Adriana���s Insurance Services, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

May 31, 2016

364 NLRB No. 17 (N.L.R.B. 2016)

364 NLRB No. 17
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Adriana’s Insurance Services, Inc.; Just Auto Insur-
ance Services, Inc.; Veronica’s Auto Insurance
Services, Inc. and Aldo Alpizar and Liset
Viamontes. Cases 31–CA–113416, 31–CA–
113417, 31–CA–113420, 31–CA–113423, 31–CA–
113425, and 31–CA–113428
May 31, 2016
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS MISCIMARRA, HIROZAWA,
AND MCFERRAN
On April 7, 2015, Administrative Law Judge Mary
Miller Cracraft issued the attached decision. Respond-
ents Adriana’s Insurance Services, Inc. (Adriana’s) and
Just Auto Insurance Services, Inc. (Just Auto) filed joint
exceptions and a supporting brief, Respondent Veroni-
ca’s Auto Insurance Services, Inc. (Veronica’s) filed
separate exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel filed an answering brief, and Respondents
Adriana’s and Just Auto filed a joint reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The judge found, applying the Board’s decision in D.
R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in rele-
vant part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), and Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (2014), enf. denied in rele-
vant part 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), that the Re-
spondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by enforc-
ing an arbitration agreement that requires employees to
waive their rights to pursue class or collective actions
involving employment-related claims in all forums,
whether arbitral or judicial. The judge also found, rely-
ing on D. R. Horton and U-Haul of California, 347
NLRB 375, 377–378 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed. Appx. 527
(D.C. Cir. 2007), that the maintaining of the arbitration
agreement by the Respondents Adriana’s Insurance Ser-
vices, Inc. (Adriana’s) and Veronica’s Auto Insurance
Services, Inc. (Veronica’s) violated Section 8(a)(1) be-
cause employees reasonably would believe that it bars or
restricts their right to file unfair labor practice charges
with the Board.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and, based on the
judge’s application of D. R. Horton and Murphy Oil, we
affirm1 the judge’s rulings,2 findings,3 and conclusions4

1 The Respondents assert that the D. R. Horton decision is invalid
because it was issued by a panel that included Member Becker. The
appointment of Member Becker was constitutionally valid and had not

expired, and thus the Board had a quorum at the time it issued D. R.
Horton. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.Ct. 2550 (2014); Mathew
Enterprise, Inc. v. NLRB, 771 F.3d 812, 814 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Gestamp
South Carolina, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 769 F.3d 254, 257–258 (4th Cir.
2014); Entergy Mississippi, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 89 (2014), affd. in
part, revd. in part on other grounds 810 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2015).
The Respondents additionally argue that Regional Director Mori
Pam Rubin was appointed at a time when the Board lacked a quorum,
and therefore lacked authority to issue and prosecute the complaint.
We reject this argument for the reasons stated in Prime Healthcare
Centinela, d/b/a Centinela Hospital Medical Center, 363 NLRB No.
44, slip op. at 1 fn. 2 (2015). See also Pallet Cos., 361 NLRB No. 33,
slip op. at 1–2 (2014).
Finally, we reject the Respondents’ argument that the Acting Gen-
eral Counsel was not properly “appointed.” The Respondents cite the
decision in Hooks v. Kitsap Tenant Support Services, 2013 WL
4094344 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 13, 2013), as supporting a finding that the
Acting General Counsel was not properly “appointed” under the Feder-
al Vacancies Reform Act and therefore lacked authority to delegate his
responsibilities to Regional Director Rubin.
At the outset, we note that under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act
(FVRA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345 et seq., a person is not “appointed” to serve
in an acting capacity in a vacant office that otherwise would be filled
by appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. Rather, either the first assistant to the vacant office per-
forms the functions and duties of the office in an acting capacity by
operation of law pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(1), or the President
directs another person to perform the functions and duties of the vacant
office in an acting capacity pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2) or (3).
On June 18, 2010, the President directed Lafe Solomon, then-
Director of the NLRB’s Office of Representation Appeals, to serve as
Acting General Counsel pursuant to subsection (a)(3)—the senior
agency employee provision. Under the strictures of that provision,
Solomon was eligible to serve as Acting General Counsel at the time
the President directed him to do so. See S. W. General, Inc. v. NLRB,
796 F.3d 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015), rehearing en banc denied, Nos. 14–1107
& 14–1121, 2016 U.S.App.LEXIS 981 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 2016). Thus,
Solomon properly assumed the duties of Acting General Counsel and
we find no merit in the Respondents’ affirmative defense that the Act-
ing General Counsel was “improperly and unlawfully appointed.”
We acknowledge that the court in S. W. General also held that Sol-
omon lost his authority as Acting General Counsel on January 5, 2011,
when the President nominated him to be General Counsel. While that
question is still in litigation, the Respondent never raised that argument
in this proceeding, and we find that it has waived the right do so.
Finally, on October 22, 2015, General Counsel Richard F. Griffin,
Jr., issued a Notice of Ratification which states, in relevant part,
I was confirmed as General Counsel on November 4, 2013. After ap-
propriate review and consultation with my staff, I have decided that
the issuance of the complaint in this case and its continued prosecution
are a proper exercise of the General Counsel’s broad and unreviewa-
ble discretion under section 3(d) of the Act.
My action does not reflect an agreement with the appellate court rul-
ing in S.W. General. Rather, my ratification authorizes the continued
prosecution of this matter and facilitates the timely resolution of the
charges that I have found meritorious. Congress expressly exempted
“the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board” from
the FVRA provisions that would otherwise preclude the ratification of
certain actions of other persons found to have served in violation of
the FVRA. [Citation omitted.]
For the foregoing reasons, I hereby ratify the issuance and continued
prosecution of the complaint.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2

Even if the Respondent had not previously waived its right to chal-
lenge the continued authority of the Acting General Counsel following
his nomination by the President, this ratification by the General Coun-
sel would render moot any argument that the S. W. General holding
concerning the former Acting General Counsel’s authority precludes
further litigation in this matter.
The Respondents filed a response to the Notice of Ratification on
December 4, 2015, arguing that General Counsel Griffin lacks the
authority to ratify the actions taken by former Acting General Counsel
Solomon because those actions were void under S. W. General. We
reject this argument. The Respondent has misstated the holding of S.
W. General. In that case the court recognized that the General Counsel
of the National Labor Relations Board is one of several officers ex-
pressly exempted from the “void-ab-initio” and “no ratification” provi-
sions of the FVRA. 796 F.3d at 78–79, citing 5 U.S.C. § 3348(e)(1).
Therefore, the court treated the actions of an improperly serving Acting
General Counsel as “voidable, not void,” and indicated that any statuto-
ry defect in actions could be cured through ratification by a subsequent,
properly appointed General Counsel. Id. (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 3348);
see also Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Office of Thrift Supervision,
139 F.3d 203 (D.C.Cir.1998); Federal Election Commission v. Legi–
Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Indeed, the court held that the
Board’s order finding the violation in S. W. General “did not ratify or
otherwise render harmless the FVRA defect in the ULP complaint”
precisely because, given the scope of prosecutorial discretion under the
Act, it could not be confident that the underlying complaint would have
been issued by a different General Counsel. 796 F.3d at 80–81. Here,
there is no such uncertainty: the issuance of the complaint and its con-
tinued prosecution have been expressly ratified by General Counsel
Griffin.
2 Respondents Adriana’s and Veronica’s argue that the judge erred
in excluding from evidence a new arbitration agreement they assertedly
have adopted, which they claim clearly permits filing charges with the
Board. The mere adoption of a new rule, without more, does not serve
as a defense to an unfair labor practice finding. See New Passages
Behavioral Health & Rehab, 362 NLRB No. 55, slip op. at 1–2 (2015);
Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, 237 NLRB 138, 138–139 (1978).
Accordingly, the judge’s evidentiary ruling was not an abuse of discre-
tion. The Respondents may introduce any new agreement at the com-
pliance stage of these proceedings to show they have rescinded the
unlawful agreement.
3 The Respondents argue that the complaint is time barred by Sec.
10 (b) because the initial unfair labor practice charge was filed and
served more than 6 months after the Charging Parties signed and be-
came subject to the Agreement for Binding Arbitration. We reject this
argument because the Respondents continued to maintain the unlawful
agreement during the 6-month period preceding the filing of the initial
charge. The Board has long held under these circumstances that
maintenance of an unlawful workplace rule, such as the Respondents’
arbitration policy, constitutes a continuing violation that is not time
barred by Sec. 10(b). See PJ Cheese, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 177, slip op.
at 1 (2015); Neiman Marcus Group, 362 NLRB No. 157, slip op. at 2 &
fn. 6 (2015); and Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC, 362 NLRB No. 27,
slip op. at 2 & fn. 7 (2015).
The dissent asserts that “[t]he class-action waiver agreements were
voluntarily signed, even though the Respondents were willing to hire
employees or continue their employment only if they entered into the
agreements” This assertion does not withstand scrutiny. Under estab-
lished law in Horton and the many cases following it, the material
question is whether the employees were required to sign the waiver
agreements “as a condition of their employment.” D. R. Horton, supra,
357 NLRB at 2277. By the dissent’s own admission, they were.
Moreover, employees who sign the agreements after being told that, if
they don’t sign, they can look elsewhere for a job, can hardly be said to
and adopt the recommended Order as modified and set
forth in full below.5

