Collins & Aikman Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 24, 1963

143 N.L.R.B. 15 (N.L.R.B. 1963)

COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. 15
The Trial Examiner concludes and finds, in the absence of any evidence of actual
discrimination , that this allegation has not been sustained . And for the reason
stated in the section of this report immediately above, he believes that this ques-
tion , not having been raised either directly or indirectly , expressly or by implica-
tion, in any of the charges is not properly before the Board.
E. Summary
Having concluded and found that the evidence fails to support the allegations of
unfair labor practices on points claimed by General Counsel in his brief , the Trial
Examiner will recommend that the complaint , in its entirety , be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATIONS
On the basis of the foregoing findings and conclusions , the Trial Examiner recom-
mends that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
Collins & Aikman Corp . and Textile Workers Union of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC. Cases Nos. 10-RC-5338 and 10-CA-5175. June
24, 1963
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 11, 1963, Trial Examiner Sidney Sherman issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair
labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Inter-
mediate Report. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report and a brief in support thereof.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Members Leedom, Fanning, and
Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
this proceeding, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following addition,
and the limitations concerning the election.'
1 We hereby correct the apparently Inadvertent error in the Intermediate Report, under
"The October 10 notice" where the letter is referred to as the October 10 letter when the
date as shown by the record should have been October 3.
Member Leedom does not agree that Respondent violated the Act in connection with the
letter distributed on October 3 or the notice distributed on October 10. There is no con-
tention or evidence that either document is in any respect factually inaccurate. Nor is
there any language In either document which, fairly interpreted , can be said reasonably
to imply that Respondent would use its power to the employees ' disadvantage , should they
select union representation . In these circumstances , Member Leedom believes that the
distribution of both documents is protected by Section 8 (c) of the Act, which bars basing
an unfair labor practice finding on "the expressing of any views , argument , or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof . . ." if , as here, . . such expression contains no threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit." He therefore dissents from the failure of his
colleagues to dismiss the allegations of the complaint pertaining to these documents.
143 NLRB No. 2.
16 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
We do not agree with our dissenting colleague that the Respond-
ent's letter of October 3, 1962, and notice of October 10, 19621,
amounted to no more than an expression of views, arguments, or
opinion devoid of any threat of reprisal privileged under Section 8
(c) of the Act. The letter of October 3 specifically listed 19 plants
that had "closed or gone out of business" where the employees had se-
lected the TWUA as their representative and raised before the em-
ployees the specter that their future security would be jeopardized if
they voted for this Union. In these circumstances and in the context
of the notice of October 10, circulated on the eve before the election,
the employees could reasonably have understood that Respondent's
plant too would be closed if they voted for the TWUA. As the Trial
Examiner concluded, the notice of October 10 was calculated to con-
firm the implied threat of the October 3 letter that the continued op-
eration of the plant depended on the defeat of the Union in the elec-
tion. In view of the foregoing, we find that by the above-mentioned
letter and notice the Respondent restrained and coerced employees
in the exercise of their rights guaranteed under the Act, thereby
violating Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
As set forth in the Intermediate Report, the Regional Director for
the Tenth Region had ordered that the complaint issued in Case No.
10-CA-5175 be consolidated with objections filed in Case No. 10-RC-
5338 for the purposes of hearing. The objections relate to an elec-
tion held on October 11, 1962, pursuant to an agreement for consent
election. Pursuant to the Regional Director's order, the Trial Ex-
aminer made credibility resolutions and findings of fact. Under the
Board Rules applicable to an agreement for consent election, ques-
tions relating to such elections are to be determined by the Regional
Director and not the Board 2 Therefore, we shall sever the repre-
sentation case from the complaint case herein, and shall remand the
representation case to the Regional Director for such action as he
may deem appropriate. In view of this disposition, we do not pass
upon the Trial Examiner's findings that the Respondent engaged in
objectionable interference with the election. Accordingly, we limit
our Decision and Order herein to the complaint case only.
ORDER
The Board adopts as its Order the Trial Examiner's Recommended
Order with respect to the complaint case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case No. 10-RC-5338 be, and it hereby
is, severed from the consolidated complaint in case herein numbered
10-CA-5175 and that Case No. 10-RC-5338 be remanded to the
Regional Director for the Tenth Region for such action as he deems
appropriate.
