Astronautics Corp. of America

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 16, 1967

164 N.L.R.B. 623 (N.L.R.B. 1967)

ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA 623
Astronautics Corporation of America and
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO
Astronautics Corporation of America and
Phyllis L. Flikeid
Astronautics Corporation of America and
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO. Cases
30-CA-384, 30-CA-397, and 30-RC-434.
May 16, 1967
DECISION AND ORDER
Respondent's president on June 21, 1966, did not violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act
2 The General Counsel excepts to the failure of the Trial
Examiner to find that Respondent's letter of June 15, 1966,
contained a threat of loss of existing benefits if the employees
voted in favor of the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. We agree. Respondent's letter to all its employees, stating
that "Under the law, an employer is not required even to continue
in effect its existing benefits if a union wins Bargaining is a two-
way street and it starts from scratch," carries with it the coercive
implication that the employees may wind up with less than what
they already have, in the event they exercise their lawful right to
bargain collectively, and, accordingly, violates the Act We
further find that these statements, when viewed in the context of
other violations committed by Respondent, are sufficiently
serious to justify the issuance of a remedial order. Compare,
Howell Refining Company, 163 NLRB 18 (1967)
BY MEMBERS FANNING, BROWN, AND JENKINS
On December 23, 1966, Trial Examiner
Abraham H. Mailer issued his Decision in the above-
entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had
engaged in certain unfair labor practices within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and recommending that it cease and
desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action,
as set forth in the attached Trial Examiner's
Decision. The Trial Examiner further found that the
Respondent had not engaged in certain other unfair
labor practices alleged in the complaint and
recommended dismissal of these allegations.
Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions to the Trial
Examiner's Decision with a supporting brief. The
General Counsel filed cross-exceptions to the
Decision with a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel.
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial
Examiner made at the hearing, and finds that no
prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are
hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions, cross-
exceptions, and briefs, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions,'
and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, as
modified herein.2
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the
Recommended Order of the Trial Examiner and
hereby orders that the Respondent, Astronautics
Corporation of America, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take
the action set forth in the Trial Examiner's
Recommended Order.
i In the absence of exceptions , we adopt pro forma the Trial
Examiner 's recommendation that certain statements made by
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ABRAHAM H. MAILER, Trial Examiner: In Case
30-CA-384, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, herein referred to as the
Union, filed a charge on May 2,1 a second amended charge
on May 23, and a third amended charge on June 27. In
Case 30-CA-397, Phyllis L. Flikeid filed a charge on
May 17. Upon the aforesaid charges, the Regional Director
for Region 30 of the National Labor Relations Board,
herein called the Board, on July 29, issued a consolidated
complaint on behalf of the General Counsel of the Board
against Astronautics Corporation of America, herein
called the Respondent, alleging violations of
Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. Sec. 151,et seq.), herein called
the Act. In its duly filed answer, Respondent denied the
commission of any unfair labor practice.
In Case 30-RC-434, pursuant to a petition filed by the
Union on April 20, and a Decision and Direction of
Election issued by the Regional Director on May 24, an
election by secret ballot was conducted under the
direction and supervision of the Regional Director on
June 22. A tally of the ballots showed that there were
approximately 137 eligible voters and that 128 ballots were
cast, of which 56 were for the Union (Petitioner), 68 were
agairt"st the Union, and 4 were challenged. The Union filed
timely objections to conduct affecting the results of the
election. Thereafter, the Regional Director caused an
investigation to be made on the objections and, on
August 1, issued and served on the parties his Report on
Objections in which he recommended that one objection
be overruled. As to the remaining objections, he found that
they raised substantial issues with respect to credibility
which could most expeditiously be resolved by a hearing,
noting that the allegations in the objections are
substantially similar to the allegations in Case 30-CA-384,
which was then scheduled for hearing before a Trial
Examiner. Accordingly, he ordered that the representation
case be consolidated with the complaint cases herein for
the purpose of eliciting evidence pursuant to which the
Board may discharge its duties under Section 9(c) of the
Act.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Trial
Examiner Abraham H. Maller at Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
I All of the events in the instant proceeding, unless otherwise
specified, occurred in 1966
164 NLRB No. 89
624 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
on August 30, 31, September 1, 2, 6, 7, and 8. The General
Counsel, the Respondent, and the Union were represented
and were afforded full opportunity to be heard and to
introduce relevant evidence, to present oral argument, and
to file briefs with me. Briefs were filed by all parties
represented by counsel.
Upon consideration of the entire record, including the
briefs of the parties, and upon my observation of each of
the witnesses, I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Respondent is, and has been at all times material
herein, a Wisconsin Corporation with its principal office
and plant in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where it is engaged in
the manufacture, sale, and distribution of electronic
aircraft instruments. During the 12 months immediately
preceding the issuance of the consolidated complaint,
Respondent sold and shipped, in interstate commerce,
products valued in excess of $50,000 to points outside the
State of Wisconsin. In view of the foregoing, I find and
conclude that the Respondent is engaging in commerce
within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the
policies of the Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction here.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Brotherhood of Electrical) Workers,
Local 494, AFL-CIO, is, and has been at all times material
herein, a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
III THE ISSUES
1. Whether the Respondent interfered with, restrained,
and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by:
(a) Promising the employees benefits if the employees
rejected the Union.
(b) Threatening employees that if they voted in favor of
the Union, Respondent would cease its existing practice of
interdepartmental transfers during a work shortage,
thereby threatening employee layoffs.
(c) Discriminatorily promulgating an invalid no-
solicitation rule designed to interfere with the Union's
campaign, and thereafter enforcing said rule against union
solicitation while at the same time permitting employees to
solicit for other purposes.
(d) Unlawfully soliciting, assisting, and inducing its
employees to revoke the authorizations they had
previously given to the Union.
(e) Threatening an employee with termination because
of her membership in, support of, and activities on behalf
of the Union.
(f) Threatening an employee with reprisals and
retribution if the Union were voted into the plant.
(g) Interrogating an employee with respect to the union
sentiments, sympathies, and interests of another
employee.
(h) Announcing and granting disproportionate wage
increases to certain of its employees, designed to
discourage said employees from becoming or remaining
members of the Union, or otherwise assisting the Union.
(i) Threatening employees with loss of existing benefits
if the employees voted in favor of the Union.
2. Whether Respondent discriminatorily suspended
employee Jean Ilgenfritz because of her membership in,
sympathy for, and activities on behalf of the Union.
3. Whether the Respondent discriminatorily issued a
written reprimand to employee Jean Ilgenfritz because of
her membership in, sympathy for, and activities on behalf
of the Union and because she had previously given
testimony in a hearing conducted by the Board.
4. Whether the Respondent discharged employeee
Phyllis Flikeid because of her membership in, support of,
and activities on behalf of the Union.
5. Whether the objections to the election are supported
by substantial evidence.
IV THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background L
The Union's campaign at Respondent's plant began on
November 15, 1965 However, authorization cards were
not distributed until February 1966 Union meetings of
employees began on March 26 and were held weekly
thereafter, except on Memorial Day
In the meantime, a rival union, United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America attempted to organize
Respondent's employees. The attempt appears to have
been short-lived. Under date of March 11, "Astronautics
U.E. Organizing Committee" sent a letter to the
Respondent's employees, in which it compared their
wages and benefits with those which U.E. had obtained for
the employees at Allen-Bradley and charged that more
than a dozen of Respondent's employees have been fired
during the past several weeks without being given a
reason.
On March 17, Respondent held a meeting of its
employees in the plant cafeteria. President Nathaniel K.
Zelazo, Vice President Norma Z. Paige," and Personnel
Manager Anthony Methenitis spoke at this meeting.
President Zelazo referred to the U.E. letter and stated that
he had received one. Vice President Paige reminded the
employees that the Respondent had in effect a rule
prohibiting solicitation during worktime, but that during
their lunch hour, coffeebreaks, and before and after
worktime, they could do as they pleased. Personnel
Manager Methenitis referred to the statements in the U.E.
letter concerning people that had been discharged and
asked if there were any questions. Employee Jean
Ilgenfritz asked about two friends of hers who had been
discharged and who had not been given any reason
therefor. Methenitis replied that he had no records with
him at the time and asked Ilgenfritz to come to his office
the following day. The following day she went to
Methenitis' office. Respondent had asked her to take
another employee with her, and she was accompanied by
employee Mary Graf. Present at Methenitis' office, in
addition to Methenitis, were Production Manager Gerald
Tackes and Foreman Feltis. Ilgenfritz asked about the two
people who had been discharged, and Methenitis looked at
his records and told Ilgenfritz that there was a reason for
their dismissal and that they had been given a reason
therefor. He asked her to tell these people to call him if
they desired.
I None of the events detailed in this subsection is alleged to
have constituted an unfair labor practice
3 Paige is a member of the bar of New York
ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA 625
B. Alleged Restraint, Coercion, and Interference
Admittedly, Respondent sought to combat the Union's
attempt to organize the plant. This involved letters to, and
mettings with, the employees, and other conduct alleged to
be violative of the Act.
