Opinion
C/A No. 9:08-2627-HFF-GCK.
August 4, 2008
Report and Recommendation
Background of this Case
The plaintiff is an inmate at the Broad River Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). According to the plaintiff, Mr. Alpin is the "head" of the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services. John C. Hayes is a South Carolina Circuit Judge. Defendant Roberts is the Warden of the Broad River Correctional Institution.
The plaintiff may be confused about this defendant's first name and surname. The South Carolina Department of Corrections website (www.doc.sc.gov) indicates that Robert M. Stevenson, III, is the Warden of the Broad River Correctional Institution.
The "STATEMENT OF CLAIM" portion of the § 1983 complaint reveals that this civil rights action arises out of the plaintiff's sentencing for violations during community supervision parole ("C.S.P."). The plaintiff alleges: (1) the plaintiff is being held beyond the expiration of his original five-year sentence; (2) the plaintiff has "been violated 5 — times on C.S.P. and sent back to Prison" for these C.S.P. violations; (3) the plaintiff "maxed out" his original five-year sentence in 2000, "got violated 2003 on C.S.P. done 1 — year, 2004 violated again got another year[,] Violated C.S.P. 2006 got another year[,] Violated 2007 got (90) Days, Violated 2008 got another year[;]" (4) the plaintiff is now thirty-eight months over his "max out" sentence; (5) the plaintiff is suing Mr. Alpin for keeping him on C.S.P. every time he gets out of prison; (6) the plaintiff is suing "Warden Stevenson Roberts III" and the "Head" of the SCDC for keeping him incarcerated; and (7) the plaintiff is suing Judge Hayes for sentencing him four times to a mandatory one-year sentence while he knew that the plaintiff had already "maxed out" his original sentence. In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks $3,500,000 for wrongful imprisonment, mental anguish, and the loss of the plaintiff's child. The plaintiff also seeks a court order that all his C.S.P. violations be "cleared off" his record.
The South Carolina Department of Corrections website (www.doc.sc.gov) indicates that the plaintiff's original sentence was for second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. His original conviction was entered in the Court of General Sessions for York County.
The Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections is not listed as a defendant in the caption of the complaint or in the "party information" section on page 2 of the complaint.
Discussion
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-325 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) ( en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979) (recognizing the district court's authority to conduct an initial screening of any pro se filing); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff is a pro se litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 75 U.S.L.W. 3643, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007) ( per curiam); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 n. 7 (1980) ( per curiam); and Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint or petition, the plaintiff's or petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). Even under this less stringent standard, the § 1983 complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 (DSC), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Boyce has been held by some authorities to have been abrogated in part, on other grounds, by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) (insofar as Neitzke establishes that a complaint that fails to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), does not by definition merit sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)], as "frivolous").
Since the plaintiff is complaining about an order of a South Carolina Circuit Judge in a criminal case, which returned the plaintiff to prison, this case is subject to summary dismissal because a right of action has not accrued. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994):
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486-487 (footnote omitted). See also Woods v. Candela, 47 F.3d 545 (2nd Cir. 1995) (litigant's conviction reversed by state court in 1993; hence, civil rights action timely filed); Treece v. Village of Naperville, 903 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Seaton v. Kato, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 2380, *12-*13, 1995 WL 88956 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 1995); and Smith v. Holtz, 879 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Pa. 1995), affirmed, 87 F.3d 108 (3rd Cir. 1995).
Until the plaintiff's conviction and sentence are reversed, vacated, or set aside, any civil rights action based on the conviction and sentence will be barred because of the holding in Heck v. Humphrey. Sufka v. Minnesota, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 84544, 2007 WL 4072313 (D. Minn., Nov. 15, 2007). Even so, the limitations period will not begin to run until the cause of action accrues. See Benson v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 947 F. Supp. 827, 830 n. 3 (D.N.J. 1996) (following Heck v. Humphrey: "[b]ecause a prisoner's § 1983 cause of action will not have arisen, there need be no concern that it might be barred by the relevant statute of limitations."), which applied Heck v. Humphrey to probation and parole matters; and Snyder v. City of Alexandria, 870 F. Supp. 672, 685-88 (E.D. Va. 1994).
