Allied Mechanical, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 19, 2004

343 N.L.R.B. 631 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

ALLIED MECHANICAL, INC.
343 NLRB No. 74
631
Allied Mechanical, Inc. and United Steelworkers of
America, AFL–CIO–CLC. Cases 31–CA–26120,
31–CA–26135, 31–CA–26184, 31–CA–26194, 31–
CA–26276, and 31–RC–8202
November 19, 2004
DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION
OF SECOND ELECTION
BY MEMBERS SCHAUMBER, WALSH, AND MEISBURG
On December 19, 2003, Administrative Law Judge
Lana H. Parke issued the attached decision.1 The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The
General Counsel and Charging Party each filed an an-
swering brief, and the Respondent filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions2 and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,3 and conclusions as
modified below and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified below.4
These combined representation and unfair labor prac-
tice cases arise in the context of an election conducted in
a bargaining unit of production, maintenance, shipping
and receiving, and programmer employees at the Re-
spondent’s Ontario, California facility on March 6. The
Union lost the election and thereafter filed election ob-
jections and several unfair labor practice charges regard-

1 All dates refer to 2003 unless otherwise indicated.
2 No exceptions were filed to the judge’s dismissal of the 8(a)(3) and
(1) allegations regarding employee Marcello Pinheiro’s postelection
performance review, reduction of hours, and selection for lay off.
There were also no exceptions filed to the judge’s finding that the Re-
spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) by issuing written discipline to
Pinheiro on March 25. Likewise, there were no exceptions filed to the
judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act
when, after the election, it ascribed its preelection reduction in employ-
ees’ hours to retaliation for employees’ union activity.
On November 4, 2004, the Respondent withdrew its exception to the
judge’s finding that it violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) by disciplining and
discharging employee Walter Reddoch. The Respondent also filed a
motion to reopen the record or for special leave to file a supplemental
brief on the propriety of a Gissel bargaining order in light of changed
circumstances. The General Counsel and the Charging Party opposed
the motion. Given our disposition of the Gissel issue herein, we deny
as moot the Respondent’s motion.
3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
4 We have also substituted a new notice to conform it to the language
of the recommended Order.
ing the Respondent’s conduct before, during, and after
the election.
The judge found that the Respondent committed sev-
eral unfair labor practices and recommended sustaining
three of the Union’s election objections and overruling
three others.5 The judge further found that the Respon-
dent’s unlawful and objectionable conduct impeded the
election process and prevented the possibility of ensuring
a fair rerun election. The judge recommended ordering
the Respondent to bargain with the Union pursuant to
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). As
set forth below, we affirm the judge’s unfair labor prac-
tice findings and sustain the Union’s Objection 9 regard-
ing the Respondent’s enforcement of its posting policy
during the critical period. We further find, however, that
the coercive effects of the Respondent’s unlawful con-
duct can be satisfactorily mitigated, and a fair rerun elec-
tion ensured, by the use of the Board’s traditional reme-
dies. We accordingly reverse the judge’s finding that a
Gissel bargaining order is warranted. We instead direct a
second election.
1. We find, for the reasons set forth in the judge’s de-
cision, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and
(1) by disciplining and discharging employee Timothy
Hays on January 23, and by issuing a reprimand to em-
ployee Marcello Pinheiro on January 31. We also agree
with the judge that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) by threatening employee Pablo Rodriguez after
the election with unspecified reprisals.
In addition, we agree with the judge that the Respon-
dent’s discriminatory enforcement of its posting policy
during the critical period not only violated Section
8(a)(1) but also interfered with employee free choice. As
more fully set forth in the judge’s decision, the Respon-
dent permitted posting of nonwork-related notices at a
tool crib and on restroom walls. The Respondent, how-
ever, removed union literature posted in these same loca-
tions. By removing union literature from employee post-
ing areas in its facility while permitting other nonwork-
related notices to remain, the Respondent violated the
Act. Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 332 NLRB 565 (2000). In
addition, by removing union literature during the critical
period, the Respondent denied its employees access to an
important medium of communication during the cam-

5 The judge recommended sustaining the Union’s Objection 2 re-
garding Supervisor Cliff Conley’s conduct on election day, which
allegedly created an impression of surveillance, the Union’s Objection
5 concerning the Respondent’s reprimand of employee Pinheiro during
the critical period, and the Union’s Objection 9 concerning the Respon-
dent’s enforcement of its posting policy during the first few weeks of
the critical period. In the absence of exceptions, we adopt pro forma
the judge’s recommendations to overrule the Union’s Objections 1, 3,
and 4.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD632
paign. For this reason, the Respondent’s discriminatory
enforcement of its posting policy is objectionable and
warrants setting aside the election. Waste Management,
Inc., 330 NLRB 634 fn. 2, 635, and 636 (2000); Ford
Motor Co., 315 NLRB 609, 615 (1994). Accordingly,
we sustain the Union’s Objection 9. In light of this rul-
ing, we find it unnecessary to pass on the Union’s Objec-
tions 2 and 5.6
2. Under the circumstances of this case, we find, con-
trary to the judge, that a Gissel bargaining order is not
necessary. We find that the Board’s traditional cease-
and-desist and other affirmative remedies including post-
ing of a notice will sufficiently address the Respondent’s
misconduct to ensure that a fair rerun election can be
held, and that these remedies and the holding of a rerun
election will satisfactorily protect and restore employees’
Section 7 rights.