1. The meetings of April 7
On April 7, Production Manager Tackes held meetings
with each department on company time.4 At these
meetings, Tackes opened the proceedings by stating that
he had noted an apparent change in atmosphere during the
union campaign and he was concerned because it was
affecting the work of the employees, pointing out that the
work they do is very delicate and requires a good deal of
concentration. He told them that he had received reports
of union discussion going on during working time and that
there was pressure being applied to the employees to join
the Union. He suggested that it would be best for the
employees to confine their discussion of unionization to
times when they were not working. He pointed out that
with a union in the plant things may not always be better;
that some unions by contract ask for departmental
seniority as opposed to plantwide seniority and that under
such a contract the Respondent could not freely transfer
people from department to department when work in any
particular department slackened; that this might result in
a situation where one department might be laying off
people while another department was hiring employees:
that the Respondent did not want this type of
arrangement, but might be forced into it with some union.
He told them that the last layoff that Respondent had
experienced was in 1963; that although work at the
moment was slow, Respondent had no intention of laying
off any people in the foreseeable future.'
Tackes' statement was not coercive. He did not threaten
a change in Respondent's practice, if the employees chose
the Union to represent them. He was merely pointing to
the fact that, if the employees selected a union as their
bargaining representative, the union might demand
departmental seniority which might not be to their
advantage. Such a statement is not violative of the Act. Cf.
Copeland Oil Co., Inc., 157 NLRB 126.''
2. The Respondent's letter of April 8
Under date of April 8, Respondent sent a letter to all of
its employees disputing certain alleged statements made
by the Union. In pertinent part, the letter read as follows:
LET'S SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT RIGHT NOW
NO ACA employee will have to quit a union to work at
ACA.
NO ACA employee will receive any benefits or
privileges just because he belongs to a union.
NO employee will lose any benefits or privileges just
because he belongs to a union.
Your Company will not threaten, coerce, or force
you in any way because of your thoughts or acts on the
union issue By the same token, your Company will
not tolerate any threats, force or coercion by union
organizers and "inside contacts" on employees.
The letter then mentioned the fringe benefits which the
Respondent had established for its employees in the past
and continued as follows-
All these benefits and advantages you have
received without a union. No union obtained them for
you. It won't require a union to keep them for you.
Quite the contrary, your company is dedicated to
continue to improve your benefits and advantages as
your company grows and can afford to do so.
One final point should be brought out. A union must
have signed cards to get a foothold in a company.
Because of changes by the National Labor Relations
Board, it is now possible to have a union certified as a
representing body WITHOUT AN ELECTION merely
on the basis of signed union cards. Therefore, your
signing a card "to get them off of your back" could
backfire, your signing a card to stop the threats could
backfire Don't sign a union card unless you are
absolutely convinced a union will make ACA a better
place for you.
The General Counsel contends that this letter, although
carefully worded and subtly phrased, carries the firm
impression that the employees could reasonably expect
the granting of future benefits coupled with their rejection
of the Union. I do not agree. In James A. Pearson, d/b/a
Crystal Lake Broom Works, 159 NLRB 429, it was held
that similar language "`at most contained a vague
suggestion of the possibility that at some indeterminate
date the Employer might evolve a formula whereby these
benefits could be increased. This, we believe, falls short of
the type of promise contemplated by the Act."' (Quoting
from American Laundry Machinery Company, 107 NLRB
511, 513 ) Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed
in this regard.
3. The no-solicitation rule
NO ACA employee will have to loin the union in order
to work at ACA.
" The complaint alleges that these meetings occurred on
April 11, and employees Flikeid and O'Konek fixed that as the
date of the meetings The precise date is not crucial It is clear
that these employees and Tackes were all testifying about the
same event To the extent that the date may be deemed material, I
credit the testimony of Tackes that the meetings occurred on
April 7 Tackes had more reason to note and remember the date
than did the employees It appears from the record that prior
thereto, on April 5, Tackes and President Zelazo held similar
meetings with each department The complaint does not allege
any violation by Respondent at the meetings of April 5
The credited testimony of Tackes who impressed me as being
an honest witness Tackes ' source of information was a contract
between another union and the Lear Corporation, a competitor of
The General Counsel contends that early in April the
Respondent announced a rule prohibiting union
Respondent . Several employees testified regarding this incident,
but did not contradict Tackes' testimony in any substantial
regard Employees Ilgenfritz and O'Konek added that, when
Tackes spoke in their department , he referred to the fact that
people had come upstairs (to the office) to discuss their problems,
and that Ilgenfritz and employee Graf had done so , that, when
Ilgenfritz came there , she made a remark about the fact that
people were taking bets as to how long she would be working
there, and that Tackes replied that he could assure the employees
that Ilgenfritz would have a job as long as she wanted it.
The General Counsel contends that Tackes ' statements
constituted also the announcement of an invalid no-solicitation
rule This contention is discussed infra under the subheading
"The No-Solis cation Rule "
626 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
solicitation, which was invalid because; (1) of the timing of
the announcement of the rule; (2) the fact that it was by its
terms limited to union solicitation and was never applied
to other forms of employee solicitation; and (3) was
disregarded by the Respondent who contemporaneously
engaged in coercive acts of antiunion solicitation on
company time.
Although the complaint originally alleged that the no-
solicitation rule was promulgated on or about April 21, the
allegation was amended during the hearing by changing
the date to April 5. Presumably, the amendment is based
upon a written warning notice issued by Respondent on
that day to employee Agnes Snyder, which read as follows:
You were observed Monday, April 4, 1966, at
2:30 p.m. soliciting another employee for union
membership. Solicitation for a union is not allowed
during business hours and no further solicitation will
be tolerated.7
Snyder admitted that she had, in fact, engaged in union
solicitation as charged in the warning notice.
Thereafter, as previously noted, Production Manager
Tackes suggested in the meetings of April? that the
employees should limit their discussions of unionization to
nonworking hours such as breaks, lunch periods, and
before and after work.
Also, during the latter part of April, Tackes met with the
entire second shift. According to Tackes, the meeting was
prompted by the fact that one of the employees had come
to him in tears, saying that she was being needled
relentlessly by her fellow employees on the second shift.
Tackes told the employees that he would prefer it if they
limited their discussion of unionization to nonworking
hours such as breaks, lunch periods, and before and after
work; that it would be best for everyone concerned if they
spent their time at work as pleasantly as possible. During
his talk he made the comment that there were a lot of
union buttons being worn and reminded employees that
they had a right to belong and attempt to organize a union
as they had not to belong or to eliminate themselves from
an organizational campaign, and they could do as they
chose."
A review of the record convinces me that an oral rule
prohibiting solicitation during working time was in effect
before the start of the union campaign and that the
prohibition was not limited to union solicitation. The rule
was in effect at Respondent's Wisconsin Avenue plant
from which it moved to its present location in April 1965,
and three employees who worked at the Wisconsin
Avenue plant testified that they were aware of the rule. As
previously noted, during the meeting of March 17, Vice
President Paige reminded the employees of the rule.9
Since the rule had been established long before the
advent of the Union, the warning notice to Snyder did not
constitute the promulgation of a new rule. By the same
token, Production Manager Tackes' suggestion to the
employees at the meetings of April 7 and in the latter part
of April was merely the reminder of a preexisting rule, and
not the promulgation of a new rule.
The rule was presumptively valid, Walton
Manufacturing Company, 126 NLRB 697, 698, enfd. 289
F.2d 177 (C.A. 5), and the General Counsel in his brief so
concedes. We, therefore, turn to the question whether the
rule was unfairly or discriminatorily applied.
The no-solicitation rule was enforced during the Union's
campaign. As noted above, Personnel Manager Methenitis
issued written warnings to employees Agnes Snyder and
Lynn Morton for soliciting for the Union on company time.
On April 14, Ilgenfritz came to Methenitis' office and
complained that Gerry Anderson, a fellow employee, was
soliciting for a company union on company time.
Methenitis asked Ilgenfritz to list the circumstances by
date, place, etc., but Ilgenfritz refused to do this.
Nevertheless, Methenitis summoned Anderson to his
office and told him that he had heard that he was soliciting
for a company union on company time. Anderson denied
engaging in such conduct.
An exception to the no-solicitation rule appears to be the
handling of the United Fund Campaign in which the
Respondent participates each year. In 1965, the campaign
in Respondent's plant was initiated by a letter from
President Zelazo to all employees telling them that
Respondent is behind the United Fund and encouraging
the employees to participate. These letters were put into
the employees' timecard slots. Approximately a week
later, pledge cards were put into the timecard slots. When
this procedure failed to show a satisfactory return,
Respondent asked each department manager to go around
and pick up the pledge cards. This was done on company
time. Also, if the employees desired, they were given an
opportunity to leave their work stations to talk to their
foremen to discuss their pledge. Before the termination of
the campaign, an employee was designated by each of the
various department managers to speak to the employees
and suggest that, if they were going to donate, they should
turn their pledge in at that time. During the 1964
campaign, each department manager was told to select a
couple of employees to distribute the pledge cards and
literature. This was also done on company time.
The record shows also that there were violations of the
no-solicitation rule, particularly in Foreman Pilak's
department. This took the form of collections among the
employees for gifts to employees who were sick, retired, or
experienced blessed events. The manner of taking up the
collections was that a jar was passed among the employees
who put in their donations and signed a paper. Foreman
Pilak admitted that he was aware of the no-solicitation
rule, but "looked the other way" when such collections
were being taken during working time. On the other hand,
Foreman King rigidly enforced the rule and on one
occasion confiscated the collection jar when it was being
passed during working time. On two other occasions,
Production Manager Tackes stopped collections which
were being taken during working time.
Finally, the General Counsel points to the fact that the
Respondent conducted meetings on company time in
which it campaigned against the Union. In advancing this
' A similar notice was given to employee Lynn Morton for
soliciting for the Union on company time
s Tackes' testimony as to his statements to the employees was
corroborated substantially by employees Robert Petre and
Richard Blanding, witnesses for the General Counsel.
