Brown Transport Corp. And Chauffeurs, Teamsters And Helpers Local Union No. 391

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 12, 1989

294 N.L.R.B. 969 (N.L.R.B. 1989)

BROWN TRANSPORT CORP.
Brown Transport Corporation and Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 391,
affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America , AFL-CIO. Case 11-CA-
12831
June 12, 1989
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
CRACRAFT AND HIGGINS
On March 2, 1989, Administrative Law Judge
Hutton S. Brandon issued the attached decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief.
The National Labor Relations Board had dele-
gated its authority in this proceeding to a three-
member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and brief and has
decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I and
conclusions2 and to adopt the recommended
Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the
recommended Order of the administrative law
judge and orders that the Respondent, Brown
Transport Corporation, Greensboro, North Caroli-
na, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
take the action set forth in the Order.
' The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find-
ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative
law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all
the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry
Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951)
We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing
the findings
2 We find it unnecessary to rely on the judge's alternative analysis, pre-
mised on the acceptance of discredited testimony, in affirming his finding
that the Respondent unlawfully threatened unspecified reprisals for en-
gaging in union activity
We affirm the judge's dismissal of the General Counsel's unlawful sur-
veillance allegations in the absence of exceptions
Paris Favors, Jr., Esq., for the General Counsel.
Walter O. Lambeth, Jr., Esq. (Elarbee, Thompson & Trap-
nell), of Atlanta, Georgia, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
HUTTON S. BRANDON, Administrative Law Judge.
This case was tried at Greensboro, North Carolina, on
January 24, 1989. The charge was filed by Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 391, affiliated
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-
969
CIO (the Union), on July 22, 1988,1 and the complaint
based on the charge issued on September 28 The issues
presented by this case are whether Brown Transporta-
tion Corporation (Respondent or the Company), engaged
in surveillance of its employees' union activities and
threatened them with unspecified reprisals if they en-
gaged in union activities thereby violating Section 8(a)(1)
of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
On the entire record, including my observation of the
demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of
the oral argument of the General Counsel at hearing and
the posthearing brief filed by Respondent, I make the
following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. JURISDICTION
Respondent is, and has been at all material times, a
Georgia corporation with a terminal located at 503
Banner Avenue, Greensboro, North Carolina, where it is
engaged in interstate transportation of freight and com-
modities. During the 12-month period prior to the issu-
ance terminal gross revenues in excess of $50,000 for
services performed outside the State of North Carolina.
During the same period Respondent transported materi-
als valued in excess of $50,000 directly from the State of
North Carolina to points outside the State of North
Carolina. Based on these facts which Respondent admits,
Respondent further admits, and I find, that Respondent is
an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
The complaint alleged that the Union is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act Re-
spondent's answer claimed insufficient knowledge of the
labor organization status of the Union and denied the
complaint allegation. While no independent evidence was
offered to establish the complaint allegation I take offi-
cial notice of other Board proceedings in which the
Union was found to be a labor organization, e.g., PPG
Industries, 251 NLRB 1146 (1980), APAC-Carolina, Inc.,
JD(ATL)-71-87 (Dec 31, 1987), I infer in the absence
of evidence to the contrary that the Union's status as a
labor organization has not changed, and I therefore con-
clude that the Union continues to be a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act as the
complaint alleges.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
It is undisputed that the Union began an organizational
campaign among Respondent's employees at its Greens-
boro, North Carolina, terminal in late March or early
April. In connection with that organizing effort the
Union through Bobby Blanket, an assistant organizer for
the Union, distributed handbills at various times to Re-
spondent's employees in or about the driveway entrance
to Respondent's Greensboro terminal. This handbilling
and Respondent's observation thereof provides the predi-
cate for the first allegation set forth in the complaint that
Respondent, through its terminal manager, Bobby M.
I All dates are in 1988 unless otherwise stated
294 NLRB No. 86
970 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Brooks, engaged in unlawful surveillance of its employ-
ees' union activities in "late March 1988 (exact date pres-
ently unknown)." The only remaining complaint allega-
tion of unlawful action asserts that Respondent, again
through Brooks, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
threatening employees on August 16 "with unspecified
reprisals if they engaged in union activities." Respond-
ent's answer denied the two complaint allegations of un-
lawful activity thus putting the General Counsel on her
proof. The alleged unlawful conduct will be treated
below in the order alleged.