2 The Board 's Rules and Regulations , Series 8, as amended , Section 102 .62(2).
COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. 17
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
A copy of the original charge herein was served upon the Respondent on Novem-
ber 19 , 1962,' and the complaint herein issued on December 18. On January 15,
1963, the Regional Director issued an order consolidating for hearing the instant
unfair labor practices case (Case No. 10-CA-5175) with the instant representation
case (Case No. 10-RC-5338 ). A consolidated hearing was held before Trial
Examiner Sidney Sherman at Dalton , Georgia, on February 26 and 27, 1963. Briefs
were filed by the Respondent and the General Counsel . The issues litigated were
whether ( 1) the Respondent had violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by interroga-
tion , solicitation , threats of reprisal , and promises of benefits , and (2 ) the Respond-
ent had interfered with the election conducted by the Board at Respondent 's Dalton
plant on October 11.
Upon the basis of the entire record ,2 and my observation of the witnesses , I adopt
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Collins & Aikman Corp., herein called the Respondent, is a Delaware corporation,
and is engaged at its plant in Dalton, Georgia, in the manufacture of carpeting. It
annually ships from this plant to out-of-State points products valued in excess of
$50,000.
I find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION
Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, herein called the Union,
is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act.
M. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The allegations
The complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a) (1) of the Act by the following conduct: (1) Soliciting employees to
prepare, sign, and distribute petitions withdrawing from the Union; (2) threatening
to close or move its plant rather than deal with the Union, and threatening em-
ployees on October 3 with reprisals if they voted for the Union; (3) interrogating
employees about their union activities; and (4) offering employees inducements,
and otherwise soliciting them, to abandon the Union .3
Respondent's answer in substance denies all the foregoing allegations.
B. Sequence of events
In the spring of 1962, the Union launched a campaign to organize the employees
at Respondent's Dalton plant. Sparks, the plant's general manager, instructed his
supervisors not to engage in any coercive conduct, but he stressed to the supervisors
the fact that Respondent at Dalton, unlike its competitors in the area, was required
to incur an expense of $100,000 a year in shipping yam between Dalton and Re-
spondent's finishing plant in Albemarle, North Carolina .4 Sparks, in effect, au-
thorized his supervisors to explain the foregoing matter to the employees Sparks
also addressed the employees stating that it was for them to make their decision
about the Union, but that the Respondent was opposed to the Union and did not
believe that it would benefit the employees in any way, and in discussion with
various employees he pointed out that if the Respondent's costs increased to the
point where it could not meet competition it would have to go out of business.5
'All dates herein relate to 1962, unless otherwise stated.
2The transcript of testimony herein Is hereby ordered corrected as follows: Page 35,
line 3, change "they were one" to "there were some" ; page 278, line 4, change "But they"
to "But you" ; page 303, line 6, change "be" to "because of."
$A further allegation (paragraph 13 of the complaint) that on October 4 Respondent's
"plant manager," Sparks, threatened discharge for union activities was withdrawn at the
hearing.
4 The yarn was sent from Albemarle to Dalton to be made into tufted carpeting, which
was shipped back to Albemarle for finishing.
5 The foregoing findings as to Sparks' remarks are based on his uncontradicted testimony.
18 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Thomas, the manager of the Dalton plant, admittedly spoke to most of the
employees about the union campaign, and solicated "12 to 15" of them to reject
the Union.
The employees were subjected to a barrage of literature from both sides through-
out the campaign.6 On September 18, the Respondent and Union entered into an
agreement for a consent election, to be conducted on October 11. Within the next
3 weeks various incidents occurred which form the basis for the complaint. In-
cluded are incidents of alleged solicitation of employees to reject the Union, and
to sign written repudiations of the Union, and the distribution- of literature (1) list-
ing a number of textile mills organized by the Union that had closed down and
(2) referring to the economic consequences of the closing of a textile mill in a
neighboring county.
In the election, held on October 11, 78 votes were cast, of which a majority were
for no union. On October 16, the Union filed objections to the election, and on
January 15, 1963, the Regional Director ordered a hearing on the objections and
consolidation of such hearing with the hearing on the instant complaint.
C. Discussion
1. Solicitation and inducements
a. Johnson-Dover
Paragraph 7 of the complaint alleges that Plant Manager Thomas, on or about
August 28, urged employees to prepare and distribute a petition soliciting em-
ployees to withdraw from the Union.
In support of this allegation, the General Counsel adduced the testimony of
employee Johnson that he signed a card for the Union in April, but about August 1
voluntarily informed Thomas that he was renouncing the Union; that several weeks
later Thomas asked him and another employee, Dover, to draft a petition repudiat-
ing the Union and to procure the signatures of other employees on such petition;
and that both the witness and Dover refused to do this.
Thomas admitted that Johnson had informed him of this renunciation of the
Union but denied categorically that he had solicited Johnson or Dover to draw up
a petition to be distributed among the other employees or had ever discussed the
Union while Johnson and Dover were both present. Dover corroborated Thomas'
denial.
