Opinion
November 14, 1994
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Kutner, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly dismissed so much of the first and second causes of action as sought to recover damages for legal malpractice. An action to recover damages for legal malpractice requires proof that (a) the attorney was negligent; (b) the negligence was the proximate cause of the loss sustained; and (c) actual damages (see, Ressis v. Wojick, 105 A.D.2d 565; Mendoza v Schlossman, 87 A.D.2d 606). In other words, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must demonstrate that the attorney failed to exercise that degree of skill commonly exercised by an ordinary member of the legal community, and that but for the failure to exercise that requisite degree of skill the result sought by the plaintiff would or could have been achieved (see, Stroock Stroock Lavan v. Beltramini, 157 A.D.2d 590; Seveca v. Reilly, 111 A.D.2d 493; Parker Chapin Flattau Klimpl v. Daelen Corp., 59 A.D.2d 375).
Although the first and second causes of action set forth several acts and/or omissions constituting the alleged negligence, they failed to allege any facts which support a finding that the plaintiffs sustained present damages as a result of that negligence. Consequently, to the extent that the first and second causes of action sought to recover damages for legal malpractice they were properly dismissed (see, Ressis v. Wojick, supra).
We have considered the plaintiffs' remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. O'Brien, J.P., Joy, Friedmann and Krausman, JJ., concur.