Carpenters Local Union No. 1849

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 25, 1966

161 N.L.R.B. 424 (N.L.R.B. 1966)

424 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
WE WILL notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of their rights to full reinstatement upon
application in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal
Military Training and Service Act, as amended , after discharge from the
Armed Forces.
WE WILL make whole for any loss of pay they may have suffered those
employees whom we unlawfully laid off, discharged , or locked out, in the
manner set forth in the section of the Trial Examiner 's Decision entitled
"The Remedy."
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with , restrain , or coerce our
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
All of our employees are free to become or refrain from becoming members
of the above-named Union, or any other labor organization.
SERV-AIR INC.,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative ) ( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered , defaced , or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice or compliance with its
provisions , they may communicate directly with the Board 's Regional Office, Sixth
"Floor Meacham Building, 110 West Fifth Street , Forth Worth , Texas 76102, Tele-
phone 335-4211 , Extention 2145.
Carpenters Local Union No . 1849, affiliated with the United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America , AFL-CIO
and William H . Parker. Case 19-CB-1074. October 25, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On May 10, 1966, Trial Examiner James R. Hemingway issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor prac-
tices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Exam-
iner's Decision. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has
delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three member
panel [Members Fanning, Brown, and Jenkins].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner to the extent they are consistent
with our Decision herein.
161 NLRB No. 29.
CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1849 425,
We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's findings that the East-
ern Washington Agreement was, by its terms, limited to new hires
or was not intended to apply to existing employees. The critical con-
tract clause in question provides that "when workmen . . . are
needed, the Employer will notify the proper Union of number and
classification of employees needed and it shall be the responsibility
of the Union to refer the necessary men required by the Employer."
[Emphasis supplied.] In our opinion, the Trial Examiner has placed
too narrow an interpretation on the contract clause by concluding
that the word "needed" limited the contract application to only those
cases where additional employees are needed over and above present
employees, wherever located, whose services could be utilized.
This very question of interpretation was considered by the Board
in almost identical circumstances in Local 542, International Union
of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO.' There the Board refused to
apply a narrow construction to similar provisions in the contract
relating to the hiring hall. On the contrary, the Board there found
that the overwhelming practice in the construction industry was that
the contractor would first attempt through the hiring hall to secure
all needed employees from among the available local labor force. The
same logic and rationale applied there applies in the instant case. As
we said in Local 542, supra, to accept the Trial Examiner's conclu-
sions would permit a contractor to hire as many men as he desired
outside the Union's area and then, because they are then not "needed"
after they have been hired, bring them into the area notwithstanding
an exclusive contract referral system. Clearly, such a construction
would sanction a practice contrary to that prevailing in the construc-
tion industry.
In such circumstances, we conclude that the Eastern Washington
Agreement requires that the Employer first utilize the referral sys-
tem in initially securing employees to work in Local 1849's jurisdiction.
As the record shows that Parker was not referred to the Employer
pursuant to the terms of the contract, we find that Respondents
steward was within his rights in questioning Parker's status on the
jobsite. We also find that Parker was not denied clearance or referral
because of his lack of membership in the Respondent Local but, rather,
was removed from the job because his status as an employee on the job
violated the Employer's contract with the Respondent. Accordingly,
we shall dismiss the complaint.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
1151 NLRB 497 ( Ralph A. Marino, General Contractor).
426 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION AND • RECOMMENDED ORDER
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The complaint herein, issued on October 15, 1965, based on a charge filed by
William Parker, an individual, on August 4, 1965, against Carpenters Local Union
No. 1849, affiliated with United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
AFL-CIO, herein called the Respondent, alleged violations of Section 8(b)(2)
and (1 ) (A) of the Act.'
On October 25, 1965, Respondent wrote a letter to the Acting Regional Director,
denying the commission of the unfair labor practices alleged. The letter was
received on October 26, 1965, but no contention is made that it was filed too late.
On November 3, 1965, Respondent, by attorney, filed a formal answer admitting
certain allegations but denying the alleged unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial Examiner James R. Hem-
ingway at Richland, Washington, on November 30, 1965. At the outset of the
hearing, motions were made to amend the pleadings in certain minor respects.