Although Johnson had signed a card for the Union, it is undisputed that he an-
nounced to Thomas his defection from the Union. He was still in Respondent's em-
ploy when he testified and I was favorably impressed by his demeanor. Absent
any evidence that his renunciation of the Union was insincere, the record suggests
no reason why he would want to fabricate testimony helpful to the Union and
injurious to his employer.
Thomas, on the other hand, admitted that he had actively campaigned against
the Union, soliciting many of the employees to reject it. It would be in keeping
with the pattern of such activity for him to request employees to engage in the
same solicitation. Moreover, he had an obvious interest in disavowing conduct
which would implicate his employer in wrongdoing. As for Dover, while he was
a reluctant witness, it is open to conjecture whether this reluctance stemmed from
an awareness that the truth would hurt the Union, for which he had at one time
signed a card, or the Respondent, from which he derived his livelihood. Moreover,
Dover evinced a tendency toward evasion and self-contradiction under cross-
examination?
Upon consideration of all the foregoing matters, I have determined to credit
Johnson, and find that in the latter part of August, Thomas solicited Johnson and
Dover to draft a petition repudiating the Union and to obtain the signatures of
other employees thereon. I find further that by such conduct Respondent violated
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act .8
6 According to Sparks , the Union was responsible for 38 items and the Respondent for
78 Items.
7 When asked whether he had ever been in Thomas' office with Johnson, Dover answered
only that "There was seven of us at one time that went to see Mr. Sparks and Mr.
Thomas." Later, after categorically denying that Thomas had ever mentioned the Union
in any way, he admitted that he and Thomas had discussed the benefits the employees
enjoyed without a union , and without having to pay union dues. When asked to explain
this apparent contradiction, Dover asserted that the "union and union dues are two differ-
ent things ," and that it was "probably" Dover and not Thomas who referred to union dues.
8 See cases cited in footnote 11, infra.
COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP.
b. Colter
19
Paragraph 8 of the complaint charges Thomas and Sparks with soliciting em-
ployees on various dates in September to sign a petition withdrawing from the
Union , and paragraph 11 of the complaint , as amended at the hearing, alleges that
Thomas on or about September 21 offered employees inducements to abandon the
Union. These allegations refer mainly to certain incidents involving Colter, who,
as Respondent was admittedly aware, was one of the leaders of the prounion faction
among the employees.
(1) September 20 incidents
Colter testified that on September 20 he was approached by Thomas , who solicited
him to renounce his union activity , opining that if this happened others would fol-
low suit; that Colter refused to commit himself; that later the same day, when
Colter informed them that he would give up his union activity if he was satisfied
that the majority of the employees opposed the Union, Thomas and Sparks tried
unsuccessfully to persuade him to sign an "affidavit ," to be posted on the plant bul-
letin board , repudiating the Union ; and that he then rejected an offer by Sparks
of an opportunity to address the other employees on company time regarding his
supposedly changed attitude to the Union
Thomas admitted that on September 20 he approached Colter about his union
activity , but insisted that this was only because other employees had advised Thomas
that Colter , although wishing to defect from the Union, was deterred by the fear
that if the Union lost the election the Respondent would discharge him because of
his identification with the Union; 9 and that Colter admitted to him that this was
in fact his state of mind, Thomas added that he assured Colter there would be no
reprisals whether or not he quit the Union , but Thomas admitted that he im-
portuned Colter to shift his allegiance to the Respondent . Regarding the "affidavit"
incident later that day, both Thomas and Sparks denied that either of them sug-
gested to Colter that he sign a document repudiating the Union , insisting that Colter
voluntarily proposed that he do so, and that Sparks merely indicated his approval,
whereupon Colter had a change of heart , declaring that he would rather talk to
the employees in person . However , according to these witnesses , when he was
offered an opportunity , a few moments later, to address the other employees at
their work stations , Colter again reneged.
It appears from the foregoing that the only material conflict as to the events of
September 20 relates to the matter of who proposed the antiunion "affidavit" and
who proposed that Colter address the other employees . Colter's claim that manage-
ment took the initiative in these respects is more plausible in view of Thomas' ad-
mission that he initiated the original discussion earlier that day of Colter 's attitude
to the Union, and his further admission that he repeatedly solicited Colter, as well
as others , to reject the Union . Moreover the account given by Sparks and Thomas
fails to supply any logical motivation for Colter 's conduct . All witnesses are
agreed that Colter refused to sign a repudiation of the Union or to address the other
employees on the subject of his supposed conversion to the Respondent 's cause.