have signed “voluntarily.” In any event, the Board holds that an arbi-
tration agreement that, as applied, precludes collective action in all
forums is unlawful even if entered into voluntarily, because it requires
employees to prospectively waive their Sec. 7 right to engage in con-
certed activity. See Haynes Building Services, 363 NLRB No. 125, slip
op. at 3 fn. 12; Bristol Farms, 363 NLRB No. 45 (2015); On Assign-
ment Staffing Services, 362 NLRB No. 189, slip op. at 1, 5–8 (2015).
We accordingly need not pass on whether the agreements here are
voluntary.
The Respondents argue that their arbitration policy includes an ex-
emption allowing employees to file charges with a governmental agen-
cy, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and thus
does not, as in D. R. Horton, unlawfully prohibit them from collectively
pursuing litigation of employment claims in all forums. In support of
their argument, the Respondents cite Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702
F.3d 1050, 1053–1054 (8th Cir. 2013), in which the court stated, in
dicta, that the arbitration agreement there did not bar all concerted
employee activity in pursuit of employment claims because the agree-
ment permitted employees to file charges with administrative agencies
that could file suit on behalf of a class of employees. We reject the
Respondents’ argument for the reasons set forth in SolarCity Corp., 363
NLRB No. 83 (2015).
4 Our dissenting colleague, relying on his dissenting position in
Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014), would find
that the Respondents’ arbitration agreement does not violate Sec.
8(a)(1). He observes that the Act does not “dictate” any particular
procedures for the litigation of non-NLRA claims, and “creates no
substantive right for employees to insist on class-type treatment” of
such claims. This is all surely correct, as the Board has previously
explained in Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 2, and Bristol Farms, 363
NLRB No. 45, slip op. at 2 & fn. 2 (2015). But what our colleague
ignores is that the Act “does create a right to pursue joint, class, or
collective claims if and as available, without the interference of an
employer-imposed restraint.” Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 2 (empha-
sis in original). The Respondents’ agreement is just such an unlawful
restraint.
Likewise, for the reasons explained in Murphy Oil and Bristol
Farms, there is no merit to our colleague’s view that finding the agree-
ment unlawful runs afoul of employees’ Sec. 7 right to “refrain from”
engaging in protected concerted activity. See Murphy Oil, above, slip
op. at 18; Bristol Farms, above, slip op. at 2. Nor is he correct in insist-
ing that Sec. 9(a) of the Act requires the Board to permit individual
employees to prospectively waive their Sec. 7 right to engage in con-
certed legal activity. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 17–18; Bristol
Farms, above, slip op. at 2.
Further, we reject the position of the Respondents and our dissenting
colleague that the Respondents’ motion to compel individual arbitration
was protected by the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. In Bill John-
son’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 747 (1983), the Court identi-
fied two situations in which a lawsuit enjoys no such protection: where
the action is beyond a State court’s jurisdiction because of Federal
preemption, and where “a suit . . . has an objective that is illegal under
federal law.” 461 U. S. at 737 fn. 5. Thus, the Board may properly
restrain litigation efforts such as the Respondent’s motion to compel
arbitration that have the illegal objective of limiting employees’ Sec. 7
rights and enforcing an unlawful contractual provision, even if the
litigation was otherwise meritorious or reasonable. See Murphy Oil,
supra, slip op. at 20–21; Convergys Corp., 363 NLRB No. 51, slip op.
at 2 fn. 5 (2015).
5 We amend the judge’s remedy and shall order the Respondents to
reimburse Charging Parties Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes and any
ADRIANA’S INSURANCE SERVICES 3
ORDER
A. The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Adriana’s Insurance Services, Inc., Rancho
Cucamonga, California, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining an Arbitration Agreement and
Agreement for Binding Arbitration that employees rea-
sonably would believe bars or restricts the right to file
charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
(b) Enforcing an arbitration agreement in a manner
that requires employees to waive the right to maintain
class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral
or judicial.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the unlawful Arbitration Agreement and
Agreement for Binding Arbitration in all of their forms,
or revise them in all of their forms to make clear to em-
ployees that each Agreement does not bar or restrict em-
ployees’ right to file charges with the National Labor
Relations Board.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who
signed the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or to
whom the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or the Ar-
bitration Agreement was presented that they have been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy
of the revised Agreements.

other plaintiffs for all reasonable expenses and legal fees, with interest,
incurred in opposing the Respondents’ unlawful motion in State court
to compel individual arbitration of their class or collective claims. See
Bill Johnson’s Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 747 (1983) (“If a
violation is found, the Board may order the employer to reimburse the
employees whom he had wrongfully sued for their attorneys’ fees and
other expenses” as well as “any other proper relief that would effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.”). Interest shall be computed in the manner
prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded
daily as prescribed in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB 6
(2010). See Teamsters Local 776 (Rite Aid), 305 NLRB 832, 835 fn.
10 (1991) (“[I]n make-whole orders for suits maintained in violation of
the Act, it is appropriate and necessary to award interest on litigation
expenses”), enfd. 973 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1992).
We shall also amend the judge’s remedy to order the Respondent to
notify the state superior and appellate court that it has rescinded or
revised the Arbitration Agreement and Agreement for Binding Arbitra-
tion and to inform these courts that it no longer opposes the Charging
Parties Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes’ lawsuit on the basis of the
Arbitration Agreement and Agreement for Binding Arbitration.
Finally, we shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform
to our findings, the amended remedy, and to the Board’s standard re-
medial language, and we shall substitute new notices to conform to the
Order as modified.
(c) Notify the Superior Court of California, County of
Los Angeles, Central Civil West, in Case Number
BC502472 and the California Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division Three, in Case Number
BC502472 that it has rescinded or revised the Agreement
for Binding Arbitration and the Arbitration Agreement
upon which it based its motion to compel arbitration of
the claims of Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes, and
inform the court that it no longer opposes their lawsuit on
the basis of the Agreement for Binding Arbitration and
the Arbitration Agreement.
(d) In the manner set forth in this decision, reimburse
Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes and any other plain-
tiffs for any reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation ex-
penses that they may have incurred in opposing the Re-
spondent’s motion to compel individual arbitration.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Rancho Cucamonga, California location copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix A,”6 and at all other
locations where the Arbitration Agreement and Agree-
ment for Binding Arbitration have been maintained, cop-
ies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B.”7 Copies
of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director
for Region 31, after being signed by the Respondent's
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Re-
spondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physi-
cal posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or
an internet site, or other electronic means, if the Re-
spondent customarily communicates with its employees
by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facilities
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall du-

