Comcast Cable Communications, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 23, 2021

2020003871 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 23, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/857,869 12/29/2017 James Barkley 007412.03582\US 4159
71867 7590 11/23/2021
BANNER & WITCOFF , LTD
ATTORNEYS FOR CLIENT NUMBER 007412
1100 13th STREET, N.W.
SUITE 1200
WASHINGTON, DC 20005-4051
EXAMINER
SHELEHEDA, JAMES R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2424
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/23/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTO-71867@bannerwitcoff.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAMES BARKLEY and FEI WAN
Appeal 2020-003871
Application 15/857,869
Technology Center 2400
Before HUNG H. BUI, AMBER L. HAGY, and MICHAEL J. ENGLE,
Administrative Patent Judges.
ENGLE, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–20, which are all of the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies Comcast Cable Communications,
LLC as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2020-003871
Application 15/857,869

2
TECHNOLOGY
The application relates to video playback with a “trick play,” such as
fast forward or rewind. Spec. ¶¶ 32–33.
ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with the limitations at
issue emphasized:
1. A method comprising
receiving, by a video playback device and during output
of segmented video content, a request to start a trick play;
determining, based on a playback time associated with a
video frame of the segmented video content that is outputted
during receipt of the request to start the trick play, a video
segment of segmented trick play video content at which to begin
the trick play;
obtaining the segmented trick play video content at a rate
at which one or more segments of the segmented video content
were obtained; and
causing playback of the segmented trick play video
content beginning with the determined video segment.
REFERENCES
The Examiner relies on the following references as prior art:
Name Number Date
Boccon-Gibod US 6,965,724 B1 Nov. 15, 2005
Hurst US 2012/0210216 A1 Aug. 16, 2012
Major US 2005/0262257 A1 Nov. 24, 2005
REJECTIONS
The Examiner makes the following rejections:
Claim(s) Statute Reference(s) Final Act.
1–3, 6–11, 14–19 § 102 Hurst 3–10
4, 5, 12, 13 § 103 Hurst, Boccon-Gibod 10–14
20 § 103 Hurst, Major 14–15
Appeal 2020-003871
Application 15/857,869

3
ISSUE
Did the Examiner err in finding Hurst discloses “obtaining the
segmented trick play video content at a rate at which one or more segments
of the segmented video content were obtained,” as recited in claim 1?
ANALYSIS
§ 102:
Claims 1–3, 6–11, and 14–19
Claim 1 recites, inter alia: “obtaining the segmented trick play video
content at a rate at which one or more segments of the segmented video
content were obtained.” Independent claims 8 and 15 recite commensurate
limitations.
Appellant argues that “the constant playback rate discussed in Hurst is
not equivalent to a constant transmission rate.” Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis
added and omitted). According to Appellant, when it comes to transmission
rates, “Hurst discloses adjusting a transmission rate based on network
conditions,” which “suggests that a constant transmission rate is not
necessary for Hurst’s constant playback rate.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
Instead, “the received stream is provided in a manner that is selected based
upon the desired playback mode (e.g., fast/slow, forward/reverse).” Id.
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Hurst ¶ 56).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. The Examiner finds
that Hurst discloses one embodiment with “a trickplay stream to achieve
‘reverse’ playback at the normal playback speed (paragraph 23), where the
reverse stream includes the same size video segments including the same
number of frames at the same speed as the normal playback” just “arranged
in the reverse order.” Ans. 4 (citing Hurst ¶ 23). Specifically, Hurst
Appeal 2020-003871
Application 15/857,869

4
discloses “[a]n additional stream could be encoded at the same frame rate
as” the original video “but in reverse frame order to facilitate effective
reverse playback at the same speed as normal forward playback.” Hurst
¶ 23. Therefore, the Examiner finds, “[t]he same size trickplay segments are
received at the same rate at which the normal playback stream.” Ans. 4.
More generally, the Examiner finds that in Hurst, the “video segments
frames are being requested, decoded and played back as they are received
without requiring extra buffering.” Id. at 3–4 (citing Hurst ¶¶ 4, 6, 19, 20,
44, 45); see also Hurst ¶¶ 6 (“Ideally, such a feature would reduce or
eliminate the need for additional processing resources or special buffering”),
4 (criticizing the prior art’s rewind feature having to rely on a buffer).
Appellant fails to adequately address these findings of the Examiner.
A person of ordinary skill would have understood that Hurst’s disclosure of
receiving a normal video stream and the same video stream in the reverse
direction (i.e., with the same number of frames and the same playback rate)
without any extra buffer discloses “obtaining the segmented trick play video
content [e.g., the reverse stream] at a rate at which one or more segments of
the segmented video content [e.g., the original video] were obtained.”
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 8, and 15, and their dependent claims 2, 3, 6, 7, 9–11, 14, and 16–
19, which Appellant argues are patentable for similar reasons. See Appeal
Br. 9; 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
§ 103:
Claims 4, 5, 12, 13, and 20
Appellant does not argue the rejections of claims 4, 5, 12, 13, and 20
separately. Appeal Br. 9. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections
of claims 4, 5, 12, 13, and 20.
Appeal 2020-003871
Application 15/857,869

5
OUTCOME
The following table summarizes the outcome of each rejection:
Claim(s)
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–3, 6–11,
14–19
102 Hurst 1–3, 6–11,
14–19

4, 5, 12, 13 103 Hurst, Boccon-Gibod 4, 5, 12, 13
20 103 Hurst, Major 20
Overall
Outcome
1–20
TIME TO RESPOND
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.36(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED