Carpenter Technology Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 31, 2006

346 N.L.R.B. 766 (N.L.R.B. 2006)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
346 NLRB No. 73
766
Carpenter Technology Corporation and United Steel-
workers of America International Union, AFL–
CIO, CLC. Cases 4–CA–33564, 4–CA–33744, and
4–RC–20898
March 31, 2006
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, SCHAUMBER, AND WALSH
On August 11, 2005, Administrative Law Judge
Robert A. Giannasi issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the
General Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Re-
spondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2
We affirm the judge’s finding that the Respondent
unlawfully disciplined employee Barry Geib for distrib-
uting union literature. In this regard, we agree with the
judge that the Respondent failed to show that it would
have disciplined Geib even in the absence of his union
activity. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662
F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989
(1982).3
As the judge found, Geib distributed union literature in
a nonwork area on nonworktime. Because of this activ-
ity, the Respondent issued a verbal warning to Geib pro-
hibiting him from leaving his work area at any time, for
any reason.
The Respondent cites safety concerns—Geib’s being
alone in a dangerous area—as the reason for issuing the
warning. The judge properly rejected that contention.
The warning was not limited to times when Geib was

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance
with our decisions in Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144 (1996),
and Excel Container, 325 NLRB 17 (1997). We shall also substitute a
new notice in accordance with our decision in Ishikawa Gasket Amer-
ica, Inc., 337 NLRB 175 (2001), enfd. 354 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2004).
3 Although we agree with the judge’s reasoning, we find the consid-
erations discussed in the text above sufficient to reject the Respondent’s
Wright Line defense. In addition, we find the pretextual nature of the
Respondent’s proffered defense to be additional evidence that the warn-
ing to Geib was unlawfully motivated.
alone in unsafe areas; it forbade him to go anywhere out-
side his work area, at any time, under any circumstances.
Moreover, as the judge found, the warning to Geib was
inconsistent with the Respondent’s treatment of employ-
ees who did not engage in union activities. The Respon-
dent had never articulated a safety rule prohibiting em-
ployees from leaving their work areas. To the contrary,
the Respondent knew that employees frequently left their
work areas even for personal visits to employees in other
departments, but had never disciplined any employee for
that conduct. Indeed, when Geib left his work area again
a month after receiving the verbal warning, but did not
engage in union activity, he was not issued another warn-
ing. In these circumstances, we cannot find that the Re-
spondent would have issued Geib a verbal warning in the
absence of his union activity.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Carpenter Technology Cor-
poration, Reading, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
1. Change the date in the last sentence in paragraph
2(b) to October 26, 2004.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
[Direction of Second Election omitted from publica-
tion.]
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT threaten that existing pension, 401(k),
and ESOP plan benefits and coverage would be lost if
you select a union to represent you in collective bargain-
ing.
CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORP. 767
WE WILL NOT warn, discipline, or otherwise discrimi-
nate against you because you engage in protected or un-
ion activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful verbal warning issued to employee Barry Geib on
October 26, 2004, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter,
notify him in writing that this has been done and that the
verbal warning will not be used against him in any way.
CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION
William Slack, Esq., for the General Counsel.
John W. Tryon, Esq. and Gary D. Melchionni, Esq. (Stevens &
Lee), of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, for the Respondent.
Brad Manzolillo, Esq., of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge. This con-
solidated case was tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on June
28 and 29, 2005. The complaint alleges that, in a widely dis-
tributed memo and in group meetings with employees, Respon-
dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employ-
ees that they would lose certain pension, 401(k), Employee
Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), and retiree benefits if they se-
lected the Charging Party Union (the Union) as their collective-
bargaining representative. It also alleges that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by issuing a written
document “considered to be a verbal warning” to employee
Barry Geib for discriminatory reasons, because he was engag-
ing in union activities.1 The conduct alleged as unfair labor
practices also forms the basis of objections filed by the Union
to an election it lost. Respondent filed an answer denying the
essential allegations of both the complaint and the objections.
After the trial, the parties filed briefs, received on August 1,
2005, which I have read and considered.
Based on the entire record, including the testimony of the
witnesses and my observation of their demeanor, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a Delaware corporation, with a facility in Read-
ing, Pennsylvania, is engaged in the manufacture and distribu-
tion of specialty steel alloy materials. During a representative

1 The complaint alleges that Respondent made the same threats of
loss of benefits in the November 3 memo and in three of the group
meetings. The objections do not specify when or in what circumstances
the threats were made. It appears that essentially the same statements
were made in all the approximately 30 group meetings with employees.
What was said in all the group meetings was fully litigated.
1-year period, Respondent, in conducting its business opera-
tions, purchased and received, at its Reading facility, goods
valued in excess of $50,000 directly from outside the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of Delaware. Ac-
cordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent’s Reading facility employs some 1800 employ-
ees, almost 1200 of whom are production and maintenance
employees (Tr. 164). The facility covers a large geographical
area, with numerous structures separated by roads, parking lots,
and walkways, on both the east and the west sides of the
Schuylkill River (Tr. 8). Employees use a bridge that runs over
the river to get from buildings on the West Shore to ones on the
East Shore. The hand mill building, at which some of the
events in this case took place, is a very large structure on the
East Shore (Tr. 9).
Pursuant to a Stipulated Election Agreement approved by the
Regional Director for Region 4 on October 12, 2004, a Board-
conducted election was held on November 11, 2004, in the
following appropriate unit:
All full time and regular part time production and mainte-
nance Employees and coordinators employed by [Respon-
dent] at its facilities located at Reading, PA., excluding all
other employees, individuals on permanent lay off, office
clerical employees, Engineers, Laboratory Technicians,
guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
The Union lost the election by a vote of 602 to 524, but thereaf-
ter filed timely objections and unfair labor practice charges,
resulting in the instant proceeding.
B. Respondent’s November 3 Memo
As part of its campaign against the Union, Respondent dis-
tributed a 2-page memo, dated November 3, 2004, to all em-
ployees. (GC Exh. 8.) The memo was in the form of a letter to
employees signed by John Thames, the vice president of human
resources. It purported to be based on questions raised in group
meetings, which began two days before the memo and contin-
ued throughout that week. See discussion below. The subject
of the memo was whether existing employee benefit plans
would change if the employees voted to be represented by a
union. The contents of the memo, in relevant part, are set forth
below:
Question: Can the pension plan change if employees
vote to be represented by a union?
Answer: Yes. The current pension plan is subject to
negotiation. Any new plan could result in a benefit that is
more, the same, less, or discontinued. Under the General
Retirement Plan (GRP) Master Plan description, adopted
January 1, 1950 and restated on February 19, 1999—on
page 4, item (q)(5):
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD768
(q) “Employee” means any person employed by the
Company except as excluded below:
(5) A person who is accruing under a separate spe-
cial agreement (including collectively bargained agree-
ment) with the Company.
This means that at the point in time in which you be-
come subject to collective bargaining, you no longer fit the
definition of an employee under the plan description and
would be excluded from the plan as a non-employee.
Whatever benefit you have accrued to that time belongs to
you. The question is what type of plan would be put in
place of the current pension plan. That is subject to nego-
tiation. We believe the situation would be as follows:
If the union is voted in, you maintain the status quo.
You no longer fit the definition of employee under the
GRP as you become subject to a collective bargaining
agreement. A “New” pension plan is on the table for
negotiation. Based on the results of negotiations, em-
ployees might begin vesting in [the] “new” pension
plan. The “New” pension plan could be the same or
different than the current plan. It depends on the re-
sults of negotiations.
. . . .
Question: Can the 401(k) plan change if employees
vote to be represented by a union?
Answer: Yes. The plan is subject to bargaining.
There is no guarantee your participation in the plan would
continue. As a result of bargaining, your benefit could be
more, the same, less or discontinued. Based on the defini-
tion of employee in the 401(k) plan description, employees
subject to collective bargaining would be excluded. Under
the rules of the 401(k) plan participation stops immedi-
ately. Whether you have a 401(k) plan in the future and
whether the company contributes to it, is subject to the
outcome of collective bargaining.
Question: Can the Employee Stock Ownership Plan
(ESOP) change [if] employees vote to be represented by a
union?
Answer: Yes. The plan is subject to bargaining.
There is no guarantee your participation in the plan would
continue. As a result of bargaining, your benefit could be
more, the same, less or discontinued. Based on the defini-
tion of employee in the ESOP plan description, employees
subject to collective bargaining would be excluded. Under
the rules of the ESOP, accruals stop immediately.
Whether or not you have an ESOP in the future is subject
to the outcome of collective bargaining.2

2 Respondent introduced into evidence another document, dated No-
vember 4, 2004, which was also apparently distributed to all employees
and discusses possible changes in the pension plan if the employees
selected the Union (R. Exh. 3). The General Counsel has not alleged
that anything in this document violated the Act because, as he stated in
his brief (Br. 4), unlike the November 3 memo, nothing in the Novem-
ber 4 document “would automatically disqualify employees from par-
ticipation upon acquisition of Union representation.”
C. The Group Meetings
During the week or so before the election, beginning on No-
vember 1, Respondent held about 30 meetings with groups of
employees—so-called town meetings—to discuss several issues
in the union campaign. All employees attended one or another
of the meetings, at which Vice President of Human Resources
John Thames and Senior Vice President Dennis Oates spoke.
(Tr. 260–261, 268.) They were introduced by General Manager
Tom Reed. (Tr. 279–280.) It is undisputed that Respondent
posed questions that were placed on an overhead projector and
visible on a screen at the front of the meeting room; manage-
ment officials answered the questions. Among the questions
posed and answered, was one handled by Thames, relating to
the Respondent’s pension plan, question 10, which asked, “If
the union wins, can we continue with the current Carpenter
pension plan as is?” As there was apparently no written script
or transcription of the response to the question, the only evi-
dence on the response comes from the testimony of witnesses
in this proceeding.
The General Counsel called four employee witnesses to tes-
tify about Thames’s answer to question 10. They testified that
he read the question—“If the union wins, can we continue with
the current Carpenter pension plan as is?”—and that he an-
swered, “No.” According to two of the witnesses, Thames
went on to say that, under the pension plan rules, the employees
would no longer fit the definition of employee (Tr. 147, 154).
One witness testified that Thames said the employees would
have to “start over” in negotiations (Tr. 155). All four admit-
ted that Thames said something more in his answer, but they
could not remember what. Respondent called six employee
witnesses. Like the General Counsel’s employee witnesses,
they could not remember all of what Thames said in answer to
question 10. All gave a conclusory denial that they heard a
threat to take away benefits, but testified in different ways
about what was said. Two of those witnesses testified that
Thames stated the parties would start from “zero” (Tr. 296,
309) and one testified that Thames said something about “start-
ing from scratch” or “like a new beginning.” (Tr. 317–318.)
Respondent also called management witnesses Thames,
Oates, and Reed, as well as Bill Jonas, an independent labor
consultant who advised Respondent during the union campaign,
and Area Manager Bob Lord, who were present during some of
the meetings. Thames, whose testimony was the most compre-
hensive, acknowledged that he answered the posed question—
“If the union wins, can we continue with the current Carpenter
pension plan as is?”—by stating the words “as is” in the ques-
tion permitted him to answer it by a simple, “No.” He then
explained that the pension plan covered many different groups
of employees and the language of the plan excluded “bargain-
ing unit people.” (Tr. 262–263.) On cross-examination, he
acknowledged that he told employees that the definition ex-
cluded “people in the bargaining unit” (Tr. 272) and that, if
they chose union representation, they could not be covered by
the plan “as it was currently drafted.” (Tr. 271–272.) Thames
also testified that he told employees there were three tim e
frames to consider: First, where the employees were “right
now,” the period “as of today” and “up until November 11,” the
date of the election; the pension plan to that point was “solid,
CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORP. 769
protected, it’s yours . . . it’s not going to be lost.” The second
period would be after any union victory and during negotia-
tions. During that period, according to Thames, he told em-
ployees “everything stays as is.” He further testified, “Status
quo is the language we kept referring to.” The third stage, ac-
cording to Thames, was “when an agreement was reached,
there would be whatever the agreement called for.” He then
went on to relate what might be in a final agreement. He testi-
fied that he said, “And that could be more, it could be less, it
could be very different, it could be similar to what they had.”
He also answered a conclusory question from Respondent’s
counsel by denying that he threatened to take away existing
benefits (Tr. 263–266, 273, 275). Oates, Reed, Lord, and Jonas
essentially corroborated Thames’ account, although in less
detail (Tr. 318–320, 282, 290–291, 205–206).3
Thames’ testimony was in accord with that of some em-
ployee testimony in two crucial respects: He acknowledged
that he answered the question whether the pension plan would
continue “as is” if the employees selected the Union by stating,
“No.” He also acknowledged that he told employees that, un-
der the plan’s definition, employees lost coverage if they se-
lected the Union. In my view, the testimony of the manage-
ment officials, including Thames, as to what else Thames said
in response to the question was somewhat conclusory and se-
lective. It seems likely that Thames would have continued his
answer by making essentially the same points he made in his
November 3 memo to employees. After all, he had signed and
written the memo and it was distributed at about the same time
the group meetings were being held. In contrast, the testimony
of management officials, which was different, at least in em-
phasis, from what was stated in the November 3 memo, was
given months later, after the complaint had issued and they had
a better understanding of their legal position. In any event,
although Thames’ testimony about what he said after his initial
comments was somewhat confusing, it did not refute his earlier
statements that the pension plan would not continue “as is” and
employees would be excluded from the plan upon their selec-
tion of the Union. Indeed, that testimony reinforced those
statements. Thames said that, in assessing the impact of the
union election on the pension plan, employees ought to con-
sider three time frames. He said nothing would be lost in the
first time frame, that is, the period prior to the election. The
second time frame, which he described as being different from
the first time frame, was the period after the election and prior
to an agreement’s being reached. Although he testified that he
said everything would stay the same during this second time
frame, that statement is at odds with his earlier statements that
nothing would be lost up to the date of the election, but that if
employees chose the Union, the plan would not continue “as
is;” at that point, they would be excluded from the plan and
their future benefits would depend on what the Union could

3 I discount conclusory testimony from any witness—employee or
management official—either affirming or denying that threats were
made. It is difficult enough for lawyers and judges to decide what is or
is not a threat. Conclusory testimony from witnesses on this point is
not helpful; testimony on the matter is helpful only insofar as it recites
what was said.
win in collective bargaining. The very mention of a second
time frame different from the first suggests a difference in ap-
plication of the pension plan and retention of benefits. The
only way Thames’ testimony about the second time frame
makes any sense is if he told employees that, although accrued
pension benefits up until the time of the election would not be
lost, benefits would no longer accrue thereafter, unless the Un-
ion was able to negotiate them in some future collective-
bargaining agreement. That view is also reflected in the No-
vember 3 memo.
Similarly, I do not credit employee testimony that Thames
specifically said that the employees would have to “start over”
in negotiations, the parties would start from “zero” or from
“scratch,” and it would be “like a new beginning.” Although I
believe the employees’ testimony honestly reflected their un-
derstanding of Thames’ remarks, I conclude that Thames’ ac-
tual words merely reiterated the themes spelled out in his No-
vember 3 memo.
With this background, and based on my assessment of the
credibility of all the witnesses, I find as follows. Thames re-
sponded to question 10 by stating that the pension plan would
not continue “as is” if the Union won the election. He then
went on to state that the language of the plan excluded employ-
ees upon their selection of the Union and their, thus, becoming
members of a “bargaining unit.” Although I cannot fully credit
the testimony of either management or employees as to what
Thames said after these initial comments, I believe that
Thames’ further comments did not refute his earlier statements
and they essentially repeated the message of his November 3
memo.
Analysis
An employer violates the Act, and engages in objectionable
conduct that requires overturning an election, when its words
reasonably convey the impression, during an election cam-
paign, that employees will be excluded from an existing benefit
plan upon choosing a union to represent them in collective
bargaining. That impression is not dispelled by a reference to
negotiations that may follow union representation, unless that
reference makes clear that the employees do not lose benefits or
coverage during negotiations. Hertz Corp., 316 NLRB 672 fn.
2 (1995). See also Handleman Co., 283 NLRB 451, 452 (1987)
(exclusionary language in benefit plan not unlawful because it
contemplated “the continuation of coverage during the negotia-
tions” and left “continued coverage to collective bargaining,
allowing the parties to agree to continued coverage or not”);
and KEZI, Inc., 300 NLRB 594, 595 (1990) (exclusionary lan-
guage not unlawful because it is “triggered only by the comple-
tion of good faith bargaining—not by the mere commencement
of bargaining on this topic”). Indeed, preelection suggestions
that, after selection of a union, subsequent bargaining starts
from “zero” or from “scratch” are unlawful if they give the
impression that existing benefits may be lost upon selection of
a union and may be regained only after the vagaries or uncer-
tainties of negotiations. See Ryder Truck Rental, 341 NLRB
761 (2004), enfd. 401 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2005). The Board
examines such suggestions in context to determine whether
they “effectively threaten employees with the loss of existing
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD770
benefits and leave them with the impression that what they may
ultimately receive depends in large measure upon what the
Union can induce the employer to restore,” or—conversely—
whether they indicate that any “reduction in . . . benefits will
occur only as a result of the normal give and take of collective
bargaining.” Federated Logistics & Operations, 340 NLRB
255 (2003), enfd. in relevant part 405 F.3d 920, 924–927 (D.C.
