A&C Healthcare Services, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jul 18, 2008

20-CA-033588 (N.L.R.B. Jul. 18, 2008)

JD(SF)–27-08
Millbrae, CA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
A & C HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.
and Case 20-CA-33588
20-CA-33780
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION, UNITED HEALTHCARE
WORKERS-WEST
Micah Berul, Esq., San Francisco,
CA, for the General Counsel
Robert M. Cassel, Esq., Mill Valley,
CA, for the Respondent
Bruce Harland, Esq., of Weinberg,
Roger & Rosenfeld, Alameda, CA,
for the Union
DECISION
Statement of the Case
Gerald A. Wacknov, Administrative Law Judge: Pursuant to notice a hearing in this
matter was held before me in San Francisco, California on April 21, 2008. The charges were
filed by Service Employees International Union, United Healthcare Workers-West (Union) on
September 18, 2007 and January 23, 2008, respectively. Thereafter, on March 26, 2008, the
Regional Director for Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) issued a
consolidated complaint and notice of hearing alleging violations by A & C Healthcare Services,
Inc. (Respondent) of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended
(Act). The Respondent, in its answer to the complaint, duly filed, denies that it has violated the
Act as alleged.
The parties were afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to call, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses, and to introduce relevant evidence. Since the close of the hearing, briefs
have been received from Counsel for the General Counsel (General Counsel) and counsel for
the Respondent. Upon the entire record, and based upon my observation of the witnesses and
consideration of the briefs submitted,1 I make the following:

1 General Counsel’s post-hearing motion to strike portions of Respondent’s brief is denied,
however matters discussed in the brief that are not part of the record have been disregarded.
Respondent’s post-hearing motion to strike references to certain cited cases in General
Counsel’s brief is denied.
JD(SF)–27-08
.5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The Respondent, a California corporation with two nursing home facilities in the State of
California, including the facility herein located in Millbrae, California, is engaged in the business
of providing residential nursing care to patients. In the course and conduct of its business
operations the Respondent annually derives gross revenues in excess of $100,000, and
annually purchases and receives at its California facilities goods and services valued in excess
of $5,000 which originated outside the State of California. It is admitted and I find that the
Respondent is, and at all material times has been, an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6) and (7) of the Act, and a health care institution within the
meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act.
II. The Labor Organization Involved
It is admitted, and I find, that the Union is and at all times material herein has been, a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act,
III. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. Issues
The principal issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, as a successor
employer, unilaterally changed employees’ pre-existing terms and conditions of employment
without bargaining with the Union, in violation of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
B. Facts
The facts in this proceeding, which were largely stipulated, are not in material dispute.
In July, 2007,2 The Respondent, a licensed nursing home owner/operator, purchased the
predecessor’s nursing home facility as the low bidder in a bankruptcy auction. The Order of the
Bankruptcy Court, Central District of California (Los Angeles Division), is the underlying
document setting forth the parameters of the transaction and the respective obligations of the
buyer (Respondent) and seller (Predecessor). The Bankruptcy Court retained jurisdiction of the
entire purchase/transfer process until such time as the Respondent acquired the proper State
license and thereby replaced the predecessor as the legal owner/operator of the facility. The
sequence by which the Respondent would first become the interim operator of the facility under
the predecessor’s California State operating license, and subsequently would become the legal
owner/operator of the facility upon obtaining its own operating license, is set forth, inter alia, in a
separate document between the Respondent and predecessor entitled Operations Transfer
Agreement (OTA), also subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy Court.
The Respondent assumed interim operation of the facility on August 8, on which date
the Respondent’s principals personally informed all the individuals employed by the
predecessor, including managers and supervisors, that they were immediately being hired by
the Respondent on a 90-day probationary basis. Further, the Respondent told the non-