9 The General Counsel urges me to disregard Paige's testimony
in this regard, because three employees testified that they were
not aware of the rule prior to April I found Paige to be an honest,
straightforward witness , and I credit her testimony which was
corroborated by Personnel Manager Methemos Of the three
employees who testified as to their lack of awareness of the rule,
only one, Ilgenfritz, testified concerning the meeting of March 17,
and she did not explicitly contradict Paige's testimony in this
regard.
ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA 627
contention, the General Counsel states in his brief that he
is not unmindful of the Supreme Court's decision in
N.L.R.B. v. United Steelworkers of America, CIO (Nutone,
Inc.), 357 U.S. 357, nor the Board's holding in James Hotel
Company, d/b/a Skirvin Hotel and Skirvin Tower, 142
NLRB 761, in which it was held that an employer's
meetings held on company time did not invalidate an
otherwise valid no-solicitation rule. The General Counsel,
however, seeks to distinguish these cases by arguing that
in neither case was the contention made that the rule was
discriminatorily promulgated, nor was the employer's
antiunion solicitation coercive to the extent as that herein.
The General Counsel further contends that the instant
case is governed by the Board's holding in The Wm. H.
Block Company, 150 NLRB 341. The contention must be
rejected. As I have previously pointed out, at none of the
three meetings discussed above (meetings of March 17
and April 7 and 21) were any coercive statements made by
the Respondent. Similarly, as is pointed out infra, none of
the statements made by the Respondent at the meeting of
June 21 were coercive. The basis for the General
Counsel's attempted distinction of the Nutone and Sktrvin
cases is therefore lacking. Conversely, the Block case is
inapposite, as the Board found that the no-solicitation rule
in that case had been promulgated "specifically for the
purpose of defeating union organization." In the instant
case, I have found that the no-solicitation rule was
promulgated long before the Union's organizational
campaign began.
Nor does the fact that Respondent made an exception to
the no-solicitation rule for the annual United Fund
Campaign vitiate the no-solicitation rule. Cf. Nutone,
supra, at page 363. Likewise, the fact that Foreman Pilak
"looked the other way" when "sunshine" collections were
taken in his department amount to discriminatory
enforcement of the no-solicitation rule by the Respondent.
The action of one supervisor in failing to enforce an
otherwise valid no-solicitation rule is not sufficient ground
to estop the Employer from its continued assertion of that
rule. All that Pilak's action demonstrates is that Pilak was
derelict in his duty. It does not attribute to the Respondent
a discriminatory attitude in the enforcement of the rule.
Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed in this
regard.
4. The revocation campaign
Under date of April 27, Respondent sent a letter to all of
its employees pursuant to advice of counsel. The letter
reads as follows:
A number of employees have advised the Company
that they signed union authorization cards under
extreme pressure. They wondered what effect their
signing would have and they wondered how they
could revoke the authorization.
If you don't realize it, when you sign such a card
you are giving the union a legally binding "power of
attorney" to make a contract that may be legally
binding upon you. In effect, you are signing a blank
check.
Before you sign such a card it would be a good idea
to talk it over with your lawyer. He will be able to
point out the extent of power that a union will have to
legally bind you by reason of the authority which such
a card gives a union. He will also be able to advise you
how you can protect yourself by either limiting the
power or by revoking it.
We have been advised that such a power of
attorney can be revoked by (1) promptly notifying the
union that the power is revoked, and (2) sending a
copy of the revocation notice to the employer. A
sample form of letter of revocation is attached. A
signed copy should be sent to the Union and a signed
copy should be sent to the Company.
Enclosed with the letter were two copies of a form
addressed to the Union which reads as follows:
Gentlemen:
I hereby revoke any authorization or "power of
attorney" that I may have given to the Union.
Date:.........
(Signature)
A copy of the letter, revocation forms, and an
accompanying notice were posted on the bulletin board in
the production area and on the bulletin board outside the
ladies' restroom. The notice which is dated April 28, reads
as follows:
This letter and two copies of the half size sheet
letter were mailed to your homes last night. It is
important that you carefully read the letters. This is
for your protection, now and in the future.
If you want to take care of revoking any
authorization you gave the Union RIGHT NOW,
please see your Foreman and pickup additional copies
of these documents. If you choose to take care of this
matter from your homes, please remember to bring
one signed copy of the form revoking authorization to
your Foreman or your Personnel Office.
It's Your Company and Your Future-Be Sure You
Know What You Have Done.
Between April 29 and May 2, Respondent received
signed revocation forms from the following nine
employees: Barbara Protasiewicz, Elvina Weis, Helen
Storm, Florence Kubacki, Sharon Kainz, Leora Kainz,
Hazel Engstrom, Tillie Ellis, and Arlene Cieklinski. Of the
above, employees Engstrom, Ellis, and Storm mailed
revocation letters to the Union.
Foreman Gerald Pilak was active in speaking to
employees generally and individually regarding
revocation. According to employee Claudette Calenzo,
Pilak addressed all of the employees in the electronics
subassembly department before the employees received
the revocation letter and told them that the revocation
cards would be in the mail, because some of the employees
have told him that they had signed union cards too quickly
and had asked him whether there was anything they could
do about it. He explained that the employees should read
the cards carefully "and then sign them." Foreman Pilak
admitted that he addressed the employees in his
department while they were at their work stations and told
them basically the contents of the letter that they would
receive and that some people had complained to
management that pressures were being exerted to get
them to sign union authorization cards; and that if this was
the case, if they wished to revoke, this would be the
method to use.
According to employee Calenzo, Foreman Pilak on the
same day called employee Ruth Schulz to his desk and
asked her if she remembered talking about jumping on the
bandwagon too quickly. When Schulz replied in the
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628 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
affirmative, Pilak told her that she would be receiving the
revocation forms in the mail and this would be her way of
"getting off the bandwagon." Foreman Pilak denied that
this incident had occurred. However, employee Schulz,
called as a witness for the Respondent, admitted that Pilak
had said something to her "about people getting on a
bandwagon too soon," although she denied that anything
was said about her being on the bandwagon, because there
was no reason in her case to do that. She testified further
that this was merely a "friendly conversation" and that
Pilak was already aware of her antiunion sentiments.
Schulz' testimony not only corroborates partially that of
Calenzo, but also impeaches Pilak's denial that the
incident occurred.
Foreman Pilak also had several conversations with
Elizabeth Bolyard, an employee in the receiving inspection
department. According to Bolyard, she was returning to
her department from lunch on April 27, when Pilak
stopped her, noticed her union button,io and said, "Oh
Betty, not you too ... you're too nice a person to be
involved in anything like this." Bolyard then pointed out to
Pilak that management had not done much for her as far
as her salary was concerned, that she was getting only 25
cents more per hour than when she had started 3 years
before. To this, Pilak replied, "Well, which is better, your
salary or no job?" Bolyard asked him what he meant, and
Pilak said, "Well, let me rephrase that statement."
However, Bolyard's lunch hour was over and she returned
to her work station.
Bolyard testified further that shortly thereafter Foreman
Pilak called her over to a window separating the inspection
department from the stockroom, reminded her of their
friendship, and asked her if she minded whether he
conferred with higher management about her salary. Later
that afternoon, he met her again and asked her if she
would sign one of the revocation forms, but she refused to
do so. The next morning, during her break, Foreman Pilak
called her over to a table where he was sitting in the plant
cafeteria and asked her if she had signed one of the
revocation forms. Bolyard replied that she had not and
"wouldn't sign anything for anybody."
Foreman Pilak's version of the foregoing incidents is
entirely different. He testified that Bolyard had been
crying and told him that she was about to lose her home
and that she did not want to wear a union button, but felt
that she had no alternative. Pilak told her that if she didn't
really like the Union, she could revoke her authorization.
Bolyard emphatically insisted that she did not want to do
that. Pilak then asked her if she would mind his taking up
her financial problem with her supervisor, and Bolyard
said she would appreciate that. The next morning, in the
cafeteria, Bolyard and Pilak again discussed her financial
problems. Then, Bolyard very pointedly asked Pilak what
would happen if she did not sign a revocation card. Pilak
replied that he didn't care one way or the other, that it
made no difference.
On April 28, Pilak also discussed the revocation with
employee Florence Kubacki. According to Kubacki, she
was sitting in the department on her 3 o'clock break
reading a book, when Pilak called her over to where he
was working and asked her whether she had signed an
authorization card. Before she had an opportunity to reply,
Pilak told her that three employees had told him that she
was one of the card signers. Kubacki replied that she was
not sure whether she had signed a union card. Later that
afternoon, Kubacki remembered that she had in fact
signed an authorization card and went back to Pilak's desk
and told him that she "thought" that she might have
signed a card. Pilak asked her if she would sign a
revocation form. Kubacki, angry that someone had told
Pilak that she had signed an authorization card, signed a
revocation form and gave it to him. Pilak's version of the
incident differs substantially from that of Kubacki. He
testified that employees Ann Schauble, Mary Froncek,
and Kubacki were having a conversation and he overheard
Froncek say to Kubacki, "What do you think about this,
ain't it the nuts?" Kubacki replied that she was "getting
pretty sick of it," at which point Foreman Pilak "piped
up" that he'would "second that," that he was "getting
pretty tired of this constant conversation and division in
the people." Kubacki then said that she had signed some
card last fall, because someone had told her that the work
was being moved to Hurley and she should sign to protect
her job. Pilak then said, "If you don't feel you would want
them to have your authorization you could sign a
revocation." Kubacki indicated that she was uncertain as
to whether the card she had signed applied to this
particular union. Later in the day, Kubacki came back to
Pilak and said that she would like to sign a revocation
because "she wasn't going to pay for any union official to
sit in a plush office with his feet on the desk, smoking a
cigar." Pilak denied that he told Kubacki that some girls
had told him that Kubacki had signed a union card. On
cross-examination, Kubacki admitted that she had made a
remark to Pilak about the union official in the plush office,
but explained that she had made the remark "long before"
when the Union was coming in. Employees Schauble and
Froncek were not called to corroborate Pilak.