Cir. 2005), and authorities cited therein.
When evaluating allegedly coercive campaign statements,
the Board has been advised by a unanimous Supreme Court to
“take into account the economic dependence of the employees
on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former,
because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of
the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disin-
terested ear.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617
(1969). The Court also stated that an employer should make
his views known without engaging in “brinksmanship.” At the
least, he should avoid “conscious overstatements he has reason
to believe will mislead his employees.” Id. at 620.
Applying the above principles, I find that Respondent’s ref-
erences, in the November 3 memo, to changes in its 401(k) plan
and its ESOP plan if “the employees vote to be represented by a
union” were unlawful and objectionable. In both instances, the
question posed by Respondent was whether the plans could
“change” if the employees voted “to be represented by a un-
ion.” The answer given was, “Yes.” This was followed by a
statement that the plans were “subject to bargaining,” followed
immediately by the caution, “There is no guarantee that your
participation in the plan[s] would continue.” Respondent also
stated that employees “subject to bargaining” were excluded
from the plans by definition. “Subject to bargaining” is clearly
something different from “after collective bargaining” or after
the conclusion of negotiations or execution of a collective-
bargaining agreement. Thus, the reasonable implication is that
employees would lose their participation rights in the existing
plans upon voting for the Union. Indeed, that implication was
reinforced by what followed. Respondent emphasized that,
under the rules of the 401(k) plan, “participation stops immedi-
ately.” And, under the ESOP plan, “accruals stop immedi-
ately.” Thus, not only was there no assurance that the benefits
of, and participation in, the existing plans would continue dur-
ing negotiations, but Respondent’s language emphasized the
opposite: If the employees chose a union to bargain on their
behalf, they would not be eligible to participate in the plans and
would lose all unaccrued benefits. That impression was not
dispelled by Respondent’s peppered and ambiguous references
to negotiations that might follow selection of the Union. In-
deed, unlike in its statements about loss of coverage or partici-
pation when employees became “subject to collective bargain-
ing”—a clear reference to employees selecting a collective-
bargaining representative—Respondent’s statements about
possible future benefits were conditioned on the “outcome of
collective bargaining.” Accordingly, Respondent’s message
was that the benefits of participating in those plans would be
lost and might or might not be recaptured in collective bargain-
ing.
In these circumstances, I find that, in its November 3 memo,
Respondent threatened that, if the employees voted to be repre-
sented by a collective-bargaining agent, they would lose cover-
age and benefits they presently enjoyed under Respondent’s
existing 401(k) and ESOP plans. Those threats were violative
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and, because they were widely
disseminated to all employees, constituted objectionable con-
duct that interfered with the fairness of the election.
Respondent’s threats with respect to loss of participation in
the 401(k) and ESOP plans infected its discussion of the pen-
sion plan, also mentioned in the same November 3 memo. The
thrust of its message was the same: If employees selected the
Union, they would be excluded from participation in the pen-
sion plan and their future coverage and benefits would depend
on the outcome of negotiations. Here again, the Respondent
posed the question whether the plan could change if the em-
ployees voted for the Union and answered, “Yes.” And, here
again, the Respondent stated that the current pension plan was
“subject to negotiation.” But what followed clearly implied
that, upon selecting the Union and throughout negotiations, the
employees would no longer be eligible to participate in the
plan. Respondent set forth the exclusionary language in the
pension plan and gave its interpretation of that language. It
stated that “at the point in time in which you become subject to
collective bargaining, you no longer fit the definition of an
employee under the plan description and would be excluded
from the plan as a nonemployee.” As indicated above, the
phrase “subject to collective bargaining” clearly means upon
selection of a union rather than after the conclusion of collec-
tive bargaining. Thus, the message was that the employees
would no longer be participants in the pension plan upon selec-
tion of the Union. Indeed, the subsequent statement, “What-
ever benefit you have accrued to that time belongs to you,”
suggests that there would be no accrual thereafter, that is, dur-
ing negotiations. Accordingly, the message was that employees
would lose both participatory rights and benefits upon selection
of the Union and they would have to try to recapture those lost
rights and benefits in negotiations.
In light of the above threats, the last part of the pension plan
discussion in the November 3 memo is somewhat confusing.
But nothing in that subsequent discussion refutes the earlier
statements that employees would be excluded from the existing
plan upon voting for the Union and would have to regain their
coverage and lost benefits in collective bargaining. Interposing
the words “status quo,” mentioning an accurate definition of
employee coverage and adding the possibility of negotiating a
“new” pension plan did not cure the unlawful statements, but
only added an element of ambiguity to Respondent’s threats.
Indeed, viewed in the light most favorable to Respondent, the
memo states both an unlawful and a lawful interpretation of the
plan’s exclusionary language. Even under this view, however,
Respondent created an ambiguity, which would lead employees
reasonably to infer that they could lose pension coverage upon
selecting the Union. Such ambiguities are read against the
party creating them. See Unifirst Corp., 335 NLRB 706, 707
(2001); and Ellison Media Co., 344 NLRB 1112, 1113 and fn. 5
(2005).
In these circumstances, and considering the similar messages
of Respondent with respect to the 401(k) plan and the ESOP
plan, I find that Respondent conveyed the impression that the
CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORP. 771
employees would lose their right to participate in the pension
plan upon their selection of the Union and could regain that
right only after negotiations, which might result in a “new” and
perhaps less desirable plan. Accordingly, the Respondent’s
message about pension plan changes amounted to a threat in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Because that message
was widely disseminated to all employees, it also amounted to
objectionable conduct that interfered with a free election.4
Applying the same principles set forth above to Thames’ re-
marks in response to question 10 in the group meetings with all
employees, I also find that Thames separately threatened a loss
of pension benefits if the employees selected the Union. Based
upon my credibility determinations and findings of fact set
forth above, I find that Thames made essentially the same
threats about loss of pension rights in the meetings as he did in
his November 3 memo. More particularly, he stated emphati-
cally that, upon selection of the Union, the pension plan would
not remain “as is.” He also cited his interpretation of the pen-
sion plan’s exclusionary language, stating that the employees
would no longer be participants in the plan after they selected
the Union. Here again, as in the November 3 memo, Thames
gave no assurances that employees would continue to be cov-
ered or accrue benefits during the period after the Union was
selected and while negotiations were in progress. Indeed, he
said that employees were excluded from the plan upon their
selection of the Union and their future benefits would depend
on the ultimate results of collective bargaining. Thames thus
conveyed to employees that they would lose at the least the
accrual of future benefits unless the Union was able to recap-
ture those benefits at the bargaining table. Thames’ remarks in
this respect comported with the message in his November 3
memo and had nothing to do with what he said would happen
after an agreement was reached. In these circumstances, I find
that Thames’ remarks at the group meetings amounted to a
separate violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as well as ob-
jectionable conduct that interfered with a fair election.
In its brief (Br. 12–13), Respondent asserts that the exclu-
sionary language of the pension plan is lawful because it simply
precludes participation in the plan upon coverage of employees
in a different plan, including one under a collective-bargaining
agreement. But that is not the violation alleged and found here.
Both in his November 3 memo and in his statements at the
group meetings, Thames gave his interpretation of the pension
plan’s exclusionary language, which does not, by its terms,
preclude coverage of union-represented employees. Not only
was Thames’ interpretation different from the actual language

4 Although the General Counsel’s brief does not address the issue,
the complaint also alleges that the reference, in the November 3 memo,
to changes in the retiree medical plan is likewise violative of the Act
for the same reasons. I do not reach that issue. Such a finding would
be cumulative and would not appreciably affect the order in this case or
the ruling on objections. Moreover, it is unclear whether the reference
to retiree medical benefits is limited to already retired employees, and
thus implicates issues under Georgia Power Co., 325 NLRB 420
(1998), discussing Chemical Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971). Because no party has raised or discussed
those issues, I am reluctant to address them here, particularly since it
appears unnecessary to do so in the posture of this case.
in the plan, but Thames’ interpretation tied loss of coverage to
selection of the Union, not to execution of a collective-
bargaining agreement. And he implied that the lost coverage
and benefits would have to be recaptured in negotiations. That
is what was unlawful, under the applicable authorities cited and
discussed above.5
D. The Warning Issued to Employee Barry Geib
Barry Geib was a flex utility operator in the bar finishing de-
partment, also known as department 34, which was located in
one of the buildings on the West Shore. He was active in the
Union’s campaign in the period leading up to the election of
November 11, 2004. For example, he distributed union litera-
ture both outside the facility and inside, in break areas (Tr. 23).
He himself wrote and signed three letters to employees setting
forth his reasons for supporting the Union and urging employ-
ees to vote for the Union in the upcoming election. He also
made known his prounion feelings in conversations and meet-
ings with his immediate supervisor, Area Manager Bob Lord.
(Tr. 29–31.)6
On October 24, 2004, Geib attended a union meeting, at
which some hand mill employees who worked on the East
Shore complained that they never received union literature.
The next day, October 25, Geib attempted to remedy the matter
by delivering and distributing union literature at the East Shore
buildings, including the hand mill building. At the end of his
shift, at 2 p.m., Geib, armed with union literature and still wear-
ing his safety equipment, left his work station in department 34
on the West Shore, and crossed the bridge over the river to the
East Shore part of the facility. After crossing the bridge, he
walked around the perimeter outside the hand mill building and
went across the street into what is called the old locker room, a
nonwork area. He went through the locker room and distrib-
uted some of the union literature. He then went to the new
locker room, another building nearby, and similarly distributed
union literature there. (Tr. 31–34.) Thereafter, he went inside
the hand mill building and placed union literature on a picnic
table, which was in a nonwork area used by employees during
breaks. Nearby was a separate structure, a building within the
very large hand mill building; it functions as an office, which
housed the hand mill coordinator and a clerical employee. No
other employees were working in the hand mill building at the
time and the lights and machinery were shut off. After placing
literature on the picnic table, Geib walked out of the hand mill
building and returned to the locker rooms. When he came

5 It appears that Respondent’s argument in this respect applies only
to the alleged violation dealing with the pension plan, not the alleged
violations dealing with the 401(k) or the ESOP plan. Respondent’s
discussion of those plans in the November 3 memo did not include a
statement of the actual exclusionary language of those plans.
6 Two of the three letters written by Geib were distributed to em-
ployees by hand and the other was reproduced and mailed to all produc-
tion and maintenance employees by the Union. Tr. 25–26; GC Exh. 3,
4, and 5. It appears that only one of the three letters was distributed
before the issuance of his verbal warning in late October 2004. Tr. 86–
87. In the last letter, Geib referred to the incident that led to his verbal
warning, although he did not mention the warning itself; he simply
mentioned that Respondent had confiscated some union literature he
had distributed on October 25.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD772
back, about 15 minutes later, he looked inside the hand mill
building and noticed that the union literature he had placed on
the picnic table had been removed. He immediately suspected
that the coordinator had removed the literature so he went to the
office, approached the coordinator, an employee named Joe
Yadlowsky, and told him that he had no right to remove the
union literature and that he, Geib, was going to report the mat-
ter to the Union and the Labor Board. According to Geib, Yad-
lowsky replied, “What literature?” (Tr. 34–37.)
After the above confrontation, Yadlowsky immediately
called his area manager, Michael Kershner, and told him what
had happened. According to Yadlowsky, he told Kershner that
someone had approached him in the office and accused him of
violating Federal law by removing union literature from the
picnic table. Kershner, who was at another location, then
agreed to come to the handmill building. (Tr. 178.) Yad-
lowsky also testified that he had indeed removed the union
literature on the picnic table and mentioned that fact to
Kershner. (Tr. 181.) According to Kershner, Yadlowsky told
him that there was an individual walking through the hand mill
building with a “bag full of literature.” (Tr. 183.) Kershner
told Yadlowsky he would be right over, and notified his supe-
rior, Scott Herber, the manager of the hot mills. Herber and
Kershner got into separate vehicles and drove the short distance
to the hand mill building, where they met with Yadlowsky.