A. The Alleged Surveillance
1. The evidence
Blanket testified for the General Counsel that he began
handbilling at or near Respondent's terminal entrance be-
ginning in late March or early April and continued doing
so on a more of less regular basis approximately twice a
week up until September. He usually timed his handbill-
ing to coincide with the shift changes of Respondent's
employees in the hope of reaching as many of Respond-
ent's approximately 150 employees as possible with his
handbill messages.
Respondent's terminal entrance is a driveway which is
doublewide for truck tractor and trailer passage. The
driveway leads from the intersection of Apache and
Banner avenues , both public streets, approximately 250
to 300 feet, according to Brook's estimate, to Respond-
ent's terminal building. Except perhaps for width and
type of paving, the driveway in direction would appear
to be a continuation of Apache Avenue which in fact
terminates at Banner Avenue. Approaching the terminal
from the intersection Respondent's driveway is bounded
on the right by a narrow grass strip and an employee
parking lot which, except for two ungated entrances off
the driveway, is bordered by a chain link fence. On the
left the drive way is bounded for approximately half its
length nearer the terminal by a vacant lot and for the re-
mainder of its length by a fenced trailer parking area uti-
lized by another employer. Respondent's terminal build-
ing, based upon photographs received in evidence as
well as testimony of the witnesses, is also fenced with a
gate , normally opened, on the driveway as it approaches
the left end of the terminal.
The terminal is a long one-story building occupied pri-
marily by loading doors and docks on the right, an office
area more to the center and what appear to be shops to
the extreme left. The intersection of Banner and Apache
avenues can be observed from almost any point at the
front of the terminal building , and specifically, all parties
herein concede, from the office area.
It is undisputed that the driveway is, and at all materi-
al times was, Respondent's property. It is also undisputed
that at the material times herein one side of the driveway
was unpaved and in disrepair with a number of pot holes
which drivers were forced to either drive around or pro-
ceed through slowly in order to prevent their loads from
being thrown about. The existence of this condition had
the effect of reducing the driveway's useful width.
Blakeney testified that in handbilling he generally
stood at a point about 5 feet inside the Banner Avenue
curb on the left side (facing the terminal) of Respond-
ent's driveway. Occasionally he would handbill from the
right side of the driveway, and sometimes he handbilled
from the center of the driveway so that he could more
easily distribute to the employees whether they were ar-
riving at, or departing from, the driveway. It was Bla-
keney's belief, based upon a concrete marker a few feet
off the Banner Avenue curb at Respondent's driveway,
that he was not on Respondent's property.2 Blakeney
further testified that at various times Terminal Manager
Brooks came out in his car during the handbilling and
parked on either the left or right side of the driveway
some 20 to 30 feet away from Blakeney and observed the
handbilling for periods of time ranging from a few min-
utes to 20 or 30 minutes. Blakeney could recall talking to
Brooks only on one occasion and his recollection of that
occasion was vague. Thus, he testified that Brooks mo-
tioned him over to his car and said "something about
giving out the handbills on company time," and "Stop-
ping or something of that nature." Blakeney conceded
that Brooks was "real friendly," and he testified that
Brooks never accused him of trespassing on Respond-
ent's property.
Blakeney's testimony regarding the conduct of Brooks
on one particular occasion was corroborated by then em-
ployee Paul Nichols. Nichols, a line haul driver for Re-
spondent at the time, testified that in late March or early
April, as he was returning to the terminal after a trip he
noted Blakeney, an old friend, handbilling at the drive-
way entrance. As Nichols pulled into the driveway
slowly because of some bumps he stopped briefly to ex-
change comments with Blakeney, but, not wanting to
stop or obstruct traffic, he proceeded on into the termi-
nal after a short time. He then conducted his work at the
terminal , got in his personal vehicle, proceeded out to
Blakeney's location, parked his car on Apache Avenue,
and got out and talked to Blakeney. During the course of
their conversation, Blakeney pointed out to Nichols that
Brooks was parked on the right side of Respondent's
driveway beside the fence to the employee parking, lot.
