Arvinmeritor, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 24, 2003

340 N.L.R.B. 1035 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

ARVINMERITOR, INC. 1035
Arvinmeritor, Inc. and International Union, United
Automobile Aerospace & Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, Local No. 1037. Case
8–CA–33322–1
November 24, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On July 29, 2003, Administrative Law Judge David L.
Evans issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the General
Counsel filed limited exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified below.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Arvin-
meritor, Inc., Newark, Ohio, its officers, agents, succes-

1 We agree with the judge, for the reasons set forth in fn. 10 of his
decision, that under the Board’s decision in Postal Service, 302 NLRB
767 (1991), the 8(a)(5) complaint allegation is not appropriate for de-
ferral pursuant to Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971). In
declining to defer under Collyer, we also rely on American Commercial
Lines, 291 NLRB 1066, 1069 (1988), where the Board held, in perti-
nent part:
[W]hen as here, an allegation for which deferral is sought is inextrica-
bly related to other complaint allegations that are either inappropriate
for deferral or for which deferral is not sought, a party’s request for
deferral must be denied.
Here, we find that the 8(a)(5) allegation that the Respondent seeks to
defer is closely intertwined with the 8(a)(1) allegation that Maintenance
Manager Combs threatened employees with unspecified reprisals. The
Respondent did not request that the 8(a)(1) allegation be deferred.
Accordingly, since we are resolving the 8(a)(1) issue, “it makes no
economic sense to refrain from deciding [the] closely related [8(a)(5)]
issue.” Clarkson Industries, 312 NLRB 349, 352 (1993).
2 We find merit in the General Counsel’s limited exceptions to the
judge’s failure to include provisions in his affirmative Order and notice
that accord specifically with the 8(a)(5) violation found. Therefore, the
recommended Order and notice shall be modified to conform to the
8(a)(5) violation.
However, we reject the General Counsel’s limited exceptions to the
extent that she contends that the existing language in par. 2(a) of the
judge’s recommended Order should be retained and included in the
notice. Par. 2(a) contains a general bargaining order requiring the
Respondent to bargain with the Union with respect to all terms and
conditions of employment. It is not an appropriate remedy for the
Respondent’s specific unlawful unilateral action and, therefore, we
shall delete this aspect of the judge’s recommended Order.
sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the
Order as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a).
“(a) Restore its past practice of, and honor the parties’
collective-bargaining agreement that requires, meeting
with the Skilled Trades Committee for the purposes of
entertaining and processing the grievances of the skilled
trades employees.”
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AN AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.

FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO

Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT threaten you with unspecified reprisals
if you attempt to file or process grievances under the
collective-bargaining agreements existing between us
and International Union, United Automobile Aerospace
& Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local
No. 1037 (the Union).
WE WILL NOT unilaterally repudiate past practice or
collective-bargaining agreements existing between us
and the Union by refusing to meet with the Skilled
Trades Committee for the purposes of entertaining and
processing the grievances of our skilled trades employ-
ees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of rights
guaranteed to you by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.
WE WILL restore our past practice of, and honor our
collective-bargaining agreement that requires, meeting
with the Skilled Trades Committee for the purposes of
entertaining and processing the grievances of skilled
trades employees.