(Tr. 178, 183–184.)
In the meantime, Geib had left the hand mill building, but,
when he reached the bridge leading to the West Shore, he de-
cided to return to replace the union literature that had been
removed. This time, he entered the hand mill building at one of
the north entrances and walked through the plant on his way
down to the picnic table near the office. (Tr. 37–38.) When
Geib was about 50 yards away from the office, Kershner, who
had been talking to Yadlowsky, noticed Geib and called for him
to stop. When Kershner confronted Geib, he asked Geib who
he was and what he was doing there. Geib identified himself,
said he had been in the hand mill building in the past and men-
tioned that he was distributing union literature. Kershner then
recognized him as an employee he knew. (Tr. 40–41, 190.)7
After this initial exchange, Kershner, according to his own
testimony, asked if Geib had accused anyone in the office of
removing union literature. (Tr. 190.) Geib denied that he had,
but admitted that he had talked to someone about removing
union literature, stating that he had placed union literature in
the building and that it was removed shortly thereafter.
Kershner then asked if he had seen anybody removing union

7 Geib had worked in the hand mill building on previous occasions
and he was familiar with the interior of the building. He testified that,
when confronted by Kershner, he made a reference to having gone
through the mill on previous occasions, using it as a shortcut to pick up
his car. Kershner’s testimony is that Geib stated that that was his rea-
son for going through the mill on this occasion. Whatever the ex-
change about Geib picking up his car, it is clear that Kershner knew
that Geib was there to distribute union literature. Geib, who testified
that he told Kershner that this is what he was doing, was obviously
carrying union literature at the time; and Kershner had been told that
someone, who turned out to be Geib, had been observed carrying union
literature in the hand mill building.
literature and Geib said he had not. Kershner then said that
Geib should be more careful about accusing people without
proper justification. At that point, he asked whether Geib was
on the clock; and Geib said he was off duty. After this ex-
change, Kershner mentioned that he was concerned for Geib’s
safety because no one else was present in the area. (Tr. 191,
195–197,185–186, 40–41.) According to Geib, the discussion
ended when Kershner escorted him out of the building. (Tr.
40.)8
In due course, Kershner’s report of what had happened in the
hand mill building reached Geib’s supervisors. The next day,
October 26, at about 10 a.m., Area Manager Bob Lord asked
Geib to come to a meeting in Department Manager Rich
Zeller’s office. At the meeting, Zeller presented Geib with a
written document that he had prepared. (Tr. 41–47, 226.) The
document (GC Exh. 6), which stated that it was to be “consid-
ered a verbal warning,” and listed its subject as “Distributing of
Literature/Safety Issue,” read as follows:
On Monday, October 25, 2004 at approximately 3:00
pm and again at approx. 3:45 pm Barry Geib was observed
distributing literature in the Hand Mills (Bldg 1) on the
East Shore of the plant. He was observed placing litera-
ture at non-work areas. Although this was after his shift
and also after the scheduled shift at the Hand Mills, it is
unacceptable for him to be out of his normal work area.
This could be a potential safety issue if he were to be in-
jured or incapacitated while in an unfamiliar area, particu-
larly when no one is in the area to assist. He must refrain
from any activities that would take him outside his normal
work area, whether on shift or not or during working or
non-working hours.
Barry understands that future occurrences could lead to
Corrective Performance.9
After he received the above document, Geib submitted a re-
sponse on the back of the document setting forth his position,

8 The above sequence in Kershner’s interrogation of Geib was de-
veloped during his cross-examination by counsel for General Counsel,
obviously based on a pretrial affidavit. On direct, Kershner never men-
tioned any discussion of union literature between him and Geib (Tr.
191); and, even later, in response to Respondent’s attorney’s questions,
Kershner tried to emphasize that he first discussed safety issues with
Geib. Still later, on re-cross, when he was shown his affidavit, he ad-
mitted that he discussed the union literature issue before he discussed
safety issues. Tr. 194–197. I find that Kershner was deliberately eva-
sive in trying to emphasize his concern with safety issues, as opposed
to Geib’s distribution of union literature, in an effort to strengthen
Respondent’s case. Thus, I cannot credit his testimony on the crucial
issues in this case, except where it is contrary to Respondent’s interests.
9 Under the Respondent’s formal corrective performance proce-
dure—an apparent progressive discipline policy, an employee is pre-
sented with certain written notifications and warnings leading to “sus-
pension with intent to discharge.” Tr. 232. Verbal warnings are not
themselves considered part of the corrective performance procedure.
Tr. 231–232. But one management official testified that such warnings
could lead to “corrective performance [Tr. 208];” and another testified
that verbal warnings remain in at least the employee’s departmental file
and may be utilized when considering discipline, transfer or promotion
Tr. 244–245.
CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORP. 773
including that his distribution of union literature in the hand
mill building had been done in nonwork areas, that he was fa-
miliar with the building because he had worked there in the
past, and that he had also worked alone in the past, with the
knowledge of his supervisor, and no one had questioned that
that was inappropriate. (GC Exh. 7.)
Analysis
Motive-based allegations of discrimination are decided under
the framework of the Board’s Wright Line decision.10 The
General Counsel must establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the employee’s protected or union activity was a
substantial or motivating factor in the challenged decision.
Once the General Counsel meets his initial burden, the burden
of persuasion shifts to the employer to show that it would have
taken the same adverse action against the employee, even in the
absence of protected or union activity. The issue is, thus, not
simply whether the employer “could have” disciplined the em-
ployee, but whether it “would have” done so, regardless of his
union activities. See Alexandria NE LLC, 342 NLRB 217, 219
(2004), and Structural Composites Industries, 304 NLRB 729,
730 (1991). Accord: Brandeis Machinery & Supply Co. v.