2 All dates or time periods hereinafter are within 2007 unless otherwise noted.
JD(SF)–27-08
.5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
3
supervisory employees that they would continue to receive their regular pay but would not
receive health or other benefits. This announcement effectively modified the employees’ then-
current wages, hours and benefits, which were established and set forth in a collective
bargaining agreement between the Union and predecessor, extending from October 1, 2006
until June 15, 2008. It was stipulated that the Respondent did not state to the employees it was
setting “initial terms and conditions of employment.”
Upon assuming operations of the facility, the Respondent continued to provide
residential nursing care to patients at the facility in essentially unchanged form from the
predecessors’ operations, and with the same employee complement.
On November 8, coinciding with the end of the 90-day probationary period, the
Respondent informed all but six of the 85 non-supervisory/managerial employees who had
been previously employed at the facility by the predecessor, that they had passed their
probationary period and were eligible to become, and did become, permanent employees.
Also on November 8, the Respondent announced and unilaterally established terms and
conditions of employment covering wages, holidays, health insurance, overtime, sick leave and
no-call/no-show policy, to all assembled workers who had passed probation and wished to be
employed in permanent regular positions.
The Complaint alleges and the Respondent admits that on about September 14, during
the probationary period and prior to the aforementioned November 8 announcement of terms
and conditions of employment, the Union requested that Respondent recognize and bargain
collectively with the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees.
The Respondent apparently did not reply to this request for several months during which period
its license application was pending. Then, on Monday, December 3, it advised the Union by
letter that it would agree to recognize the Union conditionally, provided that:
1) Respondent had been licensed by the Department of Health and thereby able
(sic) to close its purchase of the Facility; 2) employ persons directly as a
healthcare employer; 3) and a majority of employees currently employed were
previously bargaining unit employees of the former employer.
Further, the Respondent offered, subject to the above conditions, to meet and bargain with the
Union on January 3, 2008.
Prior to January 3, 2008, the Respondent had been granted the appropriate license by
the Department of Health, and its purchase of the facility had been consummated. On
January 3, 2008, the Respondent recognized the Union as the exclusive collective- bargaining
representative of the Unit employees employed by the Respondent. On about January 15,
2008, the Respondent issued an Employee Handbook which unilaterally establishes wages,
hours and working conditions that are apparently different from and/or in addition to those
previously announced to the employees on November 8, supra. The parties held bargaining
sessions on January 15, January 30, March 7, and April 4, 2008.
JD(SF)–27-08
.5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
4
C. Analysis and Conclusions
The Complaint alleges and the General Counsel and Union argue that the Union
became a Burns3 “perfectly clear” successor on August 8, when it hired all the unit employees
employed by the predecessor on a probationary basis without simultaneously setting their initial,
i.e. non-probationary, terms and conditions of employment upon becoming permanent
employees; therefore, although Burns makes it clear that the Respondent, as a successor
employer, assumes no contractual relationship with the Union, it is nevertheless obligated to
negotiate with the Union regarding initial terms and conditions of employment that differ from
those previously enjoyed by the employees, as set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.
The Respondent maintains that this case is unique and that all prior cases under Burns
are readily distinguishable because they do not arise in a bankruptcy setting. First, it is argued
that the Bankruptcy Court’s Order specifically addresses the issue of successorship, and
precludes the finding that the Respondent is a successor under the Act. Thus, the Bankruptcy
Court’s Order states, at paragraph 8:
Except for unexpired leases and executory contracts to be assumed by the
Debtors and assigned to the buyer [Respondent], the buyers shall not be
assuming any of the Debtors’ [predecessor’s] liabilities. The buyers are not
successors of the Debtors, and the buyers shall have no successor liability as a
result of purchasing any of the Debtors’ facilities.4
The Respondent’s brief is silent regarding the meaning and intent of this language, or its
significance and implications vis-à-vis a successor employer’s obligations under the National
Labor Relations Act. The quoted language simply appears to immunize the Respondent from
the debtor’s contract liability unless the Respondent specifically becomes a party to the
contract, and further, appears to immunize the Respondent from the debtor’s tort liability
attendant to lawsuits that may have been brought or could be brought against the debtor. This
language appears to have no bearing whatsoever regarding the Respondent’s relationship to
the Union, which, as noted in Burns, is not a contractual relationship. Accordingly, as the
Respondent has not demonstrated that the language is pertinent to the issues herein, I find no
merit to the Respondent’s argument.
Next, the Respondent maintains that its successorship status did not begin when it took
over the operation of the facility on August 8, because it was merely the interim operator until
such time as it obtained its own operating license. In Golden Cross Health Care of Fresno, 314
NLRB 1201, 1205-6 (1994), the Board found, under similar circumstances, that successorship
status commenced when the employer began operating the facility; thus, although legal
ownership of the facility had not yet been transferred and the employer’s operating license had
not yet been granted, the record evidence supported the finding of a “respectable certainty” that
these eventualities would, in fact, occur. The Respondent has not demonstrated that obtaining

