Ark. R. Civ. P. 8
Ark. R. Civ. P. 8
Reporter's Notes to Rule 8: 1. Although reworded, Rule 8 is substantially the same as FRCP 8. It seeks to accomplish the same purpose as FRCP 8, i.e. to require that pleadings be drafted in such a manner as to give a party fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it is based. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957).
2. Section (a) requires that all claims for relief contain three basic elements, one of which a statement upon which venue and jurisdiction are based which requirement was not found under superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-1113 (Repl. 1962). Section (a)(1) and (2) substitutes the term "ordinary and concise" language from this superseded statute for the term "short and plain" found in the Federal Rule
3. Section (a)(3) tracks superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-1113 (4) (Supp. 1975) relative to claims for unliquidated damages. The obvious purpose of this section is to prevent a plaintiff from using unliquidated demands to avoid removal of diversity of citizenship cases to federal court.
4. Section (b) follows FRCP 8(b). The theory behind this section is that an answer or reply should apprise a claimant which allegations in the claim are admitted and not in issue and which are contested and thus require proof. Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F. 2d 924 (C.C.A. 5t h, 1946). In the first sentence of Section (b), the term "ordinary and concise" is substituted for the term "short and plain" used in the Federal Rule.
5. Section (b) permits a pleader to allege that he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment and thereby deny such allegation. This follows superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-1121 (2) (Repl. 1962). In doing so, however, the pleader must act in good faith or risk having his pleading stricken under Rule 12(f). Section (b) also requires that the pleader fairly meet the substance of the averment denied. The purpose of this provision is to proscribe a pleading which neither admits nor denies, but simply demands proof of claimant's allegations. Such an allegation or averment is not sufficient to constitute a denial. Reed v. Hickey, 2 F.R.D. 92 (D.C., 1941). Section (b) also follows the Federal Rule by allowing a pleader to admit certain allegations while denying others, and by permitting the use of general denials, although their use is discouraged under federal practice. One asserting a general denial is required to act in good faith in doing so.
6. Section (c) follows in substance FRCP 8(c). The list of affirmative defenses contained in this section is not intended to be exclusive and other defenses may be asserted, if available, even though not specifically listed. The last sentence of this section grants the court discretion to allow a counterclaim or affirmative defense even though improperly designated.
7. Section (d) is essentially the same as FRCP 8(d) and superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-1151 and 27-1121 (Repl. 1962) concerning general denials.
8. Section (e)(1) is designed to avoid verbosity in pleadings. It is a slightly reworded version of FRCP 8(e)(1). Technical rules or forms of pleadings or motions are abolished. Also, this section follows superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-1121 (Repl. 1962) in requiring separate defenses to be set out in separate, numbered paragraphs.
9. Section (f) follows superseded Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-1150 (Repl. 1962) by requiring that all pleadings be liberally construed so as to do substantial justice.
Addition to Reporter's Notes, 1983 Amendment: Rule 8(a) is amended to remove the requirement of pleading grounds of jurisdiction and venue.
The original Reporter's Notes were meant to apply to the committee draft of Rule 8(a) and not to the rule as revised by the Supreme Court. In Harvey v. Eastman Kodak Co., 261 Ark. 783, 610 S.W.2d 582 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear its intention that Arkansas had not become a "notice pleading" jurisdiction in the image of the federal system. See Faculty Note, 34 Ark. L. Rev. 722 (1981).
Addition to Reporter's Notes, 1992 Amendment: Rule 8(a) is amended to require that the complaint and other pleadings that set forth claims for relief include facts showing that the court has jurisdiction and that venue is proper. This requirement is consistent with statements in the case law regarding personal and subject matter jurisdiction. E.g., Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Chisley, 308 Ark. 308, 825 S.W.2d 558 (1992) (personal jurisdiction is to be determined on the basis of facts alleged in the complaint); Hesser v. Johns, 288 Ark. 264, 704 S.W.2d 165 (1986) (question of whether court has jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined from allegations in the complaint). Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that a complaint may on its face reveal that venue is improper. E.g., Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 246 Ark. 101, 437 S.W.2d 459 (1969). Nonetheless, some confusion arose in light of the 1983 amendment of Rule 8(a) deleting a requirement, found in the original version of the rule, that the complaint contain a statement of "the grounds upon which venue and the court's jurisdiction depend." However, elimination of the requirement that grounds be pleaded was apparently not intended to modify the role of the factual allegations in the determination of jurisdiction and venue. The 1992 amendment, which is designed to clarify the obligations of the pleader as to jurisdiction and venue, is consistent with the requirement that a complaint allege facts constituting a cause of action. See Harvey v. Eastman Kodak Co., 271 Ark. 783, 610 S.W.2d 582 (1981).