Alled Mechanical Services, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 30, 2008

352 N.L.R.B. 662 (N.L.R.B. 2008)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
352 NLRB No. 83
662
Allied Mechanical Services, Inc. and Plumbers and
Pipefitters Local 357, United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing
and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and
Canada, AFL–CIO. Cases 7–CA–40907 and 7–
CA–41390
May 30, 2008
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
BY CHAIRMAN SCHAUMBER AND MEMBER LIEBMAN
On September 28, 2007, the National Labor Relations
Board issued its Supplemental Decision and Order in this
case.1 The Supplemental Decision and Order granted the
General Counsel’s and the Union’s motions for reconsid-
eration of the original Decision and Order2 and overruled
prior dismissals of allegations that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Specifically, the
Board found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) by withdrawing recognition from Local 357 on
July 22, 1998, by revising its job application procedure
without notice to Local 357 on August 1, 1998, and by
failing to provide a response to Local 357’s July 29,
1998 information request.
In finding these violations, the Board applied its recent
decision in Raymond F. Kravis Center for the Perform-
ing Arts, 351 NLRB 144 (2007) (Kravis), which over-
ruled the “due process” standard for union mergers and
held that, following a union merger or affiliation, an em-
ployer’s obligation to recognize and bargain with the
union continues regardless of whether the union mem-
bers were provided an opportunity to vote on the merger
or affiliation.3 The Board also addressed other rationales
set forth by the judge for dismissal of the 8(a)(5) allega-
tions. Among other things, the Board found, contrary to
the judge, that the parties had a 9(a) bargaining relation-
ship, rather than an 8(f) relationship. Finally, as part of
its remedy for the 8(a)(5) violations, the Board ordered
the Respondent to recognize and bargain with the Union
as the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit
employees.
On November 16, 2007, the Respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and a supporting brief, contending
that the Board erred in applying Kravis retroactively, in
finding that the parties had a 9(a) relationship, and in
ordering the Respondent to recognize and bargain with
the Union. The Respondent also contended that the

1 351 NLRB 80.
2 341 NLRB 1084 (2004).
3 Only where the merger or affiliation resulted in changes so signifi-
cant as to alter the identity of the bargaining representative will the
bargaining obligation cease.
Board should remand the case to the judge to apply the
Board’s subsequent decision in Toering Electric Co., 351
NLRB 226 (2007). The General Counsel and the Union
filed answering briefs.4
Having duly considered the matter, the Board5 finds
that the Respondent’s motion fails to present “extraordi-
nary circumstances” warranting reconsideration under
Section 102.48(d)(1) of the Board’s Rules and Regula-
tions.6
I. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF KRAVIS
In its motion, the Respondent contends that the
Board’s retroactive application of Kravis would cause
manifest injustice. In determining whether the retroactive
application of a Board decision will cause manifest injus-
tice, the Board balances three factors: “[1] the reliance of
the parties on preexisting law; [2] the effect of retroactiv-
ity on accomplishment of the purposes of the Act; and
[3] any particular injustice arising from retroactive appli-
cation.” SNE Enterprises, 344 NLRB 673, 673 (2005)
(citing cases).
We addressed the first factor in our Supplemental De-
cision and Order. There, we found that the Respondent
could not have justifiably relied on the due process stan-
dard as a well-settled requirement when it withdrew rec-
ognition from Local 357 in 1998 because the Supreme
Court cast grave uncertainty on that standard in NLRB v.
Financial Institution Employees (Seattle-First National
Bank), 475 U.S. 192 (1986). In that case, the Court held
that the Board lacks authority to discontinue an em-
ployer’s obligation to recognize a union after a merger
unless the merger raises a question concerning represen-
tation. We further explained that, in cases subsequent to
the Supreme Court’s Seattle-First decision, the Board
refrained from relying on a union’s failure to meet the
due process standard as a basis for finding that an em-
ployer lawfully withdrew recognition from the union.
As our Supplemental Decision and Order inadvertently
failed to address the second and third factors, we shall do