3 NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
4 The Court’s Order deals with multiple debtor entities and multiple buyer entities; hence the
plural designations.
JD(SF)–27-08
.5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
5
the new operating license or completing the transfer of ownership of the property was in
jeopardy or problematical or less than a “respectable certainty” at the time it became the
interim operator of the facility.5 Therefore, I find this argument of the Respondent to be without
merit.
Assuming arguendo that it became a successor on August 8, the Respondent contends
that is not a Burns successor but rather a Spruce Up6 successor because on that date it did in
fact establish initial terms and conditions of employment by hiring the predecessor’s employees
at their current wage rate, but as probationary employees with no benefits. Thus, the
Respondent states in its brief:
There is no evidence herein R [Respondent] had failed to clearly offer its initial
terms and conditions on August 8th. The only employment being offered on that
date to all R employees (including supervisors and management staff) pursuant
to the OTA was probationary employment for a 90 day period which if successful
would provide eligibility for permanent employment on wages and benefits to be
announced on or before the expiration of the 90 day period.
In Windsor Health Care the Administrative Law Judge essentially subscribed to a
similar argument, finding the successor employer, upon hiring the predecessor’s employees as
“temporary employees,” and later unilaterally setting initial terms and conditions of employment,
was not a Burns successor because:
As the Board noted in Spruce Up:
When an employer who has not yet commenced operations
announces new terms prior to or simultaneously with his invitation
to the previous work force to accept employment under
those terms, we do not think it can fairly be said that the new
employer “plans to retain all of the employees in the unit,” as
that phrase was intended by [Burns].
When the possibility that the predecessor’s employees may
not enter into an employment relationship with the new employer
is a real one, the Board does not consider it “perfectly
clear” that the new employer “plans to retain all of the employees
in the unit.” Ibid.7 Here, Respondent informed the Candlewood
applicants that they would be employed only in a temporary
or probationary status for 90 days. That should have signaled
to the applicants that terms and conditions of employment
with Respondent were not going to be identical with those of its
predecessor, and they could have declined employment upon