On or about May 2, according to employee Barbara
Protasiewicz, Foreman Pilak called her from her work
station to his desk and asked her if she had received the
revocation forms in the mail. Protasiewicz replied that she
had, but had thrown them away. During the conversation
she mentioned that she had signed an authorization card
and asked Pilak whether she should sign a revocation
form. Pilak explained the revocation form and asked her to
sign it to "unauthorize" herself from the Union. She
thereupon signed two of the revocation forms and returned
them to him. Foreman Pilak testified that he did not
remember how the conversation started, but that
Protasiewicz volunteered the information that she had
signed a union card but did not know what it was for. Pilak
replied that he did not want to know anything about it.
Protasiewicz then asked him what she should do about it.
Pilak replied that he was not very much up on unions,
knew very little about unions, and that he could not advise
her what to do. He suggested that she discuss the matter
with her father who worked at Louis Allis "and was in
some way connected with the Union." The following
morning Protasiewicz presented him with the signed
revocation forms. Protasiewicz admitted that she had
discussed the matter with her father, but stated that she
had done so before discussing the matter with Foreman
Pilak.
Protasiewicz testified further that she overheard
Foreman Pilak call employee Essie Jones over to his desk
during the afternoon of May 2 and asked her whether she
had signed one of the revocation forms. Pilak denied
10 This was the first day that Bolyard wore a union button.
ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA
discussing the matter with Jones. Neither party called
Jones as a witness.
Resolving the conflicts in the foregoing testimony, I
credit the versions of Calenzo, Bolyard, Kubacki, and
Protasiewicz who appeared to be credible witnesses.'' As
noted above, Calenzo's testimony was partially
corroborated by Schulz, a witness for Respondent, whose
testimony contradicted Pilak's denial of the Schulz
incident . It is also significant that four different witnesses
testified that Pilak had asked them individually to sign
revocations, and Pilak admitted having had conversations
with them. To credit Pilak's versions would require me to
find that all four had testified falsely, and that only Pilak
had told the truth. I find it impossible to do so. Respondent
in its brief apparently recognizes the significance of the
fact that the four employees testified to Pilak' s activities
and asks: "Why should four different individuals each
present a picture which is contrary to fact?" Respondent
answers the question by saying that "Pilak apparently is
not as adept as he might be with his female employees,"
and points out that Pilak had been accused of sarcasm in
situations totally unrelated to the Union. I find the answer
singularly unpersuasive. There is no evidence in the
record that these witnesses bore any malice toward Pilak.
In sum, I find that Foreman Pilak actively sought to
implement Respondent' s campaign to secure revocations
of union authorizations. I conclude that Respondent's
letter and posted notice and Foreman Pilak's efforts to
secure revocations constituted restraint , coercion, and
interference within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. Cumberland Shoe Company, 160 NLRB 1256: Movie
Star, Inc., 145 NLRB 319; Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 128
NLRB 574, 580, 588; The Jefferson Company, Inc., 110
NLRB 757, 771. In its brief, Respondent concedes "that it
is, generally speaking, a violation of the Act for an
employer to solicit the withdrawal of union
authorizations." Respondent argues, however, that where
there is evidence of a union campaign to obtain
authorizations by coercion, the employer is entitled to
explain to the employees how they may protect themselves
from such coercion and how they may nullify the effect of
authorizations they may have granted as a consequence of
such coercion. There is no evidence in this case of any
coercion by the Union, except that Production Manager
Tackes testified that he had received some reports either
from some employees directly or indirectly from his
supervisors. None of the employees testified to any
coercion by the Union. Moreover, Respondent concedes
that it has been unable to find any authority to support its
proposition. It relies on two decisions in which the Board,
in another context, has held that an employer may advise
employees as to how to revoke union membership, even to
the point of supplying them with appropriate instructions
and forms. The cases relied on by Respondent,
Warrensburg Board & Paper Corporation, 143 NLRB 398,
and Perkins Machine Company, 141 NLRB 697, are
inapposite. In both cases there was a contract between the
11 However, I do not credit that portion of Protasiewicz'
testimony that she conferred with her father regarding revocation
before she discussed the matter with Pilak Except for this, her
version is credited
12 Respondent cites Bolyard 's statement on cross - examination
to the effect that "this was strictly on a personal basis , this had
nothing to do with the Union " However , this statement is taken
out of context It was made in regard to Pdak's inquiry whether
Bolyard minded "if he went higher up to ask questions" about her
failure to receive a higher wage
11 The record discloses that prior thereto, on June 10, the
629
employer and the union which provided an escape period
during which employees could withdraw from the Union. It
was in this context that the Board held that an employer
may notify the employees of the existence of the escape
period and how they may exercise their privilege of
withdrawing from the Union.
5. Interrogation and threats
As previously detailed, Foreman Pilak had a
conversation with employee Bolyard on April 27, the first
day that some employees started to wear "IBEW
Organizing Committee" buttons. Pilak expressed surprise
at Bolyard's wearing a button. When she replied that her
salary was unsatisfactory, Pilak asked her, "Well, what is
better, your salary or no job?" Foreman Pilak's remark, in
the context of his opening remark about the union button,
clearly carried an implication which was coercive in
character and as such was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act.' '
In the early part of April, as Foreman Pilak was
instructing employee Rose Christ how to paint header
sets, he remarked to her that "anybody that signed a union
card, and the Union got in, there would be a lot of sorry
people." About 2 weeks later, he asked Christ if Caroline
Cade, another employee, had ever talked union to her.
Christ replied in the negative, and Pilak walked away.
Pilak admitted having the first conversation with Christ,
but testified that he was discussing the Union "in
generalities" and that "as to the campaign, there had been
the division in the plant and everything, and it was a
shame that the atmosphere had changed so drastically,
and I said that if the Union might get in, they might be
sorry, because there would be a further, there could be a
further change in the atmosphere." He denied the latter
conversation about employee Cade. Respondent argues
that Christ's version should not be credited because of her
admission that after May 26, she did not get along too well
with Foreman Pilak because "he was kind of picking on
me." Respondent also cites the fact that Christ learned on
May 27 that she was not getting a raise for which she
blamed Pilak who was her foreman. Respondent,
therefore, argues that there is an element of retribution
toward Pilak in Christ's testimony. I have heretofore found
that Foreman Pilak was active in securing revocations of
union authorizations. His interrogation and statements to
employee Christ are consistent with his other antiunion
activity. I did not credit Pilak's versions of his
conversations with the four employees whose revocations
he had solicited. Nor do I credit his testimony with regard
to the foregoing incidents. I, therefore, find and conclude
that Foreman Pilak interrogated and threatened Christ in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act
6. Respondent's letter of June 15
Under date of June 15,1•1 Respondent sent another letter
to all of its employees. The letter informed the employees
Respondent enclosed a letter in the pay envelopes of the
employees, which read in pertinent part as follows "If the Union
wins they will demand that we deduct each month a substantial
part of your pay and transmit it to them as dues So you can
appreciate this fact, we have made such a deduction this week
This time you are getting the difference back in the separate
check enclosed with this letter If the Union wins, you can plan on
that amount going to them " It is unnecessary to decide whether
the foregoing was violative of the Act, since it is not alleged as a
violation in the complaint, nor does the General Counsel so
contend in his brief
630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that there would be a Board-conducted election on
June 22. The letter continued in pertinent part as follows:
In considering the choice you will make, I want to
reaffirm that the company is definitely opposed to
unionization . We do not believe that an outside
organization is either necessary or desirable ....
Employees voting in this kind of election sometimes
mistakenly assume that a union victory is bound to
mean higher wages and benefits. Nothing could be
further from the truth . Under the law , an employer is
not required even to continue in effect its existing
benefits if a union wins. Bargaining is a two-way
street and it starts from scratch . What wages and
conditions will prevail thereafter depends on what
both parties agree. Our company most certainly will
not agree , merely because there is a union , to raise
our costs out of line with our competition . Our aim is
to provide a stable operation with , good, steady
employment , and this goal we would not jeopardize.
* * * * *
We realize that we have not performed miracles
and that we have our faults, but we are trying to do
our best . As a young company, we all have reason to
be proud of our accomplishments in our short history.
