Opinion
18-cv-04471-JSC
03-10-2023
KYLE CHRISTOPHER ZOELLNER, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ARCATA, et al., Defendants.
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Re: Dkt. No. 412
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the single claim remaining in Mr. Zoellner's fifth amended complaint (“5AC”). (Dkt. No. 412.) Having carefully considered the briefing, the Court concludes that oral argument is unnecessary, see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), VACATES the March 16, 2023 hearing, and GRANTS the motion. Mr. Zoellner's claim is barred by California's litigation privilege as a matter of law.
Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents.
BACKGROUND
The operative 5AC asserts nine claims and names 11 Defendants. (Dkt. No. 106.) In April 2021, the district judge then presiding over the case granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss the 5AC. (Dkt. No. 131.) As relevant here, the district judge denied the motion to dismiss as to claim nine, styled “wrongful threat of criminal prosecution” in the 5AC but construed by the judge as an intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim. (Dkt. No. 106 at 67; Dkt. No. 131 at 18.) That claim was bifurcated and stayed. (Dkt. No. 161; see Dkt. No. 233 at 12:15-16, 40:17-19.) In March 2022, the district judge granted summary judgment to Defendants on all live claims except the malicious prosecution claim against Mr. Losey only. (Dkt. No. 233.)
The malicious prosecution claim proceeded to trial in October 2022. The jury returned findings favorable to Mr. Zoellner on all elements that were put to the jury. (Dkt. Nos. 376, 377.) The Court then determined, based on the trial record, that Mr. Zoellner had not proved the lack of probable cause element of malicious prosecution-an element that was not put to the jury because the law requires the trial judge to decide it. (Dkt. No. 383; see Dkt. No. 370 at 12 (instructing jury that “[t]he law requires that the trial judge, rather than the jury, decide if Mr. Zoellner has proven element 3 above, whether a reasonable person in Mr. Losey's circumstances would have believed that there were grounds for causing Mr. Zoellner to be prosecuted”). Thus, the trial verdict was in Mr. Losey's favor. (See Dkt. No. 383 at 11:24-25.)
The parties now turn to the bifurcated claim of wrongful threat of criminal prosecution/IIED, which is asserted against all Defendants. Mr. Zoellner alleges Defendants' counsel, acting as each Defendant's agent, “attempted to extort Plaintiff by threatening him with a new prosecution for the death of [David Josiah] Lawson unless Plaintiff dismissed this lawsuit, but in exchange for Plaintiff's dismissal, Defendants would agree to not file any further criminal charges against Plaintiff.” (Dkt. No. 106 ¶ 282.) The 5AC refers to “four different occasions,” “in particular . . . December 15, 2021 and December 21, 2021.” (Id. ¶¶ 135, 282.) The Court lifted the stay with respect to Defendants filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, (see Dkt. No. 411 at 12:21-22), on the grounds that California's litigation privilege precludes the claim, (Dkt. No. 412).
Magistrate judge settlement conferences were held on those two dates. (See Dkt. Nos. 95, 96; see also Dkt. No. 143-1 (Mr. Zoellner's declaration in support of motion to disqualify Defendants' counsel, describing threats); Dkt. No. 143-2 (Mr. Zoellner's counsel's declaration in support of same); Dkt. No. 411 at 5:5-23 (Mr. Zoellner's counsel representing that the claim arises out of statements made in a proceeding before the formerly presiding district judge, a discovery proceeding before a magistrate judge, and a settlement conference before a magistrate judge).)
DISCUSSION
“Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Like a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion under Rule 12(c) challenges the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Chavez, 683 F.3d at 1108. “[I]t is common to apply Rule 12(c) to individual causes of action.” Strigliabotti v. Franklin Res., Inc., 398 F.Supp.2d 1094, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
I. LITIGATION PRIVILEGE
Under Section 47(b), formerly 47(2), “[a] privileged publication or broadcast is one made . . . [i]n any . . . judicial proceeding.” Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b)(2). “California's litigation privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that has some connection or logical relation to the action.” Graham-Sult v. Clainos, 756 F.3d 724, 741 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). As to the first element, “[t]he communication may be made outside a courtroom, since many portions of a ‘judicial proceeding' occur outside of open court, such as settlement negotiations.” Carney v. Rotkin, Schmerin & McIntyre, 206 Cal.App.3d 1513, 1521 n.4 (1988) (cleaned up). “When a communication meets these requirements, the privilege is absolute; that is, it is unaffected by the presence of malice.” Id. at 1521. Unlike evidentiary privileges, “which operate by excluding evidence,” the litigation privilege “directly affects liability.” Id. at 1520. It “applies to judges and other official officers, attorneys, parties, jurors, and witnesses.” Id. “Any doubt about whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it.” Finton Constr., Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC, 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 212 (2015) (cleaned up).
“The litigation privilege . . . serves broad goals of guaranteeing access to the judicial process, promoting the zealous representation by counsel of their clients, and reinforcing the traditional function of the trial as the engine for the determination of truth.” Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299, 324 (2006). The privilege “afford[s] litigants and witnesses the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.” Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 213 (1990) (cleaned up), as modified (Mar. 12, 1990). The privilege “enhanc[es] the finality of judgments and avoid[s] an unending roundelay of litigation, an evil far worse than an occasional unfair result.” Id. at 214.
The privilege “immunizes defendants from virtually any tort liability (including claims for fraud), with the sole exception of causes of action for malicious prosecution.” Olsen v. Harbison, 191 Cal.App.4th 325, 333 (2010). “Malicious prosecution actions are permitted because the policy of encouraging free access to the courts is outweighed by the policy of affording redress for individual wrongs when the requirements of favorable termination, lack of probable cause, and malice are satisfied.” Silberg, 50 Cal.3d at 216 (cleaned up). “We recognize . . . that the disallowance of derivative tort actions based on communications of participants in an earlier action necessarily results in some real injuries that go uncompensated.” Id. at 218. “But . . . that is the price that is paid for witnesses who are free from intimidation by the possibility of civil liability for what they say.” Id. (cleaned up). And “in a good many cases of injurious communications, other remedies aside from a derivative suit for compensation will exist and may help deter injurious publications during litigation,” including “State Bar disciplinary proceedings.” Id. at 218-19.
II. APPLICATION
Construing the 5AC allegations in the light most favorable to Mr. Zoellner, see Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009), his wrongful threat of criminal prosecution/IIED claim is barred by the absolute litigation privilege, see Graham-Sult, 756 F.3d at 741.
First, the alleged threats were made in a judicial proceeding because they were communicated by Defendants' counsel to Mr. Zoellner during the latter's active civil case. See Olsen, 191 Cal.App.4th at 334. Second, Defendants' counsel was a participant authorized by law. See Carney, 206 Cal.App.3d at 1520; e.g., Finton Constr., 238 Cal.App.4th at 211-13 (privileged statement by counsel); Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, 236 Cal.App.4th 793, 814-16 (2015) (same). As to the third and fourth elements, Defendants' counsel made the alleged threats to achieve their object of the litigation-that is, a resolution in Defendants' favor. See Olsen, 191 Cal.App.4th at 336 (noting third and fourth elements “overlap to a considerable degree”). The 5AC squarely alleges Defendants' counsel “threaten[ed] [Mr. Zoellner] with a new prosecution” to “convince him to dismiss the case.” (Dkt. No. 106 ¶¶ 282, 136; see id. ¶ 135.) Those communications could not be more related to this case. See Asia Inv. Co. v. Borowski, 133 Cal.App.3d 832, 842 (1982) (privileged “threat to coerce Asia into settling”); see also Olsen, 191 Cal.App.4th at 336 (“Had there been no litigation, these comments would never have been made.”).
Accordingly, the privilege applies. The Court addresses Mr. Zoellner's other arguments below.
A. Law of the Case
Mr. Zoellner argues the formerly presiding district judge rejected the litigation privilege at the motion to dismiss stage, creating law of the case.
The law of the case is a “discretionary” doctrine, United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000), which:
generally provides that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case. The doctrine expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided, but it does not limit courts' power.Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 244-45 (2016) (cleaned up). “The law of the case doctrine does not preclude a court from reassessing its own legal rulings in the same case . . . before judgment is entered or the court is otherwise divested of jurisdiction over the order.” Askins v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035, 1042 (9th Cir. 2018). “For the doctrine to apply, the issue in question must have been decided explicitly or by necessary implication in the previous disposition.” Lummi, 235 F.3d at 452 (cleaned up).