5 The fact that the Respondent had been previously licensed to operate and was operating
another nursing home in the State of California, and, in addition, Sections 16 and 17 of the
Court’s Order that provide for forfeiture of the Respondent’s deposit and purchase price if the
Respondent fails to obtain the appropriate license or to consummate the transaction in the
manner required, are strong indicators of the Respondent’s certitude that the license would be
granted and the transaction consummated.
6 Spruce Up Corp., 209 NLRB 194 (1974).
7 Spruce Up, supra.
JD(SF)–27-08
.5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
6
learning they would have to complete a probationary period.
Thus,… Respondent did not violate the Act by setting initial terms
of employment. Contrast Elf Atochem North America, Inc., 339
NLRB 796 (2003) (Employer a “perfectly clear” successor
when it informed employees it would provide them employment,
recognize their seniority, and grant equivalent salaries
and benefits.)
However the Board disagreed with this rationale and came to the opposite conclusion, as
follows:
Turning to the instant case, the judge, applying Spruce Up, found that the Burns
“perfectly clear” exception does not apply because the Respondent informed
Candlewood applicants that they would be employed only in a temporary or
probationary status. This, the judge reasoned, “should have signaled” to them
that their terms and conditions of employment would change, thus raising the
possibility that some might decline employment and rendering the “perfectly
clear” exception inapplicable.
We disagree. Although the Respondent did subject former Candlewood
employees to what amounted to a probationary period, we nonetheless find,
applying Spruce Up, that the Burns “perfectly clear” exception does apply
because the Respondent “failed to clearly announce its intent to establish a new
set of conditions prior to inviting former [Candlewood] employees to accept
employment.”[footnote omitted.] 209 NLRB at 195.
Thus the Board in Windsor determined that simply hiring employees on a probationary basis,
without clearly advising them of an intent to establish a new set of conditions of employment, is
insufficient to create the inference that employees might decline employment; therefore, for
purposes of determining union majority, their probationary status is immaterial.
It seems unclear whether the Board in Windsor has directly addressed the precise
issue presented here by the Respondent, namely, whether an offer of 90-day probationary
employment, during which the employees will be receiving no health insurance or continuation
of other contractual benefits previously enjoyed, constitutes an announcement and
establishment of new terms and conditions of employment within the meaning and rationale of
Spruce Up.8 In other words, is there a real possibility that the Respondent’s changes to the
employees’ current conditions of employment are sufficient to cause them to reject the offer of
probationary employment and seek employment elsewhere? If so, then, under Spruce Up, the
Union’s majority status remains uncertain until sometime after August 8.9

8 Thus in Windsor, it appears the employees were initially told only that they would be hired as
“temporary employees” and were later advised that they would no longer have their previous
benefits during their probationary period.
9 In this regard, the Respondent would apparently argue that in a bankruptcy setting the
employees could have reasonably anticipated benefits inferior to what they had received under
the predecessor’s tenure, and such lowered expectations would cause them to decline the
probationary offer of employment and/or seek other employment in the interim. However it
seems equally probable that, as experienced long-time employees who were familiar with the
patients and their needs, the Respondent would make every effort to retain their services by
offering them substantially the same benefits they previously enjoyed at the expiration of the
probationary period. Accordingly, the one postulate is not more probable that the other.
JD(SF)–27-08
.5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
7
The Respondent assumes that it’s bargaining obligation attached only after the 90-day
probationary period had expired on November 8, at which time it retained a majority of the
former unit employees; thus, during the probationary period the employees’ status as
permanent employees was merely tentative. However, as noted, the Board in Windsor has
found, in effect, that the status of former permanent employees, who are initially hired by a
successor employer as temporary or probationary employees, is not changed for purposes of
determining union majority.
The Respondent maintains that because it purchased the predecessor through a
bankruptcy auction, it’s principles had only limited opportunity to learn about the facility prior to
the purchase, and had been unable to perform a thorough “due diligence” investigation
customarily attendant to the purchase of an ongoing business enterprise. Further, the
Respondent maintains it had no access to the facility or information about the employees until
the Respondent’s principals walked through the door on August 8, and hired the employees
sight unseen, not knowing the condition of the facility, the competence and qualifications of the
employees or of the administrative/ supervisory staff, or the physical needs of the patients.
Accordingly, the Respondent suggests that under these circumstances, particularly because it
had been unable to pre-evaluate the qualifications and competence of the employees and staff,
it was not a “perfectly clear” Burns successor on August 8; thus, to presume on August 8, that
a majority of the employees would survive the probationary screening process or ultimately
become permanent employees is simply an unrealistic presumption under the circumstances.
There is no record evidence indicating the extent of the Respondent’s information
concerning the facility, its supervisors, administrators and employees, prior to August 8, and
therefore the Respondent’s arguments in its brief on this point are unsupported by record
evidence. What is clear however, is that the Respondent’s negotiations with the predecessor
culminated in the execution of the aforementioned Operations Transfer Agreement on July 26,
a detailed document consisting of some 21 pages, including provisions pertaining to the hiring
“on a probationary basis, each Facility Employee who elects to accept employment with New
Operator…”10
The record is devoid of any evidence showing that the facility was other than a
functioning health care institution, operating with the proper license in accordance with and
under the scrutiny of applicable governmental agencies, and subject to strict requirements and
safeguards for the care and safety of its patients. The fact that the facility was purchased
through a bankruptcy auction may be relevant to its profitability,11 but it is not relevant to the
qualifications or competency of the predecessor’s employees or staff. Accordingly, there
seems to be no compelling reason to conclude that the employee complement inherited by the
Respondent was generally less qualified and more likely to be replaced than any other
complement of employees; or to conclude that a special exception, under Burns and its
progeny, should be carved out for successors who elect to acquire businesses through
bankruptcy auctions.