Nichols was not familiar with Brooks at the time be-
cause, as a road driver he spent little time at the terminal
and Brooks was a relatively new terminal manager.3
Brooks in testimony for Respondent did not generally
dispute Blakeney's testimony. He conceded that he 'had
on a number of occasions, primarily in March and April,
gone out to observe the handbilling from his car after
parking it along the side of the driveway, although he
could have observed the handbilling from his office. He
also conceded that he had talked to Blakeney at least a
couple of times. Thus, he related that he first observed
Blakeney handbilling at a time when Brooks was pro-
ceeding to work. As he turned into the driveway Bla-
keney gave him a handbill, and Brooks identified himself
as a member of management and told Blakeney he would
2 His belief in this regard was apparently contradicted by Brooks who
testified Respondent's lease to the terminal premises extended all the way
to Banner Avenue
8 Brooks, formerly employed by Thurston Motor Lines, had only
become terminal manager around the first of the year as a result of the
merger of Thurston and Respondent
BROWN TRANSPORT CORP
appreciate it if Blakeney would stay out of the driveway
and off the property and not impede the traffic flow in
and out of the facility. Brooks testified that at that point
Blakeney was 10 to 15 feet inside the driveway and on
Respondent's premises Thereafter during the first week
of handbilling, Brooks observed Blakeney flagging down
an incoming truck stopping it half way into the drive-
way. Brooks found it necessary to go out and tell Bla-
keney, "I've asked you before to stay out of the drive-
way." Still later, but in the first few weeks of handbill-
ing, Brooks noted that outgoing trucks began to back up
on the driveway from Banner Avenue to and around the
terminal. On this occasion he again went out and told
Blakeney, "Look, I've asked you before to stay off the
property, and don't impede the traffic," and "Now either
clear it and stay out of it or I'll call the sheriff's depart-
ment." Subsequently, whenever it was reported to
Brooks that Blakeney was impeding traffic he admittedly
went out to the driveway, parked his car and observed
the handbilling for periods from a few minutes to about
20 minutes. Brooks indicated in his testimony that he be-
lieved his presence was necessary on these occasions so
that Blakeney could see him and, in this way, keep Bla-
keney "honest" about not being on Respondent's proper-
ty It is undisputed that Brooks never found it necessary
to call any police or other authorities as a result of the
handbilling or any traffic problems incidental thereto.
2. Arguments and conclusions
While conceding that an employer "has a right to de-
termine whether or not its proprietary rights or its prop-
erty rights have been violated by trespass of nonem-
ployee personnel," the General Counsel argues that an
employer does not have the right to go out of his way to
observe its employees receiving union handbills. "If an
employer does something out of the ordinary, then the
presence of the company representatives at or near the
place of distribution becomes a coercive and intimidating
element which violates Section 8(a)(1) as surveillance of
employees' union activities." Applying the argument to
the facts in this case the General Counsel contends that
Respondent did "something out of the ordinary" when
Brooks purposely positioned himself near the handbilling
so that employees could observe and be intimidated by
his presence when Brooks could have accomplished his
professed purpose (the prevention of trespass, traffic
delays, and traffic hazards) by watching the handbilling
from his office
Respondent argues in its defense that there was no evi-
dence that Brooks intended to interfere with handbilling
or the union activities of any of Respondent's employees.
On the contrary, it is urged that Brooks did nothing to
stop the handbilling or prevent employees from talking
to Blakeney who clearly identified himself to all observ-
ers as a union advocate by his wearing of a hat and
jacket bearing the union name or logo. In short, Brooks
was only ensuring strict observance of Respondent's
property rights and the unrestricted and unendangered
ingress and egress of Respondent's employees to the
premises . The absence of any intention to coerce em-
ployees in their union activity is shown, Respondent as-
serts, by Brooks' failure to come to the driveway and ob-
971
serve the handbilling on every occasion when the hand-
billing occurred.
The Board has long adhered to the principle that
union organizers and the employees they seek to orga-
nize have no cause to complain that the employer of the
employees has observed their activities where such ac-
tivities are openly conducted at the employer's premises.