6 Unlike his colleagues, Member Schaumber would overrule the Un-
ion’s Objection 9 and, further, would reach and overrule the Union’s
Objections 2 and 5.
Objection 2 alleges that Supervisor Conley’s continued presence
where employees exited the Respondent’s facility on their way to the
polling place on the day of the election created an impression of sur-
veillance and interfered with employee free choice. In Member
Schaumber’s view, Supervisor Conley’s conduct on election day did
not create an impression of surveillance. Member Schaumber notes
that Conley was never closer than 150 feet to the polling location and
there was no evidence that any employee had to pass by Conley in
order to reach the polling place. For these reasons, Member Schaumber
would overrule Objection 2.
Objection 5 alleges that the Respondent’s unlawful reprimand of
employee Pinheiro during the critical period interfered with employee
free choice. Although Member Schaumber agrees with his colleagues
that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(3) and (1) by reprimanding
employee Pinheiro during the critical period, he is of the view that
Pinheiro’s reprimand would not reasonably tend to interfere with em-
ployee free choice because it was not widely disseminated among unit
employees. Therefore, Member Schaumber would overrule Objection
5.
Objection 9 alleges that the Respondent discriminatorily enforced its
posting policy during the critical period by removing union literature
from posting places where nonwork-related notices were allowed to
remain. This conduct was also alleged in the complaint as an unfair
labor practice. Member Schaumber would find that the Respondent’s
removal of pro and antiunion fliers from the restroom and tool crib
walls where other nonwork-related notices were posted during the first
2 weeks of the critical period was not a violation of the Act nor was it
objectionable. He notes that throughout the critical period employees
could post any flier, regardless of its content, on a bulletin board in the
employee breakroom and the Respondent did not disturb these postings.
Moreover, for approximately 5 weeks before the election, the Respon-
dent allowed all campaign related literature, regardless of its content, as
well as nonwork-related notices, to remain posted in its facility. In
these circumstances, Member Schaumber would find that the Respon-
dent’s enforcement of its posting policy would not reasonably tend to
interfere with employees’ ability to communicate among themselves
about unionization nor interfere with employee free choice; accord-
ingly, he would dismiss this complaint allegation and overrule Objec-
tion 9.
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by:
(a) Discriminatorily issuing written disciplinary no-
tices to Timothy Hays and Walter Reddoch on January
23, 2003.
(b) Discriminatorily discharging Timothy Hays and
Walter Reddoch on January 23, 2003.
(c) Discriminatorily disciplining Marcelo Pinheiro on
January 31 and March 25, 2003.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by:
(a) Impliedly and coercively telling an employee that
Respondent had retaliated against employees by reducing
employees’ hours.
(b) Threatening an employee with unspecified reprisals
by telling him he would lose by supporting the Union.
(c) Discriminatorily prohibiting the posting of union
literature.
3. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. Respondent did not engage in any unfair labor prac-
tices other than those found above.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Allied Mechanical, Inc., Ontario, California,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Order as modified below.
1. Delete paragraph 2(a) and reletter the subsequent
paragraphs.
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held on
March 6, 2003, in Case 31–RC–8202 is set aside and that
the case is remanded to the Regional Director for Region
31 for the purpose of conducting a new election.
[Direction of Second Election omitted from publication.]
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
ALLIED MECHANICAL, INC. 633
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate
against any of you for supporting the United Steelwork-
ers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC or any other labor or-
ganization.
WE WILL NOT discipline or otherwise discriminate
against any of you for supporting the Union or any other
labor organization.
WE WILL NOT discriminatorily prevent you from post-
ing union literature.
WE WILL NOT tell any of you that we have retaliated
against you for your support of the Union.
WE WILL NOT threaten any employee that he will lose
by supporting the Union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, offer Timothy Hays and Walter Reddoch full re-
instatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to a substantially equivalent position, with-
out prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Timothy Hays and Walter Reddoch
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered
as a result of the discrimination against them, less any
net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of Board’s Or-
der, remove from our files any reference to the unlawful
discipline and discharges of Timothy Hays and Walter
Reddoch, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify
them in writing that this has been done and that the dis-
cipline and discharges will not be used against them in
any way.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful discipline of Marcelo Pinheiro, and WE WILL, within 3
days thereafter, notify him in writing that this has been
done and that the discipline will not be used against him
in any way.
ALLIED MECHANICAL, INC.
Michelle Youtz Scannell and Christy Kwon, Attys., for the Gen-
eral Counsel.
Steven D. Atkinson, Atty. (Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud &
Romo), of Los Angeles, California, for the Respondent.
Robert J. Stock, Atty. (Gilbert & Sackman), of Los Angeles,
California, for the Charging Party.
DECISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON OBJECTIONS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LANA H. PARKE, Administrative Law Judge. This consoli-
dated case was tried in Los Angeles, California, on September
8–12, 2003,1 pursuant to a consolidated complaint and notice of
hearing in Cases 31–CA–26120, 31–CA–26135, 31–CA–
26184, 31–CA–26194, and 31–CA–26276 and Report on Ob-
jections in Case 31–RC–8202, order directing hearing, notice of
hearing, and order consolidating cases issued by the Regional
Director for Region 31 of the National Labor Relations Board
(Region 21) on June 26 and August 21, respectively. The con-
solidated complaint is based on charges filed by United Steel-
workers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC (the Union or Petitioner)
against Allied Mechanical, Inc. (Respondent).
The consolidated complaint alleges Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the
Act) by discharging employees Walter Reddoch and Timothy
Hays (Reddoch and Hays, respectively), by disciplining em-
ployee Marcelo Pinheiro (Pinheiro), by giving Pinheiro an un-
favorable performance ranking in “attitude,” by reducing Pin-
heiro’s working hours, by selecting Pinheiro for layoff, and by
undertaking these actions because said employees had engaged
in union and other protected concerted activities and to discour-
age employees from engaging in such activities.
The consolidated complaint further alleges Respondent inde-
pendently violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening an
employee with retaliation because of his union activities and by
promulgating and enforcing an ad hoc rule prohibiting union
literature posting, and thereby interfering with, restraining, and
coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
As remedy for the above alleged unfair labor practices, the
General Counsel seeks an order requiring Respondent to bar-
gain with the Union (Gissel remedy).2
On March 13, the Petitioner filed Objections 1 through 10 to
the representation election conducted March 6. The Petitioner
thereafter withdrew Objections 7 and 8. In its posthearing
brief, the Petitioner withdrew Objections 6 and 10, modified
Objection 1 to eliminate Jose L. Rodriguez from the objection,
and modified Objection 3 to eliminate all allegations except
with respect to Frederico Hernandez’s raise. The remaining
objections allege the Employer engaged in certain conduct
during the critical laboratory period that interfered with the
election. Objections 4, 5, and 9 correlate to allegations of the
complaint, while Objections 1, 2, and 3 concern independent
allegations of the Employer’s misconduct.
Issues
1. Did Respondent violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act
by the following conduct:
(a) On January 23, terminating Reddoch and Hays.
(b) On January 31, disciplining Pinheiro?

1 All dates are in 2003 unless otherwise indicated.
2 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD634
(c) In February, issuing Pinheiro a performance review with
a low ranking in “attitude?”
(d) On March 6, reducing the working hours of Pinheiro?
(e) On March 25, issuing a written discipline to Pinheiro?
(f) On April 8, selecting Pinheiro for lay-off?
2. Did Respondent independently violate Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act by the following conduct:
(a) On January 28, promulgating and enforcing an ad hoc
rule prohibiting posting of union literature?
(b) In March, threatening an employee with unspecified re-
taliation because of union activities?
(c) In March, enforcing an ad hoc rule prohibiting posting of
union literature?
3. Did Respondent engage in conduct as alleged above
and/or other conduct alleged in the Union’s Objections 1, 2,
and 3 so as to interfere with the election herein?
On the entire record,3 including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel, Respondent, and the Charging Party, I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent, a California corporation, with a facility in On-
tario, California (the facility), manufactures machine parts.4
During the calendar year preceding the complaint, a representa-
tive period, Respondent purchased and received at its facility
goods, supplies, and materials valued in excess of $50,000
directly from suppliers located outside the State of California.
Respondent admitted and I find it to be an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act and the Union to be a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.5
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Alleged Violations of Section 8(a)(3)
1. The discipline and termination of Hays
Employed by Respondent from February 19, 2001, to Janu-
ary 23, 2002, Hays contacted the Union in December 2002,
arranged and attended union meetings with other employees on
January 7, 14 and 16, and became a member of the employee
organizing committee. On January 20, Hays discussed the
upcoming January 23 union meeting with 10 to 15 employees
and continued to discuss it with employees in the days follow-
ing. Some of the discussions took place near Hays’ work area

3 The record includes two post-hearing documents, Respondent’s
Exhs. 24 and 25: requests to proceed filed with the Board by the Union
in Case 31–RC–8202 on January 28 and February 7, respectively.
4 Respondent is a “job shop” as distinguished from a “production
shop,” manufacturing individual or custom work rather than large quan-
tity runs.
5 Where not otherwise noted, the findings herein are based on the
pleadings, the stipulations of counsel, and/or unchallenged credible
evidence.
where Miguel Sedano, who on one occasion told Hays and a
coworker to get back to their work areas, could observe him.6
On January 23, Slater informed Bechtol of his decision to
terminate Hays. On that same day, Hays was called to Bech-
tol’s office after lunch. Miguel Sedano and Bechtol were pre-
sent. Miguel Sedano gave Hays a disciplinary action notice
dated January 22, which read, in pertinent part:
This disciplinary action is for the following reasons:
1) Excessive Discrepancies (see attached DR’s, refer-
ence documented verbal warnings).
2) Excessive talking & not paying attention to job.7
3) Work area not being kept clean.8
Hays asked to see the discrepancy reports referred to, and
Bechtol [gave] him five discrepancy reports numbered, dated,
and described as follows:
Discrepancy Report Stated cause and corrective action (CA)
no. and date _______________________________
No. 6567-1/14/2002 . . . broken insert while roughing the
bores . . . setting boring bar incorrectly
. . . boring bar insert coming lose [sic]
while machining. CA: Operators in-
structed to inspect that the tools are
sharp and tight prior to running the
part, check more often to help reduce
this type of problem.9
No. 6579-1/26/2002 Drill pushed in the holder, making
hole shallow for the boring end mill.
Which caused the boring end mill to
hit the bottom of the hole making the
hole oversize. CA: Operator in-
structed to use end mill holder in place
of collect holder to insure that the set
screws will prevent to[ol] from mov-
ing. [Handwritten on the bottom of
the DR]: Operator was told he needed
to pay more attention when he is set-
ting up.10
No. 6646-5/11/2002 Heading on program, specified 1/2
thick cutter. Program was changed to
use 3/8 thick cutter. Operator used 1/2

6 It is not unusual for Miguel Sedano to tell employees to stop talk-
ing and return to work. In the past, Miguel Sedano has interrupted
conversations Hays had with coworkers to tell them to return to work.
There is insufficient evidence for me to infer that Miguel Sedano knew
Hays was discussing union matters with coworkers in January, but it is
clear that Miguel Sedano knew Hays was talking to coworkers more
than usual.
7 While Hays had been told on occasion that he was talking too
much, he had never been warned about it.
8 Hays credibly denied this accusation; Respondent had never
warned him of such a problem.
9 Hays told Bechtol Larry Owens had done that part. L. Owens was
also listed as operator on this DR.
10 Hays did not recall ever being so warned. Miguel Sedano admit-
ted adding the comment in January (presumably January 23 when he
added comments to the other DRs). The part was salvaged. I conclude
Miguel Sedano did not warn Hays.
ALLIED MECHANICAL, INC. 635
cutter which caused miscut. CA:
Heading on program has been changed
to reflect correct thickness of 3/8 thick.
No. 6679-7/8/2002 Twin bore was not setup correctly
when switching from 1 setup for
roughing 8.800 to finish setup for
roughing 8421. CA: check and double
check tools when changing over setup.
More tools may be needed in the shop
to accommodate multiple setups. This
may not have happened if there were
two boring bars setup for operations
that were already running. [Handwrit-
ten on the bottom of the DR]: Opera-
tor was told that a machinist should be
able to adjust the same boring head for
different diameter as needed. But
needed to check his work.11
No. 6714-8/16/2002 Twin bore was set incorrectly by tool
crib and was not rechecked by machin-
ist before running tool. (roughing bor-
ing bar). CA: Boring bars are to be set
by machinists not tool crib. [Hand-
written on the bottom of the DR]:
Machinist was warn[ed] about this
problem before. And was told that we
couldn’t afford to make the same type
of mistake twice.12
No. 6721-9/17/2002 Item #1 Misinterpret program call-cut
of rotation per section. (2) Operator
made a program change. From center
drill to 90° spot drill and forgot to
change Z depth. CA: Item #1 visually
double check section pinned at plate to
program call-out to print specs. (2)
Program has been corrected to the cor-
rect Z value or depth. [Handwritten on
the bottom of the DR]: Tim Hay was
told to think about the differences be-
tween a center drill to a 90° spot drill
and check distance to go on the screen
display.13
Hays asked why he was receiving disciplinary action for
things that had happened months ago. Bechtol said Hays’ mis-
takes had cost the company considerable money, referring to
DR 6679 (the AKT part), in which Respondent set its cost at

11 Sedano admitted adding the handwritten comment to the bottom of
this discrepancy report on January 23. Slater testified that after trying
for months to save the part, Respondent considered it unsalvageable in
mid-January.
12 Hays credibly denied he was ever so warned. Sedano admitted
adding the handwritten comment to the bottom of this discrepancy
report on January 23.
13 Employee Pablo Rodriguez had run the part incorrectly before it
came to Hays, but welding repaired his error. Hays mistakenly over-
sized the counter sink, and welding also repaired it. Hays then satisfac-
torily remachined the part. Sedano admitted adding the handwritten
comment to the bottom of this discrepancy report on January 23.
$29,589.14 Hays accused Bechtol of firing him because he was
organizing a union. Bechtol denied the accusation and gave
Hays an employee separation report, which noted that prior
disciplinary action was given on that same date, January 23,
and stated the following reason for termination: “In reference to
Disciplinary action date 1/23/03 and DR#’s 6567, 6579, 6646,
6679, 6714, and 6721.” When informed of his termination,
Hays directed profanity and vulgar gestures at Bechtol and
slammed and kicked the door on exiting the office.15 Leaving
the office to retrieve his tools, Hays saw Reddoch about 20 to
30 feet away and yelled to him that he had just been fired.
About 5 to 10 people were within hearing distance. Later, Hays
went to the scheduled union meeting and told attending em-
ployees, most of who already knew, that he had been fired.
Mark Burnett (Burnett) who was still employed by Respon-
dent at the time of the hearing, also made errors in machining
parts. One error resulted in an estimated $20,000 to $25,000
cost to Respondent, but Respondent did not discipline Burnett.
Other employees, including Will Chavez, Sharma, Eric Frank-
lin, and Dave Leach, also made significant errors, and were not
discharged.16
Mark Slater (Slater), Respondent’s president, testified that on
January 22 he decided to terminate Hays and Reddoch, whose
termination is described hereafter, in order to make a statement
about work quality. Slater asserted a rash of production quality
problems had occurred, and Reddoch and Hays were the worst
offenders. He testified that on January 22 he decided to termi-
nate Hays because of the production quality problems and be-
cause the company had realized their efforts to save the AKT
part were unavailing; the part would have to be scrapped at a
cost of nearly $30,000.17 Slater informed Bechtol of his deci-
sion on January 23.
2. The discipline and termination of Reddoch
Respondent employed Reddoch December 13, 1999 to Janu-
ary 23. Beginning January 7, he discussed union benefits with

14 Hays was aware of the July 8, 2002 DR and had expected to be
fired at that time, but Sedano had said Respondent would not fire Hays
but would try to fix the part.
15 Hays later apologized to Bechtol and others in attendance at his
termination for this conduct, which apology Bechtol and Miguel Se-
dano accepted.
16 Respondent issued disciplinary action notices to Sharma on Janu-
ary 15 and February 21, respectively. The January 15 notice stated that
stacked chips caused the end mill to damage the part. Since alignment
was not checked, all remaining features were miscut at a cost of ap-
proximately $29,894. The notice of February 21 stated Sharma had
miscut an AKT 25 K Lid worth $25,951 and that “[f]urther disciplinary
action may be required if the part cannot be salvaged.” Slater testified
Respondent did not discharge Sharma because he had (with a break in
service) worked there for over 10 years, that he was a good employee,
and was learning the machine on which the errors were made. Slater
admitted Miguel Sedano had recommended Sharma’s discharge.
17 It is unclear whether Slater said he realized the part was unsal-
vageable in December or in January. He testified that the January scrap
costs were unusually high at about $90,000 compared to $20,000 to
$30,000 for most months. Presumably, those costs included the AKT
part as well as Sharma’s mistake.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD636
other employees and invited them to union meetings.18 He
attended union meetings with other employees on January 7,
14, and 16, and became a member of the employee organizing
committee. On January 16, the organizing committee planned a
meeting for January 23 to which all unit eligible employees
would be invited. Thereafter, during work hours the week of
January 20, Reddoch invited numerous employees to the Janu-
ary 23 meeting. The office window of Day-Shift Supervisor
Miguel Sedano overlooked Reddoch’s machine area, and Mi-
guel Sedano walked around the machining areas during the day.
During the week of January 20, Miguel Sedano several times
told Reddoch who was talking to another employee about the
Union, to stop talking and return to work.19
Reddoch traditionally ate lunch and played cards with em-
ployees, including Hays and Cedric Partlow (Partlow) at an
outdoor picnic table. Supervisor Cliff Conley (Conley) com-
monly joined the group. At lunch on January 21, with Conley
present, Reddoch asked Partlow if he planned to attend the
meeting on Thursday at the Best Western (referring to the un-
ion meeting scheduled for January 23.) Conley said he did not
need to hear about that, and Reddoch told Partlow they would
talk about it later. Thereafter, Conley did not join the group for
lunch and card playing. Hays corroborated Reddoch’s account.
Conley denied it and maintained he was unaware of any union
activity prior to the terminations of Reddoch and Hays. Re-
spondent called Partlow, who was still employed, to testify. In
his initial testimony, he said he did not recall any such lunch
table conversation. Under cross-examination, however, when
asked if and when Reddoch had told him about the January 23
meeting, Partlow exhibited such confusion and equivocation as
follows, that I cannot accept his original testimony:
A. Well, I am not quite sure when but as I recall, it
seemed like to me, I didn’t find out about it until practi-
cally the day when it was—the same day. I mean, it
was—I don’t know. I just didn’t—no one ever really told
me about it. And, you know, it just—I think I was told the
same day that the meeting was held.
. . . .
Q. Could [you have been told] at lunch?
A. It is possible but, you know, I just don’t—you
know, it was just it went through one ear and out the other
ear because it just wasn’t that important to me.
Although Conley had admittedly joined the group regularly,
he said he ceased doing so prior to January 23 because he was
too busy. Under cross-examination, he was less definite, say-
ing only that he did not remember playing cards with the group

18 Reddoch invited leadman Murad Murad to the January 16 meet-
ing, and he attended.
19 Reddoch testified that prior to union activity in the facility, he had
had conversations with employees at his machine without Sedano inter-
rupting them. No evidence was presented, however, as to comparable
length of the exchanges and no evidence that Sedano knew Reddoch
was discussing the Union in the latter conversations. I cannot, there-
fore, infer any union animus by Miguel Sedano’s directing employees
to stop talking, but I conclude the supervisor was aware that Reddoch
was doing considerably more talking than usual.
that week. I found his manner in giving this testimony guarded
and his stated reason for deserting the group unconvincing.
Conley also testified that he first realized a union organizing
campaign was going on at the company a few days after the
discharges of Hays and Reddoch when “there were rumors
flying around . . . that there was union activity going on.” I
accept Conley’s testimony regarding the rumors, but I question
the timing he assigns. On January 23, Hays confronted Miguel
Sedano and Bechtol with the fact of employee union activity. It
is implausible that Conley was not informed of that, and so he
must have known of ongoing union activity from Hays’ January
23 proclamation. Therefore, if Conley first learned of employ-
ees’ union activity from “rumors flying around,” he must have
learned of it before Hays was fired. I credit Hays and Red-
doch’s accounts of what occurred at the January 21 lunch gath-
ering. I also infer from Conley’s reaction to Reddoch’s men-
tion of the Thursday meeting that Conley knew the meeting
Reddoch referred to was a union meeting.
After lunch on January 21, Miguel Sedano summoned Red-
doch to the office of Tom Bechtol (Bechtol), facility manager.
Bechtol gave Reddoch a disciplinary action notice dated Janu-
ary 15, which read in pertinent part:
On 1/8/03 you ran part 1GO2267-1 job number
X2680. A miss cut on Data-C-of .922” deep by .780”
wide was made due to some changes, which were not
needed, in the program made by you. The changes were
not checked and this caused the part to be scrapped.
Then on the next part of the same number and job
some changes were made to the x, y, and z-axis set posi-
tions. Derek Smith told you that the center of the tooling
ball was x0 and y0, which was incorrect; you started run-
ning the part without verifying that the x, y, and z-axis set-
tings matched the program, which was a proven program.
X axis was off +.625” causing the part to be damaged. Es-
timated cost of damage is $5,264.
Immediate improvement must be shown and main-
tained or further disciplinary action will be taken, up to
and including termination.
The part referred to in the disciplinary notice had been ma-
chined three times. The first time Reddoch machined it per-
fectly, but John Lombardo, the machinist at the next step, dam-
aged it. The second time, when Reddoch changed the work-
station, the machine defaulted to another setting, which Red-
doch did not catch, and consequently miscut the part. The third
time programmer Derek Smith misprogrammed values, causing
another miscut.20 Neither John Lombardo nor Smith was pre-
sent at the disciplinary meeting. Reddoch asked if John
Lombardo or Derek Smith had been disciplined for their roles
in the mistakes, but Bechtol did not answer. The following
day, Reddoch complained to Bechtol about the disparate treat-
ment, and Bechtol said he would look into it. There is no evi-
dence he did so, and there is no evidence either John Lombardo
or Derek Smith received discipline for his mistake on the part.

20 Reddoch stopped the part as soon as he saw the miscut occurring,
and the part was salvaged.
ALLIED MECHANICAL, INC. 637
In the morning of January 23, Reddoch worked on a part that
had been set up off-center by the night shift machine operator,
Vince Hamilton (Hamilton). Reddoch reported the problem to
Miguel Sedano who sent the part to inspection. Later that day,
Reddoch was called to Bechtol’s office. With Miguel Sedano
present, Bechtol gave Reddoch a disciplinary action notice
dated January 23, which concerned the part Reddoch had ear-
lier given Sedano and which read in pertinent part:
On 1/21/03 [sic]21 you ran art number sub-140005-001, job
number x2727-200 operation 5500. Part was run off center
by .040”. You did not set up the part, but you should have
checked the parts position. You started checking the part
when you were finishing the critical holes, checking should
have been done during semi finishing. Ref. DR#6844.22
Reddoch protested he had not been responsible for the mis-
take. Bechtol did not respond but only said Reddoch made too
much money to make such mistakes, and the company would
have to let him go. He gave Reddoch an employee separation
report dated January 23, which referred to the cause of termina-
tion as “Disciplinary actions given on 10/31/00, 1/15/03, and
1/23/03 and DR# 6844.”
While Bechtol agreed to Slater’s motivation in terminating
Reddoch, i.e., the amount of scrapping his work engendered, he
was unable to recall anything about his discussions with Slater
regarding the disciplinary notices or the termination. Bechtol
cited Marco Lopez, Quang Dang, and Paul Cortis as employees
who had also been terminated for poor quality work. Quang
Dang was terminated for not meeting company standards in his
90-day probationary period. Paul Cortis was laid off as a re-
duction in force. In addition to those employees, Slater testi-
fied that Respondent terminated Brad Green, Phillip Potter, and
Dwane Robinson for poor quality work. Company records
show the three to have been laid off due to lack of work. Slater
claimed they were actually fired, but Respondent misstated the
cause of termination to permit them to draw unemployment. I
cannot accept his explanation. There is no evidence of such a
company practice, and I note neither Reddoch nor Hays were
similarly accommodated.
3. The discipline, performance review, reduced hours,
and layoff of Pinheiro
Beginning in January, Pinheiro attended union meetings and
posted and distributed union flyers to employees at work, hand-
ing one to Miguel Sedano on one occasion.23 On a later occa-
sion, Pinheiro told his supervisor, Eddie Rogers, he meant no
disrespect by his union activities. Rogers replied that Pinheiro

21 The date of January 21 appears to be an inadvertent error as the
corresponding DR is dated January 23.
22 DR# 6844 refers to a discrepancy report (DR) of that number.
DRs do not constitute discipline. Respondent prepares a DR for every
part not completed exactly to specification. Respondent provides the
DR to the purchaser. Although DR# 6844 (dated January 23) noted
both Reddoch and Hamilton were operators on part sub-140005-001,
Hamilton was apparently not disciplined for his share of the mistake.
23 Burnett and employee Edwin Shook also posted prounion flyers,
some of which were removed.
was a hard worker, and he had no problem with that (meaning
the union activity).
In January, Pinheiro asked Rogers and Miguel Sedano not to
remove flyers he had posted. On January 31, after observing
fliers had been removed, Pinheiro told Rogers and Miguel Se-
dano he planned to file a charge with the NLRB over their re-
moval. Later that day, Respondent issued Pinheiro a discipli-
nary action notice, which read in pertinent part:
On Tuesday night, 1-28-03 Marcelo was machining job num-
ber X2618-074Hsq. on the Toshiba. He unloaded the part and
it was not finished. One of the seal faces still needed to be
serrated. The part will have to be set up again to finish it.
Pinheiro protested he had the part inspected before unloading
it as required, and the inspector “bought”24 it; thereafter Pin-
heiro reloaded the part and finished it within the time target and
without scrapping it. Respondent did not withdraw the disci-
plinary notice, and Pinheiro refused to sign it. Sometime after
that discipline, Pinheiro told Rogers that if Bechtol continued to
“harass” him, he would get a lawyer.25
On February 6, Rogers gave Pinheiro a performance review
covering the period September 3 to December 2, 2002. Rogers
marked Pinheiro as poor in “attitude,” noting in the comment
section that Pinheiro “threatened to fight one of his co-
workers.” In the employee comment section, Pinheiro wrote,
“Vick had threatened to go talk to Mark & tell him things that
were not true about me . . . . All I said to Vick was that there
were consequences to his actions.” In testimony, Pinheiro ad-
mitted he had threatened to “kick [the] butt” of coworker Vick
Sharma (Sharma) who had spread rumors about him. Sharma
called the police when his supervisor refused to do so. Rogers
sent both employees home.
Prior to the election, Respondent reduced Pinheiro’s work
hours. Bechtol told him it was because work was slow. Other
employees’ work hours were reduced as well, and some em-
ployees were laid off.26
On March 6, Pinheiro served as an observer at the election.
On March 25, Respondent issued a disciplinary action notice to
Pinheiro for “excessive discrepancies and quality problems
within a 6-month period.” The disciplinary notice referred to
DRs 6864, 6907, and 6914, which state as follows:
Discrepancy Report Stated cause and corrective action (CA)
no. and date _______________________________
No. 6864-Feb. 14 There was porosity in the casting. The
sand in the porosity caused the mate-
rial to tear.27

24 “Buying” a part is Respondent’s term for an inspector having
passed off on or endorsed a part as completed. The inspector, Belton,
who was present at the disciplinary meeting, admitted he had “bought”
the part. Bechtol later orally “disciplined” Belton.
25 This comment was motivated by Pinheiro having heard that Bech-
tol had asked a coworker if Pinheiro had made mistakes.
26 The General Counsel does not dispute the lawfulness of Respon-
dent’s decision to reduce employees’ hours but only its selection of
Pinheiro.
27 Rogers, Pinheiro’s supervisor, did not consider this DR to be Pin-
heiro’s fault.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD638
No. 6907-March 14 Insufficient lubrication while tap-
ping28caused the material to tear. Op-
erator has been instructed to put a gen-
erous amount of Molecular’s Tapping
Fluid inside the hole and also apply
Tapmatic while tap is cutting.29
No. 6914-March 19 Operator used wrong dia drill to drill
these holes. Did not check dia of tool
before using it. Operator has been told
to check every tool before using them
and check 1st hole he drills before go-
ing any further.
By letter dated March 26, Bechtol informed Pinheiro Re-
spondent would remove DR no. 6864 from the March 24 disci-
plinary action. The disciplinary action remained in effect.
On April 8, Respondent laid off six employees. Bechtol told
Pinheiro he would be laid off as work had decreased and he
was the least senior employee.30 Pinheiro remained on layoff
until his recall In June.31
B. Alleged Independent Violations of Section 8(a)(1)
Consolidated complaint paragraph 15 alleges that Respon-
dent, by Miguel Sedano, threatened an employee with unspeci-
fied retaliation because of his union activities. About 1 week
after the election, Pablo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) who is still
employed by Respondent, complained to Miguel Sedano about
Respondent having cut employees’ work hours for a few weeks
before the election, saying he knew the hours had been cut
because of the Union. Miguel Sedano replied that of course if
employees attacked the company, the company would get back
at them. When Rodriguez said he supported the Union for
better wages, Miguel Sedano said Rodriguez would be the one
to lose.
Consolidated complaint paragraphs 16 and 17 allege that Re-
spondent promulgated and enforced an ad hoc rule prohibiting
the posting of union literature. In late January/early February,
Respondent permitted the posting of nonwork-related flyers at
its tool crib and restroom walls while, during that same time, it
removed union flyers from the same locations.
C. The Requested Gissel Remedy
The parties stipulated as follows: the appropriate collective-
bargaining unit herein included no more than 91 employees
during the period January 7 through January 24. During that
same period, 57 of Respondent’s employees signed union au-
thorization cards stating, “I hereby authorize the United Steel-
workers of America-AFL–CIO–CLC to represent me in collec-
tive bargaining.”