Sparks and Thomas portray such refusals as sudden and unexplained about-faces,
whereas Colter explained them with logical consistency , as rejections of manage-
ment efforts to wean him away from the Union , of which he was a leading ad-
vocate.io Another factor affecting the credibility of Thomas here is the fact that I
6 The record contains other testimony about this apparently paradoxical fear on the part
of Colter and other employees that they would suffer reprisals for union activity if they
withdrew from the Union . Apparently , the sense of this testimony is that those employees
who had become identified with the Union were apprehensive that reprisals would follow
upon the defeat of the Union and that by withdrawing from the Union they would insure
its defeat and subject themselves to such reprisals
11 while Colter admitted , as already related , that he told Sparks and Thomas that he
would renounce his union activity if he was satisfied that a majority of the employees
opposed the Union, he denied that he expressed to them an unconditional desire to
abandon the Union
In its brief , the Respondent contends that Colter 's testimony is inherently incredible,
as it fails to explain why Sparks and Thomas would propose to Colter that he Publicly
repudiate the Union , if he had not already advised them privately of his disenchantment
with the Union However, it is not improbable that any intimation by Colter that he
would drop the Union if the majority of the employees did likewise , would encourage
Sparks and Thomas to believe that Colter could be induced to go further and influence
the other employees to defect.
717-672-64-vol. 143-3
20 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have already rejected his disavowal of the somewhat similar Johnson-Dover incident
related above.
For all the foregoing reasons, as well as demeanor considerations, I credit Colter,
and find that on September 20, Thomas and Sparks solicited him to sign a document
repudiating the Union, and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. I find a further such violation in Thomas' admitted solicitation of Colter
that day to change his allegiance."
(2) September 21 incidents
Colter testified further that in the morning of September 21, Thomas again urged
him to change sides, offering to guarantee his tenure so long as Thomas remained
in the plant; that shortly thereafter Colter and two other employees, Pass and Shep-
herd, met with Thomas, who (1) solicited them to procure employee signatures on
a "letter" renouncing the Union, and (2) assisted in the drafting of a document to
be used for that purpose; that the three employees later that day consulted a local
attorney about the legality and phrasing of the document; and that a revised draft
thereof prepared by the lawyer was soon thereafter received by Colter from Pass
and turned over to Thomas.
Thomas did not specifically contradict Colter's testimony that on September 21
Thomas solicited him to defect from the Union, and, in fact, frankly avowed that
he had so solicited Colter on many occasions,12 and Thomas admitted assisting
Colter, Pass, and Shepherd to make a preliminary draft of a document repudiating
the Union, but insisted that Pass was the one who proposed that such a document
be drafted for circulation among the employees.
Shepherd confirmed Thomas' testimony that Pass was the one who proposed a
written repudiation of the Union. This witness added that, after Thomas helped
them prepare an initial draft, they consulted an attorney, who rewrote the document,
and that it was then shown by Shepherd to Sparks who approved its circulation
during nonworking hours. It is undisputed that Pass and Shepherd signed the docu-
ment and that Shepherd solicited the signature of one other employee.
On the basis of Colter's undisputed testimony I find that on September 21, Thomas
again solicited him to defect from the Union thereby violating Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act. I find further, notwithstanding Thomas' denial, that in so soliciting
Colter, Thomas offered to guarantee his tenure so long as Thomas remained in the
plant, and that by offering such inducement Respondent further violated Section
8(a) (1) of the Act.
While there is a seeming conflict between the testimony of Colter, on the one
hand, and that of Thomas and Shepherd, as the other, as to whether Thomas or
Pass suggested the drafting of a repudiation of the Union for endorsement by the
employees, it is undisputed that Thomas did assist in the drafting of such a docu-
ment. Since such assistance, in itself, constituted unlawful interference with the
concerted activities of Respondent's employees, it would be necessary to find, on
the basis of Thomas' own testimony, that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act by such assistance, whether or not he instigated the preparation of the
petition.13
Moreover, there was evidence that, whether or not Thomas conceived the plan
of a written repudiation, he offered an inducement to the employees to perserve in
the plan. Thus, Colter testified that Thomas, in discussing the drafting of the
repudiation, offered to put in writing a pledge to operate the plant on the basis
of seniority and that he actually did draft such a statement in the employees' pres-
ence, including a provision that seniority would govern layoffs.