See Emenee Accessories, 267 NLRB 1344 (1983); Porta
Systems Corp., 238 NLRB 192 (1978); Chemtronics, Inc.,
236 NLRB 178 (1978); Larand Leisurelies, Inc., 213
NLRB 197, 205 (1974); Milco, Inc., 159 NLRB 812
(1966). See also Columbia Casuals, 180 NLRB 741, 747
(1970). In Tarrant Mfg. Co., 196 NLRB 794 (1972), an
administrative law judge with Board approval stated the
principle in somewhat broader and clearly more forceful
terms saying at 799, "The notion that it is unlawful for a
representative of management to station himself at a
point on management 's property to observe what is
taking place at the plant gate is too absurd to warrant
comment " The Board has suggested that the principle
finds additional support in the general recognition of an
employer's legitimate property rights and the "proprie-
tary perogative" to expel and bar nonemployee union or-
ganizers from the employer's premises. Hoschton Gar-
ment Co., 279 NLRB 565, 567 (1986). Thus, the principal
has particular application in those case where nonem-
ployee union -organizers are found to be trespassing on
the employers premises in connection with their handbill-
ing or other organizational efforts Id. Accordingly, even
an employer's close, as opposed to casual, observation of
union activity at or near his premises in order to pre-
clude trespass cannot be found to constitute unlawful
surveillance of that activity. In short, the "monitoring of
trespassory activity" of nonemployee union representa-
tives does not violate Section 8(a)(1 ) of the Act. Id.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, where an employer's
observation of open union activity is shown not to be
casual in nature, based upon trespassory concerns, or
concerns over safety of ingress or egress, but rather upon
a deliberate attempt to interfere with the legitimate union
activity of employees (as in cases where the observation
is coupled with overt actions extending beyond the em-
ployer's premises or demonstrating that the observation
is specifically calculated to disrupt the union activity)
such observation will be found to be unlawful surveil-
lance violative of Section 8(a)(1). See Hoschton, supra,
Gainesville Mfg. Co., 271 NLRB 1186 (1984); Reeves
Southeastern Corp., 256 NLRB 574, 578 (1981); Shrews-
bury Nursing Home, 227 NLRB 47, 50 (1976); Dumas,
Inc., 169 NLRB 892, 897 (1968).
In determining whether an employer's observation of
union activities at its premises is casual , innocent, or
prompted by legitimate concerns on the one hand, or
calculated to unlawfully interfere, on the other hand, a
number of factors must be considered. These include the
duration of the observation, the frequency and timing of
the observation, the proximity of the observer to the
union activity being conducted, the likelihood or actual-
ity of tiespassory actions by nonemployees engaged in
the union activity, and the reasonableness of any percep-
tion on the part of the employer of any safety risks to
972 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees or customers associated with the conduct of
the union activity . Additional factors include the exist-
ence of demonstrated union animus on the part of the
employer, the commission of other acts to interfere with
the activity being conducted , and the employer observ-
er's departure from customary or normal practice repre-
sented by his presence in the immediate vicinity of the
union activity. Although each of the foregoing factors
are significant , in the final analysis, all the circumstances
surrounding the observation must be considered and
evaluated.
In considering Respondent 's motivation in the observa-
tion herein one must determine the facts including the
claim by Brooks that there was actual trespass by Bla-
keney on Respondent's premises . Based on Brook's un-
contradicted testimony that Respondent 's premises ex-
tended to Banner Avenue , and in the absence of evi-
dence regarding local street right of ways , I am com-
pelled to conclude that Blakeney did trespass . Blakeney
conceded that he at times was inside and upon the curb
on Banner Avenue and Respondent's driveway. I also
credit the testimony of Brooks that he observed Bla-
keney within the boundaries of the driveway on the first
occasion Brooks saw the handbilling . While Blakeney,
contrary to Brooks' testimony, acknowledged no warn-
ing from Brooks regarding trespassing , Blakeney's recol-
lection regarding exactly what Brooks told him im-
pressed me as extremely vague , incomplete and unreli-
able. I therefore find that there was at least minimal tres-
pass which would warrant Respondent's subsequent
monitoring of Blakeney's handbilling activity.
In addition, I find , consistent with Brooks' testimony,
that there existed on Respondent's part reasonable con-
cerns regarding traffic problems attendant to the hand-
billing. The handbilling was not restricted to automobiles
of employees reporting to or leaving work. It extended
to outgoing and incoming trucks driven by Respondent's
employees on worktime .4 Brooks' testimony that on one
occasion Blakeney 's handbilling caused outbound trucks
to back up around the terminal was not contradicted by
any other witness and provides a basis for Brooks'
claimed concern over the delays caused by the handbill-
ing. Therefore , Brooks' monitoring of the handbilling to
insure the absence of traffic problems and attendant
delays was not so unreasonable as to suggest that the
monitoring was motivated by an intent to interfere with
the union activity.