340 NLRB No. 124
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1036
ARVINMERITOR, INC.

Iva Y. Choe, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Charles C. Warner, Esq., of Columbus, Ohio, for the Respon-
dent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
DAVID L. EVANS, Administrative Law Judge. This case,
under the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), was tried
before me in Newark, Ohio, on May 29, 2003. On April 25,
2002,1 International Union, United Automobile Aerospace &
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local No. 1037
(the Union) filed the charge in Case 8–CA–33322–1 under
Section 10(b) of the Act alleging that Arvinmeritor, Inc. (the
Respondent) has engaged in unfair labor practices as set forth
in the Act. Upon an investigation of that charge, the General
Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the Respondent had
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by repudiating a
collective-bargaining agreement existing between itself and the
Union and further alleging that the Respondent had violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening employees with un-
specified reprisals if they attempted to invoke the agreement.
The Respondent duly filed an answer admitting that this matter
is properly before the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board), but denying the commission of any unfair labor prac-
tices.
Upon the testimony and exhibits entered at trial,2 and after
consideration of the briefs that have been filed, I make the fol-
lowing findings of fact3 and conclusions of law.
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS
As it admits, at all material times the Respondent, a corpora-
tion, has been engaged in the business of manufacturing auto-
motive parts at Newark, Ohio. Annually, in the course and con-
duct of that business operation, the Respondent purchases and
receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from sup-
pliers located at points located outside the State of Ohio. There-
fore, at all material times the Respondent has been an employer
that is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. As the Respondent further admits,
at all material times the Union has been a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
In 1953, International Union, United Automobile Aerospace
& Agricultural Implement Workers of America (the Interna-
tional) was certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates subsequently mentioned are in
2002.
2 Certain passages of the transcript have been electronically repro-
duced; some corrections to punctuation have been entered. Where I
quote a witness who restarts an answer, and that restarting is meaning-
less, I sometimes eliminate without ellipses words that have become
extraneous; e.g., “Doe said, I mean, he asked” becomes “Doe asked.”
3 There are no factual disputes in this case. (The testimony about an
alleged threat was not denied by the supervisor involved.)
representative of the production and maintenance employees of
the Respondent’s predecessor, Rockwell International. Since
that year, the Respondent (or its predecessor) and the Interna-
tional have been parties to successive collective-bargaining
agreements, the last of which has been (and continues to be, as
of the date of this decision) effective by its terms from July 19,
2000, to September 30, 2003 (the National Agreement). Article
5, “Representation,” section N-9, of the National Agreement
provides:

There shall be established in each plant a Shop Bargaining
Committee of not more than six (6) members, one of who
shall be designated as Chairman.

Immediately thereafter, section N-9a provides:

The matter of representation at each local plant in addition to
the Shop Bargaining Committee referred to above shall be set
forth in a Supplemental Agreement between the local Man-
agement and Local Union of each plant.

Section N-37 of the National Agreement provides:

In the event a dispute shall arise between the parties as to
whether the National Agreement or Local Supplementary
Agreement thereto is applicable or covering in any given
situation, the National Agreement shall be prevailing and con-
trolling.

Article 6 of the National Agreement, “Grievance Procedure and
Arbitration,” provides a 4-step grievance procedure and binding
arbitration.
Also since 1953, the Respondent (or its predecessor), the Un-
ion, and the International have been parties to successive local
agreements (each called a Supplementary Agreement), the last of
which has been (and continues to be, as of the date of this deci-
sion) effective by its terms also from July 19, 2000, until Sep-
tember 30, 2003. Article 3, “Representation,” section S-5, of
the 2000 Supplementary Agreement provides:

The employees covered by this Supplementary Agreement
shall be represented by a union bargaining committee of not
more than five members, one of whom shall be designated as
chairman, all of whom shall be employees of the Plant and
may be selected in any manner determined by the Union.

Since at least 1958, portions of the supplementary agreements
have specifically applied to the Respondent’s employees who
work in its tool and dye and maintenance departments. The
employees of these two departments have been referred to in
the supplementary agreements as the Respondent’s “skilled
trades employees.” Under the supplementary agreements, the
skilled trades employees have been represented for certain mat-
ters by a “Skilled Trades Committee.” Section 22 of the 2000
Supplementary Agreement provides:

The Company and Skilled Trades Committee shall meet twice
each month for the purpose of settling grievances. Such meet-
ings will be held on the second and fourth Thursdays of each
month.