28 The term for threading holes.
29 Rogers said Pinheiro may or may not have known of the method
the day man had used on the same job.
30 Bechtol’s statement was inaccurate as machinist Rusalin Manea
was hired after Pinheiro. However, Pinheiro was least senior in his
work center, which was slow at that time.
31 The General Counsel does not question the lawfulness of Respon-
dent’s layoffs but only its selection of Pinheiro.
III. DISCUSSION OF ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Discipline and Discharges of Hays and Reddoch
Respondent contends it had no knowledge of any union ac-
tivity among its employees prior to the discharges of Hays and
Reddoch. I cannot accept that assertion. As set forth above, I
have concluded that Conley, Respondent’s foreman, knew of
employees’ union activities prior to January 23. It follows,
therefore, that Respondent had knowledge of its employees’
union activities prior to its discharges of Hays and Reddoch.32
Discharge circumstances can also support an inference of
knowledge. Music Express East, Inc., 340 NLRB 1063 (2003).
The circumstances of these two discharges support an inference
that Respondent knew of employees’ union activity in general
and that Hays and Reddoch were significant proponents of the
activity. In drawing that inference, I have noted it was Red-
doch who posed the lunch table question about the union meet-
ing and that both Hays and Reddoch were unusually interactive
with coworkers in the 3 days preceding their discharges, which
would reasonably draw employer attention to them.
Hays had received no disciplinary action notices from Re-
spondent prior to that given him when he was discharged on
January 23. It is clear the notice’s first two reasons for dis-
charge, excessive talking and messy work area, were not true
concerns of Respondent. Respondent failed to provide eviden-
tiary support for either of the two assertions, and as to the latter,
Miguel Sedano, Hays’ supervisor, additionally said he fre-
quently saw employees talking together, and it was not unusual
for him to tell them to go back to work. These unfounded ac-
cusations cannot have been reasons for Hays’ discharge, and
their very inclusion in the disciplinary notice suggests pretext.33
The six DRs Respondent issued to Hays constitute Respon-
dent’s only colorable discharge explanation. All were issued in
2002, the last more than 4 months prior to Hays’ discharge.
Slater, who made the discharge decision, said Hays’ scrapping
record prompted it; however the parts referenced in three of the
DRs were not scrapped, which gives rise to a question as to
why they were included in the discharge documentation. Mi-
guel Sedano added handwritten comments to the bottoms of
three of the DRs on the day of discharge to reflect oral warn-
ings that were never given to Hays,34 which gives rise to an-
other question of why Miguel Sedano felt it necessary to fabri-
cate evidence against Hays. The only reasonable inference is
that Respondent felt the DRs needed beefing up and that Re-
spondent felt that way because reliance on the DRs was spuri-
ous.

32 A supervisor’s knowledge of union activity is ordinarily imputable
to the employer, and no basis exists here for not doing so. Woodlands
Health Center, 325 NLRB 351, 361 (1998).
33 By the hearing, Respondent had essentially abandoned these two
reasons and shifted its focus to Hays’ DRs. Shifting explanations for
discharge also demonstrate pretext. Douglas Foods Corp, 330 NLRB
821 (2000).
34 As set forth above, I have credited Hays’ denial of being given the
oral warnings belatedly reflected on the DRs, and I have noted Miguel
Sedano’s volte-face admission of adding the comments on the day of
Hays’ discharge.
ALLIED MECHANICAL, INC. 639
As to Hays’ mistake on the AKT part, the scrapping of
which cost Respondent nearly $30,000 and which might rea-
sonably support a discharge, still more questions arise: Why did
Miguel Sedano tell Hays at the time of the mistake that Re-
spondent would not fire him? Why did Respondent wait until
January 23 to discharge Hays for a mistake that occurred on
July 8, 2002? If, as Slater contended, it was only in December
or January Respondent learned the part would have to be
scrapped, why did Conley testify Respondent knew about a
week after the mistake that the part would have to be scrapped?
If Respondent was so concerned about scrapping that it fired
Hays for his July 2002 mistake, why didn’t Respondent fire
Sharma for his equally costly January and his February mis-
takes?35 Why was Hays’ discharge so peremptorily abrupt
when no exigency existed? Respondent provided no adequate
answers to these questions, and I conclude the only reasonable
answer is that Respondent’s asserted reasons for issuing Hays a
disciplinary action notice and discharging him on January 23
are pretextual.36
Reddoch’s January 21 discipline and January 23 discharge
were even more obviously pretextual than Hays’.37 Other em-
ployees shared equal or even greater culpability in the mistakes
that assertedly motivated Reddoch’s termination. Yet none was
fired. Respondent gave no cogent explanation why they and
still other employees who made similar or more costly errors
were not fired. In comparison to other disciplinary actions in
evidence, Reddoch’s discharge was unusually abrupt, and one
of the participants, Bechtol, suffered a singular memory defi-
ciency concerning management discussions leading up to it.
Respondent also presented spurious evidence to support its
discharge of Reddoch. Of 15 DRs for parts Reddoch worked
on from June 2000 until the date of his discharge, only 3 clearly
reflect operator error. Respondent’s production of old and
immaterial production discrepancies strongly suggests dis-
charge pretext. Finally, comparative terminations offered by

35 Respondent argues the situations are different because it has not
yet been determined that the part Sharma miscut on January 14 will
have to be scrapped, and Sharma has 10-year seniority. I discount both
arguments. Sharma’s January 15 disciplinary action notice says noth-
ing about salvageability in contrast to his February 21 disciplinary
action notice, which notes salvage determination on the “AKT 25 K Lid
worth $25,951” is pending. As to seniority, there is nothing in state-
ments to Hays, Reddoch, or Sharma to suggest that seniority played a
role in any discharge determination.
36 The General Counsel did not allege a violation of the Act by Re-
spondent’s issuance of a disciplinary action notice to Hays on January
23. However, as the facts surrounding the discipline were fully and
fairly litigated, and as the issue is closely connected to other allegations
of the complaint, I have considered the lawfulness of the discipline
herein. Gallup, Inc., 334 NLRB 366 (2001); Letter Carriers Local
3825, 333 NLRB 343 fn. 3 (2001); Parts Depot, 332 NLRB 733
(2000).
37 The General Counsel did not allege a violation of the Act by Re-
spondent’s issuance of a disciplinary action notice to Reddoch on Janu-
ary 21. However, as the facts surrounding the discipline were fully
and fairly litigated, and as the issue is closely connected to other allega-
tions of the complaint, I have considered the lawfulness of the disci-
pline herein. Gallup, Inc., supra; Letter Carriers Local 3825, supra;
Parts Depot, supra.
Respondent as evidence that Reddoch’s discharge fit within
normal parameters, are inapt. Two of the named employees
were terminated during their probationary periods, and four
were laid off for lack of work. As counsel for the General
Counsel urges, since “the reasons proffered [by Respondent]
are inadequate and conflicting . . . a finding of improper motive
is appropriate.”
With regard to the discipline and discharges of Hays and
Reddoch, I conclude Respondent’s stated reasons for both dis-
cipline and discharges are pretextual. It is not, therefore, neces-
sary to “go through the burden-shifting inquiry as to whether
[they] would have been discharged had [they] not engaged in
union activity, as required by Wright Line.38 Sodexho Marriott
Services, 335 NLRB 538 fn. 6 (2001) [citations omitted].
However, if I were to apply a Wright Line analysis, I would
find the General Counsel met his burden of showing that Hays
and Reddoch’s protected conduct was a motivating factor in
Respondent’s decision to discipline and then to discharge them.
I would also find that Respondent did not meet its shifted bur-
den to demonstrate that the same actions would have taken
place even in the absence of protected conduct. Accordingly, I
conclude Respondent disciplined and fired both employees
because of their activities in support of the union organizing
drive.
B. Pinheiro’s Discipline, Performance Review, Reduction
of Hours, and Selection for Layoff
Respondent gave Pinheiro a disciplinary action notice on
January 31, the same day he told supervisors he planned to file
charges with the NLRB over Respondent’s removal of proun-
ion postings. I have considered whether Respondent’s stated
reasons for the disciplinary notice were pretextual. Pinheiro’s
mistake, which formed the basis for his January 31 discipline,
was a quickly remedied error of omission. It resulted in neither
cost nor deadline delay to Respondent and was, at least in part,
an inspector as well as machinist error. The evidence supports
a conclusion that no other machinist making so harmless an
error would have been disciplined, and, in the event, the errant
inspector was only orally reprimanded. Moreover, the timing
of Pinheiro’s supernumerary discipline, coming shortly after
Pinheiro had threatened NLRB action but 3 days after the mis-
take occurred, is particularly suspect. Based on these consid-
erations, I conclude Respondent’s reasons for the January 31
written discipline were pretextual and the discipline was given
because of Pinheiro’s vigorous support of the Union. Under the
Sodexho reasoning set forth above, it is unnecessary to apply a
Wright Line analysis. However, under Wright Line, the evi-
dence would require me to conclude the General Counsel has
met his burden of showing that Pinheiro’s protected activity
was a motivating factor in Respondent’s decision to discipline
him on January 31. I would also find that Respondent did not
meet its shifted burden to demonstrate that the same discipline
would have occurred in the absence of the protected conduct.