While Brooks conducted his observation of the hand-
billing on several occasions and on one or two occasions
for periods of up to 20 minutes, it is clear that he made
no effort to monitor the handbilling on each day it was
conducted . And on those days he did come out to watch
he was not there for the full duration of the handbilling.
This sporadic observation lends credence to Brooks'con-
tention that he was trying to keep Blakeney "honest"
about not trespassing . It also renders reasonable Brooks'
explanation for his presence in the driveway rather than
monitoring Blakeney from his office , i.e., Blakeney could
not see Brooks in his office and, believing Brooks would
not be watching, would be more tempted to trespass to
facilitate the handbilling.
To be sure, Brooks was conspicuous in his observation
of the handbilling as as result of parking his car on the
side of Respondent's driveway in the general vicinity of
the handbilling. Moreover, his parking in the driveway
was, as the General Counsel contends, unlike the actions
of the employer in Metal Industries, supra, extraordinary
conduct for Brooks. Nevertheless, unlike the employer
representatives in the Hoschton and Gainesville cases,
supra, who stood next to the handbillers, Brooks was
parked 100 feet or mores away from the handbilling.
Indeed, Nichols testified he did not even notice Brooks
until Blakeney called his attention to him. And although
Brooks candidly admitted that he had a notebook with
him during his observation of the handbilling, he claimed
the notebook pertained to other matters, and he denied
taking any notes regarding the handbilling. There was no
evidence presented to contrary.
As discussed infra, I have Brooks demonstrated union
animus by as as result of his union activity. the Act and
Brooks' sporadic observation unaccompanied by any
overt physical interference with, the handbilling. con-
cluded that Respondent through an unlawful threat to an
employee. However, this single violation of effort to
interfere with, or actual interference with, the handling.
Considering all of the above and the fact that the Re-
spondent's observation of the handbilling during its dura-
tion from April to September was sporadic in nature, I
conclude the insufficient to establish that the observation
was calculated to interfere with the handbilling and the
Section 7 rights of Respondent's employees. And while
subjective impact on employees of Brooks' observation
of the union activity is not a test for the violation al-
leged, it is nevertheless noteworthy that no evidence of
adverse impact on employees was adduced. The absence
of any such impact at least suggests that none was in-
tended. I therefore find no unlawful surveillance, and
consequently no violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
by Respondent as a result of Brooks' observation of the
union activity here.
B. The Alleged Threat of Unspecified Reprisals
1. The evidence
Perry Callicutt, a former employee of Respondent
who worked as a local driver , testified for the General
Counsel that he sought and obtained authorization cards
from the Union in early to mid-August and thereafter
began to talk to an estimated four or five of his fellow
employees about the Union . He testified that he was
always off the clock during such talks.
Callicutt further testified that around August 16
Brooks called him aside on the steps to a terminal load-
ing dock where the two engaged in a brief conversation
during which Brooks told Callicutt that if "Charlotte [a
5 Brooks' testimony suggests , and Respondent's brief argues, that
* It appears that both local and over-the-road drivers of Respondent Brooks parked 150 feet from the terminal entrance and the handbilling.
used the Banner Avenue terminal . Based on Nichols ' testimony local However , he did not always park in the same spot and I am unwilling to
drivers were hourly paid while road drivers were paid by the mile. conclude that he was always 150 feet from the handbilling.
BROWN TRANSPORT CORP
reference to Respondent's home office] found out I was
with the Teamsters, it could be made rough on me." Cal-
licutt, who testified that he had not previously made
known to his union inclinations,6 could recall little else
about the conversation.