NLRB, 412 F.3d 822 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
In the instant case, the General Counsel has established that
the warning issued to Geib was based on his union activities,
namely passing out union literature. The warning itself states
that one of its subject matters was distribution of literature.
Moreover, the first two sentences of the warning deal with Geib
passing out literature; only later does the warning mention other
factors such as Geib being out of his normal work area and
potential safety concerns. Likewise, when Kershner confronted
Geib in the hand mill building, the first thing he mentioned was
Geib’s accusation that someone removed the union literature he
had placed in nonwork areas. Kershner told Geib he should be
careful in making such accusations, a particularly ironic state-
ment because the person Geib accused of removing the union
literature admitted that he had done so. Indeed, the reason
Kershner came to the hand mill building at all was that he was
notified that someone was passing out union literature. Only
after Kershner’s remarks about Geib’s accusations concerning
the removal of union literature did Kershner mention safety
concerns connected with Geib being away from his work sta-
tion in a building that he may not have been familiar with, at a
time when no one else was present. This evidence not only
satisfies the General Counsel’s initial burden as to discrimina-
tory motive, but it shows that whatever other reasons were
given at the time of the verbal warning were secondary in na-
ture and would not have, in themselves, resulted in issuance of
the warning.
In the face of this evidence, Respondent was unable to inde-
pendently and persuasively show that it would have issued a
warning to Geib in the absence of his having passed out union
literature. For example, the warning itself gives few specifics
about what was wrong with Geib being in the hand mill build-
ing. And it cites no work place rule that was violated. The

10 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1989), enfd, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir.
1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
warning simply states that Geib was out of his normal work
area, even though it acknowledges that he was off duty and that
he distributed literature only in nonwork areas. Significantly,
one month later, Respondent noted another incident when Geib
was out of his work area, but, on that occasion, which did not
involve union activity, Geib was not issued a verbal warning.
(Tr. 247–249.)
The warning of October 26 also alludes to “a potential safety
issue if [Geib] were to be injured or incapacitated while in an
unfamiliar area, particularly when no one is in the area to as-
sist.” But that is speculative at best. The evidence shows that
Geib was familiar with the interior of the hand mill building
because he had worked and been there in the past, and that he
and others worked alone many times, with the knowledge of
supervisors who did not complain or issue warnings about that.
The evidence also shows that many employees, including Geib,
left their normal work areas to go elsewhere in the facility on
their nonwork time. It also shows that many employees came
to their work areas before the beginning of their shift and re-
mained after the conclusion of their shifts. Geib’s uncontra-
dicted testimony is that he did not walk in congested or danger-
ous areas when he was in the hand mill building and there was
plenty of light for him to see where he was going. He also
credibly testified, without contradiction, that there were no
signs either inside or outside the building limiting access to off
duty employees or employees who worked in other buildings.
(Tr. 48–62, 87–90, 96–106, 116–121, 127–128, 132–143, 155–
157.) Indeed, one management official confirmed that there
were no posted signs limiting access to the hand mill building
(Tr. 189) and another testified that Respondent never commu-
nicated to employees generally any prohibition against staying
in the facility after an employee’s shift was concluded (Tr.
249–250). Finally, the warning broadly restricts Geib’s future
movements beyond his “normal work area” even on nonwork
time. This restriction is not tied, or related in any way, to
safety issues. Thus, not only has Respondent failed to show
that it would have issued the warning in the absence of Geib’s
union activities, but the evidence shows that what Geib did was
something that was common practice among the employees,
with supervisory knowledge and without supervisory objection.
Nor is Respondent’s position aided by the testimony of the
officials most involved in the issuance of the warning. It was
Zeller who essentially decided to issue the warning to Geib
after he was notified of the incident at the hand mill building
the day before (Tr. 238).11 But not only did Zeller have no first
hand knowledge of what had transpired, but it is clear that he
attempted to support his issuance of the warning by relying
upon a completely unrelated matter. Zeller testified that he
keeps summary department files on all 170 production employ-
ees under his authority, including Geib (Tr. 238–239), and that
he could only recall one previously documented verbal warning
for something he considered similar to what Geib did. That

11 Zeller testified that he spoke to his superior, General Manager
Tom Reed, before issuing the warning. Tr. 235–236. But Reed testi-
fied that, when he talked to Zeller about the matter, he simply wanted
someone to talk to Geib; Reed did not expect a warning to be issued.
Tr. 278–279, 283.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD774
was a verbal warning issued to employee Gary Collar in Febru-
ary 2002. (Tr. 229–230.) Zeller described Collar’s infraction
on that occasion as his having been in a restricted area “that he
should not have been in.” (Tr. 240–241.) Later, however,
when documentation of the warning was produced, it appeared
that Zeller misrepresented the gravamen of Collar’s infraction,
which was in no way comparable to Geib’s alleged offense.
Collar’s verbal warning was for “disruptive activities,” and it
was the last in a string of warnings, mostly for poor perform-
ance. (Tr. 327–328.) According to the verbal warning, Collar
went to his former work area while other employees were
working and engaged them in controversial discussions as to
why he had been previously transferred out of that area. (Tr.
329.) Collar was cautioned that “his statements can and do
have a serious negative effect in an already strained work envi-
ronment.” (Tr. 330.) This is clearly a different kind of impro-
priety than the one for which Geib was charged. Collar’s warn-
ing does not support the contention that Geib committed an
offense that was uniformly punished by the issuance of a verbal
warning. Moreover, I find that Zeller’s initial misrepresenta-
tion in this matter reflects adversely on his credibility and es-
tablishes that the allegedly lawful reason he advanced for the
verbal warning—that Geib was out of his work area—was a
pretext. In these circumstances, I find that Respondent has not
shown, through Zeller’s testimony, that Geib would have been
issued a verbal warning in the absence of his union activities.