38 251 NLRB 1083, 1089 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Transportation
Mgt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD640
On March 25, Respondent issued Pinheiro another discipli-
nary action notice for “excessive discrepancies and quality
problems within a 6-month period.” The disciplinary notice
named three DRs, one of which was later withdrawn and one of
which may have been due to insufficient information. The
assessed cost to Respondent was $100. Given the discrepant
treatment accorded Pinheiro by the March 25 disciplinary no-
tice, I conclude that, like the January 31 notice, it was pretex-
tual, and the discipline imposed because of Pinheiro’s union
support.
As to Pinheiro’s performance review, reduction of hours, and
selection for layoff, I have applied a Wright Line analysis.
Under that analysis, to prove an employee was disciplined in
violation of Section 8(a)(3), the General Counsel must first
persuade, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an em-
ployee’s protected conduct was a motivating factor in the em-
ployer’s decision. If the General Counsel is able to make such
a showing, the burden of persuasion shifts “to the employer to
demonstrate that the same action would have taken place even
in the absence of the protected conduct.” Wright Line, supra at
1089. The burden shifts only if the General Counsel establishes
that protected conduct was a “substantial or motivating factor in
the employer’s decision.” Budrovich Contracting Co., 331
NLRB 1333, 1333 (2000). Put another way, “the General
Counsel must establish that the employees’ protected conduct
was, in fact, a motivating factor in the [employer’s] decision.”
Webco Industries, 334 NLRB 608 fn. 3 (2001).
The elements of discriminatory motivation are union activ-
ity, employer knowledge, and employer animus. Farmer Bros.
Co., 303 NLRB 638, 649 (1991). Here, those elements are met:
Pinheiro was actively involved in supporting the Union, Re-
spondent was aware of it, and Respondent demonstrated its
animosity by its unlawful January 31 and March 25 discipline.
It is not so clear the General Counsel has established that pro-
tected conduct was, in fact, a motivating factor in Respondent’s
performance review, reduction of hours, and selection for lay-
off of Pinheiro as required by Webco Industries, supra. None-
theless, I have assumed the General Counsel has met his initial
burden, and I have shifted the burden to Respondent to demon-
strate it would have given Pinheiro a poor attitude rating in his
performance review, reduced his hours, and selected him for
lay-off even in the absence of his protected activities. I con-
clude Respondent has met its burden as to all three actions re-
garding Pinheiro.
Concerning his performance review, Pinheiro admittedly
threatened a coworker with physical violence. To have re-
ceived merely a poor attitude ranking on his performance re-
view less than 2 months later cannot be considered extraordi-
nary or unreasonable. I recognize the legitimacy or equity of
Respondent’s action is immaterial if Respondent’s motive in
assigning the attitude rating was unlawfully retaliatory.39 How-
ever, the reasonableness of Respondent’s action is a factor to be
considered. I have also considered that no attendant antiunion
sentiments accompanied the rating, which was given by a su-
pervisor who had earlier assured Pinheiro he had no problem
with his union activity. Regarding his hour reduction and lay-

39 E & L Transport Co., 331 NLRB 640 (2000).
off, Pinheiro was among a group of Respondent’s employees
who received nondiscriminatory hour reductions and layoffs.
His seniority level was in line with those selected for hour re-
ductions and layoffs, and he was recalled to employment when
work picked up. The General Counsel asserts but has not
shown that Pinheiro’s selection was “clearly tied” to his union
activities. Accordingly, I conclude Respondent has demon-
strated it would have taken those actions even in the absence of
Pinheiro’s union activities.
IV. INDEPENDENT VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 8(a)(1)
Although Respondent lawfully reduced its employees hours
prior to the election, when Miguel Sedano ascribed the reason
to company retaliation for employee union activity, he violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.40 Informing employees an em-
ployer’s conduct is discriminatorily motivated coerces employ-
ees and independently violates the Act even if the conduct is
not unlawful. K-Mart Corp., 336 NLRB 455 (2001); Owens
Corning Fiberglass Co., 236 NLRB 479, 480 (1978). Miguel
Sedano’s further statement that Rodriguez would be the one to
lose if he supported the Union constituted a threat of unspeci-
fied reprisal in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondent admittedly removed union literature from post-
ing areas where it permitted employee personal notices to re-
main. “Where an employer permits its employees to utilize its
bulletin boards for the posting of notices relating to personal
items . . . or, in general, any nonwork-related matters, it may
not ‘validly discriminate against notices of union [material]
which employees also posted.].”’ [footnotes omitted.] Honey-
well, Inc., 262 NLRB 1402 (1982).41 Here, Respondent did not
“uniformly [prohibit] the posting of non-work-related messages
on its bulletin boards.”42 Respondent’s removal of prounion
literature therefore violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
A. The Propriety of a Bargaining Order
By January 24, a majority of Respondent’s unit employees
had designated the Union as their collective-bargaining repre-
sentative. Respondent argues that “while 63% of the bargain-
ing unit employees may have signed authorization cards,” the
Union did not have “overwhelming support.” Such is not re-
quired to support a bargaining order if Respondent’s conduct
otherwise warrants one.
In Gissel Packing Co., supra, the Supreme Court identified
two categories of cases in which a bargaining order is appropri-
ate: Category I cases are exceptional situations involving outra-
geous and pervasive unfair labor practices that traditional
remedies cannot resolve and which make a fair election impos-
sible. Category II cases involve unfair labor practices that are
less extraordinary but that nonetheless have a tendency to un-

40 The General Counsel did not allege a violation of the Act by Mi-
guel Sedano’s implied assertion that Respondent’s reduction in hours
was to “get back at” employees. However, as the facts surrounding the
statement were fully and fairly litigated, and as the issue is closely
connected to other allegations of the complaint, I have considered the
lawfulness of the statement herein. Gallup, Inc., supra; Letter Carriers
Local 3825, supra; and Parts Depot, supra.
41 Enfd. 722 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983).
42 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 NLRB 703 fn. 1 (2003).
ALLIED MECHANICAL, INC. 641
dermine majority support and impede the election process. As
such unfair labor practices render the possibility of a fair elec-
tion slight, “employee sentiment once expressed through cards
would . . . be better protected by a bargaining order.”
The instant matter meets the standards for a Gissel category
II bargaining order. On the day of a scheduled unit wide union-
organizing meeting, Respondent precipitately and unlawfully
fired two prominent employee organizers. Hays’ discharge was
dramatically made known to many employees when he shouted
out the news as he left the plant, and both discharges were re-
ported to additional employees at the two union meetings held a
short time later. The discharges were so devoid of valid basis
that they must have been calculated to send a warning to all
employees of the consequences of union advocacy, and it is
reasonable to infer that employees viewed them as such. The
discharge of leading union adherents is a “hallmark” violation43
and has an especially pernicious effect on other employees.
National Propane Partners L.P, 337 NLRB 1006 (2002).
While it is true, as Respondent argues, that the bulk of the
union authorization cards were signed on January 23 and 24,
the day of and the day following the discharges, that does not
show the discharges were without effect among employees. It
is reasonable to expect discharges that remained unremedied
through the date of the election to affect even stalwart prounion
sentiment and to intimidate employees. Moreover, Respon-
dent’s continued unlawful conduct could only have reinforced
intimidation. Even after the Union’s unsuccessful election bid,
when employees might have expected antiunion animosity to
cool, Respondent continued its unlawful conduct. On January
31, Respondent unlawfully disciplined Pinheiro, a prominent
and outspoken union adherent. In January and February, Re-
spondent unlawfully removed prounion literature from com-
pany posting areas. About a week after the election, Miguel
Sedano’s ascribed the company’s reduction in hours to anti-
union retaliation and told an employee he would “lose” by sup-
porting the union. About 3 weeks after the election, Respon-
dent issued Pinheiro another unlawful disciplinary notice.
Those actions could only have served as a continuous warning
to employees of the dangers attendant on union adherence.44 In
these circumstances, the possibility of erasing the effects of
Respondent’s violations is slight, and the holding of a fair rerun
election pursuant to timely objections is improbable. See Jo-
seph Stallone Electrical Contractors, Inc., 337 NLRB 1139,
1139–1140 (2002); L.S.F. Transportation, Inc., 330 NLRB
1054, 1056 (2000). Accordingly, having determined that the
Union enjoyed majority status in the appropriate unit and that
Respondent’s unfair labor practices undermined majority sup-
port and impeded the election process, I find a bargaining order
is an appropriate remedy in this case.45