6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notices reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
7 See fn. 6 above.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
plicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
marked “Appendix A” to all current employees and for-
mer employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since March 13, 2013, and any former employees against
whom the Respondent has enforced its arbitration
agreements since March 13, 2013. If the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed any facilities other than
the ones involved in these proceedings, the Respondent
shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the notice marked “Appendix B” to all current employees
and former employees employed by the Respondent at
those facilities at any time since August 23, 2011.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 31 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
B. The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Veronica’s Auto Insurance Services, Inc.,
San Bernardino, California, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining an Arbitration Agreement and
Agreement for Binding Arbitration that employees rea-
sonably would believe bars or restricts the right to file
charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
(b) Enforcing an arbitration agreement in a manner
that requires employees to waive the right to maintain
class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral
or judicial.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the unlawful Arbitration Agreement and
Agreement for Binding Arbitration in all of their forms,
or revise them in all of their forms to make clear to em-
ployees that each Agreement does not bar or restrict em-
ployees’ right to file charges with the National Labor
Relations Board.
(b) Notify all current and former employees who
signed the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or to
whom the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or the Ar-
bitration Agreement was presented that it has been re-
scinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy of
the revised Agreements.
(c) Notify the Superior Court of California, County of
Los Angeles, Central Civil West, in Case Number
BC502472 and the California Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division Three, in Case Number
BC502472 that it has rescinded or revised the Agreement
for Binding Arbitration and the Arbitration Agreement
upon which it based its motion to compel arbitration of
the claims of Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes, and
inform the court that it no longer opposes their lawsuit on
the basis of the Agreement for Binding Arbitration and
the Arbitration Agreement.
(d) In the manner set forth in this decision, reimburse
Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes and any other plain-
tiffs for any reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation ex-
penses that they may have incurred in opposing the Re-
spondent’s motion to compel individual arbitration.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its San Bernardino, California location copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix C,”8 and at all other
locations where the Arbitration Agreement and Agree-
ment for Binding Arbitration have been maintained, cop-
ies of the attached notice marked “Appendix D.”9 Cop-
ies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 31, after being signed by the Respond-
ent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in
conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physi-
cal posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed
electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or
an internet site, or other electronic means, if the Re-
spondent customarily communicates with its employees
by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. If the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facilities
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall du-
plicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
marked “Appendix C” to all current employees and for-
mer employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since March 13, 2013, and any former employees against
whom the Respondent has enforced its arbitration
agreements since March 13, 2013. If the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed any facilities other than
the ones involved in these proceedings, the Respondent

8 See fn. 6 above.
9 See fn. 6 above.
ADRIANA’S INSURANCE SERVICES 5
shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the notice marked “Appendix D” to all current employ-
ees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at those facilities at any time since August 23, 2011.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 31 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
C. The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Just Auto Insurance Services, Inc., Ontario,
California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Enforcing an arbitration agreement in a manner
that requires employees to waive the right to maintain
class or collective actions in all forums, whether arbitral
or judicial.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Inform the Superior Court of California, County of
Los Angeles, Central Civil West, in Case Number
BC502472 and the California Court of Appeal, Second
Appellate District, Division Three, in Case Number
BC502472 that it no longer opposes the lawsuit of Aldo
Alpizar and Liset Viamontes on the basis of the Agree-
ment for Binding Arbitration and the Arbitration Agree-
ment upon which it based its motion to compel arbitra-
tion of the claims of Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes.
(b) In the manner set forth in this decision, reimburse
Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes and any other plain-
tiffs for any reasonable attorneys’ fees and litigation ex-
penses that they may have incurred in opposing the Re-
spondent’s motion to compel individual arbitration.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel rec-
ords and reports, and all other records, including an elec-
tronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form,
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under
the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Ontario, California location copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix E.” 10 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 31,

10 See fn. 6 above.
after being signed by the Respondent's authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper
notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such
as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, or
other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily
communicates with its employees by such means. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. If the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facilities involved in these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice marked “Appendix E”
to all current employees and former employees employed
by the Respondent at any time since March 13, 2013, and
any former employees against whom the Respondent has
enforced its arbitration agreements since March 13,
2013.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 31 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible official on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 31, 2016
______________________________________
Kent Y. Hirozawa, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
MEMBER MISCIMARRA, concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
In this case, my colleagues find that the Respondents
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA or the Act) when they enforced the Agree-
ment for Binding Arbitration by filing a motion to com-
pel individual arbitration of claims asserted by Charging
Parties Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes in a State-
court class action lawsuit against the Respondents alleg-
ing wage and hour violations of the California Labor
Code. The Respondents filed their motion, which the
court denied, in reliance on the Agreement for Binding
Arbitration, which Alpizar and Viamontes signed, and
which requires that non-NLRA employment claims be
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
resolved through arbitration. I respectfully dissent from
this finding for the reasons explained in my partial dis-
senting opinion in Murphy Oil USA, Inc.1 For the rea-
sons stated below, I concur in finding that the Agreement
for Binding Arbitration and a separate Arbitration
Agreement (collectively, the Agreements) violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) because they unlawfully interfere with
NLRB charge filing.2
1. Alleged Interference with Class Action Participa-
tion. I agree that an employee may engage in “concert-
ed” activities for “mutual aid or protection” in relation to
a claim asserted under a statute other than the NLRA.3
However, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act does not vest author-
ity in the Board to dictate any particular procedures per-
taining to the litigation of non-NLRA claims, nor does
the Act render unlawful agreements in which employees
waive class-type treatment of non-NLRA claims. To the
contrary, as discussed in my partial dissenting opinion in
Murphy Oil, NLRA Section 9(a) protects the right of
every employee as an “individual” to “present” and “ad-
just” grievances “at any time.”4 This aspect of Section