4 The Respondent also filed a statement of additional authority.
5 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Schaumber and Member Liebman constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act.
6 Insofar as the Respondent’s motion seeks reconsideration of the
Board’s Order requiring the Respondent to recognize and bargain with
the Union, the motion is denied for the reasons stated in the Supple-
mental Decision and Order, which fully sets forth the basis for requir-
ing the Respondent to recognize and bargain with the Union. See 351
NLRB 80, 86–87.
ALLIED MECHANICAL SERVICES 663
so here. Regarding the second factor, we find that retro-
active application of Kravis would further the purposes
of the Act because, as the Supreme Court explained in
Seattle-First, permitting an employer to withdraw from a
bargaining relationship when there is no question con-
cerning representation is contrary to the Act. Moreover,
no statutory purpose is served by having a question con-
cerning representation resolved solely by those bargain-
ing unit employees who are union members, as the “due
process” standard contemplated.7
Turning to the third factor, we find that no particular
injustice would arise from retroactive application of
Kravis. As discussed above, in view of Seattle-First
National Bank’s rationale and the Board’s subsequent
decisions, the Respondent could not have justifiably re-
lied on the Board’s “due process” standard when it de-
cided to withdraw recognition. Notably, the Respondent
asserted no other basis for its claim that it would suffer
injustice from retroactive application of Kravis.
The Respondent further argues that the language of the
Act permits the Board to retain the due process require-
ment, and that the Board’s decision to abandon that re-
quirement simply represents a new policy choice. We
find no merit in this argument. As stated above and dis-
cussed more thoroughly in Kravis, Seattle-First stressed
that the Board lacks authority to allow an employer to
withdraw from a bargaining relationship absent a ques-
tion concerning representation. As the Court stated there,
“where affiliation does not raise a question of representa-
tion, the statute gives the Board no authority to act.” Se-
attle-First, 475 U.S. at 203.
In sum, retroactive application of Kravis here would
not cause manifest injustice and is required by Seattle-
First.
II. THE 9(A) BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP
The Respondent also contends that the Board’s finding
that the parties had a 9(a) bargaining relationship is erro-
neous. The Board based this finding on two independent
grounds. First, the Board found that the parties’ 1991
settlement agreement, which resolved a complaint alleg-
ing that the Respondent had committed numerous viola-
tions of Section 8(a)(1) and (3), demonstrated that the

7 The Respondent contends that Kravis overturned the due process
requirement in order to relieve merging unions from any obligation to
show majority support, absent a question concerning representation.
The Respondent further contends that, because it already has withdrawn
recognition from the Union, retroactive application of Kravis here
would not further that purpose, for it would not prevent the Union from
having to make a majority showing. We fail to see the logic in this
argument. Application of Kravis here does, in fact, restore the Respon-
dent’s obligation to recognize and bargain with the Union without
requiring the Union to show majority support.
parties had established a 9(a) relationship. Second, the
Board found that its prior decision in Allied Mechanical
Services, 332 NLRB 1600 (2001),8 precluded the Re-
spondent from making the argument that the parties
merely had an 8(f) relationship. The Board concluded
that the 2001 decision, which held that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) in 1995–1996 by, among other
things, making unilateral changes and engaging in over-
all bad-faith bargaining, was necessarily premised on the
existence of a 9(a) relationship. Accordingly, the Board
held that the Respondent was barred, under the principles
of collateral estoppel, from relitigating whether the par-
ties had a 9(a) bargaining relationship.
A. The 1991 Settlement Agreement
In the 1991 settlement agreement, the Respondent
agreed to “recognize and, upon request, bargain” with
Local 337 “as the exclusive collective bargaining repre-
sentative of the [unit] employees . . . with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment” and “if an understanding is reached, em-
body it in a signed collective-bargaining agreement.” The
Board found that, “given that (a) Local 337 demanded
recognition as the employees’ majority representative
and offered to demonstrate proof of majority status; (b)
the settlement agreement resolved a complaint alleging
that Local 337 represented a majority of the unit employ-
ees and sought a Gissel bargaining order because a fair
election could not be held; and (c) the settlement agree-
ment imposed obligations on the Respondent to recog-
nize and bargain with Local 337 that went beyond obli-
gations that could be imposed by an 8(f) relationship and
are characteristic of 9(a) relationships, it is clear that the
parties intended to establish a 9(a) relationship.” 351
NLRB at 80, 84.
Nothing in the Respondent’s motion warrants recon-
sideration of our conclusion that the settlement agree-
ment demonstrated that the parties had established a 9(a)
relationship. In addition to the reasons set forth in our
Supplemental Decision and Order, we find it significant
that the language in the settlement agreement requiring
the Respondent to recognize and bargain with the Union
was identical, in all relevant respects, with the com-
plaint’s request for relief. More specifically, the com-
plaint, which sought a Gissel9 bargaining order on the
premise that a majority of the employees in an appropri-
ate unit had designated the Union as their exclusive rep-
resentative and that there was little possibility of holding
a fair election, requested that the Respondent be ordered
to:

8 Referred to herein as the “2001 case.”
9 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD664
Recognize and, upon request, bargain in good faith
with the Charging [Party] Union as the exclusive col-
lective bargaining representative of the employees in
the Unit respecting rates of pay, wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment; and if an
understanding is reached, embody it in a signed agree-
ment.
This language clearly contemplated a 9(a) relationship, as it
was designed to bestow on the Union the same status it
would have enjoyed following an election victory and to
require the Respondent to bargain toward a collective-
bargaining agreement.
The settlement agreement provided exactly what the
complaint requested. As noted above, it obligated the
Respondent to “recognize and, upon request, bargain”
with Local 337 “as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the [unit] employees . . . with respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment” and “if an understanding is
reached, embody it in a signed collective-bargaining
agreement.” Because the recognition and bargaining lan-
guage used in the settlement agreement was identical to
that sought in the complaint, we find that the agreement
demonstrates the parties’ intent to establish a 9(a) rela-
tionship as contemplated by the complaint. Indeed, had
the parties intended to establish a relationship other than
one prescribed by Section 9(a), they certainly would
have used language different from the very language set
forth in the complaint.10
In contending that a 9(a) relationship was not proven,
the Respondent, among other things, points to the fact
that the Union’s offer to show evidence of majority sup-
port preceded the settlement agreement by 14 months.
We find no merit in this contention. As stated above, the
complaint sought a Gissel bargaining order on the prem-
ise that there was little possibility of erasing the effects
of the alleged serious unfair labor practices committed by
the Respondent and conducting a fair election despite the
use of traditional remedies. In these circumstances, it
would be illogical to require the Union to demonstrate
majority support shortly before the parties entered into
the agreement settling the complaint. We note that the