I sincerely believe that our friendly and peaceful
relationships will be better maintained without
intervention of a union and that we can accomplish
more for the mutual benefit of the company and the
employees without interference from a union, and
that our employees will find only disappointment and
disillusionment in union
The General Counsel argues that the letter constituted a
threat to discontinue existing benefits if the Union got in,
pointing particularly to the language that "under the law,
an employer is not required even to continue in effect its
existing benefits if a union wins. Bargaining is a two-way
street and it starts from scratch ." The contention must be
rejected . Squarely in point with the instant case is Trent
Tube Company , Subsidiary of Crucible Steel Company of
America, 147 NLRB 538 In that case the Regional
Director recommended setting aside an election because
the employer in letters to the employees had: (1) made
reference to various benefits currently enjoyed by the
employees ; (2) made the statement that the union could
not guarantee that such benefits could continue under a
collective-bargaining contract and that "bargaining starts
from scratch ": and (3 ) stressed the possibility of strikes
and their adverse effect upon the employees if the union
were certified. A majority of the Board , after reading the
letters in their entirety and considering not only the
contents but the timing , and the opportunity of the union
to respond and its actual responses thereto, rejected the
Regional Director 's recommendation and held
The pertinent issues of existing benefits , future
benefits , strikes, union administration , and the
requirement of good-faith bargaining were fully
brought to the attention of the employees by the
respective electioneering of the Employer and the
counterelectioneering of the petitioner. In our
opinion , the Employer 's letter could clearly be
evaluated by the employees as partisan
electioneering . (Id. at 540)14
In the instant case, the Union not only had an
opportunity to reply to the Respondent's letter of June 15,
but actually did so. In the Union's letter of June 20, it
explicitly referred to the employer's statement that under
the law an employer is not required even to continue in
effect its existing benefits if a union wins, and said:
Now, winning this election does not guarantee higher
wages and benefits. However, I know ofNOI.B.E.W.
contract signed in the last 5 years which has not
encompassed a great increase in wages and benefits
than the so-called annual review made available to
you .... As long as the Company has chosen to speak
of the law, I wonder if their high priced labor attorney
has advised them that it is a direct violation of the
National Labor Relations Act for an employer to
threaten to withhold benefits or wages or to take away
benefits and/or wages because employees might
choose to vote for a union; and what other meaning
could you read in the Company's letter of June 15,
1966.
Half of the second page of their letter is used to
scare you into voting against the union because of an
implied fear of strikes. And let us look at the record
here. First of all no strike is ever called in the
I.B.E.W. unless the members involved voted in favor
of the strike. Secondly there is no union in existence
today whose record in collective bargaining and
attaining collective justice for its members on the job
can closely compare with the I.B.E.W. record when it
comes to good settlements without a strike.
I therefore conclude that "the employer's letters could
clearly be evaluated by the employees as partisan
electioneering" (Ibid.). Accordingly, the complaint should
be dismissed in this regard.
7. The wage increases
Respondent began operations in 1959 with five
employees. It has grown to the point where at the time of
the hearing it had approximately 175 employees.''
It has had a regular policy of granting wage increases in
June of each year. This is the only time of the year that
wage adjustments are made, except in the case of new
employees who are given an increase at the end of the 90-
day probationary period, if they prove to be satisfactory.
During the prior 3 years, its total increases amounted to 8
percent of its payroll, 12.5 percent, and 6 percent,
respectively. Salary increases are initially proposed by
Production Manager Tackes after consultation with the
various foremen, and are reviewed by the salary and wage
committee which during this past year consisted of
President Zelazo, Vice President Paige, and Captain
David R. Hull, U.S.N.R. The recommendations of the
salary and wage committee are then submitted to the
board of directors for final approval.
Sometime during 1965, Respondent had applied to the
Milwaukee Employers Association for a wage and
insurance survey The wage survey provided by the
Milwaukee Employers Association classified that various
jobs in Respondent's plant according to skills and
provided Respondent with a statement of the wage scales
prevalent in the Milwaukee area for the various job
classifications. Based upon the survey, Production
14 See also Jacob Brenner Company, Inc ,160 NLRB 131
"As previously noted, at the time of the election in April, there
were 137 eligible employees in the appropriate unit
ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA 631
Manager Tackes in May prepared a recommendation to
the salary and wage committee in which he set up job
classification, listed the employees in each job
classification, graded the performance of each employee
within each job classification (after a conference with the
various foremen) and made recommendations for
individual wage increases. The total increases
recommended by Tackes amounted to 13.8 percent of the
payroll.
Fearing the possiblity that the granting of a wage
increase, or the failure to grant a wage increase contrary to
the regularly established practice, during an
organizational campaign might be charged as an unfair
labor practice, the Respondent consulted its counsel who
advised that, while there was no way of preventing the
Union from charging an unfair labor practice, the
Respondent should nevertheless continue its past practice
of granting annual wage increases in June, but that the
Respondent would be well advised to stay reasonably
within the range of the wage increases granted during
prior years. Tackes' recommendations were then
considered by the salary and wage committee. Captain
Hull was adamant in insisting that the total increases
granted should not exceed 9.9 percent of the payroll. His
view prevailed and Tackes was directed to prepare revised
recommendations within this guideline. Tackes complied
under protest, and the committee approved the revised
recommendations which were adopted by the board of
directors.
The wage increases granted were effective June 10.
Approximately 116 employees received wage increases
ranging between 5 cents and 70 cents per hour, half of
them 20 cents or less. Ten employees received no wage
increases. Insofar as union affiliation or sympathy is
concerned, no pattern of discrimination can be discerned.
Some employees who were observed wearing union
buttons received wage increases, others did not.
Conversely, some employees who had not been identified
as union sympathizers did not receive an increase. That
union affiliation was not the test in determining who would
receive the wage raise is demonstrated by the fact that
employee Agnes Snyder who wore an organizer's button
was given a raise, while employee Barbara Protasiewicz
who had earlier signed a revocation card for Respondent
did not get one. I therefore find and conclude that the
wage increases granted by Respondent were not violative
of the Act.
Accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed in this
regard.
8 The meeting of June 21
On June 21, Respondent held a meeting of its employees
in the cafeteria during working hours. "' Attendance was
voluntary. At the outset, President Zelazo told the
employees that those who did not wish to attend could
return to their work stations, or if it was their breaktime,
they could return to that." Nobody left the room.
President Zelazo told the employees that on the following
day there would be an NLRB election at the company
plant. He urged all of the employees who were eligible to
vote to do so. He told the employees that he had been out
of the State in an effort to secure additional business for
the Company and that when he had returned he found a
considerable amount of correspondence on his desk,
including some letters from the IBEW. The IBEW letters,
he continued, presented a picture that the Company might
have done wrong. He wanted to have the air cleared so that
if any of the employees had any questions that they might
wish to ask him or if anybody desired to tell him what was
wrong he would welcome their doing so. At this point,
employee Charlotte Murphy asked why she was given
such a small increase. President Zelazo said that he did
not know about the increase, whereupon Vice President
Paige turned to Personnel Manager Methenitis and asked
him why Murphy had not received a larger increase.
Methenitis replied that he did not think it was appropriate
to discuss publicly confidential personnel matters. Vice
President Paige replied that since the question had been
asked in public, Murphy wanted an answer then and there.
Methenitis replied that he did not have Murphy's file,
whereupon Vice President Paige directed him to get the
file. Upon his return, Methenitis explained that the
employees had been classified into grades by virtue of
their skills and training and that there was a maximum and
minimum wage established for each grade and the
employee's performance evaluated by the supervisor.
Murphy's rating was below the middle rating for the grade.
During the discussion of Murphy's question regarding
her pay raise, President Zelazo spoke generally regarding
the pay raises that had been granted in June. According to
Vice President Paige, Zelazo said substantially as follows:
This year when the board of directors met, we knew
we had a tough problem on our hands, because there
was a union campaign, and our attorneys had
informed us that this was a sensitive period. Now, we
knew that our employees all were expecting at this
time, June 1, increases, and we were worried that if
we granted increases to our employees we might be
subject to an accusation that we were buying votes,
and if we didn't grant increases, we'd be subject to an
unfair labor practice charge, that we withheld
increases because this organizational campaign was
going on. So we called up our attorney, and he told us
that increases could be granted at this time, because
we had done so in the past, and he also suggested to
the board that we stay within the range of our past
practice for the past 3 years ... this company has
grown a great deal, as a result the classifications had
to be made more specific .... And as a result of this,
and the fact that maximum and minimum salaries had
been established for each grade level, the result was
that some of the old employees who had been
receiving wages which were close to the top of their
grade, or the top of their grade, wound up with exactly
0.
5 This meeting was held in the morning of the day before the
election, and ended at 12 30 in the afternoon The record does not
disclose what time on the following day the election was held It
is, therefore, not possible to determine whether the meeting was
held within 24 hours before the election See Peerless Plywood
Company, 107 NLRB 427 In any event, neither the Union in its
objection to conduct affecting the results of the election, nor the
General Counsel in the instant proceeding, has raised the issue
that the meeting of June 21 violated the 24-hour rule Accordingly,
that issue is not before the Board
17 The ensuing account of the meeting is based upon the
credited testimony of Vice President Paige, corroborated as to
various portions by President Zelazo, Personnel Manager
Methenitis, and Production Manager Tackes Except in one
regard, discussed infra, it was not contradicted
632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Employee Marge Cerny then took the floor and pointed
out that it took a lot of courage to stand up and ask a
question . She cited the example of employee Jean
Ilgenfritz who had asked a question at the meeting which
occurred in March as to why two employees had been
discharged , and that since then Ilgenfritz ' life at the plant
had never been the same-that she had been taunted by
her supervisors and had been transferred from her job to
another. 18
Zelazo said he did know of Ilgenfritz because her name
had come to his attention; that he had received a
telephone call from Martin , the union organizer,
concerning her and had made a memorandum of the call.