These motions were granted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties waived
oral argument but requested time within which to file briefs. A time was fixed and
was later extended. Within such extended time a brief was received only from
Respondent . Ruling on Respondent 's motion to dismiss on the merits was reserved
and is now denied for the reasons herein set forth.
Upon my observation of, the witnesses and all the evidence in the case, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER
Charles T. Parker Construction Company,2 herein called the Company, is an
Oregon corporation with its offices and principal place of business in Portland,
Oregon. It is engaged as a general contractor in the building and construction
industry. During the past year, it performed construction services in excess of
$100,000 for customers located outside the State of Oregon and it received sup-
plies and materials originating outside the State of Oregon valued in excess of
$50,000. In the course of its operations, the Company employs, among others,
carpenters.
The Respondent does not contest jurisdiction, and I find that the Board has
jurisdiction, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction
herein.
U. THE RESPONDENT AS A LABOR ORGANIZATION
The Respondent is a labor organization representing about 800 carpenters in
Eastern Washington and Northern Idaho. At all times material hereto the Respond-
ent had a collective-bargaining agreement with the Inland Empire Chapter of the
Associated General Contractors of America, Inc.
III. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Restraint and coercion
1. Parker's employment and termination
The Company, in early 1965, began construction of a transmission line for the
Washington Public Power Supply System from Vantage Substation in central Wash-
ington to the 100 North area of the Hanford Atomic Energy Site in Washington.
The work involved the installation of foundations, the erection of towers , and the
stringing of transmission lines. Among the workmen employed by the Company, it
used carpenters in the construction of forms for the transmission towers. The work
proceeded through the territorial jurisdiction of three Capenters local unions, one
in Ellensburg, one in Yakima, and the Respondent's in Pasco. The first two locals
were parties to a collective-bargaining contract with the Mountain Pacific Chapter
of the Associated General Contractors, which contract was known as the Western
Washington agreement, whereas the Respondent was a party to an agreement
129 U.S C, Sec. 151, et seq.
2 The Charging Party is no relation to the party whose name this Company bears.
CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1849 427
known as the Eastern Washington and Northern Idaho agreement, herein called
the Eastern Washington agreement. The dividing line between the area covered by
the two contracts is the 120th meridian , a line appearing on maps but not identifi-
able on the landscape .3
The work began in April 1965 neat Ellensburg. By June 1965 the work had
progressed to a point near the 120th meridian . In the latter part of June , before
reaching the Columbia River which was east of the 120th meridian at the con-
struction line, the Company had reduced its carpenter crew , partly in anticipation
of hiring men through the Respondent , but also because of a shortage of material.
Because of the latter , work was shifting between points close to the river and
points farther west.
As is customary when contractors are moving from the jurisdiction of one local
craft union to another, the Company held a precontract conference with the
Respondent's business agent in order to become acquainted with Respondent 's rules
and to learn of the availability of men. Lawrence Guthu, construction superin-
tendent for the Company, understood that when he called for men through the
Respondent's hiring hall, the men called for would be dispatched by the Respond-
ent. He also understood that members of other locals, in order to work in the
jurisdiction of the Respondent, would, by union rules, have to have a permit from
the Respondent to work in that jurisdiction. He believed that if a member of a
sister local had a permit to work in Respondent' s jurisdiction , the Company could
request the Respondent to clear him. He did not, however, know that the Respond-
ent would require that members of sister locals already employed would have to
do more than clear with the Respondent by getting a permit to work in Respond-
ent's jurisdiction.
Because neither the Respondent nor the Company was aware of the exact loca-
tion of the 120th meridian they could not reach agreement thereon at the prejob
conference. Respondent's business agent, Guy Adams, testified that, at the time
of that conference, the Company was working on top of the mountain (inferentially
the Saddle Mountains ), and that he and the Company's representatives agreed that,
when the work moved closer to the river, the latter would order some men from
the Respondent under the Eastern Washington agreement. The Company expected
to move back and forth "across that line" until the job was finished. Adams testi-
fied that, when the woik moved to the east side of the river, "it would all be
covered by this [Eastern Washington AGCY contract" The record does not
reveal the date on which the Company (not previously a party to the Eastern
Washington agreement) signed a contract with the Respondent, but I presume that
this was done before the work crossed the river, because Adams testified that, when
the work got near the river, the Company ordered men and they were dispatched.
He also testified at another point that he would not have supplied men unless he
had had a contract with the Employer. The carpenters dispatched by the Respond-
ent worked together with three remaining carpenters from the Yakima and Ellens-
burg locals on the work which shifted back and forth between the mountains and
the river. Guthu contemplated taking these three men with him when he crossed
the river, but one was injured and became unavailable, and another decided to go
home. The only remaining one was William Parker, a member of the Yakima local,
who had, however, been dispatched to the Company by the Ellensburg local.
In anticipation of working in Respondent's jurisdiction, Parker, in late June 1965,
had spoken with Guy Adams, Respondent's business agent, and asked if he could
get a permit by mail from Respondent instead of losing time from work by going
to the Respondent 's office in Pasco. Adams told him he could . Parker showed
Adams his working card from his own local, which revealed his dues as paid up.
If Adams surmised that Parker had in mind continuing to work for the Company
in the Respondent 's jurisdiction and if he knew that Respondent might raise any
objection to Parker 's continuing on that job in its jurisdiction , he said nothing to
Parker about it. Parker testified that he wrote for a working permit, paying the
required fee, and received one from the Respondent by mail on July 1, 1965, which
was good for the month of July. Parker actually received two slips, one called
"Official Referral Slip," of the Columbia River Valley District Council, on which
were listed the numbers of seven locals, including those of Respondent, the Yakima,
and the Ellensburg locals, for which he had paid $1, and another card entitled
'The Respondent ' s territorial jurisdiction was not established in the record, but
presumably It, also, extended to the 120th meridian.
428 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"Temporary Working Card," issued by the Respondent, for which he had paid
Respondent about $7.25. Both were essential to enable a member of a sister local
to work in Respondent's jurisdiction.
On July 6, 1965, Parker was stripping forms on the west side of the river.
Superintendent Guthu told Parker that, when he was through there , he should
come over to the east side. On the morning of July 7, 1965, therefore, Parker
appeared ready for work on the east side of the Columbia River .4 About 7:40 a.m.
that day, 20 minutes before starting time, William Bateman, the Respondent's
steward, approached Parker and asked if he had a dispatch slip from the Respond-
ent. Parker said that he did not have. Bateman quoted Parker as saying that he
did not need one. Bateman told Parker that he would have to have a dispatch slip
or he could not go to work. According to Parker, whom I credit, he told Bateman
that the latter would have to tell the foreman that. Bateman said that the foreman
knew all about it. Parker stated that that was not good enough, that Bateman
would have to tell the foreman in Parker's presence. The two of them then went
to the foreman, Arthur Izer, and Parker told Izer that Bateman had told him he
could not work, that he was being taken off the job because he did not have a
dispatch slip, and that he wanted two men who were standing nearby to witness
what was being said. Bateman denied that he was "taking Parker off the job."
According to Izer, Bateman said that Parker would have to have a dispatch slip
before he could go to work. Parker offered to show Bateman his dispatch slip
from the Ellensburg local, his working permit received from the Respondent, and
his receipts for assessments paid, and he claimed that he was on the job legally,
that he had met all the requirements of the local, that he was already on the pay-
roll and that he expected to draw pay until he was terminated, and that, when he
was terminated, he expected a written statement as to why he was terminated.
Foreman Izet said that if Parker wanted a written statement, he would better wait
until Superintendent Guthu arrived so he could give the statement. Izer then busied
himself with getting the carpenters to work. When he returned to Parker, Guthu
still had not arrived; so Izer told Parker that the latter should write up something
that he thought would explain the situation and then, if he (Izer ) found it accept-
able, he would sign it. Parker thereupon wrote the following statement:
7-7-65
Hanford, Ore.
100 N
W. H. Parker is being removed from Charles T. Parker Payroll this date
because of a question arising regarding said W. H. Parker having a dispatch
slip from Carpenters Local 1849 Pasco, Wn.
The Steward on the job Mr. Murray Bateman has informed me that he
cannot work without a dispatch slip.
Signed ----------------------------------
Carpenter Foreman
Izer signed the statement, and Parker picked up his tools and left. On the way out,
Parker met Guthu and apparently stopped to explain the reason for his departure,
for he showed Guthu his termination slip. Guthu testified that he told Parker to
"come on back," thinking to take the matter up with the Respondent, but Parker
declined, saying that he had what he wanted. Parker delivered his cap and badge
to Guthu and left.
2. Additional relevant facts
Before becoming a member of Local 770 in Yakima, Parker had twice been a
member of Respondent. During the period of his membership, members seeking
work through the Respondent had registered on an out-of-work list. When the
name of a member of that local or of another reached the top of the list, he
would be given a dispatch slip If he were a member of a sister local, he would
also receive, at that time, a permit to work in the Respondent's jurisdiction. But
no one was given a permit until he had been dispatched to a job. Thus, the fact
that Parker, in this case, was given a permit by Respondent without previously
having been given a dispatch slip would, in itself, suggest that the Respondent
had approved of Parker's continuing on the job on which he was already employed.
'The location of the crossing is not shown in the record From such evidence as is
available in the record, and by use of a map, I infer that the crossing was made into
the lower part of Grant County , Washington, south of the Saddle Mountains , where the
Columbia River is running in a generally north and south direction.
CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1849 429
Parker had been a member of Respondent within 4 years before the date of
the hearing , but the exact date was not shown. Because of that , Parker would
have been privileged to register on the Respondent 's A (out-of-work ) list. The
Respondent also maintained B and C lists. The B list was for members of other
locals which belonged to the Columbia River District Council. The C list was
for all others . Those on the A list would have preference in employment over
those on the B and C lists . It might appear that if Parker had been registered on
the A list, an employer for whom he had worked in the past year could, under
a clause in the Eastern Washington AGC agreement , have called for him by name
and he would have been dispatched . However, Parker was not registered on the
A list,,' and, in any event, the Respondent apparently interpreted that provision of
the contract to mean that , if, within the past year , a carpenter had worked within
the Respondent 's jurisdiction for a particular employer, the employer could call
for him by name. Since the Company had not previously worked within the juris-
diction of the Respondent , its request for Parker would, I deduce, not have been
honored even if Parker had been registered on the Respondent 's out-of-work list.
Although the Eastern Washington agreement contained a union-security pro-
vision, this was not involved here. The Respondent relies on provisions of the
contract reading:
Article V-Hiring
Section 1. .
(c) The employer shall give preference in hiring to local men who are
qualified to perform the work.
Section 3. (a) . When workmen other than those described in Sec-
tion 1 (b) of this Article [employees whom an employer may call for by
name], are needed, the Employer will notify the proper Union of number
and classification of employees needed and it shall be the responsibility of the
Union to refer the necessary men required by the Employer.
(b) It is recognized that the Union is the principal[,] but not necessarily
the sole, source of procuring workmen... .
The Columbia River District Council has working rules relating to the mainte-
nance of out-of-work lists. One provision relates to A, B, and C out-of-work lists.
Another provision therein reads: "All members seeking employment within the
jurisdiction of any of the Locals affiliated with The Columbia River District
Council of Carpenters who are in possession of a paid-up Council Working Card
shall be eligible to register for work on the out-of-work list of an affiliated Local
and will be referred for work when their name appears at the top of the list in
accordance with the dispatch procedure of the respective Local Union."
The Respondent's bylaws apparently provide that "All members must secure a
referral slip in writing from the Office of the Business Representative before going
to work on any job." This provision plus a constitutional provision making mem-
bers of any local who are working in the jurisdiction of another local subject to the
bylaws of the latter local enable the Respondent's business agent to prefer charges
with the Columbia River District Council against any member who procures his
own job without going through the Respondent 's hiring hall. If the charges are
sustained, the guilty member may be fined.