Brooks did not deny having a conversation with Calli-
cutt, but he did place it in a different context. As back-
ground he explained that after the merger of Respondent
and Thurston Motor Lines there was some unrest and
dissension among the employees, most of whom were
members of an organization referred to as the Drivers'
Mutual Association and they apparently resented the
Union. Brooks testified that he had a "couple of com-
plaints" and had noticed some friction among employees
"when Mr. Callicutt would voice his opinion about the
unions." According to Brooks, Callicutt got some heated
discussions going among the employees, so that one
morning Brooks approached Callicutt and told him, "I
don't have any objection to your doing this, but let's
don't be so pushy about it with the other employees and
get them inflamed." He admittedly added, "You got to
be careful that you don't do this on company time be-
cause this is the one thing that would not be allowed,
and I and the officials from Charlotte take a very dim
view of him using company time to further the union ac-
tivities."
2. Arguments and conclusions
Based on Callicutt's testimony the General Counsel
argues that Brooks was clearly threatening Callicutt with
reprisals because of his union activities and therefore the
threat was coercive and violative of Section 8(a)(1) Re-
spondent, on the other hand, based on Brooks' testimony
argues that Brooks' remark was justified by Callicutt's
conduct in discussing the Union and "inflaming" employ-
ees on company time
The existence of a violation in this instance is largely
dependent upon which witness is to be believed. Consid-
ering the demeanor of the witnesses and the record as a
whole, I am persuaded that Callicutt's version even if
not fleshed out with extensive detail is the more accurate
and truthful one. He appeared completely honest. More-
over, he voluntarily left Respondent's employment short-
ly after the events about which he testified occurred and
is therefore more likely to be impartial. Brooks, in com-
parison, was a much more sophisticated witness. Howev-
er, his failure to detail or substantiate the claim of mis-
conduct on Callicutt's part upon which the generalized
warning was based clearly suggested exaggeration and
served to diminish his credibility. The suggestion of ex-
aggeration is supported by Brooks' concession on cross-
examination that the complaints voiced to him by other
employees about Callicutt's actions did not specify that
they had occurred on work time. Their complaint simply
was they were tired of hearing Callicutt's opinion about
the Union. Further, there was no evidence regarding just
how Callicutt was "pushy" or how he "inflamed" others.
8 Callicutt admitted, however, that he had previously stood and talked
to Blakeney at Respondent ' s driveway entrance on more than one occa-
sion On none of these occasions did he notice Brooks around
973
Crediting Callicutt, I find that Brooks issued the warn-
ing to Callicutt in the language claimed by Callicutt. As
the General Counsel argues, I find that language clearly
threatened Callicutt with unspecified reprisals because of
his activities on behalf of the Union I find, therefore,
that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as
the complaint alleges. Moreover, even if I were to
accept Brooks' version of his remarks to Callicutt I
would still find such remarks coercive and violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In the absence of a showing
of Callicutt's interference with the his own or the work
of his fellow employees, or his breach of a valid no solic-
itation rule, a nondiscriminatorily applied no talking rule
or some other valid and uniformly applied rule of con-
duct, no basis for the warning existed, and it can only be
concluded that the warning was calculated to intimidate
Callicutt in his union activity.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent, Brown Transport Corporation, is an
employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers
Local Union No. 391, affiliated with International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By coercively threatening its employees with un-
specified reprisals if they engaged in union activities Re-
spondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. Respondent did not engage in unlawful surveillance
employees' union activities or in any other manner vio-
late Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order Re-
spondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take cer-
tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies
of the Act The remedy will include the posting of a re-
medial notice to employees.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and
on the entire record, I issue the following recommend-
ed7
ORDER
The Respondent, Brown Transport Corporation,
Greensboro, North Carolina, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening its employees with unspecified repris-
als if they engage in activities of behalf of Chauffeurs,
Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No. 391, affiliated
7 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions , and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses
974 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
with International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-
CIO or any other labor organization.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing, employees in the exercise of their
rights 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Post at its terminal facility in Greensboro, North
Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."8 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 11, after being signed by
Respondent 's authorized representative , shall be posted
by Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to
ensure that the notices are not altered , defaced , or cov-
ered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20
days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent
has taken to comply.
8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National
Labor Relations Board."
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board having found, after
trial, that we violated Federal Law by interfering with
our employees' rights to join and support a union, we
notify you that:
WE WILL NOT coercively threaten our employees with
unspecified reprisals if they engage in activity on behalf
of Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local Union No.
391, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica, AFL-CIO or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain , or coerce our employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
BROWN TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION