C & M Sportswear Manufacturing Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 10, 1970

183 N.L.R.B. 230 (N.L.R.B. 1970)

230 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
C & M Sportswear Manufacturing Corporation and
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO. Cases 4-CA-4910 and 4-CA-5003
June 10, 1970
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FANNING, MCCULLOCH, AND JENKINS
On March 13, 1970, Trial Examiner James V.
Constantine issued his Decision in the above-enti-
tled proceeding, finding that Respondent had en-
gaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, and recommending that
it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirm-
ative action, as set forth in the attached Trial Ex-
aminer's Decision. He further found that Respon-
dent had not engaged in certain other unfair labor
practices alleged in the complaint and recom-
mended that such allegations be dismissed.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the
Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting brief
and the General Counsel filed cross-exceptions to
the Trial Examiner's Decision and a supporting
brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this proceeding to a
three-member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the
Trial Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and
briefs, and the entire record in the proceeding and
hereby adopts the findings,' conclusions, and
recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the
following modifications:
1. The parties stipulated that 71 employees were
in the unit on June 2, 1969, when the Union de-
manded recognition. Additionally, the Trial Ex-
aminer found that six other employees whose status
was contested were also in the appropriate unit on
that date.
Four of these six employees, Burridge, Bennett,
Warner, and Witter, had formerly been employed
by Respondent and had terminated their employ-
ment prior to the date recognition was requested.
Thus, Burridge left in February 1969 to take a
position as an airline stewardess; Bennett left in Au-
gust 1968 to help in her husband's business; Witter
resigned in May 1967 to accompany her husband
overseas; and Warner left in July 1968 to have a
baby. They were not rehired until after the strike
began in August 1969.
The Trial Examiner found that the four women
should be included as part of the unit on the theory
that Respondent had granted them leaves of
absence when they had initially quit their jobs.
We find, however, that the four women left
Respondent's employ for reasons which clearly in-
dicated intentions permanently to quit. Further,
President Vecchio admitted that he routinely
granted leaves of absence to departing personnel.
Under these cirsumstances, we cannot rely on
Vecchio's self-serving statement that these em-
ployees had merely taken leaves of absence. Ac-
cordingly, we exclude them from the unit as of the
date of demand for recognition.
The status of Cora Buckingham was also in issue.
The Trial Examiner found that she was not a super-
visor, as General Counsel contended, on the
grounds that she merely relays instructions from an
acknowledged supervisor, Bowman, grants em-
ployees time off or lays off employees only after
consulting with Bowman, gives instructions of a
routine nature, and spends most of her time at
manual labor.
The record discloses, however, that Supervisor
Bowman works on the second floor of the plant and
has little contact with the shipping department
located on the, first floor. Buckingham is regarded
by the employees in that department as their super-
visor , she assigns work to them , grants them per-
mission to leave, instructs them in the performance
of their duties, recommends that employees be re-
warded for outstanding service, and is responsible
for counting items which leave the shipping depart-
ment. Additionally, she is listed as "head of
shipping room" on Respondent's payroll, was
characterized as a supervisor by Vecchio at an
unemployment compensation hearing, and received
a bonus generally granted to those who are super-
visors.
In weighing all of the above factors, we conclude,
contrary to the Trial Examiner, that Buckingham is
a supervisor and may not, therefore, be included in
the unit. It follows that coercive remarks made by
her to employee Wanda Howard and her interroga-
tion of LaVerne Shoemaker which the Trial Ex-
aminer credited but which he held could not be at-
tributed to Respondent, do, in fact, constitute viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1).
' In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt pro forma .be Trial Ex-
aminer's findings as to the 8(a)( I) violations committed by Respondent
President Vecchio and Supervisor Bowman.
C & M SPORTSWEAR MFG. CORP. 231
In sum , then, with the inclusion of Shoemaker
who was found to be discriminatorily discharged,
the total number of employees included in the unit
as of the date of demand for recognition was 72
rather than 77 as found by the Trial Examiner. This
does not alter his finding, however, that the Union,
having obtained 42 valid authorization cards, had
established a majority by June 2, 1969.
2. We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclu-
sion that Respondent's unfair labor practices I ave
erased the possibility of holding a fair election and
that a bargaining order is, therefore, an appropriate
remedy.
In the instant case, there is no question that the
Union had a valid majority on the date that it
requested recognition. Respondent refused to
recognize the Union , insisting instead that an elec-
tion be held. Yet at the same time, it engaged in
serious misconduct designed to undermine the
Union's strength and prevent an election which
might accurately reflect the employees' free choice.
Given these circumstances, it is clear that Respon-
dent's refusal to grant recognition to the Union vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act and that a bargain-
ing order is therefore warranted.
Moreover, we find that even were an 8(a)(5)
violation to be absent here, Respondent's unfair
labor practices were so numerous and pervasive as
to require a bargaining order to repair their unlaw-
ful effect.'
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the Recom-
mended Order of the Trial Examiner and hereby
orders that Respondent, C & M Sportswear Manu-
facturing Corporation, Meshoppen, Pennsylvania,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
2 See N L R B v Cassel Packing Company, 395 U S 575
TRIAL EXAMINER 'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES V. CONSTANTINE, Trial Examiner : This is a
consolidated unfair labor practice case litigated
pursuant to Section 10(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , herein called the Act
(29 U.S.C. 160(b)). It consists of two cases
(4-CA-4910 and 4-CA-5003) which were com-
bined for the purpose of trial . In Case 4-CA-4910
the original charge was filed on May 15, 1969. It
was first amended on May 22, 1969, and again
amended on June 13, 1969 . In Case 4-CA-5003,
the original charge was filed on August 22, 1969.
All charges name C & M Sportswear Manufactur-
ing Corporation as the Respondent . The Charging
Party in both cases is Amalgamated Clothing Work-
ers of America , AFL-CIO.
On October 29, 1969, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board , herein called the
Board , through the Regional Director for Region 4
(Philadelphia , Pennsylvania ), consolidated said
cases and issued a consolidated complaint based on
all the charges and amended charges . In essence
said complaint alleges that Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and ( 5), and that such con-
duct affects commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(6) and ( 7) of the Act. Respondent has an-
swered . As orally amended at the hearing, said
answer admits some facts but denies that Respon-
dent committed any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to due notice , the consolidated case
came on to be heard , and was tried before me, at
Tunkhannock , Pennsylvania , on December 15, 16,
and 17, 1969. All parties were represented at and
participated in the trial and had full opportunity to
introduce evidence , examine and cross -examine
witnesses , file briefs , and offer oral argument.
Although oral argument was waived , each of the
parties has submitted a separate brief.
This consolidated case presents the following is-
sues:
1. Whether at all material times Amalgamated
has been the majority collective-bargaining
representative of employees in an appropriate unit
of Respondent 's employees.
2. Whether Respondent refused to bargain col-
lectively with Amalgamated as such majority
representative.
3. Whether Respondent engaged in conduct con-
travening Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by ( a) coer-
cively interrogating employees regarding their
union activities ; ( b) threatening -employees with
reprisals if they selected Amalgamated as their col-
lective -bargaining representative ; ( c) promising
benefits to employees if they rejected Amalgamated
as their said representative; (d) telling employees it
knew who had signed authorization cards for Amal-
gamated; and (e ) warned employees not to talk
about Amalgamated.
4. Whether Respondent temporarily laid off
Roselyn Daily and temporarily laid off and then
discharged employee LaVerne Shoemaker for en-
gaging in union and other protected activity.
5. Whether a strike of Respondent 's employees
was caused by Respondent 's unfair labor practices.
6. Whether Cora Buckingham is a supervisor or
agent for whose conduct Respondent is liable.
Upon the entire record in this case, and from my
observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
232 DECISIONS OF
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. AS TO JURISDICTION
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent , a Pennsylvania corporation, is en-
gaged at Meshoppen , Pennsylvania , in manufactur-
ing and selling men's clothing items. As of
December 15, 1969, Respondent during the year
1969 sold and shipped goods valued in excess of
$50,000 directly to points outside the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania . Its sales directly to such
points were valued at less than $40,000 in 1966 and
less than $12 ,000 in 1968, but they exceeded
$50,000 in value in 1967. During 1966, 1967,
1968, and 1969 (until November 1), Respondent
made out-of-state purchases valued at less than
$5,500, $13,000, $13,000, and $10,000, respec-
tively. See Respondent 's Exhibit 5. As of the date
of the hearing of this case , I find that Respondent is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effec-
tuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction
over Respondent in this proceeding.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, herein called Amalgamated or the
Union, is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. GENERAL COUNSEL'S EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Refusal to Bargain
1. The appropriate unit
The parties have stipulated that the following em-
ployees comprise an appropriate unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act:
All production and maintenance employees of
Respondent , employed at its Meshoppen,
Pennsylvania , plant , exclusive of office cleri-
cals and supervisors as defined in Section
2(11) of the Act.