Both Thomas and Shepherd denied that there was any reference to seniority on
that occasion. However, Shepherd was at a loss to explain why the three employees
deemed it necessary to consult a lawyer about the legality of a statement which,
according to Shepherd, constituted merely a renunciation of the Union. Colter, on
the other hand, plausibly explained that the decision to consult a lawyer was
prompted by Colter's questioning of the legality of Thomas' promise of a benefit in
the form of a pledge to recognize seniority in case of layoffs and other personnel
11 Eluas Brothers Big Boy, Inc, 137 NLRB 1057 (IR) ; S. H. Kress & Co., 137 NLRB 1244;
United States Rubber Company ( Shelbyville Mills ), 115 NLRB 1707, 1709-1710; National
Biscuit Company, 83 NLRB 79; The Jefferson Company, Inc ., 110 NLRB 757, 770-771.
12 However, Thomas did deny that he offered to guarantee Colter's tenure so long as
Thomas remained in the plant.
13 The Jefferson Company, Inc., supra ; Winn -Dixie Stores, Inc, and Winn -Dixie Green-
ville, Inc, 128 NLRB 574, 580.
COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. 21
actions. Moreover, the force of Shepherd's denial that there was any reference
to seniority in the document drafted with Thomas' assistance is somewhat weakened
by his admission that he could not remember what was in the document.14 Finally,
there were material discrepancies between Thomas' version and Shepherd's.15
Accordingly, I credit Colter and find that Thomas offered to respect seniority in
personnel actions, including layoffs, and that, by offering such a concession to induce
or encourage defection from the Union, the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1)
of the Act.
c. Charles Baker
Paragraph 11 of the complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges, in part, that
on or about September 28 and October 2 Thomas solicited employees to abandon
the Union.
Charles Baker, who, as Respondent knew, was a member of the Union's organiz-
ing committee, testified that about a week before the election Thomas approached
him, and, after apologizing for having mistakenly reprimanded Baker on a previ-
ous occasion, asked him to promise "to forget all about the Union," and that
Thomas added that he knew that Respondent had made mistakes but that "it
wouldn't happen again." Thomas admitted, in effect, soliciting Baker to change
sides.16 I find that by such solicitation the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1)
of the Act.
d. Carl Baker-Parker
Carl Baker testified that in March he signed a card for the Union, but that about
2 weeks before the election he, together with Parker, a fellow employee, wishing
to avoid the partisan pressures of the election campaign, approached Sparks and
asked him to lay them off until after the election; that, when Sparks replied that
they would not be eligible for unemployment benefits during such layoff (as it
would not be due to lack of work), the two employees withdrew their request; and
that during the foregoing interview Thomas asked Parker to sign a repudiation of
the Union for posting on the plant bulletin board, which Parker refused to do.
Parker corroborated this testimony, adding that the next day Thomas, after com-
menting on what he characterized as Parker's retraction of his decision to renounce
the Union, remarked that he had thought he would get Parker, Colter, Shepherd,
and Pass to sign a repudiation of the Union.
Thomas denied soliciting a written repudiation from Parker at any time, and
both he and Sparks maintained that the only reference to the signing of a paper
at the employees' interview with Sparks was in connection with an explanation
by Sparks of Respondent's procedure for granting leaves of absence. Thomas ad-
mitted, however, that the next day he did comment to Parker on his apparent change
of heart about renouncing the Union,17 and that he referred to Parker's signing a
repudiation of the Union, but that was merely in connection with an allusion to
the statement drafted on September 21, as related above, by Thomas and Shepherd,
and that he had merely told Parker that Shepherd, Colter, and Pass hoped they
might get Parker to sign the statement. When pressed as to his reason for thus
identifying Parker as an object of the "Shepherd-Pass" group's campaign, Thomas
at first asserted that that group had advised him that they wanted to get Parker's
signature, but he promptly retracted this answer, admitting that there had been no
specific reference to Parker by the Shepherd-Pass group, and that his statement to
that effect to Parker was to that extent inaccurate.
14 This document could not be located, despite diligent search by counsel The revision
thereof drafted by the lawyer, which was introduced in evidence, contains no reference to
seniority, but only to renunciation of the Union and an expression of belief that no one
would be "mistreated" by the Respondent on account of their union activities. However,
the contents of this revision, which is couched throughout in a literate, lawyer-like style,
can shed little light on the contents of the original rough draft prepared by Thomas and
the employees.
ai For example, Thomas testified that the employees wanted the document to contain an
assurance against reprisals for union activity, whereas Shepherd denied in effect that the
employees sought any such commitment from Thomas.
10 He denied only that such solicitation took the form of asking Baker to "promise to
forget" about the Union.
17 According to Thomas and Sparks, Parker and Baker indicated in their interview with
Sparks that they were abandoning their union activity. However, they testified that they
stated that they would forsake the Union only if the rest of the employees did.