1 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 22–35 (2014) (Member Miscimarra,
dissenting in part). The Board majority’s holding in Murphy Oil inval-
idating class-action waiver agreements was denied enforcement by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB,
808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015).
2 I also agree with my colleagues that the Board had a quorum at the
time it issued the decision in D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB 2277
(2012), enf. denied in relevant part 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), that
the instant case is properly before the Board, and that the charges were
not untimely filed and served under Sec. 10(b) of the Act.
3 I agree that non-NLRA claims can give rise to “concerted” activi-
ties engaged in by two or more employees for the “purpose” of “mutual
aid or protection,” which would come within the protection of NLRA
Sec. 7. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 23–25 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part). However, the existence or absence of
Sec. 7 protection does not depend on whether non-NLRA claims are
pursued as a class or collective action, but on whether Sec. 7’s statutory
requirements are met—an issue separate and distinct from whether an
individual employee chooses to pursue a claim as a class or collective
action. Id.; see also Beyoglu, 362 NLRB No. 152, slip op. at 4-5 (2015)
(Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
4 Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 30-34 (Member Miscimarra, dis-
senting in part). Sec. 9(a) states: “Representatives designated or select-
ed for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the em-
ployees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any indi-
vidual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such griev-
ances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity
to be present at such adjustment” (emphasis added). The Act’s legisla-
tive history shows that Congress intended to preserve every individual
employee’s right to “adjust” any employment-related dispute with his
9(a) is reinforced by Section 7 of the Act, which protects
each employee’s right to “refrain from” exercising the
collective rights enumerated in Section 7. Thus, I be-
lieve it is clear that (i) the NLRA creates no substantive
right for employees to insist on class-type treatment of
non-NLRA claims;5 (ii) a class-waiver agreement per-
taining to non-NLRA claims does not infringe on any
NLRA rights or obligations, which has prompted the
overwhelming majority of courts to reject the Board’s
position regarding class-waiver agreements;6 and (iii)
enforcement of a class-action waiver as part of an arbitra-
tion agreement is also warranted by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA).7 Although questions may arise regard-
ing the enforceability of particular agreements that waive
class or collective litigation of non-NLRA claims, I be-
lieve these questions are exclusively within the province
of the court or other tribunal that, unlike the NLRB, has
jurisdiction over such claims.8

or her employer. See Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 31-32 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part).
5 When courts have jurisdiction over non-NLRA claims that are po-
tentially subject to class treatment, the availability of class-type proce-
dures does not rise to the level of a substantive right. See D.R. Horton,
Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The use of class
action procedures . . . is not a substantive right.”) (citations omitted),
petition for rehearing en banc denied No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. 2014);
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980)
(“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only,
ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”).
6 The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly denied enforcement of Board or-
ders invalidating a mandatory arbitration agreement that waived class-
type treatment of non-NLRA claims. See, e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
v. NLRB, above; D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, above. The overwhelming
majority of courts considering the Board’s position have likewise re-
jected it. See Murphy Oil, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 34 (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 36 fn. 5 (Member John-
son, dissenting) (collecting cases); see also Patterson v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 96 F.Supp. 3d 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Nanavati v. Adecco
USA, Inc., 99 F.Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2015), motion to certify for
interlocutory appeal denied 2015 WL 4035072 (N.D. Cal. June 30,
2015); Brown v. Citicorp Credit Services., No. 1:12-CV-00062-BLW,
2015 WL 1401604 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2015) (granting reconsideration
of prior determination that class waiver in arbitration agreement violat-
ed NLRA); but see Totten v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, No. ED CV
14–1766 DMG (DTBx), 2016 WL 316019 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016).
7 For the reasons expressed in my Murphy Oil partial dissent and
those thoroughly explained in former Member Johnson’s dissent in
Murphy Oil, the FAA requires that the arbitration agreement be en-
forced according to its terms. Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 34 (Mem-
ber Miscimarra, dissenting in part); id., slip op. at 49-58 (Member
Johnson, dissenting).
8 The class-action waiver agreements were voluntarily signed, even
though the Respondents were willing to hire employees or continue
their employment only if they entered into the agreements. For my
colleagues, however, the voluntariness of such a waiver is immaterial.
They indicate that the waiver was “unlawful even if entered into volun-
tarily.” See On Assignment Staffing Services, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 189
(2015) (finding class-action waiver agreement unlawful even where
employees are free to opt out of the agreement); Bristol Farms, 363
ADRIANA’S INSURANCE SERVICES 7
Because I believe the Respondents’ Agreement was
lawful under the NLRA, I would find it was similarly
lawful for the Respondents to file a motion in State court
seeking to enforce the Agreement.9 That the Respond-
ents’ motion was reasonably based is supported by court
decisions that have enforced similar agreements.10 As

NLRB No. 45 (2015) (finding class-action waiver agreement unlawful
even where employees must affirmatively opt in before they will be
covered by a class-action waiver agreement, and where they are free to
decline to do so). By definition, every agreement sets forth terms upon
which each party may insist as a condition to entering into the relation-
ship governed by the agreement. Thus, conditioning employment on
the execution of a class-action waiver does not make it involuntary.
However, the Board’s position is even less defensible when the Board
finds that NLRA “protection” operates in reverse—not to protect em-
ployees’ rights to engage or refrain from engaging in certain kinds of
collective action, but to divest employees of those rights by denying
them the right to choose whether to be covered by an agreement to
litigate non-NLRA claims on an individual basis. See Bristol Farms,
above, slip op. at 2–4 (Member Miscimarra, dissenting).
Because I disagree with the Board’s decisions in Murphy Oil, above,
and D. R. Horton, above, and I believe the NLRA does not render un-
lawful arbitration agreements that provide for the waiver of class-type
litigation of non-NLRA claims, I find it unnecessary to reach whether
such agreements should independently be deemed lawful to the extent
they “leave[] open a judicial forum for class and collective claims,” D.
R. Horton, 357 NLRB 2277, 2286, by permitting the filing of com-
plaints with administrative agencies that, in turn, may file class- or
collective-action lawsuits. See Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d
1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
9 As I explain below, I concur in my colleagues’ finding that the
Agreements unlawfully interfered with the right of employees to allege
a violation of the NLRA through the filing of an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB. However, the unlawfulness of the Agreements
in this regard is not material to the merits of the Respondents’ state
court petition, in reliance on the Agreement for Binding Arbitration, to
compel the Charging Parties to arbitrate their non-NLRA claims. See
Fuji Food Products, 363 NLRB No. 118, slip op. at 4, 4–5 fn. 13
(2016) (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding that employer lawfully enforced class-waiver agreement by
filing motion to compel arbitration of non-NLRA claims, notwithstand-
ing additional finding that agreement unlawfully interfered with Board
charge filing).
10 See, e.g., Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, above;
Johnmohammadi v. Bloomingdale’s, 755 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2014); D.
R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, above; Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., above;
Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013).
The Agreement for Binding Arbitration is silent as to whether arbi-
tration may be conducted on a class or collective basis. For the reasons
stated in former Member Johnson’s dissent in Countrywide Financial
Corp., 362 NLRB No. 165, slip op. at 8–10 (2015), and my dissent in
Philmar Care, LLC, 363 NLRB No. 57 (2015), slip op. at 4 fn. 11
(2015), finding that the Respondents’ efforts to compel individual
arbitration violated the Act is in conflict with the FAA and Supreme
Court precedent construing that statute. The Court has held that a “par-
ty may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration
unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed
to do so.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds International Corp., 559
U.S. 662, 684–685 (2010) (emphasis in original). Obviously, where an
arbitration agreement is silent regarding class arbitration, there is no
such contractual basis. Thus, Respondent’s motion to compel individu-
al arbitration “was well-founded in the FAA as authoritatively inter-
the Fifth Circuit recently observed after rejecting (for the
second time) the Board’s position regarding the legality
of class-waiver agreements: “[I]t is a bit bold for [the
Board] to hold that an employer who followed the rea-
soning of our D. R. Horton decision had no basis in fact
or law or an ‘illegal objective’ in doing so. The Board
might want to strike a more respectful balance between
its views and those of circuit courts reviewing its or-
ders.”11 I also believe that any Board finding of a viola-
tion based on the Respondents’ meritorious State court
motion to compel arbitration would improperly risk in-
fringing on the Respondents’ rights under the First
Amendment’s Petition Clause. See Bill Johnson’s Res-
taurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); BE & K Con-
struction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002); see also my
partial dissent in Murphy Oil, above, 361 NLRB No. 72,
slip op. at 33–35. Finally, for similar reasons, I believe
the Board cannot properly require the Respondents to
reimburse the Charging Parties and any other plaintiffs
for their attorneys’ fees in the circumstances presented
here. Murphy Oil, above, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at
35.
2. Alleged Interference with NLRB Charge Filing. For
the following reasons, however, I concur in my col-
leagues’ finding that the Agreements unlawfully interfere
with NLRB charge filing in violation of NLRA Section
8(a)(1).12 In pertinent part, the Arbitration Agreement,
which is contained in an employee handbook, requires
employees to resolve by arbitration “any dispute, contro-