Mr. Zoellner does not argue, and the Court sees no good faith basis to do so, that the district judge's order is a decision by a higher court. See Askins, 899 F.3d at 1042 (“The doctrine applies most clearly where an issue has been decided by a higher court; in that case, the lower court is precluded from reconsidering the issue and abuses its discretion in doing so ....”).
Here, in one paragraph of Defendants' reply to their motion to dismiss, they argued the alleged threats “fall within the litigation privilege.” (Dkt. No. 127 at 11 (citing Silberg).) The parties did not discuss the privilege at the motion hearing, (Dkt. No. 416-1), nor did the district judge's written order address it, (Dkt. No. 131). Thus, the privilege issue was not decided explicitly. Even assuming it was decided by necessary implication of the order denying dismissal as to Mr. Zoellner's wrongful threat of criminal prosecution/IIED claim, the Court will exercise its discretion not to apply the doctrine. See Lummi, 235 F.3d at 452. Neither the hearing nor the order mentioned the privilege. So, to the extent the issue was decided, it was without meaningful analysis and “reassess[ment]” with more robust briefing is appropriate. Askins, 899 F.3d at 1042; cf. Strigliabotti, 398 F.Supp.2d at 1098 (“[T]hat defense counsel believes that the previous motion to dismiss was erroneously decided, and erroneously presented by his co-counsel, is not a persuasive reason for the Court to exercise its discretion to revisit an issue ....”).
The district judge's order discussed whether “statements made by defense counsel are inadmissible because they were made during a settlement conference,” (Dkt. No. 131 at 15), but only in reference to Federal Rule of Evidence 408, not the litigation privilege.
B. Waiver
Mr. Zoellner next argues Defendants waived the privilege by failing to assert it in their answer to the 5AC.
“A defendant may . . . raise an affirmative defense for the first time in a motion for judgment on the pleadings, but only if the delay does not prejudice the plaintiff.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up); see Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Prot. Dist., 7 Cal. 5th 798, 810 (2019) (“the absolute litigation privilege . . . is an affirmative defense subject to principles of forfeiture and waiver”). There is no prejudice to Mr. Zoellner because “this affirmative defense would have been dispositive had [Defendants] asserted it when the action was filed.” Owens, 244 F.3d at 713 (finding defendant's failure to plead res judicata in its answer did not prejudice plaintiff). Whether Defendants asserted the privilege in their answer or at this stage, the result would be the same: Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Moreover, because this claim has been bifurcated and stayed, the parties have not invested resources in it in a way that prejudices anyone.
C. Unfairness
Finally, Mr. Zoellner argues this Court has denied him due process and advocated for Defendants by raising issues for them.
The Court raised the litigation privilege at a case management conference (“CMC”) following trial. (Dkt. No. 411 at 5:24-10:12; see id. at 8:6-7 (the Court to Defendants' counsel: “I'm raising that. You didn't raise that in your CMC statement.”).) The Court noted the privilege would be Defendants' burden, (id. at 8:14-15 (“[I]t is an affirmative defense. It's your burden to show it.”)), and has held them to that burden in this Order. Raising a legal issue that a party did not raise in its CMC statement does not show unfairness or partiality. See Pau v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding “no prejudicial misconduct” where judge's “most egregious acts” outside the presence of the jury were “stat[ing] that he had seen better cases before” and that he “would consider” motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict but “was not overly impressed with the Paus' case on liability”). Resolving Mr. Zoellner's claim would involve discovery of the settlement conference magistrate judge. Before allowing such an extraordinary process, this Court has a duty to ensure the law is properly applied.
Earlier, the Court raised the issue of privity in its tentative ruling on one of Mr. Zoellner's motions in limine, more than a month in advance of the pre-trial conference. (Dkt. No. 299 at 2-4 (“The Court acknowledges that Detective Losey did not raise the privity argument in response to Plaintiff's motion. Nonetheless, the Court must apply the correct law and place the burden on Mr. Zoellner [to establish issue preclusion].”).) At the pre-trial conference, the Court heard argument from Mr. Zoellner's counsel, who had had the opportunity to research the issue. (Dkt. No. 324 at 10:24-14:20; see id. at 10:24-25 (Mr. Zoellner's counsel: “I looked at the cases that were cited by the Court.”).) The Court then ruled on the motion in Mr. Losey's favor. (Dkt. No. 306 at 1-4 (“Mr. Zoellner has not met his burden of proving that a police officer is in privity with the prosecution such that he is bound by a finding of no probable cause ....”).) Raising a legal issue that a party did not raise in its opposition to a motion in limine does not show unfairness or partiality. Again, the Court has an obligation to correctly apply the governing law.
Moreover, the Court has also raised issues to Mr. Zoellner's benefit. First, one of Mr. Zoellner's motions in limine sought to exclude evidence from the criminal investigation, including DNA evidence implicating Mr. Zoellner, on grounds of relevance and prejudice. (Dkt. No. 250.) The evidence was likely relevant given Mr. Zoellner sought damages based on his testimony that he did not stab Mr. Lawson; that is, evidence developed post-preliminary hearing showing that he did stab Mr. Lawson would be relevant to his claimed emotional distress damages. And, given he was seeking millions of dollars in damages, the DNA evidence's prejudicial effect would not outweigh its probative value. But, although the Court was not persuaded by Mr. Zoellner's arguments for excluding the evidence, the Court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the DNA evidence was admissible at all “given that [Mr. Losey] does not have on [his] witness list a DNA expert or the person who performed the DNA test.” (Dkt. No. 289 at 2.) The Court ordered Mr. Losey to brief the issue, (id.), and subsequently excluded Mr. Losey's Proposed Exhibits 22-26. (Dkt. No. 299 at 5-7 (“The DNA evidence is not proffered in admissible form as Detective Losey does not have a witness on his list competent to testify to the DNA results as substantive evidence.”); see Dkt. No. 324 at 91:7-15.) Thus, the Court excluded evidence on a basis Mr. Zoellner failed to raise.
Similarly, another of Mr. Zoellner's motions in limine sought to exclude Mr. Losey's expert on grounds of scope and summarizing witness testimony. (Dkt. No. 246.) Again, the Court was unpersuaded by those arguments. But the Court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the expert's report was admissible given that it may have opined on the legal question of probable cause. (Dkt. No. 299 at 4 (“[A]lthough not raised by Mr. Zoellner, an expert witness cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law.” (cleaned up)).) The Court ordered Mr. Losey to file the full report for the Court's review, (id. at 5), and subsequently excluded it. (Dkt. No. 306 at 4 (“The report . . . is excluded because it opines on an ultimate issue of law”).) Thus, the Court excluded expert testimony on a basis Mr. Zoellner failed to raise.
Finally, when Mr. Zoellner put District Attorney Maggie Fleming on his witness list, Mr. Losey objected that Ms. Fleming was never disclosed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a). (Dkt. No. 264 at 8; see Dkt. Nos. 290, 294.) The Court ruled:
The Court will allow Mr. Zoellner to call District Attorney Maggie Fleming as a witness at trial. It was not until April 2022-after summary judgment was decided-that Defendants produced an email
from Ms. Fleming in which she states that she filed the charges in part because of Detective [Losey's] inaccurate statement. While Mr. Zoellner certainly could have taken Ms. Fleming's deposition prior to the close of fact discovery, this email is highly relevant to the causation element of Mr. Zoellner's malicious prosecution claim and thus makes Ms. Fleming an even more central witness. The late production of the email justifies Mr. Zoellner's late disclosure of Ms. Fleming.(Dkt. No. 297 at 3.) Thus, despite Mr. Zoellner not disclosing or deposing Ms. Fleming-the District Attorney whose decision to file murder charges was at the heart of Mr. Zoellner's malicious prosecution claim-during fact discovery, the Court allowed Mr. Zoellner to depose her and call her as a witness. (See Dkt. No. 324 at 37-38.)
* * *
In sum, the absolute litigation privilege precludes Mr. Zoellner's wrongful threat of criminal prosecution/IIED claim, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. See Graham-Sult, 756 F.3d at 741; Chavez, 683 F.3d at 1108.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
This Order disposes of Docket No. 412.
IT IS SO ORDERED.