2. The number in the appropriate unit
The parties stipulated that at least 69 employees
were employed in the appropriate unit when the
Union requested recognition on or about June 2,
1969. See General Counsel 's Exhibit 2. Dispute has
arisen as to whether certain other persons should
also be included therein . These are : Irene Kreus,
Diana Burridge, James Williams, Edith Bennett,
Patricia Warner , Joan Witter , Cora Buckingham,
and LaVerne Shoemaker.
It has been stipulated, and I accordingly find, that
Kreus and Williams belong in the unit . Hence they
will be added to the 69 admittedly in the unit.
Bennett , Warner , and Witter are employees who
had been on strike when they were called in August
1969 by President Vecchio of Respondent. I find
thereby that they were members of the unit and
they should be included therein.
Diana Burridge left Respondent to be an airline
stewardess . She also worked for a while "in some
summer resort." While so employed on these two
jobs she was given a leave of absence by Respon-
dent . Later, when Diana 's mother informed Pre-
sident Angelo Vecchio that Diana was available for
work, Vecchio rehired her . Upon these facts I find
that Diana remained an employee of Respondent
while away on leave of absence, and that, con-
sequently , she should be included in the unit.
For reasons more fully discussed later in this
Decision , I find that Buckingham and Shoemaker
belong in the unit and should be included in it.
Buckingham has been found to be an employee and
not a supervisor . Shoemaker has been found to
have been discharged for union activity. Such per-
sons do not lose their status or identity as em-
ployees . Citation of authority would be supereroga-
tory. Hence I find that 77 employees were em-
ployed in the unit when the Union made its request
for recognition.
3. The union's majority
In the early part of April 1969 , the Union com-
menced an organizational campaign among
Respondent 's employees . It was in charge of Mur-
ray M . Gassman, Amalgamated 's national represen-
tative. In part this involved holding meetings for
employees and house -to-house visits by Gassman.
At many homes Gassman succeeded in "signing
up" employees . He also secured signed authoriza-
tion cards from employees at such meetings and
other locations than homes . These are in evidence
as General Counsel 's Exhibits 3a-3jj . However, that
of Edna Sarnosky ( General Counsel 's Exhibit 3hh)
was not signed in Gassman 's presence. Neverthe-
less, she received the card from him and sometime
later returned it to him with her signature thereon.
Further, in response to his question to her when she
handed him her card, she replied that she had
signed the card.
Signatures to a few cards were obtained by other
employees rather than by Gassman . These signa-
tures were "verified" by Gassman by personally
asking such subscribers whether they signed such
cards. They all answered affirmatively. This group
of cards is in evidence as General Counsel's Ex-
hibits 3kk-3pp.
Accordingly , I find that when the Union
requested Respondent to recognize it on or about
June 2, 1969 , it had 42 cards . Since I have found
77 employees in the unit, I find that the Union en-
joyed a majority in the unit on or about June 2,
1969.
By a telegram dispatched on May 31, 1969,
Amalgamated requested Respondent to recognize it
C & M SPORTSWEAR MFG. CORP. 233
as the majority collective -bargaining representative
of the employees in the appropriate unit and of-
fered to prove its majority by a card check con-
ducted by an impartial third person. This was
delivered on June 2, 1969. See General Counsel's
Exhibit 5. Respondent by letter dated June 4, 1969,
replied expressing doubt of majority and refusing
recognition unless and until said majority was
established in a Board-conducted election. See
General Counsel's Exhibit 6.
B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion
As found above, Union Representative Gassman
held several meetings of employees. One of these
was conducted at the Pink Apple Restaurant on
Route 6 between Tunkhannock and Meshoppen,
Pennsylvania. Seated "about 10 feet from the meet-
ing place" was Respondent's forelady, Minnie Bow-
man, whom I find to be a supervisor and agent of
Respondent within the meaning of the Act.
Although Gassman protested to Mrs. Bowman that
she "had no right ... to be sitting there so close,"
she insisted that it was a public place where she
"put in" her take-out order. According to Gassman
the take-out order counter was located in a dif-
ferent section of the restaurant. One of the em-
ployees present at this conversation was Roselyn
Daily, who shortly before had introduced Gassman
to Bowman.
About June 3, 1969, a meeting of employees
called by Gassman formed an organizational com-
mittee consisting of several employees, including
Roselyn Daily. See page 2 of General Counsel's Ex-
hibit 7. By letter dated June 17, 1969 , Gassman in-
formed Respondent of the existence of such com-
mittee and disclosed in it the names of the em-
ployees serving on it. (See General Counsel's Ex-
hibit 7. The employee committee members' signa-
tures to the first page of said exhibit and the signa-
tures appearing on the attachment thereto did not
appear on the letter transmitted by Gassman to
Respondent. The attachment contains signatures of
employees attending the meeting organizing said
committee. Both sets of signatures are found only
on Gassman's copy.) This committee met on occa-
sion with Respondent's president, Angelo Vecchio.
Respondent was notified on July 10, 1969, of addi-
tions to the committee. See General Counsel's Ex-
hibit 8.
By letter of July 10, 1969, Amalgamated again
made a demand on Respondent for recognition and
again offered to prove its majority. (See General
Counsel's Exhibit 8. Employee signatures appearing
on this exhibit were not on the original sent to
Respondent, but are found on the Union's copy.)
Respondent did not answer this letter.
By letter dated August 18, 1969, the Union wrote
to Respondent again demanding recognition and of-
fering to prove its majority. In this same letter 38
employees joined in said demand for recognition
and informed Respondent that the Union was
authorized to display to Respondent their signed
authorization cards. They personally signed an at-
tachment to the letter. See General Counsel's Ex-
hibit 9. No reply was made to this by Respondent.
About August 8, 1969, the Union called a strike
of Respondent's employees because Respondent
refused to recognize the Union and the committee
of employees ' and these unfair labor practices."
On August 7, 1969, 37 employees signed a resolu-
tion authorizing the strike. See General Counsel's
Exhibit 10.
Roselyn Daily, a sorter at Respondent's plant,
signed a union card about April 22, 1969, at a
union meeting held in the Hayloft Restaurant in
Lawton, Pennsylvania. The next day Supervisor
Minnie Bowman asked Daily "how the Union meet-
ing was ." Daily replied that she enjoyed it. Then
Bowman asked if Daily inquired of the Union what
the hourly wage would be `if the Union got in." At
this point President Vecchio joined them. He asked
Daily how the chicken tasted at that union meeting.
About 7 a.m. on April 29, 1969, President
Vecchio showed Daily and other employees a list of
benefits to be obtained by the Union which Gass-
man outlined in a letter which Vecchio held in his
hand. At the same time Vecchio assured the em-
ployees that it was up to them whether they joined
the Union. Vecchio also asked Daily to ask
questions about such benefits at a Union meeting
scheduled for later that night. Daily promised to do
so, but she never conveyed the answers to Vecchio.
However, about 11 a.m. Vecchio asked Daily
whether Daily informed some persons in the beauty
parlor that enough union cards had been signed
"that the Union was coming into the shop." Daily
denied uttering such a statement.
About 15 minutes later Supervisor Bowman told
Daily that the latter was laid off. At the time Daily
was not performing her usual task of sorting but
was pressing jackets. When Daily asked for an ex-
planation, since there was "plenty of work here,"
Bowman replied that she merely was carrying out
orders and that Daily should speak to Vecchio as to
why she was laid off. Then Daily saw Vecchio and
accused him of punishing her for going to union
meetings and being prounion. But Vecchio denied
this. However, he did add that "from now on" any
union card signer whose regular work ran out
would be sent home and would not be assigned to
other duties as in the past. This, he continued, was
because the employees were "grabby" and were
not satisfied.
The next day Daily saw Vecchio and again ac-
cused him of laying her off because she signed a
union card. Nevertheless, he denied it. Daily did
not return to work until the following Tuesday,
May 6, 1969.
On May 6 some mixup occurred in obtaining the
proper sizes of some clothes. This caused Vecchio
to remark to Daily that, if Daily had her mind on
her work instead of on the Union, Daily would not
234 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
have made that mistake . Continuing , Vecchio said
that "this is the kind of people that go to the
Hayloft to the Union meeting ." Daily at the trial in-
sisted the error was committed by someone else
and was not attributable to her.
About May 12 , 1969, Daily was again laid off for
about a week for lack of sorting work . But other
work was available, according to her . This other
work was performed by Malcolm Burridge, a new
employee who had been hired 3 or 4 weeks before
this.
Daily saw Supervisor Bowman at the union meet-
ing of May 6, 1969, which was conducted in the
Pink Apple Restaurant . She there introduced Union
Representative Gassman to Bowman.
Some time on June 9, 1969, President Vecchio
asked Daily if she had solicited employees in the
ladies' restroom to sign union cards . But she
categorically denied this . Nevertheless he insisted
that she had and produced two witnesses who
claimed they saw Daily do so . When Daily still de-
nied it Vecchio brought forth employee Virginia
Blaisure . At this pont Blaisure said she saw Daily
attempting to sign up employee Betty Lou Harvey.
Daily responded by stating that such solicitation oc-
curred at Daily's work table. Thereupon Vecchio
ordered Daily not to talk union to anyone in the
shop or try to get anyone to sign a union card, or he
would take "drastic; measures."
In addition , at thi• time Daily was restricted to
her work area. Her work was thus brought to her.
Previously she was allowed to go to another depart-
ment to pick up her work.
Marguerite Edwards operates a sew-up machine
at Respondent 's plant . She signed a union
authorization card and also served on the Union's
organizing committee. See General Counsel's Ex-
hibit 7. About July 23, 1969, that committee sought
to meet with President Vecchio, but he refused to
talk to it until he conferred with his attorney.
About July 29 the committee again attempted to
see Vecchio but he gave the same answer . Then the
members of the comittee asked for a raise in wages,
but Vecchio replied he could do nothing about this
"as long as the Union was there ... trying to get
in."
Some time later Edwards alone met with
Vecchio. During this conversation Vecchio referred
to a "mistake " he had committed , claiming that the
Union probably would not have been bothering him
if he had "paid insurance rather than give a third
week of vacation."
Employee Wanda Howard is one of those who
signed a union authorization card. Some time
thereafter Cora Buckingham told Wanda that Cora
knew who had signed such cards on Cora's floor
and that Wanda was one of them ; and that Pre-
sident Vecchio had told Cora he could not un-
derstand wh' Wanda was for the Union and thus
"go against ' Vecchio. Although I find that Cora
made this statement , I find that it may not be at-
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tributed to Respondent because I have found that
Cora is not a supervisor under the Act.
Cora also told Wanda that Cora questioned em-
ployee LaVerne Shoemaker about union meetings
and that LaVerne had disclosed to Cora the names
of the signers of cards on that floor . On other occa-
sions Cora asked Wanda what went on at union
meetings and who attended them . For the same
reason I find that Respondent is not responsible for
these utterances by Cora.
On another occasion in July 1969, President
Vecchio told Wanda Howard that he had learned
Wanda became interested in the Union " because of
the insurance " and that " if that 's all [Wanda] was
worried about" he would "give [ her] the in-
surance."
Sometime in June 1969, President Vecchio told a
group, including Wanda, that if the Union struck
the plant he would nevertheless continue to operate
it if 20 employees would "stick with him"; other-
wise he would have to close the doors and return to
where he "came from . He also told them that he
would take care of them by increasing their wages
and their insurance ; and that if he knew "this was
going to happen" he "would have given the in-
surance instead of the extra day of paid holidays."
Vecchio repeated these remarks in substance on
about two other occasions.
Wanda also heard Vecchio speak to LaVerne
Shoemaker the day before LaVerne was fired.
Vecchio asked to see what LaVerne was writing on
a pad . When Vecchio saw it he asked for whom
"this information" was being collected . LaVerne
answered he was compiling it for Union Represen-
tative Gassman . After scolding LaVerne for this,
Vecchio told the former he would be fired for
doing anything like that again . LaVerne was writing
down addresses "on all cartons and coats hanging
up.
Virginia Blaisure, an employee of Respondent,
attended the first union meeting which was held at
the Hayloft Restaurant. The next day President
Vecchio asked her if she attended that meeting and
she replied that she had . Then he inquired of her
how many others went to it and she answered about
15. Continuing, Vecchio asked her what the Union
offered which he did not and she told him " the in-
surance ." Sometime before this Vecchio had asked
her how she felt about the Union.
Somehow Vecchio knew that Virginia attended
later meetings of the Union . He also after each
meeting asked her what went on thereat . In one of
these conversations he told her that if the Union
came in he would have to close down if he "didn't
get the workers ." One day Vecchio told her that he
knew she had signed a union card and that he could
not understand it. However , he did add that such
signing was Virginia 's "right."
At one time Vecchio told Virginia that if the
Union came in he would have to discharge "some
of the slow girls that didn 't make their rate ...
C & M SPORTSWEAR MFG. CORP.
because he wouldn't be able to keep them." He
also said he would have to "lay off about two
months out of the year." At another time in July
1969 Virginia asked Vecchio for a raise . However,
Vecchio told her he could not grant this while the
Union was trying to get in, and that she would get it
if she would "stick with" him. She took this to
mean that Vecchio could not give anybody a raise
while a union organizing campaign continued.
Supervisor Minnie Bowman once asked Virginia
if the latter went to a union meeting . Bowman
added that if Virginia "would just stick with"
Vecchio, Virginia would benefit from it in the end.
Another employee who testified for the General
Counsel is Shirley Owen. A summary of her
testimony follows. Sirley signed a union card and
attended union meetings . About mid-June 1969,
Vecchio asked Shirley and employee Mary Scou-
ten, who worked together, whether they went to
union meetings . Upon receiving an affirmative
answer , he informed them that "maybe after the
Union went away" he would pay their insurance,
and that he could not then grant them a raise but
would think about it "after the Union went away."
Vecchio also mentioned that he should have given
them "the insurance " instead of "the other week's
vacation pay." Finally, in this conversation Vecchio
said he wished the employees would not go to the
union meetings.
Mary Scouten, in substance , testified as follows.
She is employed by Respondent as a top stitcher.
She signed a card at a union meeting on April 22,
1969. The next day she informed Vecchio that she
went to that meeting . Vecchio replied, "Go with an
open mind ." I find this does not violate the Act. At
other times Vecchio told Scouten, responding to
her request for a raise, that "if the Union didn't
come in" he would give the employees " raises and
better benefits," and that in such event he would
see what he could do for her.
Cheryl Shoemaker, a sewing machine operator,
testified substantially as follows. She signed a union
card. On one occasion, in June 1969, she overheard
President Vecchio tell employee Betty Lou Harvey
that if Harvey "stuck by" him until after the Union
went away he would do better by Harvey.
Another witness for the General Counsel is Mar-
garet Teetsel, a conspectus of whose testimony en-
sues : She works for Respondent as an automatic
presser. In May 1969 she signed a union card.
When she was hired, a date not revealed in the
record, Vecchio asked her if she was union-minded.
However, in late June 1969 he inquired of her
whether she had signed a union card. In this same
conversation Vecchio said he "had a better plan
coming up for an insurance policy, but it would
have to be later." On another occasion Vecchio de-
nied Teetsel a raise in pay "because it would look
like a bribe to the Union.' I find no violation of the
Act in these last two expressions, as they do no
more than demonstrate neutrality.
235
Another top stitcher employed by Respondent is
Eleanor Shoemaker. An abridgment of her
testimony discloses the following. She signed a card
for the Union. After this, in May 1969, Vecchio
asked her if she had signed a union authorization
card, but added he had nothing against the Union
and that it was her "privilege" to sign.
A cutter of Respondent named William Burridge
also testified for the General Counsel. A con-
densed, but adequate, version of his testimony fol-
lows. Burridge signed a union authorization card. A
short time later President Vecchio asked him if he
had signed such a card. When Burridge answered
that he had, Vecchio commented that it "did not
matter [because] we're going to have an election
anyway. You can vote the way you want to." At
another time, Vecchio promised Burridge a raise
"after they [the Union] went away." I find this is an
expression of neutrality which does not violate the
Act. Vecchio so acted after Burridge's wife com-
plained to the former that her husband was un-
derpaid compared with other cutters. Burridge also
overheard Vecchio tell employee Marie Owens to
"stick with me, and after this is over, I will fix you
up." Elsewhere I have found this statement to be an
unlawful promise of benefit.
Vecchio once asked Emma Burridge, an em-
ployee of Respondent and the wife of William Bur-
ridge, why William had signed a union authoriza-
tion card. Explaining it was because other cutters
were receiving more than William, Emma asked
Vecchio why her husband was being compensated
less than the other cutters. Vecchio replied that "I
can't go into this and after the Union goes away, I
will see that Bill is taken care of." I find this is an
expression of neutrality and, therefore, lawful. Con-
tinuing , Vecchio told her that he knew William had
signed a card and asked Emma to coax her husband
"to keep out [of the Union] and when the Union
goes away, [ I'll] see that he gets more money." On
another occasion, about June 1969, Vecchio told
Emma that "if the Union gets in" he thought that
he "will [not] be able to keep up with everything,
the insurance and everything that the Union would
demand and [he] might be forced to lock the
doors."
One of the members of the Union 's committee is
Gail Bender . See General Counsel's Exhibit 7. She
also signed a union card. Shortly thereafter
Vecchio asked her if she had signed such a card.
Continuing, he told Gail that if she stuck with him
he would take care of her, and that if the Union
came in he would have to put a lock on the door.
Not long after June 17, 1969, when Respondent
was informed that Gail had been appointed to the
Union's committee , Vecchio accused Gail of wast-
ing time and that Gail "and the girls that are for the
Union are the ones who are making it tough." I find
nothing coercive in this statement , even though I
find it discloses antiunion hostility.
Joseph Kovalick is employed by Respondent to
236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
do maintenance and mechanic work. He signed a
union card and was appointed to the Union's com-
mittee. See General Counsel's Exhibit 7. About
May 1969, after Kovalick had signed a union card,
Vecchio told him not to talk union during working
hours, that "there's not going to be Union," and
that if Kovalick did not like the way Vecchio ran
things Kovalick could pick up his paycheck.
Although Kovalick admitted girls asked him about
the Union during working hours, he testified that he
merely replied to them that they should attend a
union meeting to ascertain the answers. In my
opinion, Vecchio did not transcend the permissible
limits of free speech in this conversation, and I so
find. Further, I find that prohibiting talking during
working hours is lawful. Accordingly, I find no
violation of the Act in Vecchio's said conduct.
Dawn Posten, a machine operator for Respon-
dent, in April 1969, was asked by President
Vecchio if she had signed a union card. In the same
conversation Vecchio added that after the union
organizers "went away" he would grant some of the
girls in the shop increases bringing their wages to
$1.85 an hour, and that by Christmas he might pay
for the insurance of the employees. On another oc-
casion in April or May 1969, Vecchio told Dawn
that "if the place went Union" he "could not afford
to pay the benefits [and] would have to be forced
to put locks on his doors." Still another time he
asked her whether two other employees, whom he
named , had signed union cards. Once he told her
that if the Union got in he would have to let some
girls o . The foregoing utterances are coercive, and
I so find.
Posten also testified that Supervisor Bowman
"had Ethlyn Vandemark come by [our work sta-
tions ] to try to discourage us" from joining or
showing interest in the Union. This was just before
vacation in 1969. Since Vandemark is not an agent
or supervisor of Respondent, I find that she may
not bind it with such statement.
C. The Layoff and Discharge of La Verne Shoemaker
Shoemaker was hired by Respondent sometime
in late 1967. On April 24, 1969 , he signed a union
authorization card and on April 29 , 1969, attended
a union meeting at the Hayloft Restaurant in Law-
ton, Pennsylvania . About April 30, 1969, employee
Cora Buckingham asked him if he attended the
meeting of April 29 , whether he had signed a union
card , and whether any other employee on Cora's
floor had signed such a card. As Cora has been
found not to be a supervisor, I find that Respondent
may not be held accountable for such interrogation.
About 2 p.m. on April 30, 1969, following the
foregoing questioning of Shoemaker , Cora told him
that he was laid off for lack of work . At the time
Shoemaker was operating the Paris puffer. How-
ever, work was available on the bench . In the past,
Shoemaker had been assigned to other jobs when
work became slack on the Paris puffer. Although
Shoemaker was laid off, Malcolm Burridge was
retained. Malcolm had been hired but 3 weeks be-
fore this. Also, Margaret Teetsel, over whom
Shoemaker had seniority, was not laid off.
Shoemaker was called back to work on May 23,
1969. At this time President Vecchio told him that
he did not want any union talk in the plant. About
May 28, 1969, Vecchio told Shoemaker not to take
any time off without permission and that there
should be only one person at a time in the
restroom. Sortly thereafter Shoemaker noted this
statement on a piece of paper on which he was
keeping count of his production of coats. He gives
his production figures to Cora Buckingham. How-
ever, he also noted on this paper the destination of
such coats which appeared on the cartons in which
they were being shipped.
Soon President Vecchio came to him and
removed this paper from Shoemaker's hand. See
General Counsel's Exhibit 14. Amog other things
this exhibit recites that "Angel [Vecchio] came and
told me not to take any time off without permis-
sion. Think he said only one person in the restroom
at a time." Shoemaker jotted down this information
for Union Representative Murray Gassman.
When Shoemaker reported for work the next
day, May 29, 1969, his timecard was missing from
the rack. When Shoemaker saw Vecchio .about it,
Vecchio replied he had "thought it over" and "had
to terminate Shoemaker." But no reason for this
dismissal was given.
D. The Status of Cora Buckingham
General Counsel's evidence indicates that Mrs.
Buckingham tells employees what to do, gives them
permission to take the afternoon or less time off,
calls laid-off employees to return to work, teaches
new employees, lays off employees for lack of work
after checking with Supervisor Bowman, and has a
key to the plant. In addition, Mrs. Buckingham is
listed as "head of the shipping room" on the
payroll, and receives "the bonus that other super-
visory employees get." However, some nonsuper-
visory employees, such as "the maintenance and
the mechanic," also received the same bonuses as
Mrs. Buckingham. Finally, Vecchio referred to her
as a "supervisor in an unemployment compensa-
tion hearing.
According to Respondent's evidence, Mrs.
Buckingham is "primarily a shipping clerk." She
works under Minnie Bowman, the general forelady,
taking orders from the latter. Bowman supervises
all operations, including shipping, but excluding
cutting. Bowman also tells Buckingham whom to
lay off when work is slack. Cora has performed all
jobs except that of cutting. She spends about 98
percent of her time in manual labor. She has no
authority to hire, fire, lay off, or promote. At most
she shows other employees how to perform their
C & M SPORTSWEAR MFG. CORP.
functions . When anyone in Cora's department takes
off Cora reports this to Bowman or Vecchio. She
may grant time off only after consulting with Bow-
man.
IV. RESPONDENT 'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICES
Respondent 's president is Angelo Vecchio. A
summary of his testimony follows . When Roselyn
Daily was laid off there was not any work to which
she could be assigned . But she was recalled when
business improved . Although Daily insisted she was
laid off because she signed a union card , Vecchio
retorted that that had nothing to do with it but that
lack of work accounted for his decision to lay her
off.
On May 28, 1969, Vecchio saw LaVerne
Shoemaker writing on a piece of paper . Shoemaker
was checking sizes at the time although his job was
to put belts on garments . Soon Vecchio had
LaVerne turn over to him said piece of paper.
LaVerne said "this [writing ] is a hobby of mine .. .
I make notes." The next day Vecchio fired
Shoemaker.
Vecchio previously had trouble with LaVerne.
Shortly before April 28 , 1969 , LaVerne broke a
soap dispenser in the men's restroom . At another
time in April 1969 , LaVerne shouted at Cora
Buckingham as she taught him "certain phases of
teaching." LaVerne also made holes on'the table
with an ice pick. Several times LaVerne took off
without permission . At another time LaVerne
claimed he injured his back to avoid moving some
heavy goods in the garage . However, these derelic-
tions occurred before LaVerne was laid off and
then recalled.
Vecchio testified that LaVerne was fired for tak-
ing notes , some of which related to business secrets,
on company time , and that his other derelictions
"didn 't help the situation any, either ." Vecchio ad-
mitted that some of the notes related to statements
made by him to LaVerne, but he contended that
LaVerne was insubordinate in taking even these
notes.
Vecchio denies the statements attributed to him,
supra , by Wanda Howard , Edna Sarnosky, Mar-
garet Teetsel , William and Emma Burridge, and
Shirley Owen , who testified for the General Coun-
sel. (Employee Mildred Luce gave testimony con-'
firming Vecchio 's denial of statements attributed to
him by William and Emma Burridge .) However, in
February 1969, prior to the advent of the Union,
and pursuant to past practice , he told some em-
ployees that if Respondent had good orders he
would take care of them . But he did not make any
promise of benefits to any employee after the
Union commenced to organize the plant. But when
the Union entered the picture he refused to discuss
benefits requested by employees because, "under
the law ," he knew he was "not allowed ... to im-
237
prove their conditions while there was an organiz-
ing campaign going on." However , in refusing to
talk to employees about raises or other benefits he
merely told them he could not talk about them
because to do so "is illegal."
Vecchio did tell employees not to discuss the
Union during working hours because production
had suffered thereby . But he never expressed op-
position to the Union to any employee . Nor did he
threaten to discharge or lay off , or actually
discharge or lay off , any employee because of union
activities . And he never threatended to close the
plant if the Union got in. However , he did mention
to employees that "union factories " worked less
than 11 months a year whereas Respondent
operated an average of 11 months each year.
Finally, Vecchio denied committing any of the
unfair labor practices enumerated in the General
Counsel 's complaint.
Maynard Bowman , the husband of Supervisor
Minnie Bowman , accompanied her about 6 p.m. on
May 6 , 1966, to the Pink Apple Restaurant, where
they purchased their suppers to take out . However,
Maynard remained in his parked car while Minnie
entered the restaurant to put in the order and wait
for it while it was prepared . She returned to the car
in 20 or 30 minutes with their supper. Although he
was not aware of a union meeting before arriving
there, his wife told him when she reentered the car
that "there was a Union meeting there and she saw
some of the people there ." Thereupon they left im-
mediately.
Minnie Bowman , one of Respondent's super-
visors, confirmed her husband 's foregoing version.
Additonally , she testified that she did not go to the
service window, where takeout orders are usually
processed , because it was closed . Therefore, con-
sonent with a sign on that window, she went in-
doors to place her order . Thus she entered by the
door leading into the dining room and sat down at a
counter in said room. She remained seated there
until receiving her order.