Indeed, the pretextual reason advanced by Zeller buttresses the
finding of unlawful motive for the warning.
The only other management official who played a significant
role in the issuance of the warning was Kershner. His report
eventually led to issuance of the warning and he was the only
management official who knew first hand what had happened,
although he did not actually see how Geib reached the point at
which they met in the hand mill building. This was after Geib
had distributed union literature in nonwork areas and before he
had a chance to replace the literature that had been removed.
As shown in the factual statement, Kershner was alerted to
come to the hand mill building by a report that someone was
passing out union literature there. Kershner’s first questions of
Geib after confronting him in the hand mill building and find-
ing out who he was and what he was doing there, were about
his distribution of union literature, which, of course, is what
Geib was doing in the building, and Geib’s accusation that
someone had removed the union literature. Only later did
Kershner mention his concern for Geib’s safety. This shows
Kershner’s motivation not only for confronting Geib, but for
his report to Geib’s superiors that led to the verbal warning. As
I also indicated earlier in this decision (see fn. 8, above),
Kershner was deliberately evasive when testifying about this
matter. Thus, I find that Kershner was more concerned with
Geib’s union activities than any safety issues presented by
Geib’s being in the hand mill building after hours with no one
else present. The safety issues were an afterthought and a pre-
text; they would not have prompted Kershner’s report in the
absence of Geib’s union activities.
In these circumstances, I find that the real reason for the Re-
spondent’s actions was Geib’s union activities. Respondent has
not persuasively shown that it would have issued the warning
absent Geib’s union activities. Accordingly, I find that, by
issuing the warning to Geib, Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.12
E. The Representation Case
One of the Union’s objections in the representation case—
renumbered Objection 5 (GC Exh. 1(j))—tracks the complaint
allegations with respect to the threatened loss of benefits. That
objection, based on a widely disseminated memo addressing the
loss of three important employee benefits—the pension plan,
the 401(k) plan and the ESOP plan—is sustained. That alone
requires overturning the election of November 11, 2004, and
holding a new election. I also sustain renumbered Objection 5
based on Thames’s answer to question 10 in the group meetings
attended by all the employees, which reinforced the message
set forth in the November 3 memo. I do not reach renumbered
Objections 2, 3, and 4.13
The remaining objection (renumbered Objection 1) tracks the
complaint allegation with respect to the warning issued to Geib.
Although I found that issuance of the warning was discrimina-
tory and amounted to a violation of the Act, I do not sustain the
corresponding objection. There is no evidence that news of the
warning itself was widely disseminated, although, in Geib’s
“final message to employees [GC Exh. 5],” which was widely
distributed (see fn. 6, above), he stated: “When I put union
literature on the break area picnic table in the HandMills on
Monday, October 25th it took less than 10 minutes for the co-
ordinator . . . to dispose of it.” This was, of course, the incident
that led to the warning. Nevertheless, I cannot find that the
issuance of the warning, in and of itself, even though it was a
serious unfair labor practice, interfered with a free election.
The election unit was composed of over 1100 employees. In
these circumstances, I find it doubtful that news of a warning
issued to a single employee would alone have been so widely
known and significant enough to taint the election results. See
Clark Equipment Co., 278 NLRB 498, 505 (1986).

12 In his brief (Br. 22), the General Counsel asserts that the warn-
ing’s broad restriction on Geib’s future movements outside his normal
work area, even on nonwork time, constitutes a separate and independ-
ent violation. That violation, however, was not alleged in the complaint
and the matter was not fully litigated in the specific way the General
Counsel presents it in his brief. I agree with the General Counsel,
however, that such a broad prohibition had nothing to do with alleged
safety concerns and thus confirms the illegality of the warning itself.
See GC Br. 22 at fn. 13. But a separate finding of another violation is
not necessary in this case. The remedy for the violation found includes
expungement of the warning, including the restrictive language referred
to by the General Counsel.
13 Renumbered Objections 2, 3, and 4 include more specific allega-
tions of threats of loss of benefits. To a certain extent, those specific
allegations are subsumed in the more general alleged threats set forth in
renumbered Objection 5. I also note that the Union does not specifi-
cally rely on those objections in its posthearing brief. In view of my
determination to sustain the objection relating to the threat that the
employees would lose coverage under the current pension plan, 401(k)
plan and ESOP plan (renumbered Objection 5), I do not reach the more
specific issues presented by renumbered Objections 2, 3, and 4.
CARPENTER TECHNOLOGY CORP. 775
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By threatening that existing pension, 401(k), and ESOP
plan benefits and coverage would be lost if the employees se-
lected a union to represent them in collective bargaining, Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By issuing a warning to employee Barry Geib for engag-
ing in union activities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) of the Act.
3. The above violations are unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the Act.
4. By committing the violations set forth above in item 1,
Respondent interfered with the election of November 11, 2004,
thus requiring the election to be set aside.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record herein, I issue the following recommended14
ORDER
The Respondent, Carpenter Technology Corporation, Read-
ing, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening that existing pension, 401(k), and ESOP plan
benefits and participation would be lost if the employees select
a union to represent them in collective bargaining.
(b) Warning, disciplining or otherwise discriminating against
employees because they engage in union activities.
(c) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7
rights.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.

14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be waived for all pur-
poses.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this order, remove from
its files, including departmental files, the any reference to the
verbal warning issued to employee Barry Geib on October 26,
2004, and within 3 days thereafter notify him in writing that
this has been done and that the warning will not be used against
him in any way.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
principal office and place of business in Reading, Pennsylvania,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”15 Copies of
the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 4, after being signed by Respondent’s authorized represen-
tative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceed-
ings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved herein, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since December 3, 2004.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official,
on a form provided by the Region, attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that Case 4–RC–20898 be severed and
remanded to the Regional Director to conduct a new election
when she deems it appropriate.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.

15 If this order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”