Summary
finding it inappropriate to toll the limitations period because the plaintiff had failed to allege any acts of duress occurring after the plaintiff had reached majority
Summary of this case from Twersky v. Yeshiva Univ.Opinion
October 17, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Shaw, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In this action, the plaintiff seeks to recover for emotional and psychological injuries allegedly sustained as a result of the sexual, physical, and emotional abuse inflicted upon her by the defendant, her father, from about 1963 to 1977, when she was 15-years-old. She did not commence this action until October 1991, but contends that her claims are not time-barred because the Statute of Limitations was tolled by duress. She also claims that the defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting the Statute of Limitations as a defense because of his threats and other misconduct.
When duress is part of the causes of action alleged, the Statute of Limitations is tolled until the duress terminates as such conduct is considered a continuous wrong (see, Baratta v Kozlowski, 94 A.D.2d 454; Pacchiana v. Pacchiana, 94 A.D.2d 721). While the duress alleged by the plaintiff is related to her claims, she has failed to specify any acts by the defendant occurring subsequent to 1977 or subsequent to the time when she reached her majority which would constitute duress. Assuming the plaintiff's allegations to be true and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to her, she has not met her burden of demonstrating continuing duress such as would toll the limitations period.
A defendant may be estopped from asserting the Statute of Limitations as a defense where he or she has wrongfully induced the plaintiff to refrain from timely commencing an action by deception, concealment, threats or other misconduct (see, Simcuski v. Saeli, 44 N.Y.2d 442; Doe v. Roe, 192 A.D.2d 1089; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 162 A.D.2d 249). The application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is triggered by some conduct on the part of the defendant after the initial wrongdoing; mere silence or failure to disclose the wrongdoing is insufficient (see, Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11; Simcuski v Saeli, supra). Again, the plaintiff has failed to set forth any acts committed by the defendant after the alleged abuse ended which induced her to refrain from proceeding in a timely manner. Consequently, the Supreme Court properly dismissed her complaint as a matter of law (see, Smith v. Smith, supra; Doe v. Roe, supra; Hoffman v. Hoffman, supra). Copertino, J.P., Pizzuto, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.