Opinion
1 CA-CV 21-0776
02-28-2023
STEPHEN R. ZDANKO, Appellant, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Appellee.
Barton Mendez Soto PLLC, Tempe By James E. Barton II Counsel for Appellant Littler Mendelson, P.C., Phoenix By Steven G. Biddle, Yijee Jeong Counsel for Appellee Napier Baillie Wilson Bacon & Tallone, P.C., Phoenix By Cassidy L. Bacon Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. LC2021-000077-001 The Honorable Daniel J. Kiley, Judge (Retired)
COUNSEL
Barton Mendez Soto PLLC, Tempe By James E. Barton II Counsel for Appellant
Littler Mendelson, P.C., Phoenix By Steven G. Biddle, Yijee Jeong Counsel for Appellee
Napier Baillie Wilson Bacon & Tallone, P.C., Phoenix By Cassidy L. Bacon Counsel for Amicus Curiae
Vice Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
GASS, Vice Chief Judge:
¶1 American Airlines, Inc. employed Stephen Zdanko under a collective bargaining agreement (the CBA) governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA). Zdanko sued to compel American to pay him earned paid sick time under the Arizona Fair Wages and Healthy Family Act (the Act). Under the Act, American did not owe earned paid sick time "until the stated expiration date in the collective bargaining agreement." A.R.S. § 23-381.
¶2 The issue is whether the CBA's duration clause included a stated expiration date." Though conceding the CBA did not expire on the date in its duration clause, Zdanko argues the CBA included a stated expiration date. American argues it did not. The superior court ruled in American's favor. We affirm based on the plain language of the Act and the CBA.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3 Zdanko is a member of the Transport Workers Union of America (Union), which entered the CBA with American effective September 12, 2012. Article 47 of the CBA, titled the "Duration of Agreement" clause (the duration clause), reads as follows:
THIS AGREEMENT will become effective as of September 12, 2012 and will continue in full force and effect until and including September 12, 2018 and will renew itself until each succeeding September 12 thereafter, except that written notice of intended change may be served in accordance with Section 6, Title I, of the Railway Labor Act, as amended, by either party no earlier than sixty (60) calendar days on or after September 12, 2016 [24 months prior to the amendable date].
¶4 In 2016, Arizona voters enacted the Act, which provides, in relevant part:
All or any portion of the earned paid sick time requirements of this article shall not apply to employees covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement, to the extent that such requirements are expressly waived in the collective bargaining agreement in clear and unambiguous terms. No provisions of article 8.1 shall apply to employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement in effect on the effective date of this act until the stated expiration date in the collective bargaining agreement.A.R.S. § 23-381 (emphasis added).
¶5 On September 12, 2018, almost two years after Arizona voters enacted the Act, American served the Union with a written section 6 notice of intended change under the CBA. Simply stated, a section 6 notice "officially opens contracts [for renegotiation] under the Railway Labor Act." Though the section 6 notice is not in the record, TWU-IAM's bulletin board notice to its members states, "Today, September 12, 2018, American Airlines delivered Section 6 notices for all open TWU-IAM Association collective bargaining agreements."
¶6 By serving the section 6 notice, American triggered "status quo" provisions of the RLA, which govern the CBA. The RLA's "status quo" provisions require an employer to comply with the CBA's terms for "rates of pay, rules, or working conditions" during a statutory cooling off period after a party serves a section 6 notice. 45 U.S.C. § 156.
¶7 After American issued its section 6 notice, Zdanko requested the disputed earned paid sick time three times (November 2018, March 2019, and May 2019). American did not provide benefits under the Act, instead paying Zdanko sick time based on the terms of the CBA, which were less generous than if the Act applied. On August 8, 2019, Zdanko filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission of Arizona's Labor Department (the Department) alleging American violated the Act.
¶8 On June 25, 2020, the Department determined American owed Zdanko earned paid sick time under the Act because the CBA had a September 12, 2018 "stated expiration date." American appealed, and an administrative law judge (ALJ) reversed, ruling the CBA had no "stated expiration date" and remained in effect after September 12, 2018.
¶9 Zdanko appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the ALJ's ruling. Zdanko timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under article VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1 and -2101.A.1.
ANALYSIS
¶10 This court must affirm the Department's determination unless it is "contrary to law, is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and capricious or is an abuse of discretion." A.R.S. § 12-910.F. This court defers to the Department's factual findings, but reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Special Fund Div. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 252 Ariz. 267, 269, ¶ 6 (App. 2021). And this court "shall interpret all statutes and all agency rules without deference to any previous determination that may have been made on the question by the agency." Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. Labor Dep't v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 253 Ariz. 425, 514, ¶ 10 (App. 2022) (cleaned up) (discussing A.R.S. § 12-910.F).