He asked Ilgenfritz if she would like to have him read the
memorandum , and she indicated her approval. The
memorandum which Zelazo read is as follows:
During dinner at home in the evening of 21
April 1966 Mr. Thomas E. Martin , organizer of
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
local union 494, phoned me on behalf of Mrs. Jean
Ilgenfritz . He made an appeal not to fire
Mrs. Ilgenfritz . He felt it was not her fault that during
her visit to the union she had taken more time than
she was allowed by the company , and therefore broke
company rules. He appealed on the basis that if Jean's
work is up to par the foremen should not subject her
to harassment. He thought the company should
overlook the fact that this girl did not call in, and she
was not aware that the union was making an appeal on
her behalf because he had been asked to do so by
other employees.
Throughout this telephone conversation Mrs.
Zelazo was listening . I indicated to Mrs. Zelazo that I
believed Mr . Martin was desperately trying to
provoke me to fire the young lady. I advised
Mr. Martin that although I did not know the
circumstances I would look into the matter and do my
utmost to be helpful.19
Vice President Paige then suggested that an explanation
be given as to what happened with respect to the two
employees about whom Ilgenfritz had inquired . Personnel
Manager Methenitis replied that he had had a conference
with Ilgenfritz when she first raised the question and had
told her why the two employees were discharged. Paige
then directed Methenitis to give the information to all of
the employees . Methenitis went to his office , obtained the
files, and then reported that the employees in question
whom he identified as employee 1 and employee 2 rather
than using their names were discharged for the following
reasons: 1 was not doing her work properly, and 2 was
discharged either because she was working slowly or could
not work with her colleagues.20
Paige then turned to Production Manager Tackes and
asked him to address himself to Cerny's contention that
Ilgenfritz had been mistreated since she had spoken out at
the March meeting. Tackes had some notes with him and
after obtaining Ilgenfritz ' permission he read some data
with respect to her performance record, pointing out that
certain instruments which she had worked on had been
damaged, referred to the quantity of her production and
her record of tardiness and absenteeism . Ilgenfritz
disputed Tackes' recital of her record and held up a book,
saying , " I want you to know , Mr. Tackes , I kept my own
records too about what I did on those days ." Tackes asked
Ilgenfritz whether she would like to tell what her records
indicated . Ilgenfritz replied , "All in due course and at the
proper time and place."
At one point during the meeting , President Zelazo
observed that it was getting close to the lunch hour and
asked the employees whether it would not be better to end
the meeting at 12 o'clock . The employees generally asked
him to continue the meeting , so Zelazo indicated that the
meeting would end at 12:30.
During his presentation , President Zelazo spoke about
the fact that Respondent was a new business . According to
Vice President Paige, he continued as follows:
. he said that he is accustomed to working with a
third party, for example there's a full - time resident
inspector of the Government housed in the plant ....
Now, when you have a third party, like this
Government inspector , in the plant, many times there
are problems which arise, for example, products may
have been completed and ready for shipment, but
because the Government inspector is not around, or
cannot sign off on it , shipments have been held up,
and not sent out, although they were ready . Likewise,
he said , if you want the union and the union comes
into the plant , I am concerned that a union may not
understand the nature of our business , and the union
may likewise , although I know I can work with them,
but they may likewise , similar to the Government
inspector situation , may get more difficult for me to
do what in my opinion may be best for the Company.
Let me take a very wild example ... and I don't want
anybody here ... to think that the example I'm taking
is in any way something which the union will ask me
to do, because I know it won 't, but just to use it as an
illustration , I'm setting it forth . For example ... we
have a parking lot right next to the alley , next to our
plant . Now, let 's say the union would ask me and the
company, and I am not saying it would , but let's make
believe ... that the union asks me to build out into the
parking lot in order to make more working space
available for production people. Well, in my opinion
we may require this ... space for visitors who are
coming to inspect the plant, in order to give business
to us.
Well, this is a difference of opinion which the union
and I would have; and if the union were to come in, I
would not any longer have the freedom to do what I
see fit in every single instance , it would be something
like working with the Government inspector , a third
i" Respondent 's treatment of Ilgenfritz is alleged to have been
discriminatory in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act Her
treatment by Respondent is more fully discussed infra
i" Organizer Martin denied that he had ever called President
Zelazo Also, Zelazo admitted that he had never talked to
Organizer Martin before and did not recognize his voice It is
unnecessary for the purpose of this proceeding to determine
whether Martin did, in fact, make the call that Zelazo received I
am satisfied that Zelazo testified credibly regarding this incident,
and I conclude that someone who identified himself as Organizer
Martin did call Zelazo about Ilgenfritz
2" Paige testified that she did not remember which of the two
reasons was given by Methenitis, that her memory was not certain
as to this point
ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA
party. But if a union is elected, I know I could and
would work with the union.21
Vice President Paige then spoke and said substantially
as follows:
. whether or not you decide to elect a union into this
plant is your decision, nobody else's. Now, the union
in its letters to you has written that we "should shut
up and mind our own business and let you make up
your own minds", because you are adult. Now, I don't
think that ... if we express our outlook on the
situation , we are not stopping you from making up
your own minds, but we are just presenting our
outlook to you, for your consideration.
Now, if you believe what the union said in its letters
to you, that this company desires "stooges and so-
called faithful employees" to spy on you, then you
should vote for a union, and ... if you believe as the
union has written in its letters that we are vicious,
then you certainly need a union. You should join and
you should vote for a union to protect you from us
.. But it is difficult to stand up and speak at a time
when you are accused of the type of thing which the
union wrote to you about .... If you believe that we
discriminate against our employees, then you should
go out and vote for a union, and if you believe as the
union wrote in its letters to you that "you have been
denied your just . portion of the fruits of your
labor," . . . then you should vote for a union.
Paige then spoke of the financial difficulties that the
Company had experienced in the past. She continued as
follows:
We can't make any promises to you like the union
can. There's only one way that you can judge us, and
that is our past performance, what you yourself have
seen with your own eyes in this company, and since I
know many of you are new here, I can only suggest
that you speak to your fellow employees, those who
have been working here longer, to find out about the
times when you may not have been here.
She then referred to the profit-sharing plan and the
insurance benefits program that the Company had
instituted in the past and suggested that the employees
bear it in mind when they vote, and concluded as follows:
Irrespective of whether or not a union comes into
the plant, Mr. Zelazo and I will not change in
character and your managers will not change in
character. We are going to continue to be the same
type of people that we were in the past.
Before the meeting concluded President Zelazo asked
the employees whether they liked this sort of meeting, and
the employees responded in favor of it. Zelazo then said,
"Well, can I promise to continue to have these sorts of
meetings ?" Paige cautioned him not to promise anything.
Zelazo then said, "Well, I don't care, I'm going to promise
to continue to have these sorts of meetings, I have the right
to talk to my employees ... union or no union ," and he
pointed to Plant Manager Jefferson and directed him to
see to it that such meetings be held every 2 months.
The foregoing recital of Zelazo's statement as to the effect of
unionization is the testimony of Vice President Paige,
corroborated by President Zelazo Employees Miller and Calenzo
testified to a different version The matter is more fully discussed
Infra
22 Employees Miller and Calenzo who testified to the prediction
633
Of the numerous things said at this meeting, the General
Counsel contends that two statements were violative of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. They are Zelazo's promise to
hold bimonthly meetings with the employees, union or no
union, and an alleged statement by Zelazo, not contained
in either Paige's or Zelazo's account of the meeting. Thus,
employee Gertrude Miller, corroborated by employee
Calenzo, testified that Zelazo said.
If there wasn't a third party involved he could get
more contracts, therefore more employment, more
profit, there would be more money in the profit-
sharing plan, and as we became eligible for it, we
would all be gaining, by what he could attain without
the third party.
No authorities were cited by the General Counsel to
substantiate his contention that the foregoing statements
were violative of the Act.
With regard to the promise to hold bimonthly meetings,
I find and conclude that the statement did not constitute a
promise of benefit which would be accorded the
employees if the union lost the election. Zelazo made it
plain to the employees that these meetings would be held
"union or no union." I am unaware of any authority which
holds that an employer is prohibited from holding
meetings of employees. Compare S. & H. Grossinger's
Inc., 156 NLRB 223, where the Board held that a promise
of a more effective grievance procedure to be set up in the
future was held to be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
However, unlike the promise in the Grossinger case,
Zelazo's statement in the case at bar was not presented as
action to be taken by the employer in lieu of a union;
rather, Zelazo made it clear that he would take such action
even if there were a union.
With regard to the prediction made by Zelazo, assuming
arguendo that he made the statement attributed to him by
employees Miller and Calenzo,22 I am satisfied that it was
nothing more than an economic prediction of what
business the Respondent could enjoy if there were no
union. It was not a promise of a benefit which Respondent
was in a position to carry out. On the contrary, it was a
prediction that Respondent could get more business from
parties over whom it had no control. A prediction of future
benefits cannot be considered as a promise of benefits,
unless the promise is unconditional and not contingent on
the obtaining of profitable business from customers. Here,
the statement attributed to Zelazo was not an
unconditional promise of benefit, but was not only
indefinite, but, in addition, explicitly contingent on
Respondent's getting more contracts and making more
profit. As noted earlier in connection with the General
Counsel's contention that Respondent's letter of June 8
contained a promise of benefit, "a vague suggestion of the
possibility that at some indeterminate date the Employer
might evolve a formula whereby ... benefits could be
increased . falls short of the type of promise
contemplated by the Act" (American Laundry Machinery
Company, 107 NLRB 511, 513, quoted with approval in
James A. Pearson, d/b/a Crystal Lake Broom Works, 159
NLRB 429).
quoted above impressed me as credible witnesses, as did Paige
and Zelazo However , it is unnecessary to determine which
version is correct , inasmuch as I conclude infra, that even the
statement attributed to Zelazo by employees Miller and Calenzo
was not violative of the Act
634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Accordingly, I find and conclude that the complaint
should be dismissed in this regard.