preted by the Supreme Court.” Philmar Care, LLC, above (Member
Miscimarra, dissenting).
11 Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d at 1021.
12 I agree with my colleagues that the judge did not abuse her discre-
tion in refusing to admit into evidence a revised arbitration agreement
that Respondents Adriana’s Insurance Services, Inc. (Adriana) and
Veronica’s Auto Insurance Services, Inc. (Veronica) say they imple-
mented in 2014 and 2015, respectively, after the complaint issued in
this case. At the hearing, the Respondents stated that they offered this
evidence “to show the current state of arbitration at the company, in
terms of what is communicated to employees. We believe that it shows
that the company has –-- has certain steps in place regarding arbitration.
We basically are introducing it for a full and complete record, given
what the subpoenas were that were issued.” On brief, Respondents
Adriana and Just Auto Insurance Services, Inc. assert that the evidence
should have been admitted because “no employee could reasonably
read the new language as waiving Section 7 rights.” However, there is
no contention and no finding that the “new language” is unlawful. My
colleagues find that the excluded “new language” evidence was proper-
ly excluded on the ground that even if admitted, it would not have
established that Adriana and Veronica repudiated the Agreements. I
find it unnecessary to reach the issue of repudiation because I believe
that the Respondents’ proffer at the hearing and their argument on brief
do not raise that issue. Also, because the Order requires only that Re-
spondents Adriana and Veronica rescind or revise the offending
Agreements, there is no merit to their claim that the Board’s remedy
necessarily requires them to rescind or revise the alleged revised
agreement.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD8
versy or claim arising out of or related to the employ-
ment relationship, including without limitation . . . all . . .
statutory claims, . . . to the extent the law provides such
claims may be arbitrated . . . .” And the Agreement for
Binding Arbitration states in relevant part: “I knowingly
and voluntarily agree to submit and settle any dispute,
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to my em-
ployment relationship . . . to arbitration as described in
the ‘Arbitration Agreement’ section of the handbook.”
For the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Rose
Group d/b/a Applebee’s Restaurant, 363 NLRB No. 75,
slip op. at 3–5 (2015) (Member Miscimarra, concurring
in part and dissenting in part), I believe that an agree-
ment may lawfully provide for the arbitration of NLRA
claims, and such an agreement does not unlawfully inter-
fere with Board charge filing, at least where the agree-
ment expressly preserves the right to file claims or
charges with the Board or, more generally, with adminis-
trative agencies.
Here, however, the Arbitration Agreement does not
qualify in any way the requirement that all “statutory
claims,” and therefore all claims for violation of any fed-
eral statute, including the NLRA, must be resolved in
binding arbitration and in this manner only. There is no
exception preserving employees’ right to file charges
with administrative agencies such as the NLRB. As not-
ed above, the Arbitration Agreement requires arbitration
of covered claims only “to the extent the law provides
such claims may be arbitrated.” Contrary to the Re-
spondents, however, this provision is insufficient to indi-
cate to employees that the right to file NLRB charges is
preserved. See, e.g., Keiser University, 363 NLRB No.
73, slip op. at 5, 6–7 (2015) (arbitration agreement un-
lawfully restricted NLRB charge filing where it broadly
required arbitration of employment-related disputes “ex-
cept where specifically prohibited by law”; wording of
exception found ineffective to communicate exception
for filing charges with the Board). For these reasons, I
join my colleagues in finding that the Agreements violate
the Act by unlawfully restricting the filing of charges
with the Board. See U-Haul Co. of California, 347
NLRB 375, 377(2006), enfd. mem. 255 Fed. Appx. 527
(D.C. Cir. 2007); Murphy Oil, above, slip op. at 22 fn. 4
(Member Miscimarra, dissenting in part); GameStop
Corp., 363 NLRB No. 89, slip op. at 6–7 (Member
Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Rose Group d/b/a Applebee’s Restaurant, above (Mem-
ber Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent in part from, and
concur in part with, my colleagues’ decision.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 31, 2016
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain an Arbitration Agreement and
Agreement for Binding Arbitration that our employees
reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to
file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT enforce an arbitration agreement in a
manner that requires our employees to waive their right
to maintain class or collective actions in all forums,
whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind our unlawful Arbitration Agreement
and Agreement for Binding Arbitration in all of their
forms, or revise them in all of their forms to make clear
that each Agreement does not restrict your right to file
charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
signed the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or to
whom the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or the Ar-
bitration Agreement was presented that they have been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy
of the revised Agreements.
WE WILL notify the court in which Aldo Alpizar and
Liset Viamontes filed their collective lawsuit and the
court hearing our appeal that we have rescinded or re-
vised the Agreement for Binding Arbitration and the Ar-
bitration Agreement upon which we based our motion to
ADRIANA’S INSURANCE SERVICES 9
compel individual arbitration, and WE WILL inform these
courts that we no longer oppose Aldo Alpizar and Liset
Viamontes’ collective lawsuit on the basis of the Agree-
ments.
WE WILL reimburse Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes
and any other plaintiffs for any reasonable attorneys’ fees
and litigation expenses that they may have incurred in
opposing our motion to dismiss their collective lawsuit
and compel individual arbitration.
ADRIANA’S INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31–CA–113416 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain an Arbitration Agreement and
Agreement for Binding Arbitration that our employees
reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to
file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind our unlawful Arbitration Agreement
and Agreement for Binding Arbitration in all of their
forms, or revise them in all of their forms to make clear
that each Agreement does not restrict your right to file
charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
signed the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or to
whom the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or the Ar-
bitration Agreement was presented that they have been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy
of the revised Agreements.
ADRIANA’S INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31–CA–113416 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
APPENDIX C
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain an Arbitration Agreement and
Agreement for Binding Arbitration that our employees
reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to
file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD10
WE WILL NOT enforce an arbitration agreement in a
manner that requires our employees to waive their right
to maintain class or collective actions in all forums,
whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind our unlawful Arbitration Agreement
and Agreement for Binding Arbitration in all of their
forms, or revise them in all of their forms to make clear
that each Agreement does not restrict your right to file
charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
signed the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or to
whom the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or the Ar-
bitration Agreement was presented that they have been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy
of the revised Agreements.
WE WILL notify the court in which Aldo Alpizar and
Liset Viamontes filed their collective lawsuit and the
court hearing our appeal that we have rescinded or re-
vised the Agreement for Binding Arbitration and the Ar-
bitration Agreement upon which we based our motion to
compel individual arbitration, and WE WILL inform these
courts that we no longer oppose Aldo Alpizar and Liset
Viamontes’ collective lawsuit on the basis of the Agree-
ments.
WE WILL reimburse Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes
and any other plaintiffs for any reasonable attorneys’ fees
and litigation expenses that they may have incurred in
opposing our motion to dismiss their collective lawsuit
and compel individual arbitration.
VERONICA’S AUTO INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31–CA–113416 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
APPENDIX D
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain an Arbitration Agreement and
Agreement for Binding Arbitration that our employees
reasonably would believe bars or restricts their right to
file charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind our unlawful Arbitration Agreement
and Agreement for Binding Arbitration in all of their
forms, or revise them in all of their forms to make clear
that each Agreement does not restrict your right to file
charges with the National Labor Relations Board.
WE WILL notify all current and former employees who
signed the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or to
whom the Agreement for Binding Arbitration or the Ar-
bitration Agreement was presented that they have been
rescinded or revised and, if revised, provide them a copy
of the revised Agreements.
VERONICA’S AUTO INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31–CA–113416 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
.
ADRIANA’S INSURANCE SERVICES 11
APPENDIX E
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT enforce an arbitration agreement in a
manner that requires our employees to waive their right
to maintain class or collective actions in all forums,
whether arbitral or judicial.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL notify the court in which Aldo Alpizar and
Liset Viamontes filed their collective lawsuit and the
court hearing our appeal that we no longer oppose the
lawsuit of Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes on the basis
of the Agreement for Binding Arbitration and the Arbi-
tration Agreement upon which we based our motion to
compel arbitration of the their claims.
WE WILL Reimburse Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes
and any other plaintiffs for any reasonable attorneys’ fees
and litigation expenses that they may have incurred in
opposing our motion to dismiss their collective lawsuit
and compel individual arbitration.
JUST AUTO INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31–CA–113416 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Re-
lations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Yaneth Palencia, Esq., for the General Counsel.
H. Spencer Hamer, III, Esq., for the Respondents.
Janette C. Lee, Esq., for the Charging Parties.
DECISION
MARY MILLER CRACRAFT, Administrative Law Judge. Adria-
na’s Insurance Services, Inc. (Adriana’s),1 Just Auto Insurance
Services, Inc. (Just),2 and Veronica’s Auto Insurance Services,
Inc. (Veronica’s),3 jointly referred to here as Respondents,
maintain or maintained arbitration agreements which require
their employees to submit employment-related claims, includ-
ing claims arising under Federal statutes, to arbitration. The
General Counsel alleges that employees would reasonably con-
strue the language used in these agreements to preclude them
from filing unfair labor practice charges with the National La-
bor Relations Board (the Board or NLRB) in violation Section
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).4 Addi-
tionally, when in October 2013 employees Alpizar and
Viamontes filed a State court class action wage and hour law-
suit against Respondents, Respondents moved to compel indi-
vidual arbitration. The General Counsel alleges that Respond-
ents’ attempt to compel individual arbitration in the State court
class action also violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.5 I find both
violations as alleged.
On the entire record,6 and after considering the briefs filed