22 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In view of the foregoing self-contradiction, and my rejection of Thomas' denials
with respect to similar incidents discussed above, as well as demeanor considera-
tions, I credit Parker and Carl Baker,18 and find that, about 2 weeks before the
election, Thomas requested Parker to sign a repudiation of the Union to be posted
on the plant bulletin board, and that Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
2. Threats and interrogation
Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the complaint allege, in effect, that on various dates in
September and October certain of Respondent's supervisors interrogated employees
about their union activities, and threatened that Respondent would close or move
its plant rather than deal with the Union. Paragraph 12 of the complaint alleges
the distribution on October 3 of a letter threatening reprisals if the employees voted
for the Union.
a. The October 3 letter
On October 3, the Respondent sent a letter, over the signature of Sparks, to all
its employees, which, after reciting the liberal wage and fringe benefits already
enjoyed by the employees, poses the question whether the Union can help the
employees obtain higher wages and fringe benefits. The letter continues:
The only way that I know how to judge what the TWUA can do for our
employees is to look at what they have done for other employees. Attached
to this letter are the names and locations of only a few of the hundreds of
plants that have closed down where the employees had a union contract. All
the plants listed had TWUA contracts.
This does not mean that TWUA closed them down or was the sole or
part of the reason they shut down. It does mean that having the TWUA is
not the answer to economic problems and does not guarantee the future of a
plant. The TWUA didn't shut these plants, but it could not keep them from
closing when the company decided it was necessary to close down
Now I think the question can be simply put. Did the TWUA help these
employees get more wages, more benefits, and better job security? These
plants have all closed since 1946. These workers no longer draw a pay check
at these mills They have no fringe benefits. This is the record of plants the
TWUA has been in, and it proves one fact-that without a job, workers have
NO wages, have NO fringes, and have NO job security. It also proves that
the TWUA cannot guarantee any of these things. The plain, simple truth
is that only in plants where employees and management work together in a
profitable, successful, and progressive Company can the future of everybody
be secure.
You and I have come a long way together. What we have, we got for
ourselves. Our record proves that we have better job security than any of
the TWUA members at any of the plants named on the attached list. We
have made better progress. Don't gamble your future security and progress
by voting for the TWUA. Let's continue to grow together-VOTE NO!
Appended to the letter is a list of the names and locations of 19 plants, in various
Southern States, under the caption "MILLS THAT HAD TWUA CONTRACTS
WHICH HAVE CLOSED DOWN OR GONE OUT OF BUSINESS." As an ad-
dendum to this list, the following statement appears:
American Woolen Mills operated many plants all over New England. It
was the largest woolen manufacturer in the world. All of its New England
plants in Maine, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut were
organized by the TWUA. All of them are now closed.
While the letter at one point contains a specific disavowal of any claim that the
Union was responsible for the closing of the foregoing plants, and ostensibly cites
such closings only as demonstrating that the Union cannot prevent the liquidation
of an unprofitable operation, the concluding paragraph of the letter stresses the fact
that the Dalton employees are enjoying "better job security" than the union mem-
bers at the closed plants, and urges the employees not to "gamble your future security
and progress by voting for" the Union. The clear implication on this statement is
is It seems highly unlikely in any case that these two employees , who were so anxious
to remain neutral in the dispute between the Respondent and the Union that they devised
the bizarre scheme of a sham layoff, would depart so far from neutrality as to seek to aia
the Union by volunteering false testimony against their employer.
COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. 23
that, by voting for the Union, the employees will imperil their jobs. While it may
be contended that this meant merely that the employees' job would be imperiled if
the Union should exact from the Respondent monetary concessions which would
make its operations at Dalton unprofitable, this meaning is not readily apparent
from the language quoted and it cannot be assumed that the employees would be
sufficiently astute or sophisticated to read such a meaning into the cryptic exhorta-
tion to them not to "gamble" their future security by voting for the Union. Nor
may the coercive impact of such a warning be deemed to have been nullified by
Respondent's prior disavowal of any claim that the Union was responsible for the
closing of the listed plants,1° in the absence of any disavowal that the Dalton plant
would be closed because of the Union's advent.