10 The Respondent contends that it is of no consequence that the set-
tlement agreement’s recognition and bargaining language was virtually
identical to the Board’s customary remedial language for 9(a) with-
drawal of recognition violations, and differed from the remedial orders
for 8(f) midcontract withdrawal of recognition violations. We find no
merit in the Respondent’s contention; further, we find it particularly
significant that the recognition and bargaining provision in the settle-
ment agreement replicated the language of the complaint’s request for
relief, which, as discussed above, unquestionably sought establishment
of a 9(a) relationship.
Supreme Court in Gissel explained that an otherwise
warranted bargaining order could be issued where there
is also a showing that “at one point the union had a ma-
jority.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 614
(emphasis supplied). Thus, the circumstances here differ
significantly from those cases in which the parties con-
test whether they have a 9(a) or 8(f) relationship under a
collective-bargaining agreement that may be ambiguous
regarding the nature of the bargaining relationship. In
such cases, the union’s failure to offer to show majority
support when the agreement was made may be important
in determining the parties’ relationship. See, e.g.,
Donaldson Traditional Interiors, 345 NLRB 1298
(2005). We find that the Union’s offer to demonstrate
majority status was made sufficiently close to the time
that the Respondent agreed to recognize the Union to
demonstrate an intent to create a 9(a) relationship.
B. Collateral Estoppel
Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, “once an is-
sue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive
in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action
involving a party to the prior litigation.” Big D Service
Co., 293 NLRB 322, 323 (1989) (citing Parklane Ho-
siery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 fn. 5 (1979);
Marlene Industries Corp. v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 1011,
1015–1016 (6th Cir. 1983)). An issue is “necessarily
determined” if its adjudication was necessary to support
the judgment entered in the prior proceeding. Marlene
Industries, 712 F.2d at 1015.
The Respondent contends that the question of whether
the parties’ relationship was governed by Sections 8(f) or
9(a) was not actually litigated in the 2001 case. The Re-
spondent therefore asserts that the Board erred in finding
that the Respondent was collaterally estopped from con-
tending in the present case that the parties had an 8(f)
relationship. As discussed below, we find that the Re-
spondent has failed to demonstrate “material error,” as
required by Section 102.48(d)(1) of the Board’s Rules
and Regulations.
The General Counsel’s complaint in the 2001 case al-
leged in paragraph 9 that the Union was the 9(a) repre-
sentative of the bargaining unit employees. The Respon-
dent’s answer denied the allegation. Thus, the question of
whether the Union was the 9(a) representative of the em-
ployees was squarely placed in issue. The complaint fur-
ther alleged that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
by making unilateral changes, bypassing Local 337, re-
fusing to furnish information, and engaging in overall
bad-faith bargaining. The Board found that the Respon-
dent had committed these alleged unfair labor practices.
ALLIED MECHANICAL SERVICES 665
As explained in our Supplemental Decision and Order,11
finding these 8(a)(5) violations necessarily was premised
on a finding that a 9(a) relationship existed between the
Respondent and the Union, because an 8(f) relationship
imposes no enforceable bargaining duties in the absence
of a collective-bargaining agreement. Thus, in finding
the 8(a)(5) violations, “the Board necessarily determined
that the bargaining relationship between the Respondent
and Local 337 was governed by Section 9(a).”12
In support of its argument that the question of whether
the parties’ relationship was governed by Section 8(f) or
Section 9(a) was not actually litigated in the 2001 case,
the Respondent points to statements in the parties’ briefs
in that case. In its brief in support of exceptions (at 2),
the Respondent argued that the judge improperly found
that the Union was the certified bargaining representative
of the Respondent’s employees, stating:
First, the parties did not litigate whether the Union was
the certified bargaining representative of AMS’ em-
ployees. The issue was not necessary for a determina-
tion of the unfair labor practice charges. AMS [the Re-
spondent] has agreed that it voluntarily recognized the
Union in July of 1991 and that based upon that volun-
tary recognition, it had a bargaining obligation at all
times relevant to these charges.
The Respondent then went on to argue that the General
Counsel had failed to prove that it had a 9(a) relationship
with the Union, specifically contending that the settlement
agreement “fails to provide the basis for finding a 9(a) rela-
tionship.” (Brief at 4, fn. 3.)
In its answering brief in the 2001 case, the Union con-
ceded that it had not gained representational status
through certification by the Board. Instead, the Union
asserted that it had achieved 9(a) status through the Re-
spondent’s voluntary recognition. Following its principal

11 351 NLRB 80, 84 (2007).
12 Id. The Respondent disputes this conclusion, contending that the
settlement agreement itself was an 8(f) agreement and imposed on the
Respondent’s bargaining duties, the breach of which violated Sec.
8(a)(5). Even if the settlement agreement was the sole basis for finding
a 9(a) relationship in the 2001 case, the Respondent simply tries to
relitigate an issue it lost in that case. Moreover, we find no basis for
this argument on its own terms. To foster stability in the construction
industry, Sec. 8(f) permits construction industry employers and unions
to enter into collective-bargaining agreements without regard to
whether the union has attained majority status. See John Deklewa &
Sons, 282 NLRB 1375, 1380 (1987) (discussion of legislative history),
enfd. 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 488 U.S. 889 (1988).
The settlement agreement was not a collective-bargaining agreement. It
established no terms and conditions of employment for the bargaining
unit employees.
argument on this point, the Union’s brief (at 14)13 con-
tained an alternative argument that the Respondent’s
stipulations had resolved the issue:
The above discussion notwithstanding, in the ultimate
analysis, the issue of the Union’s status is not ripe for
decision at this juncture. For the purposes of the instant
cases, Respondent stipulated at trial that it had both an
obligation to bargain with the Union, and to provide in-
formation requested by the Union that was necessary
and relevant to the Union’s ability to carry out its duties
as the collective bargaining representative of the unit
employees. Although the issue of the Union’s represen-
tational status may become ripe at some point in the fu-
ture should Respondent refuse to continue in negotia-
tions, or withdraw recognition from the Union, the
Board need not address the issue within the scope of
these proceedings, especially in light of the fact that the
parties did not litigate the issue at trial.
Despite the Union’s apparent acknowledgement that
the parties had not litigated the issue of whether the Un-
ion was a 9(a) representative of the employees, we find
that the issue was actually litigated. An issue need not be
actively litigated at trial in order to be actually litigated
for purposes of collaterally estopping a party from reliti-
gating that issue. Otherwise, admissions in answers, fail-
ure to contest material facts in summary judgment dispo-
sitions, and stipulations or failures to present evidence at
trial would have no issue preclusion consequences. See
Abbott Bank v. Armstrong, 44 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 1995)
(issue of whether bank was creditor held “actually liti-
gated” in prior case, where creditor status had not been
judicially resolved but, rather, was “inherent” and neces-
sary to judgment in case and was admitted in answer). As
set forth above, the complaint specifically alleged that
the Union was the 9(a) representative of the unit employ-
ees, and the Respondent’s answer denied the allegation.
The Respondent’s brief argued that 9(a) status had not
been proven, while the Union’s brief contended that 9(a)
status had been shown. The 1991 settlement agreement,
which is evidence of the Union’s claim to 9(a) status,
apparently was entered in the record, and the parties
made reference to it. Although the Respondent asserted
in its brief that the parties had not litigated whether the
Union was the certified bargaining representative of its
employees, that question is not the same as the question
of whether the Union was a 9(a) representative.