I. Whether the CBA included a "stated expiration date" is an issue of Arizona law under the Act.
¶11 This appeal turns on applying the statutory term "stated expiration date" in the Act to the CBA's duration clause. That dispute arises because the RLA's status quo provisions statutorily limit parties' right to engage in self-help during a "cooling off" period after a party issues a section 6 notice. RLA-governed CBAs differ from those governed by other federal labor relation statutes. See 45 U.S.C. § 151a. For that reason, this issue arises only in the context of RLA-governed CBAs.
¶12 Before the Department and the superior court, Zdanko argued the CBA expired on September 12, 2018, and any continuation of its terms was based in the RLA's statutory cooling off provisions, not under the CBA itself. On appeal, during oral argument before this court, Zdanko conceded the CBA did not expire, acknowledging it continued in force even after September 12, 2018. In doing so, Zdanko confirmed he is not relying on a federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that he previously suggested meant the CBA expired on September 12, 2018. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 776 F.2d 812, 813-816 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating agreement did not remain "in full force and effect" after a party issued a section 6 notice).
¶13 The sole issue, therefore, is whether the CBA's duration clause included a "stated expiration date" under the Act despite the RLA's status quo provisions. As a result, federal cases interpreting the RLA are not binding here.
II. The CBA's "Duration of Agreement" clause did not include a "stated expiration date" as the Act uses that term.
¶14 "The primary objective in interpreting a voter-enacted law is to effectuate the voters' intent." Ariz. Advoc. Network Found. v. State, 250 Ariz. 109, 114, ¶ 19 (App. 2020) (cleaned up). This court starts "with the statute's plain language and give[s] its words their ordinary meaning." Cao v. PFP Dorsey Invs., LLC, 253 Ariz. 552, ¶ 26 (App. 2022); see also A.R.S. § 1-213 ("Words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved use of the language."). "If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to that language without employing other rules of statutory construction." Ariz. Advoc. Network Found., 250 Ariz. at 114, ¶ 19 (cleaned up). This court gives meaning to "each word, phrase, clause, and sentence . . . so that no part of the statute will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial." Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys., 242 Ariz. 387, 389, ¶ 7 (App. 2017) (citation omitted). And Arizona courts generally construe remedial statutes broadly "to effect the [voters'] purpose in enacting them." Delgado v. Manor Care of Tucson AZ, LLC, 242 Ariz. 309, 312, ¶ 15 (2017) (citation omitted).
A. The Act's "stated expiration date" provision applies only if the agreement includes a specific date on which the agreement ended.
¶15 The Act does not define "stated expiration date." No other Arizona statutes or opinions provide guidance for interpreting the term "stated expiration date" as used in the Act. Though the term "stated expiration date" appears in two other A.R.S. sections, those sections are not instructive here. One refers to product expiration dates. See A.R.S. § 4-205.05.B (prohibiting sale of spiritous liquor at public auction after the stated expiration date). The other establishes an expiration date for letters of credit if they contain "no stated expiration date or other provision that determines its duration." A.R.S. § 47-5106.C. And no Arizona opinions address the meaning of "stated expiration date" as used in these other statutes.
¶16 In considering a declaratory judgment action, this court looked at written restrictions and covenants, subject to a "duration clause" with automatic extension provisions in the context of a covenant binding homeowners. Scholten v. Blackhawk Partners, 184 Ariz. 326, 328-29 (App. 1995). In Scholten, this court ruled the duration clause bound the homeowners to the original terms until the end of the extension period. Id. Once that period lapsed, the terms automatically renewed for the stated successive period unless the homeowners modified them. Id. Scholten, however, addressed when an amendment could apply, not whether the "duration clause" created an expiration date. See id.
¶17 Because the Act does not define the phrase, this court considers its ordinary meaning. See McMichael-Gombar v. Phoenix Civ. Serv. Bd., 253 Ariz. 429, 434, ¶ 18 (App. 2022). In doing so, this court looks to other sources, such as dictionary definitions from the time the provision was adopted. Matthews v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., Ariz.,, ¶ 33, 520 P.3d 168, 174 (2022); Burns v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 254 Ariz. 24, 31, ¶ 25 (2022). To that end, we look to Random House Webster s Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001) (Random House) and Black s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (Black's), the same dictionaries the Arizona Supreme Court and this court have used to interpret statutes and citizen initiatives, including those adopted in this time frame. See, e.g., Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n. v. Brain, 234 Ariz. 322, 325, ¶ 15 (2014) (citing Random House); Molera v. Hobbs, 250 Ariz. 13, 24, ¶ 35 (2020) (citing Black's); Ariz. Advoc. Network Found., 250 Ariz. at 115, ¶ 26 (App. 2020) (citing Random House); Simms v. Ariz. Racing Comm'n, 253 Ariz. 214, 220, ¶ 28 (App. 2022) (citing Black's).