3. Contentions and conclusions
The General Counsel contends that Parker had been properly dispatched by
another local to the job with the Company, that, because the work was progressive
in character , moving from one jurisdiction to another , Parker was an existing
employee rather than a newly hired one when the work entered the Respondent's
jurisdiction, that, because of this, the Company was not obligated to discharge
Parker and replace him with a newly hired one, and that the Respondent caused
Parker's discharge because Parker was not a member of and /or had not been
dispatched to the job by the Respondent. The Respondent takes the position that
it was merely enforcing its contract with the Company. It argues that the contract
does not permit an employer to bring into its jurisdiction any but key men (mean-
ing supervisory employees) and that, when an employer comes into Respondent's
jurisdiction to perform contract work, that employer must hire his carpenters
'By the Respondent's interpretation of the contract, a man who registered in the out-
of-work list after the job was started in Respondent's jurisdiction would not have
been privileged to work on the employer's call by name.
430 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
through the Respondent's hiring hall whether he is beginning a new job or is
merely progressing into the Respondent's jurisdiction on a job commenced else-
where . It is the Respondent 's position that, in the latter situation , it is the obliga-
tion of the employer to discharge all existing employees when the work crosses the
line into the Respondent's jurisdiction and to hire new employees through the
Respondent's hiring hall.
The complaint does not allege and the General Counsel does not contend that
the Respondent's maintenance of A, B, and C lists of job seekers or that Respond-
ent's administration of its hiring hall have resulted in discriminatory practices
generally. And we are not here concerned with the Respondent's right to discipline
its own members or members of sister locals within its jurisdiction. The sole
question is whether or not the Respondent caused the Company to discriminate in
regard to Parker's hire and tenure of employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act. This depends on (1) whether or not Respondent did, in fact, cause
Parker's discharge and, if it did, (2) whether or not the Respondent was acting
within the provisions of the Eastern Washington agreement, which is acknowledged
to be valid.
On July 7, 1965, Respondent's agent, Steward Bateman, first told Parker,
alone, that Parker could not work without a dispatch slip. Later he made a state-
ment in the presence of Foreman Izer that Parker would have to have a dispatch
slip before he could go to work. Bateman , himself, denied that he had said that
Parker could not go to work without a dispatch slip, but his denial was not only
contrary to the testimony of Parker and Izer, but was contrary to a statement
which Bateman had given a Board agent between the time of the filing of the
charge and the date of the hearing. Whatever limitation of meaning might have
been in Bateman's mind, it was not expressed to Parker and Izer. He did not, and
would not be imagined to, select his words with such semantic nicety as to express
a limited meaning by saying: "I recommend that you get a dispatch slip before
you start work or I shall be obliged to report your failure to do so to the business
agent, who, if you go to work without a dispatch slip, will probably prefer charges
against you with the Columbia River Valley District Council and you may expect
to be fined as a consequence." It is much more likely that Bateman used a cus-
tomary shortcut and made the statement which Parker and Izer attributed to him,
and I so find . If Bateman 's statement were made to an employee alone and the
latter quit as a conssequence, the presumption would be that the employee quit to
avoid the discipline he could expect as a union member if he went to work. But
a statement such as, "This man cannot work without a dispatch slip," made in the
presence of a management representative who is responsible for keeping the job
going's could carry a different connotation . This statement made in Izer 's presence
would be tantamount to telling the Company that, if it continued to employ Parker
without a dispatch slip, the Respondent would take action to compel compliance
with its wishes? That this meaning was in Izer 's mind appears from his testimony
of what , in his experience , happens if the steward 's instructions are disregarded:
.. probably the first thing they [would] do would [be to] call the Business
Agent out there and then they would probably shut the job down, although it
would be possible, I•think, just for the [steward] to tell the men not to go to work
and I don't think they would."