1 The unfair labor practice charge, first amended charge, and second
amended charge in Case 31–CA–113416 were filed by Charging Party
Aldo Alpizar (Alpizar) against Adriana’s on respectively September 13,
November 6 and 27, 2013. The unfair labor practice charge, first
amended charge, and second amended charge in Case 31–CA–113423
were filed by Charging Party Liset Viamontes (Viamontes) against
Adriana’s on respectively September 13, November 6 and 27, 2013.
2 Alpizar filed the unfair labor practice charge and first amended
charge against Just in Case 31–CA–113417 on September 13 and No-
vember 6, 2013, respectively. Viamontes filed the unfair labor practice
charge and first amended charge against Just in Case 31–CA–113428
on September 13 and November 6 respectively.
3 Alpizar filed the unfair labor practice charge, first amended
charge, and second amended charge against Veronica’s in Case 31-CA-
113420 on September 13, November 6 and 27, 2013, respectively.
Viamontes filed the unfair labor practice charge, first amended charge,
and second amended charge against Veronica’s in Case 31–CA–113425
on September 13, November 6 and 27, 2013.
4 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1).
5 The consolidated complaint issued on February 27, 2014, and was
amended at hearing. Hearing was held in Los Angeles, California on
February 10, 2015.
6 The facts were, for the most part, submitted by stipulation. No
credibility resolutions are required on this record.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD12
by counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for the Re-
spondents, the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law are made.
JURISDICTION
Respondents are not alleged to be joint employers. Each of
the Respondents admits that it is a corporation with an office
and place of business in California and that it meets the Board’s
retail jurisdictional standard7 and is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act. Thus this dispute affects interstate commerce and the
Board has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Section 10(a) of
the Act.
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Facts
Since at least the fall of 2011, Adriana’s and Veronica’s have
utilized an identical Arbitration Agreement in their respective
employee handbooks. The provision is as follows:
Accordingly, if work-related complaints and concerns are un-
able to be informally resolved, then any dispute, controversy
or claim arising out of or related to the employment relation-
ship, including without limitation, contract claims, tort claims,
breach of duty claims, wrongful termination claims, wage
claims, claims of discrimination, harassment and all other
common law and statutory claims, including all claims based
upon federal or state civil rights laws, including claims under
the EEOC, FEHA or otherwise, to the extent the law provides
such claims may be arbitrated, shall at the request of either the
employee or [Adriana’s or Veronica’s] be submitted to and
settled by binding arbitration. Such arbitration shall be con-
ducted in Los Angeles County, California. Such arbitration
shall include any claims you have against [Adriana’s or Ve-
ronica’s] officers, managers, supervisors, agents, directors or
owners.
On September 26, 2011, Veronica’s required its employee
Viamontes to sign an Agreement for Binding Arbitration and
on October 4, 2011, Adriana’s required its employee Alpizar to
sign an identical Agreement for Binding Arbitration as follows:
I KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO
SUBMIT AND SETTLE ANY DISPUTE,
CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT OF OR
RELATING TO MY EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHSIP
WITH ADRIANA’S TO ARBITRATION AS DESCRIBED
IN THE “ARBITRATION AGREEMENT” SECTION OF
THE HANDBOOK. I AGREE THAT THE ARBITRATION
OF SUCH ISSUES, INCLUDING THE DETERMINATION
OF ANY AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SUFFERED, SHALL
BE FINAL AND BINDING UPON ME AND ADRIANA’S
TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW. I
REALIZE BY AGREEING TO ARBITRATION, I WILL
HAVE WAIVED MY RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. THIS