C. The Alleged Discrimination Against Jean Ilgenfritz
Employee Jean Ilgenfritz was a member of the
organizing committee and a leading advocate of the Union.
She wore her organizer's button openly and passed out
union buttons. Prioi to April, she did assembly work and
was considered to be a good producer. On or about
April 20, the work on her regular job ran out, and she was
assigned to soldering two leads on an instrument known as
a "meter movement."23 Ilgenfritz worked on the meter
movements until approximately 11 a.m., when she was
directed to go to Foreman King's department where she
worked the remainder of the day. The next day, Foreman
King assigned her to staking pins in terminal boards, a
process which involved the operation of a press that seated
the terminals in the plastic terminal boards.24
Ilgenfritz had not previously performed either of the two
operations described above. Foreman King showed her
how to place the pins on the board and operate the press,
but from the outset Ilgenfritz experienced difficulty in that
the tips of the terminal pins bent when she operated the
press. Recognizing the difficulty, Ilgenfritz on several
occasions called it to the attention of Foreman King and
Forrest Broadhead, a technician. On one occasion,
Broadhead told her not to worry about it; that if the pins
were bent they could be repaired. On one occasion,
Foreman King told her that when the terminal pin was not
properly located, she should hit it twice, but this only
resulted in more bent pins. On another occasion, Foreman
King observed that a nut was loose on the press and the
machine was not functioning properly. Ilgenfritz finally
realized that she was suppose to pull down the plunger on
the press manually to insure that each terminal pin fitted
properly prior to actually staking it. She admitted that
King had demonstrated this procedure to her, but stated
that she understood that he meant that she should do it
only once in a while to test the terminals.
On April 21, Production Manager Tackes was called to
the stockroom to see a quantity of meter movements which
were damaged. The two foremen from the production area
involved were also called in. By checking the timesheets,
the men were able to identify the two employees who had
worked on these instruments. One was Ilgenfritz; the
other was an employee by the name of Simms who worked
on the second shift. Tackes inquired of Foreman Hesse
why Ilgenfritz had been put on this job, and was told that
he chose her because, although she had never worked on
the meter itself, she had worked on portions of the
instrument adjacent to the meter, so that she knew the
delicacy of the particular part involved. Her normal job
was soldering; consequently, she was deemed to be a
logical person to solder the wires on the meter movements.
Ilgenfritz was called in and asked to identify the meter
movements upon which she had worked. She identified
some, among which were instruments that were damaged,
in that the wires on which the flags were mounted were
bent. Ilgenfritz suggested that somebody else might have
caused the damage. However, Tackes did not accept that
21 A meter movement is a delicate instrument approximately 4
inches in diameter The leads referred to are two thin wires of
approximately three-quarters of an inch in length upon each of
which is mounted a tiny flag
The terminal boards are about 1/2 by 1-1/2 inches in size
explanation because each meter movement is mounted in
the cap of a jar, comes to the operator in a glass jar after
having been inspected, and is immediately replaced in the
jar by the operator after the wires are soldered. The jar
then goes to the stockroom without further handling.
Employee Simms was also interviewed separately in the
same manner when he came to work.
Ilgenfritz then returned to work on the terminal boards.
Later that day, Tackes was called to Foreman King's area
because King had discovered a large number of damaged
terminal boards. Approximately 90 of the 455 units that
Ilgenfritz had worked on were damaged in that the pins
were bent. Ilgenfritz was then called to Tackes' office and
asked if she was aware of the damage. She admitted that
she was aware, but explained that she had difficulty with
the job.
Because Ilgenfritz had always been a good worker,
Tackes suspected that her sudden poor performance was
deliberate. He thereupon attempted to call the
Respondent's attorney who earlier had cautioned against
any precipitous action against any union adherent. He
learned that the attorney was out and would not be
available until the following Wednesday. He thereupon
asked Ilgenfritz to stay out of the plant until he had an
opportunity to confer with Respondent's attorney.
Ilgenfritz asked Tackes if this was a layoff or dismissal, or
disciplinary action. Tackes answered in the negative. She
then asked him if it was because of her union activities,
and Tackes again said, "No." Later the same day, Simms
was also told to stay home until Wednesday.
On Monday, April 25, Ilgenfritz came to the plant with
Union Representative Martin and attempted to see
Tackes. Tackes explained to Ilgenfritz by telephone that
there was nothing further to discuss at that time because
he had not yet been able to get in touch with the
Respondent's attorney. That afternoon, at the end of the
normal workshift, there were two representatives from the
Union on the outside of the plant handing out a circular
alleging that Ilgenfritz had been laid off for union activity.
That evening, Tackes was able to reach Respondent's
attorney at his home. The attorney advised Tackes that
there was insufficient evidence of sabotage and that it
would be best to call the people back to work as soon as
possible and to place them on tasks in which they could do
little damage. Upon receiving this advice, Tackes
telephoned Ilgenfritz and told her that she could return to
work as soon as she desired. He also tried to reach Simms
by telephone but was unsuccessful. Ilgenfritz returned to
work the following day, April 26, and was assigned to
making gaskets. She was paid for the day that she had
been away from work.
The General Counsel contends that Ilgenfritz' layoff was
because of her union activity. The facts do not support the
contention. I am satisfied that Ilgenfritz' activity for the
Union was not the basis for Production Manager Tackes'
action. The work done by her on the meter movements and
the terminal boards was patently unsatisfactory.
Moreover, there were numerous other employees wearing
organizer's buttons openly. No action was taken against
any of them. Conversely, Simms who was not known to be
a union adherent was also asked to stay away from the
Thirteen small metal posts or pins are mounted on the terminal
board Of these, nine do not go all the way through Four, one near
each corner, go all the way through the board and protrude about
three - eighths of an inch on each side of the board.
ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA 635
plant until Wednesday. In sum, there was a reasonable
basis for Tackes' action, and there has been no showing
that it was discriminatorily motivated.
In the alternative, the General Counsel argues that
assuming, arguendo, that Tackes had a good-faith belief
that Ilgenfritz had engaged in sabotage, her suspension
was nevertheless discriminatory because she had not, in
fact, engaged in such conduct In support of this
contention, the General Counsel relies on N.L.R.B. v.
Burnup and Sams, Inc., 379 U.S. 21. The case is inapposite.
There, two employees were discharged because the em-
ployer was informed that, while soliciting another em-
ployee to join the Union, they had told him that the Union
would use dynamite to get in if the Union did not acquire
the authorizations. At the hearing, it developed that the
alleged threat was not made and the employer's
information was untrue. In upholding the Board, the
Supreme Court said:
In sum , §8(a)(1) is violated if it is shown that the
discharged employee was at the time engaged in a
protected activity, that the employer knew it was
such, that the basis of the discharge was an alleged
act of misconduct in the course of that activity, and
that the employee was not, in fact, guilty of that
misconduct. (Id. at 23)
In the instant case, Ilgenfritz was not engaged in any
concerted or protected activity when she produced the
defective work. It is true that Production Manager Tackes
erroneously thought that her defective workmanship was
caused by her attitude toward the Respondent, which in
turn, was based on her prounion feelings. But an
antiemployer attitude is not equivalent to being engaged in
a protected activity. I therefore recommend that the
complaint be dismissed in this regard.
D. The Alleged Violation of Section 8(a)(4)
On May 11, Respondent issued a written reprimand to
employee Jean Ilgenfritz. The complaint alleges that the
reprimand was issued to her because of her membership
in, sympathy for, and activities on behalf of the Union and
because she had previously given testimony in a hearing
conducted by the Board.
There is no substantial dispute as to the facts. On
May 9, Ilgenfritz asked Foreman King for permission to be
absent from work the following day to attend the hearing in
Case 30-RC-434. Foreman King gave her permission, but
admittedly instructed her to call in the next morning to
advise that she would be absent that day. Ilgenfritz
attended the hearing, but in her excitement forgot to call
in. Shortly after she returned to work the following
morning , Foreman King approached her and asked her
why she had not called in the day before. Ilgenfritz replied
that she had completely forgotten about it King admitted
that she "genuinely" appeared to have forgotten his
instructions Nevertheless, he gave her a written warning
notice for failing to call in her absence.
Foreman King testified credibly that the Respondent
has a rule generally applicable that employees who are to
be absent should call in as close to 8 a.m. as possible. The
Respondent does not have a rule to the effect that an
employee must also call in on the day of absence if, on a
prior day, he has already received permission to be absent
Foreman King, however, in his own department does
maintain a rule requiring the employee to call in in the
morning of the day of absence even though the employee
has previously received permission to be absent. He
explained the reason for his rule as follows:
It's the duty of the receptionist to receive and
record all these calls, and, myself, I had been ill at the
time, and I wasn't sure just when I would be available,
if I were available, and with a call-in, this makes the
man who is taking over in my absence, it gives him an
idea of who's going to be there and who isn't.
That Foreman King did in fact have such a rule in his
department is substantiated not only by the testimony of
employees of his department, but by the testimony of
Ilgenfritz herself. Thus, she testified that she had
received advance permission from Foreman King to attend
a conference in the representation case on May 2, and that
she did call in at approximately 8 a.m. of the day of her
absence.''