10 The Respondent suggests that the hiring of the employees on a probationary basis was in
effect mandated by the Bankruptcy Court. It seems clear, however, that this hiring arrangement
was voluntarily negotiated between the Respondent and predecessor, and was not imposed by
the Bankruptcy Court.
11 However, many facilities of the predecessor were simultaneously sold as a part of the same
bankruptcy proceeding, and it does not necessarily follow that the facility in question was
contributing to the overall financial indebtedness of the predecessor.
JD(SF)–27-08
.5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
8
However, under the circumstances herein, it seems to make no difference whether the
Respondent is a Burns “perfectly clear successor.” Assuming arguendo the Respondent was
not a Burns “perfectly clear” successor on August 8, it is necessary to determine the date the
Respondent’s bargaining obligation begins. I find that clearly this date was prior to the
expiration of the 90-day probationary period. Insofar as the record shows, not one employee
voluntarily left the Respondent’s employ during his or her probationary period; nor, insofar as
the record shows, did the Respondent hire any new employees during this period. Further,
there is no evidence that the Respondent intended to discharge a majority or even a substantial
number of the former employees and replace them at the end of the probationary period. Thus,
the employee complement was not in a state of flux during this period, and the Respondent’s
argument that its employee complement was indeterminate until November 8, is not supported
by the record evidence, as it clearly knew prior to November 8 the number of employees it
intended to discharge and, if necessary, replace. Accordingly, the Respondent’s permanent
employee complement and the Union’s majority status having been established prior to
November 8, I find that its bargaining obligation attached at some point between September 14,
the date the Union requested that Respondent recognize and bargain collectively with the
Union,12 and prior to November 8, the date when the Respondent unilaterally established terms
and conditions of employment for its then permanent employee complement.
On the basis of the foregoing, I conclude that the Respondent’s refusal to recognize and
bargain with the Union from sometime prior to November 8 until January 8, 2008, is violative of
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, as alleged. I further conclude that the changes to the
employees’ terms and conditions of employment made on and after November 8, constituted
unilateral changes in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, as alleged.
The complaint also alleges that the Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition from the
Union. The parties stipulated that during the January 30, 2008 bargaining session the
Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union, but rescinded this withdrawal of recognition
the following day. The record contains no further evidence regarding this matter. As
represented by Respondent’s attorney during his opening statement at the hearing, something
occurred during the January 30 bargaining session that caused him to lose his temper and to
abruptly withdraw recognition. Under the circumstances, the Respondent’s conduct is
tantamount to one party simply walking out in the middle of a bargaining session, certainly not
an uncommon occurrence during the sometimes contentious course of bargaining. The fact that
the Respondent immediately rescinded such conduct and thereafter resumed bargaining is, in
effect, an admission of error. Nor is there any evidence that this conduct impacted subsequent
bargaining. Under the circumstances, I shall dismiss this allegation of the complaint.13
Conclusions of Law and Recommendations
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2) (6) and (7) of the Act, and a health care institution within the meaning of Section
2(14) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.