On all the evidence, I find that the Respondent did cause the Company to
terminate Parker's employment. Guthu's statement to Parker, as the latter was
leaving, to "come on back" cannot be considered as a revocation of Izer 's act of
terminating Parker in view of Guthu 's testimony indicating that he would not have
worked Parker without the Respondent's approval. The evidence is also quite clear
that the Respondent's approval would not have been given while the Respondent
had men on its own out-of-work list .8
If the Respondent had caused Parker 's termination because he had been hired
in violation of a lawful agreement, the Respondent would have been acting within
6 Normally , Superintendent Guthu did the hiring and discharging , but Guthu testified
that when he was not on the job , Izer was in charge . I find that Izer could terminate
Parker , but in any event Guthu did not rescind Izer's action.
7 Local Union No. 742, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
(J. L. Sammons Company, Inc .), 157 NLRB 451; Local Union No. 592 , United Brother-
hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America AFL-CIO (Brunswick Corporation), 135
NLRB 999.
9 The Respondent had about 50 to 75 men on the list . The Company hired no more than.
8 or 10 from the Respondent.
CARPENTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 1849 431
its rights.9 But if there was no agreement requiring the Company to hire anew,
and through the Respondent, all carpenters to be used for work to be done in
Respondent's jurisdiction, then the Respondent would have had no justification
for causing the discharge of Parker.10 The Respondent contends, however, that its
contract did so provide. With this I do not agree. A reading of the Eastern Wash-
ington agreement discloses only that when the employer "needs" men, he is
required to notify the Respondent and the Respondent is then obligated to furnish
them, and that when (in Respondent's jurisdiction) the employer "hires" men,
he is to give preference to local men. The word "hire" implies a new employment
rather than the continuation of an old one." The word "needs" clearly implies
being without employees, a situation which did not exist here with reference to
Parker, who was already in the employ of the Company on a continuing job at
the time the work crossed the Columbia River.
Witnesses for the Respondent showed a marked tendency to confuse the terms
of the Eastern Washington agreement with its own laws, rules, or unwritten prac-
tices.12 The Company would have been bound by the terms of the agreement but
not by the Respondent's laws or unwritten practices which were not incorporated
in the agreement. The Respondent argued that, even if the agreement did not
expressly provide for employing only men dispatched by Respondent, that was the
interpretation placed on the agreement by the parties who negotiated it.13 Con-
ceding for the sake of argument that the agreement was subject to interpretation and
had been so interpreted by the parties who negotiated it, I find no basis for finding
that the Company, not a party to the negotiation of the agreement, and not
familiar with that interpretation, was bound by such an interpretation merely
because it had adopted the contract as written when it signed a compliance agree-
ment. The Company had a right to rely on the language of the agreement as it was
given to it. As between the Company and the Respondent there was a new contract.
Parker, as a member of a local affiliated with the same International as Respond-
ent, knew, undoubtedly, that, under the International's constitution, he could not
work in Respondent's jurisdiction without permission of Respondent.14 However,
the Respondent had issued to Parker a permit to work in its jurisdiction. Respond-
ent argues that a permit merely privileged a member of a sister local to register
on the appropriate out-of-work list, not that such member could get a job without
being dispatched. I find, however, that Respondent was, deliberately or not, ambiguous
e Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers ' Union of America, Local No. 324 (Roy
Price Inc.), 121 NLRB 508, 134 NLRB 661. Respondent relies upon this decision here.
However , that case is distinguishable , because there the employer and the union had a
tacit agreement that in a particular county the employer would employ only those laborers
whom the union had cleared See also International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
No. 98, AFL-CIO ( Consolidated Gas & Service Co ), 155 NLRB 850; Plasterers & Cement
Masons Local Union 394 , 145 NLRB 188 , 194 ("The . . . contractors shall requisition all
workmen who are to be employed in the bargaining unit from the local hiring hall . .") ;
Millwrights and Machinery Erectors Local Union No. 2471 ( Otis Elevator), 135 NLRB 79.