While waiting for her order , Mrs. Bowman ob-
served employees of Respondent in the immediate
area. One of them , Roselyn Daily, introduced
Union Representative and Mrs. Gassman to Mrs.
Bowman, but the latter refused to shake hands with
them "because I knew that I was supposed to
remain neutral."
According to Mrs . Bowman, Roselyn Daily's
regular work involves tying linings . But Daily often
does other work "when there's an abundance of it."
In late April 1969 Bowman laid off Daily because
"there was no more trimming" for her, a job to
which Daily had been assigned that day. However,
there was enough trimming work "to keep the regu-
lar trimmers going."
Further , Bowman testified that at no time did she
question Daily concerning the latter 's union activi-
ties. However , Daily once voluntarily declared to
Bowman that Daily the night before had attended a
238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOk RELATIONS BOARD
union meeting . This caused Bowman to remark,
"Are you going to get a wage increase , because
they said they would give a wage increase ." Also,
Bowman denies that she ever questioned Virginia
Blaisure regarding the latter 's union activities.
Finally, Bowman averred that LaVerne
Shoemaker was laid off about April 30, 1969, for
lack of work. However, he was discharged on May
29, 1969. Bowman is familiar with the fact that
Shoemaker broke a soap dispenser in the men's
room and that holes in a table were caused by
Shoemaker . However, Bowman not only witnessed
neither incident , but actually accused and repri-
manded Malcolm Burridge of making such holes.
Later she learned that Shoemaker created these
holes . Thereupon Bowman apologized to Burridge
but said nothing to Shoemaker.
Jennie Owen , another employee , testified that
President Vecchio never spoke to her as testified by
General Counsel 's witness William Burridge. In
substance Owen stated that Vecchio at no time in-
vited her to stick with him and not become a
member of the Union and that he would take care
of her after the Union left. Nor did Owen hear
Vecchio tell any employees not to join the Union,
question any employee concerning the latter's sig-
ning of a union authorization card , or promise any
employee benefits "when the Union leaves or if
they do not go into the Union." However, Vecchio
did encourage Owen to attend union meetings and
to make up her own mind whether to join it.
Sewing machine operator Ethlyn Vandemark also
testified on behalf of Respondent . A summary of
her testimony follows . Ethlyn told Dawn Posten, a
witness for the General Counsel, that the Union
"did not seem to be working out as good as they
thought." But Ethlyn denies that Supervisor Bow-
man asked her to convey such a message to Posten.
Actually Ethlyn did discuss the "pros and cons" of
unionism with another employee, but neither Bow-
man nor Vecchio instigated such conversations.
Further , Ethlyn testified that neither Bowman nor
Vecchio ever inquired of her about union activities
or meetings or what attitude she had toward the
Union , nor did she hear either of them ask similar
questions of other employees.
Respondent also introduced evidence through
other employees that neither Supervisor Bowman
nor President Vecchio told them or other em-
ployees to eschew the Union, or promised them or
other employees benefits if the Union did not come
into the shop , or threatened them or other em-
ployees with reprisals if the Union came in, or in-
terrogated them or other employees about their
union sentiments or activity . Employees who so
testified are Isabelle Dixon , Lela Weida , Jeannette
Harvey, and Betty Lou Harvey.
Other witnesses for Respondent testified that
Vecchio forbade talking about the Union during
working hours because he complained it interfered
with production ; that he permitted them to talk
union during nonworking hours; that he told them
it did not matter to him whether they were for or
against the Union ; and that he want ' d them to go
to union meetings " and use our own judgement" or
"go with an open mind."
V. CONCLUDING FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
A. The Refusal To Bargain
As found above, there were 77 employees in the
appropriate unit at the time the Respondent
received the Union 's demand about June 2, 1969,
for recognition in an appropriate unit. Further, I
have found that at that time Respondent had valid
authorization cards from 42 employees in the unit.
See General Counsel's Exhibits 3a-3pp. Patently
this is a majority , and I so find. Respondent's con-
tention that Amalgamated later lost its majority
(see General Counsel's Exhibits 9, 10, and 11) is
not well taken , for two reasons:
1. After a majority has been established, and a
demand for recognition is based thereon , the em-
ployer is under a statutory obligation to bargain
with the collective -bargaining representative for a
reasonable period following such demand, even
though such ma j ority may be lost during such
reasonable period. I find ti" . Respondent did not
recognize or bargain with the majority Union after
the latter 's demand for recognition , and that, until
Respondent does so bargain , said reasonable period
does not commence to run. N.L.R.B. v. Gissell
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575.
2. In anylevent, I find that Respondent 's unfair
labor practices , as found herein , proximately
caused the Union 's majority to be dissipated. Hence
I find that Respondent may not profit by this loss as
it resulted from Respondent 's own misconduct.
Medo Photo Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 687.
Since the Union enjoyed a majority when it
requested recognition , the remaining question is
whether the employer was nevertheless warranted
in insisting upon an election or whether it should
have granted recognition on the basis of the
Union's majority status resulting from the
authorization cards which the latter had obtained.
It is my opinion , and I find, that a bargaining
order is an appropriate remedy to redress such un-
fair labor practices , because they are so coercive
that , even in the absence of an 8(a)(5) violation, a
bargaining order is necessary to repair the unlawful
effect of those unfair labor practices . N.L.R.B. v.
Gissel Packing , supra ; Brown Specialty Company,
180 NLRB 969. But I further find that, even if
Respondent 's practices are deemed less pervasive,
the possibility of erasing the effects of past prac-
tices and of insuring a fair election by the use of
traditional remedies is slight and that employee sen-
timent once expressed through cards, on balance,
will be better protected by a bargaining order.
N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., supra; Gissel
C & M SPORTSWEAR MFG. CORP. 239
Packing Company, Inc., 180 NLRB 54; Louisberg
Sportswear Co., 180 NLRB 739. In my opinion,
Jasper Pool Car Service, 175 NLRB 1025, is distin-
guishable.
B. Interference, Restraint , and Coercion
1. By Supervisor Minnie Bowman
Although I find that Supervisor Minnie Bowman
was physically present in the Pink Apple Restaurant
at a time when the Union was holding a meeting
there, I find that her conduct did not amount to
surveillance. This is because I credit her and her
husband that they both came to said restaurant to
obtain takeout orders, that he parked outside while
she went in to place the orders, that she had to wait
inside while the orders were prepared, and that
neither of them knew of or intended to oversee the
meeting . Accordingly, I find no violation of Section
8(a)(1) was committed by Mrs. Bowman in visiting
said restaurant at that particular time.
About April 23, 1969, Forelady Minnie Bowman,
admittedly a supervisor, asked employee Roselyn
Daily, after Daily had attended a union meeting the
night before, how said meeting was and what the
hourly wage would be if the Union got in. Bow-
man's denial that she so inquired is not credited. I
find this interrogation is coercive within the mean-
ing of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, because no law-
ful necessity therefor is disclosed in the record.
Mrs. Bowman also asked employee Virginia Blai-
sure if Virginia attended a union meeting, and in
addition told Virginia that, by sticking to President
Vecchio, Virginia would benefit from it in the end.
Bowman 's contrary evidence is not credited. The
foregoing question is not shown to be for a lawful
purpose and, therefore, is coercive. And I find that
the allusion to sticking to Vecchio reasonably con-
notes refraining from union activity. Since Bowman
offered a promise of benefit to Virginia to adjure
the Union, I find this utterance violates Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
2. By President Angelo Vecchio
About April 23, 1969, Vecchio joined employee
Roselyn Daily and Forelady Minnie Bowman while
the latter two were conversing. Vecchio asked
Daily how the chicken tasted at the union meeting
which Daily attended the night before. I find that
said comment by Vecchio is innocuous and, there-
fore, does not contravene Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. A few days later, about April 29, Vecchio
urged Daily to ask questions about union benefits at
a union meeting scheduled for later that day. This is
not coercive, and I so find. However, at another
time on the same day Vecchio asked Daily if she
had told persons in the local beauty parlor that the
Union signed up a majority of the employees and
would thereby come into the shop. Vecchio's
testimony contradicting this is not credited. I find
that this last interrogation is coercive and, there-
fore, contravenes Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
About May 6, 1969, Vecchio reprimanded Rose-
lyn Daily for an alleged error in her work and com-
mented that if she had kept her mind on her work
instead of the Union such a blunder would not have
occurred. He also commented that such people go
to union meetings. Vecchio's contrary testimony is
not credited. Nevertheless, I find that these state-
ments by Vecchio are not coercive, but, at most,
demonstrate hostility to unions.
On or about June 9, 1969, Vecchio asked Daily if
she had solicited employees to sign union cards,
and also warned her not to talk union or solicit
union membership in the shop, for if she did she
risked "drastic measures." His denial thereof is not
credited. I find these words are comprehensive
enough to proscribe such action during nonworking
hours. But the Act protects such conduct during
nonworking hours. Diamond Shamrock Co., 181
NLRB 261. Hence I find that his said utterances are
coercive and are proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Cf. P. R. Mallory & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 422
F.2d 757 (C.A. 7). Around this time he also con-
fined Daily to her work station, whereas she for-
merly was permitted to leave this area to pick up
her work. But I find that so limiting the movements
of Daily was proper because it is part of manage-
ment's function to schedule work in any manner it
see fit. And I further find that picking up work in
another area is not part of Daily's regular job.