43 Douglas Foods Corp., supra at 822.
44 Respondent’s argument that prepetition and postelection conduct
has “no bearing on the possibility of a fair election for bargaining order
analysis” is unpersuasive. Misconduct after an election further dimin-
ishes the likelihood that traditional remedies will prove effective. Gen-
eral Fabrications Corp., 328 NLRB 1114 (1999).
45 Respondent asserts that the Union’s filing of requests to proceed
to election bars the Union from contending that no fair election could
be held or that a bargaining order is warranted. Respondent cites no
Objections to Conduct Affecting Results of Election
The Union filed the petition in Case 31–RC–8202 on January
24.46 Region 31 conducted an election on March 6 among em-
ployees in the following unit:
All full-time and regular part-time production, maintenance,
shipping and receiving employees and programmers em-
ployed by Respondent at its facility located at 1720 Bon
View, Ontario, California.
The tally of ballots showed the Union received 37 votes and 42
votes were cast against the Union. On March 13 Petitioner
timely filed Objections 1 through 10 to the election, which, as
noted above, the Regional Director consolidated with the unfair
labor practices alleged herein. The objections allege that Re-
spondent engaged in certain conduct during the critical labora-
tory period that interfered with the election. The evidence re-
lating to Objections 4, 5, and 9 correlates to allegations of the
complaint and is set forth above. Objections 1, 2, and 3 contain
independent allegations of objectionable conduct, the evidence
of which is set forth below.
Objection 1 (as modified): The Employer allowed many su-
pervisors inside the polling place.
Petitioner contends that Respondent’s leadmen, Jesus Se-
dano, Murad Murad, Milad Murad, Albert Viramontes, Hyun
Lee, and Jerry Belton, are supervisors within the meaning of
the Act and were allowed in the polling place during the voting.
All seven cast challenged ballots in the election, and several
spoke to other employees while waiting to vote.47
Section 2(11) of the Act defines a “supervisor” as any indi-
vidual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment. “The possession of even one of those attributes is
enough to convey supervisory status, provided the authority is
exercised with independent judgment, not in a merely routine
or clerical manner.” Arlington Electric, Inc., 332 NLRB 845
(2000), quoting Union Square Theatre Management, 326
NLRB 70, 71 (1998). Any lack of evidence is construed
against the party asserting supervisory authority.48
There is no evidence that any of Respondent’s lead men has
authority to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote,

authority in support of this contention, and I find it without merit as
there is nothing inconsistent in the Union’s pursuing representation
through election procedures and “then filing a refusal-to-bargain charge
after the election is lost because of the employer’s unfair labor prac-
tices.” Gissel, supra at fn. 34.
46 The critical period during which the parties’ conduct will be scru-
tinized for its impact on voters commences with the filing of the peti-
tion. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 330 NLRB 670
(2000); Ideal Electric Co., 134 NLRB 1275 (1961).
47 There is no evidence or contention any of the lead men spoke to
other employees about the union or election-related matters while in the
polling area.
48 NLRB v. Kentucky River Community Care, 532 U.S. 706, 712–713
(2001).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD642
discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees. The
supervisory issues herein center on the authority to assign and
direct employees, some measure of which authority each of the
lead men exercised. Whether the exercise was with independ-
ent judgment and not in a merely routine or clerical manner is
the crucial question in determining the supervisory status of
each. As the United States Supreme Court noted, “The statu-
tory term ‘independent judgment’ is ambiguous with respect to
the degree of discretion required for supervisory status. . . . It
falls clearly within the Board’s discretion to determine, within
reason, what scope of discretion qualifies.”49 The Board is
careful not to give too broad an interpretation to the statutory
term “independent judgment” because supervisory status results
in the exclusion of the individual from the protections of the
Act. Tree-Free Fiber Co., 328 NLRB 389 (1999). The Board
does not find the exercise of only “routine” authority, i.e., that
which does not require the use of independent judgment in
directing the work of other employees, to fit within the ambit of
Section 2(11) of the Act. Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Ser-
vices, Inc., 335 NLRB 635 (2001).
Evidence was adduced that during the critical period, the fol-
lowing lead men performed the following duties:50
Jesus Sedano: deburring department lead man since Febru-
ary 21. He distributed deburring work, giv-
ing easier parts to less experienced employ-
ees, watched to see the deburring work was
done correctly, and taught correct procedures
as necessary. If employee problems arose,
he reported them to Mr. Conley. When di-
rected by Mr. Bechtol or Mr. Conley that a
part had to be completed quickly, he trans-
mitted the information to the affected em-
ployee. He reported to Mr. Conley the work
quality of a probationary employee who was
later fired. When deburring employee Enri-
que Coronado wanted Respondent to hire a
relative, he did not mention the matter to Je-
sus Sedano but spoke only to Mr. Conley.
Murad Murad: day shift lathe lead man; reported to Miguel
Sedano who went over job assignments with
him and assigned the lathe work. He some-
times told employees their work areas were
messy, they were going too fast, or they
needed to be accurate. He was heard to tell
Miguel Sedano that an employee was a prob-
lem and he wanted him out. Miguel Sedano
said he would see what he could do. There-
after, the employee was transferred. Murad
Murad said he intended to ask that one em-
ployee be laid off rather than another, which
was done.51

49 Kentucky River Community Care, supra at 712–713.
50 I have not included the extensive hearsay evidence presented re-
garding leadman authority. Unless otherwise noted, I have discounted
it as unreliable.
51 This evidence does not create a reasonable inference that Murad
Murad effectively recommended the transfer or the layoff.
Jerry Belton: inspector; filled in for Mr. Rogers when ab-
sent, which regularly included the Saturday
night shift but did not possess Mr. Roger’s
authority. When substituting for Mr. Rogers,
Mr. Belton assigned employees to machines
and jobs from a prepared assignment list
provided by Miguel Sedano or Mr. Conley.
He helped employees read blueprints and
complete jobs and checked employees’
work. At the end of shift, Mr. Belton locked
up the facility. Mr. Belton asked employees
to go home if there was no additional job to
assign, normally saying, “I don’t have any
work available for you right at the moment . .
. I will call the foreman and find out if there’s
anything else or do you want to go home.”
Occasionally, Mr. Belton was called in as a
witness when an employee was disciplined
since, as inspector, he was generally avail-
able.
Albert Viramontes: day shift welding lead man; machinists
went to him if they needed a part welded
whereupon he assigned the part to a welder.52
Mr. Viramontes gave his opinion of appli-
cant resumes to Mr. Conley and also told
him if employees worked well or had trou-
ble. Evidence was presented that Mr. Vi-
ramontes opined that an employee who had
sent Mr. Slater an email critical of supervi-
sors and employees should be fired, and the
employee was fired. There is no evidence,
however, that Respondent considered Mr.
Viramontes’s opinion in firing the employee.
Milad Murad: supervised employees who worked on verti-
cal turret machines and ran jobs himself;
with Miguel Sedano, he prioritized job as-
signments,53 assigned work, showed em-
ployees what to do, gave advice, answered
employee questions regarding what machine
to use, other work matters and details, and
helped employees as needed. He was heard
to tell Miguel Sedano that Respondent
needed to get rid of an employee who made
too many mistakes, and the employee was
laid off.54
Hyun Kun Lee: day shift NC mill lead man; oversaw the
work of two mill machines and ran machines
himself. Employees asked him for help or
advice, and he demonstrated how jobs should
be done.