Accordingly, I find that the letter contains an implied threat of loss of employ-
ment if the Union should prevail in the election, and that the Respondent thereby
violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act 2°
b. The October 10 notice
Paragraph 9 of the complaint alleges inter alia threats of reprisal on October 1Q
by McIntyre, the personnel manager at the Dalton plant. It was stipulated that
McIntyre participated, on October 10, with other supervisors in the distribution to
the employees of a section of a local newspaper which contained a prominent notice
over the signature "Dalton Boosters ," a facsimile of which is appended to this report
(Appendix B). While this purports to be merely a factual recital of the adverse
effect of the closing of a textile mill in a neighboring county 21 on the total number
of jobs and total size of payrolls for textile workers in that county, I find that the
circulation by the Respondent of such a notice, particularly in view of the promi-
nence in its caption of the phrase "CLOSING ONE MILL," and the timing of such
circulation in relation to the election, was calculated to confirm the impression
conveyed by the October 10 letter, discussed above, that the continued operation
of Dalton plant depended on the defeat of the Union in the election. I find there-
fore that by the distribution of the foregoing literature the Respondent violated
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act 22
19 Sparks testified that the letter was designed as a reply to union propaganda listing
unorganized plants that had shut down. While that might be deemed to justify the listing
of defunct organized plants, it is not clear how it justifies warning the employees that a
vote for the Union would endanger their security
21 See The Pulaski Rubber Company, 131 NLRB 347, 351-352.
21 Dalton Is in Whitfield County, Rossville Is in Walker County.
z' In view of the foregoing findings as to the coercion of the employees by the general
distributions of October 3 and 10, no useful purpose would be served by extended dis-
cussion of other alleged threats (and interrogation) involving only a few employees It
may suffice to deal with them briefly as follows
1. Kincaid * In view of demeanor considerations , and his admission of duplicitous con-
duct during the election campaign, I do not credit Kincaid's testimony regarding threats
and interrogation by Supervisor Ferguson , but credit Ferguson 's denials
2 Robinson* It is undisputed that about October 1 he had a chance encounter with
Supervisor Brown in a grocery store, in the course of which Brown asked a few questions
about the outcome of the impending election , and that, when Robinson expressed confidence
in a union victory, Brown made some reference to the Respondent's shipping costs at
Dalton and to a possible relocation of the plant. However, Robinson vacillated between
different versions of Brown's prediction as to plant removal, insisting at times that Brown
said that such removal would be considered by the Respondent in view of the high shipping
costs at Dalton, if the Union prevailed in the election, and at other times admitting, in
substantial agreement with Brown's testimony, that Brown said that such removal would
be considered if there was an,excessive increase in Respondent 's wage costs as a result of
the advent of the Union . Under these circumstances , I credit Brown and find that he in-
dicated , in effect, as he testified that Respondent might be forced to move the Dalton
plant if it granted the Union's wage demands , as such an increase in labor cost , coupled
with the existing shipping costs , would place the Dalton plant at a competitive dis-
advantage. I find further that this statement was a privileged prediction as to the
possible economic consequences of a union victory in terms of the impact of any wage
concession on the Re'spondent 's competitive position at Dalton, and not a threat that Re-
spondent would move its plant in reprisal for the employees ' selection of the Union See
Arch Beverage Corporation, 140 NLRB 1385 ; Balton Insulation, Inc, 129 NLRB 1296, 1297.
While Brown admittedly interrogated Robinson about his views concerning the outcome
of the election , I do not find such interrogation unlawful , in view of my above finding
24 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
IV. INTERFERENCE WITH THE ELECTION
It appears from the Regional Director's order of January 15, 1963, directing a
hearing on the objections to the election, that the Union filed the following objec-
tions: (1) Agents of Employer, and other persons, circulated threats and warnings
among the employees; (2) the Employer had the employees searched in the pres-
ence of an armed guard before they voted in the election; (3) the Employer's pre-
election conduct violated the General Shoe rule; (4) the Employer maintained an
unlawful no-solicitation rule; and (5) antiunion stickers were distributed to the em-
ployees before the election Implicit in the distribution was the Employer's direction
that these should be publicly posted on the employees' cars.
No evidence was adduced before me in support of any of the foregoing objections
other than the first. Accordingly, I make no findings as to objections (2) through
(5). As to the first objection, I find, for the reasons already stated, as follows:
1. The Respondent on October 3 sent to all employees a letter, which, after
making otherwise privileged references to the closing of a number of textile mills
that had been organized by the Union, warned, in effect, that by voting for the
Union, the employees would be jeopardizing their economic security, thereby imply-
ing that a victory by the Union in the election would result in loss of employment.
