477 U.S. 242 (1986) Cited 241,208 times 39 Legal Analyses
Holding that summary judgment is not appropriate if "the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 220,608 times 41 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
411 U.S. 792 (1973) Cited 53,194 times 96 Legal Analyses
Holding in employment discrimination case that statistical evidence of employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent behind individual employment decision
450 U.S. 248 (1981) Cited 20,198 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding in the Title VII context that the plaintiff's prima facie case creates "a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption" that shifts the burden of proof to the employer, and "if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff"
479 U.S. 60 (1986) Cited 464 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding an accommodation is reasonable where it "allow the individual to observe fully religious holy days and requires him only to give up compensation for a day that he did not in fact work"
Holding that discharge over two and one half years after employee filed EEOC complaint was insufficient showing of retaliation to avoid summary judgment for employer
Holding that the employee's religious belief-that she "had a calling from God" to take a pilgrimage to Medjugorje, Yugoslavia in October-was not in conflict with Dillard's "no-leave policy" for October through December because "the timing of the trip was a personal preference and not part of her calling"
Holding that the plaintiff established the second element of his prima facie case for failure to accommodate his “religious practice of attending the ceremony in which his wife and children were converted to Judaism,” where the plaintiff's supervisor “knew” that he was Jewish, “knew” that his “wife was studying for conversion,” and “when [the plaintiff] requested the time off, he informed the [supervisor] why he needed to miss work”