52 Viramontes testified that Conley gave out the welding work. I
find, however, that Viramontes also assigned work.
53 The evidence as prioritization was that Miguel Sedano informed
Milad Murad what jobs needed to be done; Milad Murad told Miguel
Sedano what machines were available, and Miguel Sedano decided to
which machine a job would be assigned.
54 This evidence does not create a reasonable inference that Milad
Murad effectively recommended the layoff.
ALLIED MECHANICAL, INC. 643
It is true that the above leadmen assign work to the employ-
ees they lead. However, that alone does not establish supervi-
sory authority. As the Board has consistently stated, “[Work]
assignment must be done with independent judgment before it
is considered to be supervisory under Section 2(11).”
McGraw-Hill Broadcasting Co., 329 NLRB 454, 459 (1999).
There is no evidence that any employee direction by the six
lead men demonstrated “the exercise of independent judgment
[rather than the] . . . routine decisions typical of lead men.”
Arlington Electric, above at 75. Assessment of employee
skills, such as that made by Jesus Sedano and Milad Murad,
without more, is not indicia of supervisory status. Williamette
Industries, Inc., 336 NLRB 743 (2001). Recommendation of
discipline, such as made by Milad Milad and Albert Viramon-
tes, does not establish supervisory authority unless evidence
shows the recommendations were effective, that is Respondent
followed them. MJ Metal Products, 325 NLRB 240 (1997).
There is no such evidence here. Additionally, the mere ability
to report employee problems to higher management does not
confer supervisory status. Passavant Health Center, 284
NLRB 887, 892 (1987). The party asserting supervisory status
carries the burden of proving it. Kentucky River Community
Care, 532 U.S. 706, 712–713 (2001); Dean & Deluca New
York, Inc., 338 NLRB 1046, 1047 (2003) (“The party asserting
[supervisory] status must establish it by a preponderance of the
evidence [citations omitted]”). Petitioner has not met its bur-
den of showing that the above lead men were supervisors at any
relevant time hereto. Accordingly, their conduct in entering the
polling area to vote in the election was not objectionable. I
recommend Objection 1 be overruled.
Objection 2: [S]upervisor Cliff Conley and [consultant and
agent] Eli Sandoval . . . [stood] . . . where employees exited the
plant on their way to the polling place. Conley had a Sony
digital camera around his neck capable of taking not just still
pictures but also videos. Conley and Sandoval stopped, ac-
companied, and talked to employees while the employees were
on their way to the polling place. Conley . . . surveilled . . .
employees in the stipulated bargaining unit.
On the day of the election, Conley wore a camera around his
neck to record, if necessary, problems with demonstrators gath-
ered in the company’s driveway.55 At 5:30 a.m., the day of the
election, he greeted employees and union supporters gathered at
the entrance gate, saying, “Today we’ll know; today it is finally
over.” During the course of the day, Conley directed employ-
ees exiting the shipping and receiving bay of building 1 to the
polling area in a separate building, a distance of approximately
176 feet. At about 6 a.m., Burnett told Conley that he was ille-
gally intimidating employees; Conley did not respond and con-
tinued to direct employees to the polls. Occasionally, Mark
Slater, Respondent’s president, Bechtol, and Sandoval joined

55 I credit Conley’s denial that he took any pictures or even turned
the camera on. Hays saw what he believed to be a camera flash out of
the corner of his eye and observed Conley shift the camera. A nonem-
ployee bystander told Hays that Conley was taking pictures. Hays’
testimony is based on his inferential perceptions and hearsay, which I
consider unreliable.
him. Conley only spoke to employees to direct them to the
polls.
No evidence was presented, and it seems unlikely, that any
employee needed direction to the polling area, which was in a
building adjacent to employees’ workplaces. The Board has
held the “continued presence of the Employer’s president at a
location where employees were required to pass in order to
enter the polling place was improper conduct[,]” which “inter-
fered with employees’ freedom of choice in the election [foot-
notes omitted].” Performance Measurements Co., 148 NLRB
1657, 1659 (1964). While there is no objectionable conduct in
Conley’s merely carrying a camera, I conclude his continued
presence where employees must pass by him to reach the poll-
ing area was improper. While Respondent stresses that
Conley’s distance from the polling area entrance was at least
150 feet, it is not the distance but the fact that employees had to
pass by him that is significant. Accordingly, I recommend
Objection 2 be sustained as to that conduct.
Objection 3 (as modified): Employee Hernandez was given a
raise.
Frederico Hernandez received a raise about 1 month prior to
the election. His work duties had earlier changed to include
pressure testing (a higher paid job) while his deburrer work
decreased. He requested and was granted a wage increase
commensurate with his added job responsibilities. Accord-
ingly, the Employer’s granting him a raise was not objection-
able. I recommend Objection 3 be overruled.
Objection 4: Days before the election, the employer reduced
the hours of stipulated bargaining unit employee Marcelo Pin-
heiro in retaliation for his union activities.
In conformity with my conclusions above, I find the evi-
dence does not support this objection. Accordingly, I recom-
mend Objection 4 be overruled.
Objection 5: Before the election, employee Marcelo Pin-
heiro was given a written warning . . . to retaliate against him
for his union activities.
In conformity with my conclusions above, I find the evi-
dence supports this objection. Accordingly, I recommend Ob-
jection 5 be sustained.
Objection 9: Before the election, and during the critical pe-
riod, the employer . . . removed union literature from normal
posting placed where employees are allowed to post papers
concerning matters of personal, nonwork related and work-
related matters, thereby imposing [a] discriminatory standard
for union propaganda.
In conformity with my conclusions above, I find the evi-
dence supports this objection. Accordingly, I recommend Ob-
jection 9 be sustained.
Petitioner’s Objections 3, 5, and 9 are meritorious and con-
stitute objectionable conduct affecting the results of the repre-
sentation election held on March 6. In light of my findings
with regard to the appropriateness of a bargaining order herein,
I recommend Case 31–RC–8202 be severed from the unfair
labor practice cases and remanded to the Regional Director for
appropriate action consistent with the bargaining order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD644
(a) Discriminatorily issuing written disciplinary notices to
Timothy Hays and Walter Reddoch.
(b) Discriminatorily discharging Timothy Hays and Walter
Reddoch.
(c) Discriminatorily issuing written disciplinary notices to
Marcelo Pinheiro.
2. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
(a) Impliedly and coercively telling an employee that Re-
spondent had retaliated against employees by reducing employ-
ees’ hours.
(b) Threatening an employee with unspecified reprisals by
telling him he would lose by supporting the Union.
(c) Discriminatorily prohibiting the posting of prounion lit-
erature.
3. The following unit of Respondent’s employees is appro-
priate for collective-bargaining purposes within the meaning of
Section 9(b) of the Act:
All full-time and regular part-time production, maintenance,
shipping and receiving employees and programmers em-
ployed by Respondent at its facility located at 1720 Bon
View, Ontario, California.
4. The Union has been at all times since January 23, and is,
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in said
unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
6. Respondent did not engage in any unfair labor practices
other than those found above.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Respondent having discriminatorily discharged Timothy
Hays and Walter Reddoch, it must offer them reinstatement and
make them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits,
computed on a quarterly basis from date of discharge to date of
proper offer of reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as
prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus
interest as computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987). The recommended Order will also provide
that Respondent bargain in good faith with the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the above-
described unit.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended56

56 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
ORDER
The Respondent, Allied Mechanical, Inc., its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Discharging any employee for supporting United Steel-
workers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC (the Union) and to dis-
courage employees from engaging in these activities.
(b) Disciplining any employee for supporting the Union.
(c) Discriminatorily prohibiting the posting of prounion lit-
erature.
(d) Impliedly and coercively telling any employee that Allied
Mechanical, Inc. (the Employer or the Company), had retaliated
against employees by reducing employees’ hours.
(e) Threatening any employee he will lose by supporting the
Union.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) On request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive rep-
resentative of the employees in the following appropriate unit
concerning terms and conditions of employment and, if an un-
derstanding is reached, embody the understanding in a signed
agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time production, maintenance,
shipping and receiving employees and programmers em-
ployed by Respondent at its facility located at 1720 Bon
View, Ontario, California.
(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Timo-
thy Hays and Walter Reddoch full reinstatement to their former
jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to a substantially equiva-
lent position, without prejudice to their seniority or any other
rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
(c) Make Timothy Hays and Walter Reddoch whole for any
loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against them in the manner set forth in the rem-
edy section of the decision.
(d) Expunge from its files any reference to Timothy Hays
and Walter Reddoch’s unlawful written discipline and dis-
charges and thereafter notify them in writing that this has been
done and that the discipline and discharges will not be used
against them in any way.
(e) Expunge from its files any reference to Marcelo Pin-
heiro’s unlawful written discipline and thereafter notify him in
writing that this has been done and that the discipline will not
be used against him in any way.
(f) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi-
tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause
shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board
or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other
records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored
in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of back pay
due under the terms of this Order.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Ontario, California, copies of the attached notice
ALLIED MECHANICAL, INC. 645
marked “Appendix.”57 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 31 after being signed by
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the no-
tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings,
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-

57 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
volved in these proceedings, Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by Respondent at any
time since January 23, 2003.
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case 31–RC–8202 be severed
from the other cases herein and remanded to the Regional Di-
rector for appropriate action consistent with the above-
bargaining order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.