Further, I find that this change in practice (1) did
not render Daily's job more onerous, and (2) was
not motivated by a desire to retaliate against Daily
for her union sympathies. N.L.R.B. v. United States
Railway Equipment Co., 424 F.2d 86 (C.A. 7) (em-
ployee Berry). Hence I find that so circumscribing
Daily does not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
About July 29, 1969, Vecchio was asked by a
committee of employees to grant a raise in wages.
However, he replied that he could do nothing as
long as the Union "was there ... trying to get in.
It is not unlawful for an employer to deny wage in-
creases during an organizational drive, for other-
wise he may be accused of attempting to influence
employees to decide against being represented by a
collective-bargaining representative. That principle
of law applies to the foregoing situation, for I find
that Vecchio was avoiding even the semblance of
gianting a raise which could be construed as an at-
tempt to wean union adherents from their union.
Thus it is proper to postpone benefits where such
action is taken to avoid the appearance of attempt-
ing to influence the employees' decision concerning
their representation for purposes of collective bar-
gaining . N.L.R.B. v. Dorn's Transportation Com-
pany, Inc., 405 F.2d 706, 715 (C.A. 2); Uarco, Inc.,
169 NLRB 1153. Accordingly, I find that this deni-
al of a raise does not violate the Act. Paradise Bowl-
0-Mat, Inc., 180 NLRB 699; Equitable Equipment
Co., Inc., 178 NLRB 302.
240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At another time in July 1969, Vecchio , in a con-
versation with employee Marguerite Edwards,
referred to a blunder he had made in that he
probably would have succeeded in keeping out the
Union in giving employees free insurance rather
than a longer paid vacation . It is my opinion, and I
find , that this statement does not contain a promise
of benefit , and that it is not otherwise coercive.
Hence I find that it does not contravene the Act.
But Vecchio , in July 1969, did offer a promise of
benefit to employee Wanda Howard when he told
her that he had learned she displayed an interest in
the Union "because of the insurance " and that he
would give her such insurance if only that worried
Wanda . Because such promise of benefit tends to
alienate an employee 's prounion sentiments it must
be considered coercive under Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act , and I so find.
At another time, in June 1969 , Vecchio told a
group of employees , among whom was Wanda
Howard , that if the Union struck he would operate
if at least 20 employees continued to work, but
otherwise he would have to close the doors and
return to where he came from . This statement, I
find , is coercive, in that it implies that Vecchio
would remove the plant to another location if a
strike were successful . Thus I find it is a threat of
retaliation . On this occasion Vecchio also promised
to increase their wages and insurance and stated
that , if he had known the Union would enter the
picture he would have given them insurance rather
than an additional paid holiday . This statement by
Vecchio is also coercive as a promise of benefit,
and I so find.
Wanda Edwards overheard Vecchio threaten to
fire employee LaVerne Shoemaker for writing in-
formation on a pad , some of which I have found
was protected . See General Counsel 's Exhibit 14.
This information was to be transmitted to Gassman,
an official of the Union . Hence I find that this
threat is coercive.
The day after the Union held its first meeting
President Vecchio asked employee Virginia
Blaisure if she had gone to it and, upon receiving an
affirmative reply , asked her how many others at-
tended and what the Union offered which he did
not. At another time he asked her how she felt about
the Union . On other occasions he asked her to re-
peat what transpired at each union meeting she at-
tended . One day he told her that he knew she had
signed a union card . Vecchio 's contrary evidence is
not credited. I find the foregoing utterances to be
coercive within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
At another time Vecchio told Blaisure that if the
Union came in he would not be able to keep some
of the slow workers and that he would have to lay
off employees for about 2 months in a year during
the slack season . I find this is a threat of reprisals
condemned by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. He also
told her he would have to close down if he "didn't
get the workers ." I find this implies that a strike
would shut down the plant ; but I further find that
this is not coercive as it correctly predicts the usual
consequences of a strike . Vecchio also denied Blai-
sure a raise in pay because he insisted he could not
do this during the Union 's organizing drive. I find
this is not coercive because (sl) is not intended to
undermine the Union , and (2 ) it displays that
neutrality which the Act imposes upon employers
when a union seeks to represent employees.
Vecchio also asked employee Shirley Owen
about mid-June 1969 whether she went to union
meetings . Patently this is coercive , and I so find. He
also told her that, after the Union went away, he
might provide employees with free insurance and
perhaps grant them a raise . I find this constitutes a
promise of benefits and, therefore , amounts to for-
bidden coercion . In this same conversation Vecchio
further mentioned that he should have given the
employees free insurance rather than an additional
week of paid vacations . Although this may be an in-
nocuous statement when isolated , his entire re-
marks cannot be so fragmentized . Rather the con-
versation must be viewed in its entirety . Astro Con-
tainer Company, 180 NLRB 815 . So considered, I
find this last statement coercive because it was
rendered as part of a conversation heretofore found
to violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Vecchio told employee Mary Scouten that if the
Union did not come in he would grant employees
raises in pay and improved benefits . His denial
thereof is not credited . I find this amounts to a
promise of benefits proscribed by Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
Vecchio also asked employees Margaret Teetsel,
Eleanor Shoemaker , William Burridge, Gail
Bender, and Dawn Posten whether they signed
union cards . Manifestly this interrogation is coer-
cive within the contemplation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act , and I so find . In addition , Vecchio also
told Emma Burridge , the wife of William and also
an employee , that he knew William had signed a
card and requested her to ask William to keep out
of the Union , promising that William would receive
more money when the Union went away . I find this
last statement is embraced by Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act and, therefore, is unlawful.
Vecchio assured employee Gail Bender he would
take care of her if she stuck with him. Hs testimony
inconsistent with this is not credited. I find this is an
unlawful promise of benefit intended to alienate
Gail from the Union . Also Gail was told by him that
he would have to put a lock on the door if the
Union came in. Vecchio 's testimony not consonant
with this finding is not credited. I find this is coer-
cive as it constitutes an unlawful threat of reprisal.
In finding that Vecchio made statements and
asked questions amounting to unfair labor prac-
tices, I have not overlooked his assurances to some
employees that he would not discriminate against
them for attending union meetings , and his in-
C & M SPORTSWEAR MFG. CORP. 241
sistence to them to go to the meetings with an open
mind . Nor have I disregarded Respondent's
evidence that Vecchio told many employees that he
was not opposed to unions, that he did not unlaw-
fully interrogate them regarding their union activi-
ties or sympathies, and that he neither offered them
benefits nor threatened them with reprisals.
Although I have considered the foregoing evidence,
which is favorable to Respondent's defense, I
nevertheless find that Vecchio did engage in the
unfair labor practices attributed to him and set
forth above. This is because lawful conduct toward
some persons does not per se disprove unlawful
conduct toward others when the conduct toward
such others is the very issue to be resolved. The
Copps Corporation, 181 NLRB 294, fn. 1. In this
connection it is desirable to point out that, in a
somewhat related field of law , i.e., negligence in
some tort cases, even extensive evidence of due
care by the defendant in the past does not neces-
sarily negative negligence by such defendant on the
facts developed in the particular litigation tried in
court.
C. The Layoff and Discharge of La Verne Shoemaker
It is my opinion , and I find, that Shoemaker was
discriminatorily selected to be laid off on April 30,
1969 , because of his union activity , notwithstanding
that I find that work was slack at the time . This ulti-
mate finding is based on the entire record in this
case, and the following subsidiary facts, which I
also find:
1. Shoemaker was abruptly released from the
Paris puffer in the middle of a work day, rather
than being permitted to finish the day. This abrupt-
ness gains added significance in view of the finding,
which I make, that work was available on the bench
which he was competent to perform.
2. Since work was available on the bench, it is
difficult to perceive why Respondent assigned the
same to Malcolm Burridge and Margaret Teetsel,
both of whom lacked seniority over Shoemaker. In-
deed , Burridge , who had been recently hired, had
been employed but 3 weeks at the time . Preferring
a junior employee, and withholding work from one
having seniority , when a layoff becomes necessary,
strongly suggests a discriminatory motive. New
Truck Transport , Inc., 178 NLRB 545. In my
opinion , Awrey Bakeries , Inc., 180 NLRB 905, is
distinguishable.
3. Respondent was aware of Shoemaker's union
activity , since Cora Buckingham knew of it.
Although I have found that Buckingham is not a su-
pervisor , I find that she was hostile to the Union
and was closely allied to management. Hence I find
that it is reasonable to infer that she reported to
Respondent her knowledge of Shoemaker 's union
activities.
4. Shoemaker was laid off almost immediately
after Buckingham had interrogated him concerning
his and other employees ' union activity.