It is also clear from the record that Foreman King
enforced his rule. Thus employee Dekeyser received a
written warning on May 19 for failure to call in his
absence. In late 1965, four different employees received
disciplinary suspensions on that account. In two of these
cases, suspensions were issued even for a first offense. It
was not established whether in these instances, prior
permission to be absent had been granted. However, since
Foreman King imposed the same requirements, it appears
that Ilgenfritz was not subjected to disparate treatment.
There is one instance that might possibly be construed
as disparate treatment in the enforcement of Foreman
King's rule. Employee Banks testified that on one occasion
she asked permission to be absent the following morning,
and although aware of Foreman King's requirement that
she call in her absence the following morning failed to do
so. When she returned to work the day after her absence
she was given a verbal reprimand by Foreman King for her
failure to call in. The General Counsel argues that on the
basis of the foregoing I must draw the inference that
Ilgenfritz received a written reprimand as distinguished
from an oral one, because of her union activity. I cannot
draw this inference on the basis of an isolated instance,
particularly when before the beginning of the Union's
organizing campaign, other employees had received
suspensions-a much more stringent punishment than
Ilgenfritz received-for violating the rule.
Accordingly, I recommend that the complaint be
dismissed in this regard.
E. The Discharge of Phyllis Flikeid
Phyllis Flikeid was hired by the Company on April 1,
and was discharged on May 13. The General Counsel
contends that her discharge was discriminatory; the
Respondent contends that she was discharged for cause.
Flikeid was hired as a probationary employee'' for
production assembly, because she had a background in
Foreman King testified that he instructed her to call in on
May 2, while Ilgenfritz testified that King said nothing about her
being required to call in I credit King's testimony in this regard,
as there would appear to be no reason for Ilgenfritz ' calling in on
May 2, unless she was either aware of Foreman King's rule or had
been instructed by him to call in
2' New employees are hired by the Respondent for a
probationary period of 3 months, during which time they are
judged by their supervisor as to whether they can do the -b
properly Flikeid denied that she was aware of the fact that she
was a probationary employee However, the credited testimony of
employee Calenzo, witness for the General Counsel, reflects
Flikeid's awareness of the fact that she was a probationary
employee
636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that type of work , and the Respondent was anticipating
commencement of production pursuant to a new contract.
The work on the anticipated contract , however, was
delayed and after a short period , Flikeid was transferred to
the data processing area. At that time the Respondent was
putting its accounting records into the data processing
system and required proofreading of IBM cards at the
initial stages. Flikeid indicated that she had done IBM
sorting in her previous employment and knew essentially
what was required in proofreading . Flikeid 's new job also
required the filing of cards.
Flikeid did not prove to be a satisfactory employee. As a
proofreader she failed to catch errors in the punchcards.s'
Also, Flikeid who admitted to being a talkative person was
on a number of occasions talking with other employees
away from her work station when she should have been
filing IBM cards .211
The General Counsel's contention that Flikeid was
discharged because of union membership is based upon
her testimony that she wore a union button the day before
she was discharged and had had a conversation with the
Production Manager Tackes in which she complained that
employee Ilgenfritz was being discriminated against.
I am satisfied that Flikeid was discharged because she
was an unsatisfactory employee and not because of her
union membership . As I have previously indicated, there
were many employees who openly wore union buttons and
who were not discriminated against. Nor was Flikeid
particularly active in the Union 's organizational campaign.
The fact that an employee is a union member will not
shield him from discharge for good cause. E.g.,N.L.R.B. v.
Mylan-Sparta Co., Inc., 166 F.2d 485, 490-491 (C.A. 6);
Wellington Mill Division, West Point Manufacturing Co.
v. N.L .R.B.,330 F.2d 579, 586, cert denied 379 U.S. 882.
Accordingly, I recommend that the complaint be
dismissed in this regard.
against a leading union adherent , Jean Ilgenfritz,
because of her activities in support of the Union, and
then used a captive audience meeting on June 21,
1966, to capitalize upon its discriminatory program by
a campaign of character assassination and personal
vilification of the leading union instigator.
7. By like and related conduct, the Employer had
interfered with the free choice of its employees as to
the question of union representation.
Based upon the foregoing findings and conclusions, I
recommend that objections 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7, be overruled.
With regard to objection 6, I have not previously discussed
the allegation that the Employer used a captive audience
meeting on June 21 to capitalize on its discriminatory
program by a campaign of character assassination and
personal vilification of the leading union instigator
(Ilgenfritz ). With regard to this allegation, I find and
conclude that the meeting of June 21 was not a captive
audience meeting, in that attendance at the meeting was
voluntary and was so announced to, and understood by,
the employees. With reference to the alleged character
assassination and personal vilification of Ilgenfritz, the
matter of her treatment was not raised by the Employer,
but was raised by another employee, and before the
Employer discussed Ilgenfritz' work record and the
alleged telephone call from Union Organizer Martin, it
secured the permission of Ilgenfritz to discuss these
matters openly. Accordingly, I find that the allegation has
not been substantiated.
Based upon my findings and discussion above, I find
and conclude that objection 2 has been proved by
substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole
and should be sustained by the Regional Director.
VI THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON
COMMERCE
V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON OBJECTIONS IN CASE
30-RC-434
As noted at the outset, the following objections filed by
the Union to conduct affecting the results of election were
consolidated with the complaint cases herein for the
purpose of eliciting evidence pursuant to which the Board
may discharge its duties under Section 9(c) of the Act:
1. Since on or about April 20, 1966, the Employer
has promulgated and enforced invalid and
discriminatory no-solicitation rules.
2. Since on or about April 20, 1966, the Employer
has coercively interrogated employees concerning
their union preference and activities , and unlawfully
assisted , induced and encouraged employees to
repudiate their union designation.
3. Since on or about April 20, 1966, the Employer
has announced and granted wage increases to certain
and selected employees designed to reward anti-union
sympathizers and penalize union adherents.
4. On or about June 21, 1966, the Employer openly
promised to grant wage increases and "take care of"
the other problems if the employees rejected the
Union.
6. Since on or about April 20, and more
particularly on May 11 , the Employer discriminated
" According to Production Manager Tackes , he spoke to
Flikeid three times about her failure to catch errors while
proofreading Flikeid admitted that Tackes spoke to her once
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section IV,
above, occurring in connection with the Respondent's
operations described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate , and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and
the free flow of commerce.
VII. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom
and that it take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the Act.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record in the case, I
recommend that the Respondent, its officers , agents,
successors , and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Interrogating employees concerning their or other
employees ' membership in, or activities on behalf of,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 494, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization of its
about errors I credit Tackes ' testimony
" The credited testimony of Tackes and Warren Klemmick, his
assistant , who was assigned to data processing at that time
ASTRONAUTICS CORP. OF AMERICA
employees, in a manner constituting interference,
restraint, or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
(b) Threatening employees with reprisals and
retribution if the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local494, AFL-CIO or any other labor
organization of its employees, is selected as the collective-
bargaining representative of the employees.
(c) Soliciting employees to revoke authorizations given
to International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 494, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, or
suggesting that they draft or sign written revocations of
authorizations given to any union, or assisting in the
drafting of such revocations.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist any
labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain
from any and all such activities, except to the extent that
such right is affected by the proviso of Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act-
(a) Post at its Milwaukee, Wisconsin, plant copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix.""' Copies of said
notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for Region
30, after being duly signed by an authorized representative
of Respondent, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
said Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30, in
writing, within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision,
what steps have been taken to comply herewith .31)
I FURTHER RECOMMEND that the complaint herein be
dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
heretofore found.
I FURTHER RECOMMEND that Case 30-RC-434 be
severed from the consolidated complaint in Cases
30-CA-384 and 30-CA-397, and that Case 30-RC-434 be
remanded to the Regional Director for Region 30 for such
action as he may deem appropriate.' I
2" In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, the words "a Decision and Order" shall be substituted for
the words "the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner" in the
notice In the further event that the Board's Order is enforced by
a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the words "a Decree
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order" shall
be substituted for the words "a Decision and Order "
"' In the event that this Recommended Order is adopted by the
Board, this provision shall be modified to read "Notify the
Regional Director for Region 30, in writing, within 10 days from
the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to
comply herewith "
" Collins & Aikman Corp ,143 NLRB 15,16
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
637
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial
Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in
order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our
employees that:
WE WILL NOT interrogate employees concerning
their or other employees' membership in or activities
on behalf of International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization of our employees, in a manner
constituting interference, restraint , or coercion within
the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT threaten employees with reprisals
and retribution if the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization of our employees, is selected
as the collective-bargaining representative of the
employees.
WE WILL NOT solicit employees to revoke
authorizations given to International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 494, AFL-CIO, or any
other labor organization, or suggest that they draft or
sign written revocations of authorizations given to any
union, or assist in drafting of such revocations.
WE WILL -NOT in any like or related manner
interfere with, restrain , or coerce our employees in
the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist any labor organization, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all
such activities, except to the extent that such right is
affected by the proviso of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
All of our employees are free to become or remain, or to
refrain from becoming or remaining, members of the
above-named Union or any other labor organization.
ASTRONAUTICS
CORPORATION OF AMERICA
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative ) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
If employees have any question concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions, they may communicate
directly with the Board's Regional Office, Second Floor
Commerce Building, 744 North Fourth Street, Milwaukee,
Wisconsin 53203, Telephone 272-8600.