13 The Respondent’s motion to enter into the record its exceptions
and supporting brief and the Union’s answering brief in Case 7–CA–
38022 is granted.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD666
Moreover, to the extent that the parties may have be-
lieved that it was unnecessary to litigate the Union’s ma-
jority status, this belief apparently was based on the Re-
spondent’s own admissions. Thus, the Respondent’s
brief, as quoted above, stated: “AMS has agreed that it
voluntarily recognized the Union in July of 1991 and that
based upon that voluntary recognition, it had a bargain-
ing obligation at all times relevant to these charges.”
Given that, as discussed above, any bargaining obligation
the Respondent had necessarily was premised on a 9(a)
relationship, the Respondent’s statement that, based on
its voluntary recognition of the Union, it “had a bargain-
ing obligation at all times relevant to these charges,” was
tantamount to admitting that the Union enjoyed 9(a)
status. Consequently, we adhere to both bases for our
finding that the parties had a 9(a) bargaining relationship,
rather than an 8(f) relationship: that the 1991 settlement
agreement demonstrated the existence of a 9(a) relation-
ship, and that the Respondent was collaterally estopped
from relitigating whether the parties had a 9(a) bargain-
ing relationship.
III. APPLICATION OF TOERING ELECTRIC
Finally, we deny the Respondent’s motion to remand
the case to the judge to apply Toering Electric Co., 351
NLRB 226 (2007). In our 2004 decision in this case,14
we found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act by, among other things, refusing to
consider for employment and hire four union members
who applied for jobs. Subsequent to issuance of our Sup-
plemental Decision and Order in this case,15 which ad-
dressed only the 8(a)(5) allegations, the Board issued its

14 341 NLRB 1084 (2004).
15 351 NLRB 80 (2007).
decision in Toering, which modified the elements of
proof in refusal-to-hire cases.16 The Respondent now
seeks to apply Toering to the violations that the Board
found in 2004.
We deny as untimely and lacking in merit the Respon-
dent’s motion to remand the case to the judge to apply
Toering. Section 102.48(d)(1) of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations requires that motions for reconsideration be
filed within 28 days after service of the Board’s decision.
Neither the Respondent nor any other party sought re-
consideration of the Board’s 2004 refusal-to-hire find-
ings. Reconsideration was sought regarding only the
Board’s dismissal of 8(a)(5) allegations, and the Board’s
2007 Supplemental Decision and Order concerned only
the 8(a)(5) allegations. Thus, the Respondent’s motion
for reconsideration of the refusal-to-hire violations is
untimely.
Moreover, by their terms, the rules announced in Toer-
ing apply only to “pending cases” at the time of Toer-
ing’s issuance (as well as future cases). See Toering
Electric, supra at 335 fn. 56. As the present case was
decided prior to the decision in Toering, the Respon-
dent’s motion to remand fails because this case does not
fall within the ambit of cases to which Toering applies.
ORDER
It is ordered that the Respondent’s motion for recon-
sideration is denied.

16 Toering held that “proof of an applicant’s genuine job interest is
an element of the General Counsel’s prima facie case under FES. [I]f at
a hearing on the merits, the employer puts forward evidence reasonably
calling into question the applicant’s genuine interest in employment,
the General Counsel must prove the applicant’s genuine interest by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to prove that the applicant is an
employee within the meaning of Section 2(3).” Toering Electric, supra
at 335.