And I further find that , after being recalled to
work , Shoemaker was discharged for union activity
on May 29, 1969, and that the reason assigned at
the trial is a pretext to disguise the true reason. This
ultimate finding or conclusion is derived from the
entire record and the findings recited below, which
I hereby find as facts:
1.--Respondent had cognizance of Shoemaker's
union activity , not only because of Buckingham's
knowledge thereof narrated above, but also
because Vecchio knew that Shoemaker had written
an account of some of such activity on General
Counsel 's Exhibit 14. Additionally Vecchio knew
that Shoemaker took down this information for
Union Representative Gassman.
2. Not only was Shoemaker abruptly discharged
in the middle of the workweek , but he was not even
told about it. Thus he ascertained this event oc-
curred only by inquiring why his timecard had dis-
appeared from the rack.
3. No reason was given as to why Shoemaker
was discharged . All that President Vecchio said was
that he "had to terminate " Shoemaker . I find this
does not explain the cause of his dismissal . Failure
to announce a reason for a discharge warrants the
inference-and I draw it-that it was promipted by
discriminatory motives . Virginia Metalcrafters, In-
corporated, 158 NLRB 958, 962; N.L.R.B . v. Griggs
Equipment , Inc., 307 F.2d 275, 278 (C.A. 5);
N.L.R.B. v. Plant City Steel Corp ., 331 F.2d 511,
515 (C.A. 5).
4. Respondent entertained antiunion hostility.
While this in itself is not an unfair labor practice, it
may be considered in evaluating the true motive
underlying the discharge. Maphis Chapman Corp. v.
N.L.R.B ., 368 F . 2d 298, 304 (C.A. 4); N.L.R.B. v.
Georgia Rug Mill, 308 F . 2d 89, 91 ( C.A. 5). In ad-
dition, Respondent committed other unfair labor
practices . Similarly, this conduct throws light on
the purpose inducing Shoemaker's discharge.
5. Not only was Shoemaker abruptly discharged,
but his dismissal coincided with the Union's or-
ganizing campaign . Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Com-
pany, 142 NLRB 1083 , 1085-86. "The abruptness
of a discharge and its timing are persuasive
evidence as to motivation ." N.L.R.B . v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., Inc ., 242 F.2d 497, 502 (C.A.
2), cert . denied 355 U.S. 829.
6. Finally, although I find that lawful cause ex-
isted justifying Shoemaker 's discharge, such cause
was used as a pretext to cloak the true reason. Such
lawful cause consists of Shoemaker 's copying the
names of the addresses to whom Respondent was
shipping its goods . See General Counsel's Exhibit
14. Patently the names and addresses of Respon-
dent 's customers may not be disclosed to union
agents by an employee . But I find that Respondent
would not have fired Shoemaker for this miscon-
duct alone, especially since Vecchio took no im-
mediate action to discharge him when he
discovered Shoemaker 's transgression . Cf. N.L.R.B.
242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
v. L. E. Farrell Company, 360 F.2d 205, 208 (C.A.
2).
In any event I find that, even if such intended dis-
closure contributed to Shoemaker 's discharge, it
was not the motivating or substantial reason
therefor . Rather, I find that the motivating, or a
substantial , ground for his discharge was his union
activity . This is sufficient to render his discharge
unlawful . N.L.R.B. v. Whitin Machine Works, 204
F.2d 883, 885 (C.A. 1); N.L.R.B. v. Lexington
Chair Co., 361 F.2d 283, 285 (C.A. 4).
I am not unmindful that Shoemaker in the past
was derelict in performing his tasks, and that he
could lawfully have been discharged therefor. But I
further find that such misconduct was condoned by
Respondent , since it did not at any time take
disciplinary action against him with respect thereto.
It is pertinent to observe at this point that
"Direct evidence of a purpose to discriminate is
rarely obtained , especially as employers acquire
some sophistication about the rights of their em-
ployees under the Act; but such purpose may be
established by circumstantial evidence ." Corrie Cor-
poration v. N.L.R.B., 375 F.2d 149, 152 (C.A. 4).
Therefore it is not unusual for an employer to point
to an employee's actual or doubtful shortcomings,
which otherwise generally would be overlooked, as
the true reason influencing a discriminatory
discharge.
D. The Layoffs ofRoselyn Daily
In my opinion Daily was laid off twice because of
her union activity , and I so find . Her first layoff oc-
curred about 11:15 a.m. on April 29 , 1969, and'
about 15 minutes after Vecchio reprimand her for
allegedly making prounion statements at a local
beauty parlor . The precipitous nature of the layoff,
especially when viewed in connection with the
foregoing irritation of Vecchio at Daily's prounion
pronouncements, confirm the conclusion that lack
of work was not the real cause for Daily's tempora-
ry dismissal . Insofar as Vecchio 's testimony is in-
consistent herewith, I do not credit it . It is true, and
I find , that Vecchio denied Daily 's accusation that
she was being released because of her union activi-
ty. But this denial is not conclusive. Indeed, I find
that this denial has been overcome by other
testimony , which I credit , that Vecchio expressed
hostility to the Union and also committed unfair
labor practices.
Further, I find that other work was available, so
that selecting Daily, rather than an employee whom
she outranked in seniority , to be laid off, renders
the selection discriminatory . For it may reasonably
be expected when production is decreasing that
older, more experienced , hands will be preferred to
employees enjoying less seniority . In addition, Daily
had introduced Union Representative Gassman to
Supervisor Bowman in a manner which Bowman so
resented that Bowman refused to shake hands with
Gassman . It is reasonable to infer-and I do so-
that this incident in part entered into the decision
to lay off Daily on April 29, 1969.
Daily was recalled to work on May 6, 1969. But
about May 12 she was again laid off for about a
week, allegedly for lack of work. As in the case of
her prior layoff I find that this time she likewise was
picked out to be sent home because of her union
activity. The reasons mentioned above relating to
the finding that her first layoff was discriminatory
are equally applicable here. In this connection I
find that although work was slack, some was availa-
ble; but I further find that Respondent chose to
retain Malcolm Burridge, a new employee who had
been hired but 3 or 4 weeks before this, to perform
the remaining work, thus preferring an inex-
F erienced employee with far less seniority than Dai-
7y. This, too, indicates that Respondent departed
from normal procedures in order to visit reprisals
upon a union advocate. See New Truck Transport,
Inc., 178 NLRB 545.
E. The Status of Cora Buckingham
While the resolution of this branch of the issues
is not entirely free from difficulty, I find that Mrs.
Buckingham is not a supervisor or agent of Respon-
dent as those terms are used in Section 2(11) and
(13) of the Act. It follows, and I find, that she is an
employee within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the
Act, and belongs in the appropriate unit. This is
because I find that Buckingham exercises none of
the functions described in Section 2(11) of the Act
as indicia of supervisory capacity or authority.
While not decisive, three recent cases tend to sub-
stantiate this result. See Display Sign Service, Inc.,
180 NLRB 49, 50; Murphy Bonded Warehouse, Inc.,
180 NLRB 463; G. C. Murphy Company, 171
NLRB 370, affirmed 422 F.2d 685 (C.A.D.C.).
In this respect, it is my opinion-and I find-that
Buckingham works under the supervision of Mrs.
Bowman, a supervisor, performs manual labor dur-
ing nearly all her working time, and only occa-
sionally (1) gives instructions of a routine nature,
(2) relays Supervisor Bowman's instructions to the
few employees in the shipping department, (3) al-
lows requests of employees to take time off but
only after clearing such requests with Bowman, and
(4) lays off employees after checking with Mrs.
Bowman. Patently these minor supervisory tasks,
sporadically exercised, do not vest Buckingham
with that distinctive authority contemplated by the
Act as characteristic of a supervisor, and I so find.
It is true, and I find, that Buckingham was listed
as "head of the shipping room" on Respondent's
payroll, was characterized as a "supervisor" by Pre-
sident Vecchio in an unemployment compensation
hearing, and received a bonus which was granted to
others who are supervisors. But this does not
require a different result. For, as the court stressed
in G. C. Murphy Company, supra:
As far as the [employer's] instruction sheet
[characterizing certain employees as exercising
C & M SPORTSWEAR MFG. CORP.
"supervision "] is concerned , it is well
established that "theoretical or paper power
will not suffice " to make an individual a super-
visor .... The test is what power the worker
actually exercises .... Almost any employee
"directs" other employees in some fashion at
some time.