7 The Board asserts jurisdiction over all retail enterprises which fall
within its statutory jurisdiction and have a gross annual volume of
business of at least $500,000. Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122
NLRB 88 (1958).
POLICY CANNOT CHANGE EXCEPT BY WRITTEN
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ADRIANA’S AND ME.
Analysis
Section 7 protects the right of employees to file charges with
the Board or otherwise access the Board’s processes. Bill’s
Electric, 350 NLRB 292, 296 (2007); U-Haul Co. of Califor-
nia, 347 NLRB 375, 377 (2006), enfd. 255 Fed. Appx. 527
(D.C. Cir 2007) (unpublished decision). Although the Arbitra-
tion Agreement does not specifically state that employees may
not file charges with the NLRB, a rule which does not explicit-
ly restrict Section 7 rights may nevertheless violate the Act if
employees would reasonably construe the language to prohibit
Section 7 activity. Lutheran Heritage Village –Livonia, 343
NLRB 646, 647 (2004).
The language in Veronica’s and Adriana’s Arbitration
Agreements would reasonably be construed by employees to
prohibit or restrict employees’ Section 7 right to file an unfair
labor practice charge. Read in context, the language broadly
mandates arbitration for “any dispute, controversy or claim
arising out of or related to the employment relationship.” This
all-inclusive language is reasonably construed to cover unfair
labor practice claims arising from the employment relation.
Cellular Sales of Missouri, LLC, 362 NLRB No. 27, slip op. at
1, fn. 4 (2015) (work rule reasonably construed to interfere with
ability to file charges with Board even if rule did not expressly
prohibit access to Board).
The qualifying term, “to the extent such claims may be arbi-
trated,” does not save the rule because the Board does not as-
sume that employees have specialized legal knowledge which
could be employed in understanding such a clause to exclude
NLRB claims. For instance, the Board found language limiting
a compulsory arbitration rule to claims “that may be lawfully
resolve[d] by arbitration” would not be reasonably understood
by employees to exclude unfair labor practice charges from the
scope of the agreement. 2 Sisters Food Group, 357 NLRB
1816–1817, 1837 (2011); see also U-Haul, supra, 347 NLRB at
377–378.
Veronica’s and Adriana’s argue that they have fully reme-
died any ambiguity in the Arbitration Agreement and Agree-
ment for Binding Arbitration by implementing new rules. Their
question and answer offers to prove the facts underlying this
assertion were rejected at hearing. Moreover, even were these
facts in evidence, they fall short of a defense to the allegations.
In order to fully remedy an unlawful rule, an employer must
publish a timely, specific, unambiguous, untainted notice to
employees announcing repudiation of the old rule and assuring
employees that in the future it will not interfere with Section 7
rights. See New Passages Behavioral Health, 362 NLRB No.
55, slip op. at 1-2 (2015), citing Casino San Pablo, 361 NLRB
No. 148, slip op. at 4 (2014), and Passavant Memorial Area
Hospital, 236 NLRB 138, 138–139 (1978). Here one Respond-
ent appears to have replaced one rule with another rule. This
effort is insufficient to remedy the unlawful rule.
Thus I find that by maintenance of an Arbitration Agreement
which employees would reasonably construe as limiting their
right to access to the NLRB, Adriana’s and Veronica’s inter-
fered with employee Section 7 rights in violation of Section
ADRIANA’S INSURANCE SERVICES 13
8(a)(1) of the Act. Because the “Agreement for Binding Arbi-
tration,” which employees are required to sign by Adriana’s
and Veronica’s, utilizes the same all-inclusive language and
incorporates the “Arbitration Agreement” by reference, the
Agreement for Binding Arbitration is similarly flawed and
interferes with employee Section 7 rights in violation of Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
STATE COURT WAGE AND HOUR CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION
Facts
On March 7, 2013, Viamontes and Alpizar filed a class ac-
tion complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California,
County of Los Angeles, Central Civil West, Case No.
BC502472, alleging that Adriana’s, Veronica’s, and Just had
committed various wage and hour violations of the California
Labor Code. Although neither the Arbitration Agreement nor
the Agreement for Binding Arbitration specifically precludes
collective or class action, on October 21, 2013, the three Re-
spondents filed a motion to compel individual arbitration rely-
ing on the Agreements for Binding Arbitration signed by
Viamontes and Alpizar.
Following oral argument, on December 6, 2013, Judge Elihu
M. Berle of the Superior Court signed an order denying the
motion to compel individual arbitration. The order issued on
December 10, 2013, and on December 23, 2013, Respondents
filed a notice of appeal of Judge Berle’s order. Briefs followed
in the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
Division Three. No ruling had issued at the time of hearing.
Analysis
As the opening sentence of Murphy Oil USA, 361 NLRB No.
72, slip op. at 1 (2014) states, “For about 80 years, Federal
labor law protected the right of employees to pursue their work-
related legal claims together, i.e., with one another, for the
purpose of improving their working conditions.” Starting from
this vantage point, the Board reaffirmed its holding in D. R.
Horton, 357 NLRB 2277 (2012), enf. denied in relevant part
737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013), that an employer violates the Act
when it requires an employee, as a condition of employment, to
sign an agreement that precludes employees from filing class
action suits addressing their wages, hours, and working condi-
tions. Murphy Oil USA, supra, 361 NLRB No. 72, slip op. at 2.
The issue here, however, is not whether the Respondents’
Agreements for Binding Arbitration constitute agreements that
preclude employees from filing class action suits regarding
employment claims. In fact, the Agreements for Binding Arbi-
tration are silent on that issue. Rather, the issue here is whether
Respondents’ filing a motion to compel individual arbitration
and Respondents’ appeal from denial of that motion, constitute
a restriction on employees’ Section 7 rights.
Section 8(a)(1) provides, inter alia, that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of their Section 7 right to engage in
concerted activities for their mutual aid and protection. Con-
certed activities include employee efforts to improve working
conditions outside the immediate employer-employee relation-
ship by joining together in concerted legal action regarding
wages, hours, and working conditions.8 Because employees
have a Section 7 right to jointly pursue legal redress in Federal
or State court, Respondents’ efforts to preclude this Section 7
activity have an illegal objective and are unlawful. Thus, I find
that by filing the motion to compel individual arbitration and by
appealing denial of that motion, i.e., by seeking to stop the
concerted activity of Viamontes and Alpizar, Respondents vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Respondents argue that their motion to compel individual ar-
bitration and their appeal from denial of that motion are specif-
ically permitted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) as re-
cently interpreted in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013), and AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1740
(2011). In Murphy Oil, supra, 361 NLRB No. 62, slip op. at
10–15, the Board rejected this argument. The Board found in-
stead that its view—that “requiring employees to waive their
right to collectively pursue employment-related claims in all
forums, arbitral and judicial” violated Section 8(a)(1)—did not
“conflict with the letter or interfere with the policies underlying
the [FAA].” An administrative law judge must follow Board
precedent that has not been reversed by the Supreme Court
itself.9
Murphy Oil is consistent with the Court’s holdings. Ameri-
can Express did not involve the core substantive Section 7 right
of employees to act together to file a class action lawsuit. The
Board’s interpretation of the Section 7 right of employees to act
together to file lawsuits against for employment related claims
as a core substantive right is entitled to judicial deference.10
Moreover, American Express did not involve an employer who
required employees to waive their substantive Section 7 rights.
Because Murphy Oil is not reversed by Supreme Court prece-
dent, Respondents’ argument is rejected.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondents Adriana’s and Veronica’s violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by maintaining their identical Arbitration
Agreements and Agreements for Binding Arbitration” which
employees would reasonably construe to preclude filing of
charges with the Board. Respondents Adriana’s, Just, and Ve-
ronica’s violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by filing a motion
to compel individual arbitration and an appeal from denial of
the motion to compel individual arbitration in a State court
wage and hour class action.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall order that they cease and desist
and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the

8 See, e.g., Brady v. National Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 673
(8th Cir. 2011); Mohave Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.3d 1183,
1188 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see generally Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S.
556, 565–566 (1978).
9 See Pathmark Stores, 342 NLRB 378, fn. 1 (2004); Iowa Beef
Packers, 144 NLRB 615, 616 (1968), enfd. in part, 331 F.2d 176 (8th
Cir. 1964).
10 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S.837 (1984).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD14
policies of the Act.
Specifically, having concluded that the Arbitration Agree-
ment is unlawful, to the extent Respondents Adriana’s and
Veronica’s have not already done so,11 they must revise or re-
scind the Arbitration Agreement and advise their employees in
writing that the Arbitration Agreement has been revised or
rescinded. Further, Respondents Adriana’s and Veronica’s shall
post notices at all locations where the Arbitration Agreement,
or any portion of it which is reasonably construed to preclude
employees from filing unfair labor practice charges with the
Board was or is in effect. The Agreement for Binding Arbitra-
tion must be revised or rescinded to reflect that it references a
revised arbitration agreement.
Respondents must also reimburse Charging Parties
Viamontes and Alpizar for any litigation and related expenses,
with interest, to date and in the future, directly related to the
Respondents’ motion to compel individual arbitration and Re-
spondents’ notice of appeal from denial of that motion in the
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Central
Civil West, Case BC502472. Interest shall be computed in ac-
cordance with New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
Finally, the Respondents must withdraw their motion to
compel individual arbitration and their appeal of denial of their
motion to compel individual arbitration. Bill Johnson’s Restau-
rants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 737 fn. 5 (1983) (legal proceed-
ings which have an objective that is illegal may be enjoined
without infringing the First Amendment).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The Respondents Adriana’s Insurance Services, Inc., Rancho
Cucamonga, California; and Veronica’s Auto Insurance Ser-
vices, Inc., San Bernardino, California, their officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall cease and desist from maintaining
a handbook arbitration agreement rule which is reasonably
construed to prohibit access to the NLRB and an agreement for
binding arbitration which incorporates that handbook rule. The
Respondents Adriana’s Insurance Services, Inc., Rancho
Cucamonga, California; Just Auto Insurance Services, Inc.,
Ontario, California; and Veronica’s Auto Insurance Services,
Inc., San Bernardino, California shall cease and desist from
seeking to enforce the Agreement for Binding Arbitration by
filing a motion to compel individual arbitration in Case