2. On October 10, the Respondent distributed to all employees a section of a
newspaper containing a notice signed by "Dalton Boosters" concerning the reduction
in the number of jobs and purchasing power resulting from the closing of a textile
mill in a neighboring county A full-scale facsimile of this notice is attached
thereto 23 The time of such distribution (on the eve of the election), and the con-
tents and format of such announcement were calculated to confirm the impression
conveyed by the October 3 letter, above, that a union victory at the polls would lead
to the closing of the Respondent's Dalton plant 24
V. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in con-
nection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have
a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
VI. THE REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (1) of the Act.
it will be recommended that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
By solicitation of employees to repudiate the Union, by suggesting that they pre-
pare and sign written repudiations of the Union and solicit the signatures of other
employees thereon, by assisting in the drafting of such a repudiation, by promising
that Brown's other remarks were not coercive and in view of Robinson's admission at the
hearing that he openly avowed his prounion sentiments to all at the plant, Including
supervisors
3 Colter-Fusonie: There Is no substantial dispute that on September 27, Fusonle, Re-
spondent's director of personnel, told Colter and three or four other employees that If
there was any substantial increase in Respondent's operating costs at Dalton, it would
have to consider the high cost of shipping yarn to Dalton from North Carolina In
essence this is the same statement as Brown made to Robinson, which I have found
privileged However, the issue is complicated here by a contemporaneous reference made
by Fusonie to the fact that the Respondent had shut down five plants in New England,
coupled with other remarks by Fusonie tending to link the Union to these plants. The
precise nature of the reference to Fusonie to the Union's connection with the New England
plants is in dispute, and It is a close question, in any event, whether any imputation by
Fusonie to the Union of responsibility for the closing of the New England plants would
render coercive his otherwise privileged prediction as to the economic consequences of
organization of the Dalton plant As resolution of these questions would not, in any
event, affect the remedy herein, I make no findings as to this incident
23 Appendix B.
24 In accordance with the Regional Director's direction, I make no recommendation as
to the disposition of the objections.
COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP. 25
to reward employees for repudiating the Union or defecting therefrom, and by
threats of reprisal for concerted activities, the Respondent has interfered with, re-
strained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act, and has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a)( I) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case , and the foregoing findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law , it is recommended that Respondent , Collins & Aikman Corp., Dalton,
Georgia, its officers, agents , successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Threatening employees that it will visit reprisals upon them if they engage
in concerted activities or that the selection of a union as their bargaining agent will
entail loss of employment.
(b) Soliciting employees to repudiate Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-
CIO-CLC, or any other labor organization , or suggesting that they draft or sign
written repudiations of any union and procure the signatures of other employees
thereon, or assisting in the drafting of such repudiation , or promising rewards for
repudiating , or defecting from the Union.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with , restraining , or coercing its
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form , join, or assist
the above-named Union, or any other labor organization , to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
or to refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate
the policies of the Act:
(a) Post at its plant in Dalton , Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix A." 25 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for the Tenth Region , shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent 's representa-
tive, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by it for a period of at least 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that such notices are
not altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region , in writing, within 20
days from the date of receipt of this Intermediate Report , what steps the Respondent
has taken to comply herewith 26
If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, the words "A Decision and
Order" shall be substituted for the words "The Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner"
in the notice. In the further event that the Board's Order be enforced by a decree of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words "A Decree of the United States Court of
Appeals, Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "A Decision and Order."
11 If this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board, this provision shall be modified
to read: "Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 10 days from the date of this
Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with reprisals for concerted activities,
or warn them that the selection of a union as their bargaining representative
will result in loss of employment, or solicit our employees to repudiate any
labor organization, or suggest that they prepare and sign a written repudia-
tion of any union and procure the signatures of other employees thereon, or
assist them to draft such a repudiation, or offer them any inducements to
repudiate, or defect from a union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO-CLC, or
any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives
26 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to
refrain from any or all such activities.
COLLINS & AIKMAN CORP.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, 528
Peachtree-Seventh Building, 50 Seventh Street NE., Atlanta, Georgia, 30323, Tele-
phone No. Trinity 6-33 11, Extension 5357, if they have any question concerning this
notice or compliance with its provisions.
APPENDIX B
NO WHAT
CLOSING ONE MIII
Does For A County
In the first quarter of:-1961 Walker County- had (Marcf. figures)
5,459 textile and apparel workers. Their pay, chefks. fbr fIie <4arter
totaled $4,725,641.
Peerless Woolen Mill, at Rossville closed dut!1ng,,,40, fall, `State
figures on jobs and payrolls for the first quartet: of,!'196^, jusf -re.
leased, show jobs dropped to 3,773 -a loss of 1,686. ' payroll dropped
to $3.370,982 - a loss of $1,354,659. Here is a comparisdn;'btween
Walker and Whitfield Counties:
.Jobs and Payrolls - First Quarter 1961 and 1962
Textile and Apparel Workers
Walker County Whitfield County
Jobs Payrolls Jobs Payrolls
1961 5,459 $4,725,641 8,201 $6,395,885
1962 3,773 $3,370,982 9,061 $1,601,695
loss 1,686 $1,354,669 Gain 860 $1,205,810
A lee. cf $ 104205 per week A 9eln of $92,188 per week
Keep Industry Growing-and In Dalton!