In my opinion , Huberta Coal Co., Inc ., 168 NLRB
122, on which the General Counsel relies,-does not
compel a contrary outcome . For in that case, unlike
here, the persons found to be supervisors " were en-
gaged in precisely the same course of conduct as
Respondent 's admitted supervisors and representa-
tives ." But an employee like Buckingham , who per-
forms manual labor 98 percent of her working time,
can hardly be described as executing or discharging
"precisely the same" services or the office of an un-
denied supervisor . Hence Huberta Coal Co., Inc.,
does not dictate or even suggest a finding that
Buckingham is a supervisor or agent of Respon-
dent . Likewise , Equitable Equipment Co., Inc., 178
NLRB 302, is distinguishable.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, I find
that Buckingham , although an employee, had an
antipathy to the Union and displayed this feeling in
some talks with employees . Her evidence incon-
sistent herewith is not credited . And I further find
that Buckingham 's interests were closely allied with
management . Consequently , I find that because of
said sentiments Buckingham conveyed to Respon-
dent her knowledge that LaVerne Shoemaker had
engaged in union activity. This is material solely on
the question of whether Respondent was aware of
Shoemaker 's union activity at the time of his layoff
on April 30, 1969 . It does not render Respondent
responsible for her behavior . J. A. Compley Com-
pany, 181 NLRB 123, is distinguishable for there,
unlike here, the employee was authorized by the
employer to undertake an antiunion campaign.
F. The Strike of August 8, 1969
About August 8, 1969, the Union called a strike
of Respondent 's employees , and many of them
responded by ceasing to work . See General Coun-
sel's Exhibit 10. I find that said strike was resorted
to in order to protest Respondent 's (1) refusal to
recognize and bargain with the Union and (2) com-
mission of the other unfair labor practices as al-
leged in the complaint . However , I have found that
Respondent did not commit some of the unfair
labor practices ascribed to it in the complaint.
Accordingly , I find that said strike is an unfair
labor practice strike only to the extent that it
remonstrates against the unfair labor practices
found herein , viz, the refusal to recognize and bar-
gain collectively with the Union and specific con-
duct found to violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as
delineated in section V, above . In all other respects
I find that such cessation of work is not an unfair
labor practice strike.
243
VI. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
UPON COMMERCE
The activities of Respondent set forth in section
III, above , occurring in connection with the opera-
tions described in section I, above, have a close, in-
timate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic,
and commerce among the several States and tend
to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
VII. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices prohibited by Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend
that the National Labor Relations Board order it to
cease and desist therefrom and to take specific af-
firmative action, as set forth below, designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act. Since the view of
the finding that Respondent discriminated against
Shoemaker and Daily it will be recommended that
it be required (1) to offer Shoemaker immediate
and full reinstatement to his former position or one
substantially equivalent thereto, without prejudice
to his seniority and other rights and privileges, and
(2) to make whole Shoemaker and Daily for any
loss of earnings suffered by reason of the dis-
crimination against them.
In making Shoemaker and Daily whole Respon-
dent shall pay to each a sum of money equal to that
which each would have earned as wages from the
date of his or her layoff, or discharge, or both, to
the date of reinstatement or a proper offer of rein-
statement , as the case may be, less his or her net
earnings during such period. Such backpay, if any,
is to be computed on a quarterly basis in the
manner established by F. W. Woolworth Company,
90 NLRB 289, with interest thereon at 6 percent
calculated by the formula set forth in Isis Plumbing
& Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716. It will also be
recommended that Respondent preserve and, upon
reasonable request, make available to the Board or
its agents , for examination and copying , all per-
tinent records and data necessary to aid in analyz-
ing and determining whatever backpay may be due.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact,
and upon the entire record, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
2. Respondent is an employer as defined in Sec-
tion 2 ( 2), and is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7), of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of
employment of LaVerne Shoemaker and Roselyn
Daily, thereby discouraging membership in the
Union , a labor organization, Respondent has en-
427-258 O-LT - 74 - 17
244 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
gaged in unfair labor practices condemned by Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. All production and maintenance employees of
Respondent, employed at its Meshoppen, Pennsyl-
vania, plant, exclusive of office clericals and super-
visors as defined in Section 2(11) of the Act, con-
stitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b)
of the Act.
5. On or about June 2, 1969, and at all material
times thereafter, the Union represented a majority,
and has been the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive, of all the employees in the aforesaid ap-
propriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act; and
Respondent was on that date, and has been since,
legally obligated to recognize and bargain with the
Union as such.
6. By refusing to recognize and bargain collec-
tively with the Union in regard to the employees in
said appropriate unit on and since about June 2,
1969, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices prohibited by Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
7. By engaging in the conduct set forth in section
V, B, supra, Respondent has engaged in additional
conduct interdicted by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
8. The above-described unfair labor practices af-
fect commerce within the contemplation of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
9. Respondent has not committed any other un-
fair labor practices as alleged in the complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record
in this case, I recommend that the Board enter
an Order that Respondent, C & M Sportswear
Manufacturing Corporation, its officers, agents,
successors , and assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discouraging membership in the Amalga-
mated , or any other labor organization, by laying
off or discharging employees or otherwise dis-
criminating in any manner in respect to their tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment.
(b) Refusing to recognize or bargain with the
Amalgamated as the exclusive bargaining represen-
tative of all the employees in the above-described
appropriate unit.
(c) Coercively interrogating employees concern-
ing their and other employees' union membership,
activities , and desires.
' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102 46 of
the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the
findings , conclusions , recommendations , and Recommended Order herein
shall, as provided in Section 102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be
adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions , and order, and
all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes In the event
(d) Threatening to close its plant or take other
reprisals if the employees chose a collective-bar-
gaining representative.
(e) Promising employees increases in wages and
other benefits if they refused to be represented by a
collective-bargaining agent or if they refused to join
the Amalgamated.
(f) Warning employees not to talk about the
Union or to solicit union membership in the shop
during nonworking hours.
(g) In any other manner interfering with,
restraining , or coercing its employees in the exer-
cise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of
the Act, except to the extent that such rights may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action
designated to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request, recognize and bargain with
the Amalgamated as the exclusive representative of
all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit and,
if an understanding is reached, embody such un-
derstanding in a written, signed agreement.
(b) Offer LaVerne Shoemaker immediate and
full reinstatement to his former position or one sub-
stantially equivalent thereto, without prejudice to
his seniority and other rights and privileges enjoyed
by him, and make him whole for any loss of pay he
may have suffered by reason of his layoff and his
subsequent discharge, with interest on any such
sums at the rate of 6 percent per annum.
(c) Notify said LaVerne Shoemaker, if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States,
of his right to reinstatement upon application in ac-
cordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
(d) Make whole Roselyn Daily for any loss of
pay she may have suffered by reason of her layoffs,
with interest on any such sums at the rate of 6 per-
cent per annum.
(e) Preserve and, upon request, make available
to the Board or its agents, for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment
records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Recommended Order.
(f) Post at its plant at Meshoppen, Pennsylvania,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."'
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 4, after being duly
signed by Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt
that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading " Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board " shall be changed to read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board "
C & M SPORTSWEAR MFG. CORP. 245
thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive
days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon-
dent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this
Decision, what steps have been taken to comply
herewith.'
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint
be dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor prac-
tices not found herein.
Y In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the Board,
this provision shall be modified to read "Notify said Regional Director, in
wnting , within 10 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply herewith "
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Governmennt
We hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO , or any other labor organization, by
laying off or discharging employees or other-
wise discriminating in any manner in respect to
their tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment.
WE WILL NOT refuse to recognize or bargain
with said Amalgamated as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargain-
ing unit described below.
WE WILL NOT coercively ask employees
questions about their and other employees'
union membership , activities, and desires.
WE WILL NOT threaten to close our plant or
to take other reprisals if our employees chose a
union to represent them.
WE WILL NOT promise employees increases
in wages and other benefits if they refuse to
join the Amalgamated or if they refuse to have
a union in the plant.
WE WILL NOT warn employees not to talk
about the union or to solicit union membership
in the shop during nonworking hours.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with , restrain , or coerce our employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Sec-
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, ex-
cept to the extent that such rights may be af-
fected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization under a valid union-
shop clause as authorized by Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act.
WE WILL offer LaVerne Shoemaker im-
mediate and full reinstatement to his former
job, or one substantially equivalent to it,
without prejudice to his seniority and other
rights and privileges enjoyed by him, and pay
him backpay for any loss of pay he may have
suffered as a result of his layoff and subsequent
discharge by us, with interest on any such sums
at 6 percent per annum.
WE WILL notify LaVerne Shoemaker, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the
United States, of his right to full reinstatement
upon application in accordance with the Selec-
tive Service Act and the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, as amended, after
discharge from the Armed Forces.
WE WILL pay Roselyn Daily backpay for any
loss of pay she may have suffered as a result of
her layoffs by us, with interest on any such
sums at 6 percent per annum.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively
with said Amalgamated as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of all employees in the
bargaining unit described below with respect to
rates of,pay, wages, hours of employment, and
other conditions of employment, and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody such un-
derstanding in a written , signed agreement.
The bargaining unit is:
All our production and maintenance em-
ployees employed at our Meshoppen,
Pennsylvania, plant, exclusive of office
clerical employees and supervisors as
defined in Section 2(11) of the Act.
All our employees are free to become or remain,
or refuse to become or remain, members of said
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization.
C & M SPORTSWEAR
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecu-
tive days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or com-
pliance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, 1700 Bankers Securities Building,
Walnut and Juniper Streets, Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania 19107, Telephone 215-597-7601.