11 At hearing, Adriana’s and Veronica’s offered to prove that they
had implemented or were planning to implement a new Arbitration
Agreement. The General Counsel would not stipulate to this evidence
and objected to receipt of this evidence at hearing on the basis of rele-
vance. Technically, such evidence might be relevant to the remedy
only. Although this evidence was rejected, to the extent the Region is
satisfied that new handbook Arbitration Agreements were actually
implemented and assuming no new charges involving them, the remedy
should be revised accordingly. See, e.g., Lily Transportation Corp., 362
NLRB No. 54, slip op. at 2 (2015).
12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the finding, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived.
BC502472 in the Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles, Central Civil West or appealing denial of that motion
in the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
Division Three, or in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.
1. Respondents Adriana’s and Veronica’s shall also take the
following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act.
(a) Rescind or revise all elements of their respective hand-
book arbitration agreement rules to make it clear to employees
that the rule does not constitute a restriction of the right to file
unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB or otherwise ac-
cess the Board’s processes.
(b) Notify employees of the rescinded or revised handbook
arbitration agreement rule providing them with a copy of the
revised rule or notifying of the rescission of the rule.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at all fa-
cilities where they maintained the handbook arbitration agree-
ment rule, or any portion of it which is reasonably understood
to restrict employee access to the NLRB to file unfair labor
practice charges or otherwise access the Board’s processes, the
attached notice marked “Appendix A (Adriana’s) or “Appendix
B” (Veronica’s).”13
2. Respondents Adriana’s, Veronica’s, and Just shall also
take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
(a) Reimburse the Charging Parties for any litigation ex-
pense directly related to opposing the Respondents’ motion to
compel individual arbitration and/or Respondents’ appeal of
denial of that motion.
(b) Within 7 days after the Board Order, file a motion with
the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Di-
vision Three in Case No. BC502472 withdrawing their appeal
from denial of the motion to compel individual arbitration and
file a motion with the Superior Court of the State of California,
County of Los Angeles, Central Civil West in Case No.
BC502472, withdrawing their motion to compel individual
arbitration.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix A” (Adriana’s), “Appendix
B” (Veronica’s) and “Appendix C” (Just) at all facilities im-
pacted by its filing of the motion to compel arbitration and
appeal from denial of the motion to compel arbitration. Copies
of the notices, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 31, after being signed by the Respondents’ authorized
representatives, shall be posted by the Respondents and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
In addition to physical positing of paper notices, the notices
shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on
an intranet or an internet site, and/or other electronic means, if

13 If This Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court
of appeal, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to Judgment
of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board.”
ADRIANA’S INSURANCE SERVICES 15
Respondents customarily communicate with their employees by
such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondents to
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of
these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facilities involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of
the notice to all current and former employees employed by the
Respondents since March 13, 201311 (Adriana’s and Veroni-
ca’s), or October 21, 2013 (Just).
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondents have taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. April 7, 2015
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal Labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this
notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain our handbook “Arbitration Agree-
ment” or our “Agreement for Binding Arbitration” which in-
corporates the handbook “Arbitration Agreement” because
employees would reasonably construe these documents as pro-
hibiting filing charges with the NLRB.
WE WILL NOT seek to enforce our handbook “Arbitration
Agreement” or our “Agreement for Binding Arbitration” by
claiming they prohibit collective or class action lawsuits in a
State court wage and hour litigation brought by Charging Par-
ties Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes.

11 In Excel Container, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997), the Board held
that the operative date for determining which employees receive a
contingent notice-mailing is the date of the first violation of the Act.
The Board reasoned that using this date would ensure that all employ-
ees exposed to the unfair labor practice and its effects were notified of
the outcome of the NLRB litigation. Here, Viamontes was required to
sign Veronica’s Agreement for Binding Arbitration on September 26,
2011. Alpizar was required to sign Adriana’s Agreement for Binding
Arbitration on October 4, 2011. The complaint allegations are that the
Arbitration Agreements were maintained since those dates in violation
of the Act. However, because the remedy may not exceed the six-
month 10(b) limitations period, for Respondent’s Veronica’s and Adri-
ana’s I have utilized the date of March 13, 2013, i.e., six months prior
to filing of the relevant charges on September 13, 2013.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Federal law.
WE WILL rescind or revise the “Arbitration Agreement” to
make it clear to employees that the agreement does not prohibit
the filing of charges with the NLRB.
WE WILL notify you of the rescinded or revised “Arbitration
Agreement” and provide you with a copy of any revised
agreement.
WE WILL reimburse Charging Parties Aldo Alpizar and Liset
Viamontes for any litigation expenses directly related to our
motion to compel individual arbitration and expenses directly
related to our notice of appeal from denial of our motion to
compel individual arbitration.
ADRIANA’S INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31–CA–113416 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal Labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this
notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain our handbook “Arbitration Agree-
ment” or our “Agreement for Binding Arbitration” which in-
corporates the handbook “Arbitration Agreement” because
employees would reasonably construe these documents as pro-
hibiting filing charges with the NLRB.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD16
WE WILL NOT seek to enforce our handbook “Arbitration
Agreement” or our “Agreement for Binding Arbitration” by
claiming they prohibit collective or class action lawsuits in a
State court wage and hour litigation brought by Charging Par-
ties Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Federal law.
WE WILL rescind or revise the “Arbitration Agreement” to
make it clear to employees that the agreement does not prohibit
the filing of charges with the NLRB.
WE WILL notify you of the rescinded or revised “Arbitration
Agreement” and provide you with a copy of any revised
agreement.
WE WILL reimburse Charging Parties Aldo Alpizar and Liset
Viamontes for any litigation expenses directly related to our
motion to compel individual arbitration and expenses directly
related to our notice of appeal from denial of our motion to
compel individual arbitration.
VERONICA’S AUTO INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31–CA–13416 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.
APPENDIX C
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal Labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this
notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT seek to enforce our handbook “Arbitration
Agreement” or our “Agreement for Binding Arbitration” by
claiming they prohibit collective or class action lawsuits in a
State court wage and hour litigation brought by Charging Par-
ties Aldo Alpizar and Liset Viamontes.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Federal law.
WE WILL reimburse Charging Parties Aldo Alpizar and Liset
Viamontes for any litigation expenses directly related to our
motions to compel individual arbitration and expenses directly
related to our appeal from denial of their motion to compel
individual arbitration.
JUST AUTO INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/31–CA–113416 or by using the QR code
below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision
from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board,
1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling
(202) 273-1940.