Good Samaritan Medi-
cal Center, 361 NLRB No. 145, slip op. at 4 (2014).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) by:
(a) Since March 13, 2014, promulgating and maintaining
overly broad handbook rules prohibiting employees from en-
gaging in insubordination or other disrespectful conduct and in
boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace.
(b) On January 20, 2015, applying handbook rules that pro-
hibit insubordination and other disrespectful conduct and unau-
thorized disclosure of business secrets and confidential infor-
mation to restrict employees’ Section 7 activity.
(c) On January 20, 2015, discharging James Stout due to his
protected, concerted activity.
(d) On January 20 and 26, 2015, telling an employee he was
discharged due to his protected, concerted activity.
(e) In early February 2015, telling an employee that another
employee was discharged due to the latter’s protected, concert-
ed activity.
(f) The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act. In particular, I shall order the Respondent
to offer James Stout full reinstatement to his former position or,
if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent
position, without prejudice to his seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed, and to make him whole for any
loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against him. Backpay shall be computed in
accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950),
with interest as prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987), compounded daily as prescribed in Kentucky River
Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6 (2010). In addition, the Re-
spondent must compensate Stout for the adverse tax conse-
quences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay award and to
file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating
the backpay award to appropriate calendar quarters. Don Cha-
vas, LLC d/b/a Tortillas Don Chavas, 361 NLRB No. 10
(2014). I also shall order the Respondent to remove from its
files any references to the unlawful discharge of Stout and to
notify him in writing that this has been done and that the un-
lawful discharge will not be used against him in any way.7
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended8

7 The General Counsel’s complaint sought a requirement, as part of
the remedy, that Stout be reimbursed for search-for-work and work-
related expenses, without regard to whether interim earnings are in
excess of these expenses. Under extant Board law, those expenses are
considered an offset to interim earnings. In this case and others, the
General Counsel is seeking a change in Board law. Such a change must
come from the Board, not an administrative law judge. The Board has
yet to resolve this issue. See East Market Restaurant, Inc., 362 NLRB
No. 143, slip op. at 5 fn. 5 (2015). Accordingly, I decline to include the
requested remedy in my recommended order.
8 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
ORDER
The Respondent, Component Bar Products, Inc., O’Fallon,
Missouri, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining any rule that prohibits employees from en-
gaging in insubordination or other disrespectful conduct or in
boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace.
(b) Applying handbook rules that prohibit insubordination
and other disrespectful conduct and unauthorized disclosure of
business secrets and confidential information to restrict em-
ployees’ Section 7 activity, including by discharging them for
engaging in such activity.
(c) Telling employees that they or other employees are dis-
charged because they spoke about terms and conditions of em-
ployment with other employees.
(d) Discharging employees for engaging in protected, con-
certed activity.
(e) Discharging employees because they violated an overly
broad rule prohibiting insubordination or other disrespectful
conduct.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the rules from its Personal Conduct and Discipli-
nary Action policy prohibiting: insubordination or other disre-
spectful conduct; boisterous or disruptive activity in the work-
place; and unauthorized disclosure of business secrets and con-
fidential information.
(b) Send to all employees inserts for the current employee
handbook that (1) advise employees that the unlawful rules
prohibiting insubordination or other disrespectful conduct, bois-
terous or disruptive activity in the workplace, and unauthorized
disclosure of business secrets and confidential information,
have been rescinded; or (2) provide the language of lawful
rules; or (3) publish and distribute revised handbooks that do
not contain the unlawful rules or provide the language of lawful
rules.
(d) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer James
Stout full reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no long-
er exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without preju-
dice to his seniority or any other rights or privileges he previ-
ously enjoyed.
(e) Make James Stout whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
him, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this deci-
sion.
(f) Compensate James Stout for the adverse tax consequenc-
es, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay award, and file a
report with the Social Security Administration allocating the
backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters.
(g) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any references to the unlawful discharge of James
Stout, and, within 3 days thereafter, notify him in writing that
this had been done and that his unlawful discharge will not be
used against him in any way.
(h) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in O’Fallon, Missouri, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”9 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 14, after being signed by
the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by
the Respondent and maintained for 60 days in conspicuous
places including all places were notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notic-
es, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email,
posting on an intranet or internet site, and/or other electronic
means, if the Respondent customarily communicates with its
employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de-
faced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, dur-
ing the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facilities involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since March 13, 2014.
(i) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Regional Director attesting to the
steps the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C., August 7, 2015.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
YOU HAVE THE RIGHT to warn another employee that his or
her employment is at risk, and to discuss other terms and condi-
tions of employment with other employees, and WE WILL NOT
do anything to interfere with your exercise of those rights.
WE WILL NOT discharge you because you engage in protect-
ed, concerted activities with other employees.
WE WILL NOT maintain overly broad rules in our handbook
that subject employees to discipline for engaging in insubordi-
nation or other disrespectful conduct and/or for boisterous or

9 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
COMPONENT BAR PRODUCTS 15
disruptive activity in the workplace.
WE WILL NOT discharge you because you violated an overly
broad rule prohibiting employees from engaging in insubordi-
nation or other disrespectful conduct, by exercising the rights
described above.
WE WILL NOT use rules prohibiting insubordination or other
disrespectful conduct and/or unauthorized disclosure of busi-
ness secrets or confidential information to restrict the exercise
of the rights described above, including by discharging you for
exercising those rights.
WE WILL NOT tell you or other employees that you are being
discharged, because you warned another employee that his or
her employment was at risk or talked with other employees
about employee wages, hours, or other working conditions.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, rescind
the rules in our employee handbook that subject employees to
discipline for insubordination or other disrespectful conduct;
boisterous or disruptive activity in the workplace; and unau-
thorized disclosure of business secrets and confidential infor-
mation.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer
James Stout full reinstatement to his former job, or if that job
no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to his seniority or any other rights and/or privileges
he previously enjoyed.
WE WILL pay James Stout for the wages and other benefits he
lost because we unlawfully discharged him.
WE WILL compensate James Stout for the adverse tax conse-
quences, if any, of receiving a lump-sum backpay award, and
file a report with the Social Security Administration allocating
the backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from our files all references to the discharge of James Stout and
WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify him in writing that this
has been done and that the discharge will not be used against
him in any way.
COMPONENT BAR PRODUCTS, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/14–CA–145064 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.