12 As the Union did not request recognition until September 14, it appears the Respondent had
no bargaining obligation until that date.
13 Passavant Memorial Hospital, 237 NLRB 138 (1978), cited by the General Counsel, is
inapposite.
JD(SF)–27-08
.5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
9
3. The Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as found herein.
The Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has violated and is violating Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act, I recommend that, on request of the Union, the Respondent be required to rescind
any departures from terms and conditions of employment that, absent the Respondent’s
unilateral conduct, would have existed for permanent employees on November 8, 2007. I
further recommend that the Respondent retroactively restore such terms and conditions of
employment until such time as the parties reach a collective bargaining agreement or a
bargaining impasse. 14 See, generally, Planned Building Services, 347 NLRB 670 (2006);
Windsor Convalescent Center of North Long Beach, 351 NLRB No. 44 (2007).
I shall also recommend that the Respondent be required to cease and desist from
making unilateral changes, and from in any other like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act.
Finally, I shall recommend the posting of an appropriate notice, attached hereto as “Appendix.”
ORDER15
The Respondent, A & C Healthcare Services, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Unilaterally changing wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment of employees without first giving notice to and bargaining with the
Union in the following appropriate unit:
All employees performing work covered by the collective –
bargaining agreement between Pleasant Care and the Union
effective October 1, 2006 through June 15, 2008.

14 The matter of the Respondent’s health care obligations is yet an open issue. Thus, in the
Operations Transfer Agreement, Section 2.5 (f), the Respondent is required to establish and
maintain a group healthcare plan for the general benefit of it its employees and their
dependents. Accordingly, contrary to the position of the General Counsel, the Respondent may
not have any continuing obligation under the prior group healthcare plan, as this matter is
governed by the OTA; and, in addition, whether the new healthcare plan may be deemed an
initial term and condition of employment not subject to the Respondent’s bargaining obligation
is another matter for consideration in a compliance proceeding.
15 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Section 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Section
102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
JD(SF)–27-08
.5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
10
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which is necessary to effectuate the
purposes of the Act:
(a) On request of the Union, rescind any departures from terms and conditions
of employment that existed prior to commencing operations at the facility on
August 8, 2007, retroactively restoring preexisting terms of employment, as set
forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(b) On request of the Union, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the unit described above with respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if
agreement is reached, embody such agreement in a signed document.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility copies of the
attached notice marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being duly signed by Respondent’s
representative, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof, and shall
remain posted by Respondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Regional Office, file with the Regional
Director for Region 20 a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form
provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
Dated: Washington, D.C. July 18, 2008
_______________________
Gerald A. Wacknov
Administrative Law Judge

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the wording in
the notice reading, “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board,” shall read, “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing and Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AN AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO:
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT unilaterally change wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment of employees without first giving notice to and bargaining with the Union in
the following appropriate unit:
All employees performing work covered by the collective –
bargaining agreement between Pleasant Care and the Union
effective October 1, 2006 through June 15, 2008.
WE WILL , on request of the Union, rescind any departures from terms and conditions
of employment that existed prior to commencing operations at the facility on August 8,
2007, retroactively restoring preexisting terms of employment, as set forth in the remedy
section of this decision
WE WILL, on request of the Union, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the unit described above with respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if agreement is
reached, embody such agreement in a signed document.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
A & C Healthcare Services, Inc.
(Employer)
Dated: _______________ By: ________________________________________________
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting and must not
be altered, defaced, or covered with any other material. Any questions concerning this notice
or compliance with its provisions may be referred to the Board’s office, 901 Market Street, Suite
400, San Francisco, CA. 94103-1735, Phone 415/356-5130.