These provisions have appeared, unchanged, in the successive
contracts for a great number of years.
ARVINMERITOR, INC. 1037
From at least 1974 until the events of this case, the practice
had been for the Skilled Trades Committee to represent em-
ployees when their grievances reach the third step of the 4-step
grievance procedure. Before the third step, the Shop Bargaining
Committee processed the grievances of the skilled trades em-
ployees, as well as the grievances of all other employees. The
Shop Bargaining Committee, plus the International’s regional
and national appointees, represented (and do represent) all em-
ployees, including the skilled trades employees, at the fourth
step (which was, and is, a joint plant review board). The 2000
Supplementary Agreement provides that all grievances that are
being processed by the Shop Bargaining Committee are heard
on the first and third Thursdays of each month.
The Respondent also operates a manufacturing facility in
Oshkosh, Wisconsin. The International, the Respondent, and
the Oshkosh local union have also historically negotiated local
agreements covering that facility. At Oshkosh, however, the
Respondent has never agreed to deal with any form of a skilled
trades committee in addition to the local Shop Bargaining
Committee. During the 2000 combined national and local nego-
tiations, the International and the Oshkosh local proposed crea-
tion of a skilled trades committee for Oshkosh, but the Respon-
dent rejected that proposal. In fact, the Respondent counterpro-
posed that the Skilled Trades Committee be abolished in New-
ark. The International and the Union did not agree. Therefore,
no changes in the historic bargaining structures at either Osh-
kosh or Newark were agreed on during the 2000 negotiations.
After the 2000 negotiations were completed, and after the
Union had voted to ratify both the local and national agree-
ments, the Union also went through the motions of conducting
a separate “ratification” vote among the skilled trades employ-
ees on the terms of the local agreement that applied only to
them. The skilled trades employees voted negatively, but the
Respondent ignored that vote as meaningless because the
skilled trades employees did not constitute a separate bargain-
ing unit. Thereafter, without objection by the Union or the In-
ternational, the Respondent implemented the 2000 national and
local agreements as they had been ratified by the Union as a
whole.
B. The Instant Case
The General Counsel’s evidence
By letter to Union President Gary Brehm, dated August 31,
2001, Joe Mainor, the Respondent’s director of human re-
sources for the United States, Canada, and Europe, notified the
Union:

Over the years, the Company has permitted the UAW
Local 1037 to negotiate local issues with two separate
Bargaining Committees. These two Committees have con-
sisted of a Production Committee with three (3) members
plus the UAW 1037 President and Secretary as well as a
Skilled Trades Committee consisting of three (3) members
plus the UAW 1037 President and Secretary.
Using this process has presented its challenges but es-
pecially so during the 2000 UAW contract negotiations
when it caused both sides difficulties in scheduling and
continuing negotiation sessions. It also contributed to rati-
fication issues for the parties after our negotiation process
concluded.
As a result, the Company will be eliminating [the] past
practice and reverting to our UAW Local 1037 contract
language to negotiate with one Committee. As referenced
under S-5, it states, in part, that “employees covered by
this Supplementary Agreement shall be represented by a
Union Bargaining Committee of not more than five (5)
members.”
The Company is notifying you now of our reverting to
S-5 language so the UAW will have plenty of time to
make appropriate arrangements prior to our next negotia-
tions as well as to help ensure a timely transition on other
Bargaining Committee interactions.