'°Local Union No. 592 , United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-
CIO (Brunswick Corporation ), 135 NLRB 999 ; Hoisting and Portable Engineers , Local 4
(Standard Contracting Co ), 140 NLRB 785
11 Under the definition of "employ" in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary ( 1961),
which is ". . . (2) [T]o make use of services of," the meaning of "employ " Is compared
to that of "hire" : "Employ . . . stresses the use of a person's services ; hire, the act of
engaging a person's services for compensation "
77 For example , Business Agent Adams testified that an employer can bring into Re-
spondent 's jurisdiction only his supervisory personnel and that he would have to dis-
charge other employees and call for men out of Respondent's hiring hall , and "under this
agreement," this would be true even in cases where the contract work did not start within
the Respondent 's jurisdiction but started elsewhere and progressed into Respondent's
jurisdiction . Respondent 's counsel conceded that there was no provision in the contract
which spelled this out. Harlon Brown, president of the Washington State Council of Car-
penters since 1961, and before that a business agent of the Respondent , testified to the
same thing-" . . . the contract says he can't bring in people, he can't bring them in."
When questioned about where the contract so provided , Brown testified , "I can tell you,
this is the way it is working anyhow."
19 Respondent offered in evidence a copy of "Superintendents ' Manual 1965-1968" issued
by the Inland Empire Chapter of AGC, which lists the hiring hall for Carpenters, Mill-
wrights, and Pile Drivers as "Exclusive Non-discriminatory ." There is no evidence that
the Company was furnished with a copy.
14 See Carpenters Local #40 ( Stop & Shop , Inc.), 143 NLRB 142.
432 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in its reference to a permit. Two permits were actually involved-one from the
District Council to which any member of a local which, itself, was a member of
that Council could get; the other permit was one issued by Respondent. The former
-did not entitle a member of a sister local to get his own employment in the juris-
diction of the local in which he sought work. With reference to the one issued by
the Respondent, Parker testified that, when he was -a member of Respondent, it
was Respondent's practice not to issue such a permit until a man was dispatched
to a job. Hence, he would, in such case, have both the permit and the dispatch slip.
The issuance by the Respondent of a permit to Parker for the month of July, 1965,
-without giving him a dispatch slip at the same time, suggests that Respondent did
not deem a dispatch slip to be needed in this case since Parker was already in the
,Company's employ. I note that Respondent' s business agent supplied Foreman
Izer, who was a member of a sister local, with a work permit but not a dispatch
slip. Although her, as a supervisor, was recognized as entitled to be brought into
the jurisdiction by the Company, his situation of being on the payroll before
coming in (and as therefore not needing to be dispatched) was parallel to Parker's.
On the entire record, I find that Respondent caused the Company to terminate
Parker's employment because Parker had not been dispatched by Respondent as
required by practices sought to be enforced by Respondent but not as required
by the terms of the contract between the Company and the Respondent. Although
Parker was a member of a sister local, this, I believe was not, by itself, a motivat-
ing factor in Respondent's conduct. It is involved only to the extent that Parker
was not registered with Respondent. However, Respondent' s insistance upon com-
pliance with its unilaterally established hiring rules as a basis for causing Parker's
termination, alone, establishes a violation by Respondent of the Act since the
effect of Respondent's conduct was to cause the Company to discharge Parker and
thereby "to encourage members to perform obligations or supposed obligations of
membership." 15
Accordingly, I find that Respondent, by causing the Company to terminate
Parker's employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, violated Section
8(b)(2) and (1) (A) of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
(1) Charles T. Parker Construction Company is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
(2) The Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
Of the Act.
(3) By causing said Charles T. Parker Construction Company to discharge
William H. Parker on July 7, 1965, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(2) and (1)(A)
Of the Act.
(4) The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
.commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record
in the case, I hereby make the following:
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
" Radio Officers ' Union [Bull Steamship ] v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 52.
United Steel Fabricators , Inc. and International Union of Elec-
trical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL -CIO. Case 23-CA-
2184. October 25, 1966
DECISION AND ORDER
On July 25, 1966, Trial Examiner Benjamin B. Lipton issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respond-
ent had not engaged in unfair labor practices as alleged in the com-
161 NLRB No. 36.