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Wilson v. Johnson, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS® 15870, 2008 WL 2854502 (4th Cir., July 25, 2008), is not applicable because the one-year sentences imposed upon the plaintiff were imposed by a South Carolina Circuit Judge in a criminal case and were not the result of an erroneous calculation of a sentence by a state corrections department.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, Courts of General Sessions, Courts of Common Pleas, Family Courts, Probate Courts, magistrate's courts, and municipal courts are in a unified judicial system. See S.C. Const. Article V, § 1 ("The judicial power shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which shall include a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a Circuit Court, and such other courts of uniform jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law."); City of Pickens v. Schmitz, 297 S.C. 253, 376 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1989); Cort Industries Corp. v. Swirl, Inc., 264 S.C. 142, 213 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1975); and State ex rel. McLeodv. Civil and Criminal Court of Horry County, 265 S.C. 114, 217 S.E.2d 23, 24 (1975). The entity known as the South Carolina Court Administration operates the State of South Carolina's unified judicial system pursuant to the authority delegated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. See Bailey v. State, 309 S.C. 455, 424 S.E.2d 503 (1992). South Carolina Circuit Judges are judges in the State of South Carolina's unified judicial system. See In the Matter of Peeples, 297 S.C. 36,374 S.E.2d 674 (1988).
County courts in the State of South Carolina no longer exist. Section 22 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina (1973) allowed "any existing court" on the date of ratification to continue operating until Article V was fully implemented. State ex rel. McLeod v. Civil and Criminal Court of Horry County, 217 S.E.2d at 24 ("The Horry County Court is one of the courts continued in existence solely by virtue of the provisions of Section 22 of Article V.").
Since Judge Hayes was acting as a South Carolina Circuit when he ordered the plaintiff to be confined in the SCDC, Judge John C. Hayes is immune from suit in the above-captioned civil rights action. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 351-64 (1978); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (a suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates); and Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions."). See also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (immunity presents a threshold question which should be resolved before discovery is even allowed); and Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (absolute immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability"). Accord Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing judicial immunity of United States District Judges and United States Circuit Judges).
The Warden of the Broad River Correctional Institution and the Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections are not responsible for actions taken in the plaintiff's criminal case by Judge Hayes or by the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services. See Wilson v. Cooper, 922 F. Supp. 1286, 1293 (N.D. Ill. 1996); and Campo v. Keane, 913 F. Supp. 814, 825 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also Horton v. Marovich, 925 F. Supp. 540, 543 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Thus, a plaintiff suing a government official in his individual capacity and therefore seeking to hold the official personally liable must show that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal right."); and Smith v. Beasley, 2007 U.S.Dist. LEXIS® 54010, 2007 WL 2156632, *2 (D.S.C., July 25, 2007) (adopting magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, which cites Horton v. Marovich).
The plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages for mental anguish. Case law prior to the adoption of the Prison Litigation Reform Act had held that there is no federal constitutional right to be free from emotional distress, psychological stress, or mental anguish, and, hence, there is no liability under Section 1983 regarding such claims. See Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985), rehearing denied, 779 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1986); and Rodriguez v. Comas, 888 F.2d 899, 903 (1st Cir. 1989). See also the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which provides that physical injuries are a prerequisite for an award of damages for emotional distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This provision is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), and has been held to be constitutional. See Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D. Ind. 1997), affirmed, 133 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1997).
Recommendation
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Denton v. Hernandez; Neitzke v. Williams; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-204 (4th Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) [essentially a redesignation of "old" § 1915(d)]; and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A [as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal]. The plaintiff's attention is directed to the Notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The plaintiff is advised that he may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court judge need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must "only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamondv. Colonial Life Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005).Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, Schronce v. United States, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).