Mainor sent an essentially identical letter to Terry Bolte, repre-
sentative of the International, on September 7, 2001. By letters
dated September 5 and 20, 1991, respectively, Brehm and Bolte
replied that Mainor was misinterpreting the contracts between
the parties and ignoring provisions that specifically referred to
the Skilled Trades Committee.
The Respondent’s position as expressed in Mainor’s 2001
letter did not affect the processing of grievances until April 11,
2002. On that date, which was the second Thursday of the
month, the Skilled Trades Committee attempted to meet with
James Schreiber, the Respondent’s labor relations specialist, for
a regularly scheduled third step meeting. Schreiber met the
group by stating that “this is not the committee that I met with
before,” referring to the Shop Bargaining Committee with
which he had met on the first Thursday of the month. Schreiber
refused to meet with the Skilled Trades Committee on April 11,
and the Respondent has since refused to meet with the Skilled
Trades Committee for any purpose, although there are many
third step grievances of skilled trades employees that are pend-
ing.
On April 16, the Skilled Trades Committee attempted to
meet with Paul Combs, the Respondent’s maintenance area
manager who is an admitted supervisor within Section 2(11).
According to employee Ronald Barber, Combs told the mem-
bers of the Skilled Trades Committee that they no longer repre-
sented any employees and that if they made any further at-
tempts to meet with the Respondent he would take “appropriate
action.” Combs did not deny this testimony; Combs testified
only that he could not remember making the “appropriate ac-
tion” statement to the committee.
Based on this evidence, the complaint alleges that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) because Combs threatened
members of the Skilled Trades Committee with unspecified
reprisals if they attempted to represent skilled trades employ-
ees, and the complaint further alleges that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) because it unilaterally repudiated the 2000
Supplementary Agreement as it applies to the skilled trades
employees.
The Respondent’s defense
The Respondent called Fred Paul who was employed by the
Respondent from 1966 until he retired as plant manager on
February 28, 2002. Paul described various economic inefficien-
cies that were entailed in the Respondent’s recognizing the
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1038
Skilled Trades Committee in addition to the Shop Bargaining
Committee,4 but on cross-examination he agreed that the Re-
spondent had recognized and dealt with the Skilled Trades
Committee for third step grievance proceedings from at least
1974 until the date of his retirement.
Schreiber testified that since 2001 the skilled trades employ-
ees have filed many grievances claiming jurisdiction of work
that had been performed by other employees at the Newark
facility. Schreiber testified that he has, since April 11, offered
to entertain grievances that have been filed by skilled trades
employees, and even offered to move them directly to the
fourth step from the second, but only if those grievances are
processed by the Shop Bargaining Committee. Schreiber testi-
fied that the Shop Bargaining Committee has refused his offers
on the grounds that the grievances “belong to [the Skilled
Trades Committee] and it wasn’t theirs to hear.” The Shop
Bargaining Committee did once serve notice that it would take
a skilled trades grievance directly to the fourth step, but it
thereafter withdrew that notice. That one grievance complained
about the Respondent’s refusal to recognize the Skilled Trades
Committee on and after April 11. The Respondent’s reply to the
grievance was:

The Union had been notified on several previous occasions
the Company only recognizes one committee. The group of
people on 4–11–02 were not the same as the committee which
the Company met with on 4–4–02. Mr. Schreiber did not re-
fuse to hear the grievances but was waiting to have a meeting
with the committee which [he] had met on 4–4–02.

Schreiber testified that the prior notifications to which the
Respondent referred in this answer were Mainor’s letter of
August 31, 2001, and a similar oral statement that Schreiber
had made to the Union in December 2001.
On cross-examination, Schreiber was asked and he testified:

Q. It is true, is it not, that you have refused to meet
with the Skilled Trades Committee?
A. Yes ma’am.
Q. It is also true that you did not bargain over this
change with the Union. Is that right?
A. The Union was notified by a letter, yes.
Q. Did you bargain with the Union?
A. No. I saw no reason to bargain with the Union over
that.

Mainor testified to certain difficulties that had ensued when
the Union conducted a separate “ratification” vote among the
skilled trades employees after the 2000 negotiations. Mainor
further testified that the Respondent notified the Union and the
International in 2001 that it would cease dealing separately with
the Skilled Trades Committee because “the Company was con-
cerned that there was an enormous amount of internal turmoil
that was going on within the Union and that the Skilled Trades
Committee was just kind of in chaos.”
Mainor further testified that the Skilled Trades Committee
had lately become more difficult to deal with than it had been
in the past and that: “This is a completely different environment

4 Certain errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected.
now than what has happened in years past with Skilled Trades.”
Mainor further testified that the difficulties in dealing with the
Skilled Trades Committee had injured the Respondent’s com-
petitive position in the marketplace because “you have to move
at the speed of light in making decisions or your competition is
just going to overtake you.” Mainor concluded:

The thing about the stuff from the Skilled Trades that
was very concerning, is it’s almost like the processes, and
thought processes, were frozen in time. That they never
evolved into the ongoing, improved technology [and the]
need to speed up with business and improvement, to be
flexible as you would go along.
And it was to the point where the business conditions
simply would not allow us to keep going down that road.
So we felt that we needed to go ahead and take action.
Give the Union notice on that, and communicate to them,
which took place in August [2001].

Mainor, as well as Schreiber, testified that, after the Respon-
dent notified the Union that it would no longer meet with the
Skilled Trades Committee, it offered to move all skilled trades
employees’ grievances directly from the second to the fourth
step. When he did so, I was constrained to ask:

JUDGE EVANS: Would the Skilled Trades Commit-
tee be participating in that fourth step?
THE WITNESS: The normal participants for the PRB
[Plant Review Board; i.e., the fourth step] would not in-
clude the Skilled Trades Committee.[5]
JUDGE EVANS: Next question.

At a later point, Mainor added that, under the Respondent’s
offer to send skilled trades employees’ grievances directly to
the fourth step, members of the Skilled Trades Committee
would still be permitted to assist other Union representatives
“as experts.” Mainor acknowledged that the Respondent had
historically recognized the Skilled Trades Committee for vari-
ous purposes, and he acknowledged that the Skilled Trades
Committee is specifically mentioned several times in the Sup-
plementary Agreement, but he testified:

It is true that various sections that had been mentioned here
today, do in fact reference the Skilled Trades Committee. The
problem on that is, the Company’s interpretation of that lan-
guage is that [that] is simply a documentation point, docu-
menting the past practice that we have with Skilled Trades,
and that that language works in conjunction with S-5 [of the
Supplementary Agreement] and [N]-9 [of the National
Agreement]; hence, the differences over the interpretation of
contractual language.

Upon presentation of this testimony, the Respondent rested.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
In essence, the Respondent imposed unilaterally in April
2002 what it had failed to secure during the 2000 negotiations,
a bargaining structure that did not include the Skilled Trades
Committee.
5 The transcript is corrected where, at various points, it states “PRV”
rather than “PRB.”
ARVINMERITOR, INC. 1039
The duty “to bargain collectively” that is enjoined by Section
8(a)(5) is defined by Section 8(d) of the Act as the duty to
“meet . . . and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment.” Unilateral
action is the antithesis of 8(d) responsibilities. As clearly stated
by the Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747
(1962), a case in which the employer unilaterally changed past
practices regarding sick leave and wages during contract nego-
tiations:

Unilateral action by an employer without prior discussion
with the union does amount to a refusal to negotiate about the
affected conditions of employment under negotiation, and
must of necessity obstruct bargaining, contrary to the congres-
sional policy. It will often disclose an unwillingness to agree
with the union. It will rarely be justified by any reason of sub-
stance. It follows that the Board may hold such unilateral ac-
tion to be an unfair labor practice in violation of § 8(a)(5),
without also finding the employer guilty of over-all subjective
bad faith.

It is axiomatic that union representation is a term or condition
of employment under Section 8(d), and Schreiber admitted that
the Respondent did not bargain with the Union before April 11
when it took its unilateral action of repudiating its past prac-
tices, as well as repudiating its commitments under section S-
22 to meet with the Skilled Trades Committee (specifically, on
the second and fourth Thursdays of each month) for the pur-
pose of processing grievances. When the Respondent took this
unilateral action, unlike the case in Katz, negotiations were not
even in progress because the relevant contractual agreements
had not (and still have not) expired. Therefore, if anything, the
Respondent is in a poorer legal position that the employer in
Katz.
Moreover, unilateral elimination of a past practice is an
equally clear violation of the Act, even if the practice has not
been embodied in a term of a collective-bargaining agreement
such as section S-22 of the Supplementary Agreement. The
Board so held as recently as May 16, 2003, in Verizon New
York, Inc., 339 NLRB 30 (2003) (elimination of a historic past
practice of allowing employees time off to donate blood, al-
though not mentioned in the parties’ existing contract, violated
Section 8(a)(5)). Therefore, under Katz and many other cases,6
neither the “chaos” in the Union that Mainor perceived nor the
business inefficiencies that Mainor and Schreiber described
gave the Respondent the right unilaterally to extinguish the past
practice of meeting with the Skilled Trades Committee for the
purposes of processing grievances at the third step of the pro-
cedure.7

6 See, for example, the many cases cited by the Board in Verizon
New York, supra.
7 After the contract between the parties expires, the Respondent’s ar-
guments about economic efficiency will be appropriate to support bar-
gaining demands that the longstanding arrangements between the par-
ties be modified, but the premises of those arguments are not lawful
considerations under Sec. 8(a)(5); specifically, they are not a defense
for violating that section of the Act. Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207
NLRB 1063 (1973), enfd. 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied
On brief, the Respondent contends that section N-9 of the
National Agreement “authorizes only one [grievance] commit-
tee.” The Respondent further contends that two committees
cannot contractually exist because section N-37 of the National
Agreement provides that in cases of conflict the National
Agreement is controlling over the Supplementary Agreement.
The Respondent contends that section N-37 therefore voids and
makes inoperable any local agreements or past practices that
would otherwise require the Respondent to meet with any
grievance committee other than the Shop Bargaining Commit-
tee.
Assuming that there is a conflict between the national and
local agreements, the past practice of meeting with the Skilled
Trades Committee has existed for over 45 years, and the Re-
spondent cites no Board or court authority that would permit it
to unilaterally abrogate such a practice during a contract’s
term.8 Moreover, there is no such conflict. Section N-9 of the
National Agreement, where it requires establishment of “a”
Shop Bargaining Committee at each plant does not prohibit the
creation of additional grievance committees at those plants.
And section N-9a of the National Agreement specifically pro-
vides:

The matter of representation at each local plant in addition to
the Shop Bargaining Committee referred to above shall be set
forth in a Supplemental Agreement between the local Man-
agement and Local Union of each plant. (Emphasis supplied.)

Therefore, not only does the National Agreement not pro-
hibit the establishment of local grievance committees in addi-
tion to the Shop Bargaining Committee, it specifically allows
for such committees.9 In summary, I find the Respondent’s
defenses unavailing. Accordingly, I conclude that, since on and
after April 11, 2002, the Respondent has violated Section
8(a)(5) by unilaterally repudiating its obligations to meet with
the Skilled Trades Committee for the purposes of entertaining
and processing grievances.10 I further find and conclude that
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) when Combs, on April
16, threatened Barber and other employees with unspecified
reprisals if they continued to attempt to assert their Section 7
right to file and process grievances under the existing collec-
tive-bargaining agreements.

423 U.S. 826 (1975) (dire economic constraints did not excuse unilat-
eral reduction of contractually required benefits).
8 As well, the arbitration decisions that the Respondent proffers on
brief involve cases where there was no apparent issue of a past practice,
or no past practice was proven, or a new contract had altered a past
practice, or the past practice violated a clear contractual mandate.
9 The Respondent called its chief 2000 negotiator to give his inter-
pretation of sec. N-9a. That interpretation, on which the Respondent
relies on brief, was entirely self-serving and, at any rate, hardly has the
force of law.
10 Because the Respondent’s repudiation of its obligations to con-
tinue to meet with the Skilled Trades Committee represents a rejection
of the collective-bargaining principles of Sec. 8(d), deferral to the con-
tractual grievance and arbitration process under Collyer Insulated Wire,
192 NLRB 837 (1971), is not, as the Respondent further argues, appro-
priate. See Postal Service, 302 NLRB 767 (1991) (deferral inappropri-
ate where employer denies being bound by contractual agreement).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1040
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law, and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended11
ORDER
The Respondent, Arvinmeritor, Inc., Newark, Ohio, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening employees with unspecified reprisals if they
attempt to file or process grievances under the collective-
bargaining agreements existing between the Respondent and
International Union, United Automobile Aerospace & Agricul-
tural Implement Workers of America, Local No. 1037 (the Un-
ion).
(b) Unilaterally repudiating past practices or collective-
bargaining agreements existing between the Respondent and the
Union by refusing to meet the Skilled Trades Committee for the
purposes of entertaining and processing the grievances of the
Respondent’s skilled trades employees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions necessary to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain collectively with the Union as the ex-
clusive representative of all employees in the following appropri-
ate unit with regard to rates of pay, hours of employment, and
other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understand-
ing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agree-
ment:

11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.

All production and maintenance employees set forth in Arti-
cle I–Recognition, N-1 through N-3, as listed and described
in Appendix A of the National Collective Bargaining
Agreement which is effective by its terms from July 19,
2000 to September 30, 2003.

(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Newark, Ohio facility copies of the attached notice marked “Ap-
pendix.”12 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 8, after being signed by the Respon-
dent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respon-
dent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, dur-
ing the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone
out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceed-
ings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense,
a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ-
ees employed by the Respondent at any time since April 11,
2002, the approximate date of the first unfair labor practice found
herein.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.

12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”