¶18 Definitions for "stated" include "fix[ed] or settle[d]" or "set forth in proper or definite form[.]" Stated, Random House. "Stated" also can mean "[f]ixed; determined; settled . . . [e]xpressed; [or] declared." Stated, Black's. Definitions for "expiration" include "coming to an end; termination; close: the expiration of a contract." Expiration, Random House. "Date" can mean "a particular month, day, and year at which some event happened or will happen . . . [or] the time during which anything lasts; duration . . . ." Date, Random House. And Black's defines "expiration date" as "the date on which an offer, option, or the like ceases to exist." Expiration Date, Black's.
¶19 Applying these possible definitions, the plain meaning of the term "stated expiration date" is the expressed or declared month, day, and year when the CBA terminates, comes to an end, or ceases to exist.
¶20 Amicus Curiae, A Better Place, directs this court to look at other states that have used the terms "termination date" and "expiration date." See, e.g., Seattle, Wash., Mun. Code § 14.16.120(A)(2) (2015); Jersey City, N.J. (preempted), Codification of Gen. Ordinances § 4-3(A)(12); Newark, N.J., Ordinance § 16:18-3 (preempted). Amicus argues the usage of the terms termination or expiration date under an RLA agreement in other states resulted in courts ruling those CBAs never expire under state law. That fact caused them to begin using the term "stated expiration date" instead to ensure it would exempt existing CBAs just until the stated date that marked the expiration of the contract terms. Nothing in the record or the Act's legislative history reflects this argument. And though other jurisdictions may have chosen a different term, those choices do not change the analysis or meaning of the term "stated expiration date" under Arizona law.
B. The CBA does not include a "stated expiration date" as required by the Act.
¶21 With that understanding of the Act, we turn to the CBA to determine whether it includes a statutorily established "stated expiration date." This court does not interpret contractual terms in a manner rendering them meaningless. Aztar Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 223 Ariz. 463, 476, ¶ 45 (App. 2010); MT Builders, L.L.C. v. Fisher Roofing, Inc., 219 Ariz. 297, ¶ 20 n. 9 (App. 2008). Instead, this court presumes "the language used was placed in the contract for a specific purpose." Tucker v. Byler, 27 Ariz.App. 704, 707 (1976). This court must construe an agreement "as a whole, and each part must be read in light of all the other parts." Allstate Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Watts Water Techs., 244 Ariz. 253, 257, ¶ 12 (App. 2018).
¶22 The CBA's duration clause, Article 47, contains the operative language. Titled "Duration of the Agreement," Article 47 says the CBA "will become effective as of September 12, 2012 and will continue in full force and effect until and including September 12, 2018 and will renew itself until each succeeding September 12 . . . ." Article 47 then creates an exception to the automatic renewal: "except that written notice of intended change may be served in accordance with Section 6, Title I, of the [RLA] as amended by either party no earlier than sixty (60) calendar days on or after September 12, 2016." A party's section 6 notice, thus, triggers the exception. Here, American served the section 6 notice on September 12, 2018. The CBA, thus, did not renew on September 12, 2018. But, as Zdanko concedes, the CBA also did not expire.
¶23 Zdanko's concession and American's argument track federal cases interpreting similar terms in the context of section 6 of the RLA. American argues, the 2012 CBA's duration clause was a stated amendable date, not a stated expiration date, because "a duration clause in a [CBA] under the [RLA] does not terminate the agreement on the assigned date but instead renders the agreement amendable." See 10 Emp. Coordinator Lab. Rels. § 35:81; see also Atlas Air, Inc. v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 280 F.Supp.3d 59, 67 (D.D.C. 2017), aff'd, 928 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Atlas Air, consistent with longstanding federal precedent, recognized unlike agreements subject to the National Labor Relations Act, collective bargaining agreements subject to the RLA never expire absent a change under the RLA's section 6 statutory mechanisms. 280 F.Supp.3d at 67. Zdanko conceded that point in part, agreeing the CBA did not in fact expire and American continued to have a contractual obligation under the RLA's section 6.
¶24 Our narrow ruling, thus, is the duration clause in the RLA- controlled CBA here did not create a "stated expiration date" under the Act.
ATTORNEY FEES
¶25 Zdanko asks for attorney fees and costs under A.R.S. § 23-364. We assume he meant A.R.S. § 23-324. This court may award attorney fees after considering the financial resources and reasonableness of the parties' legal positions. See A.R.S. § 25-324.A. After considering the relevant factors, we exercise our discretion and decline to award attorney fees. And we decline to award Zdanko costs because he is not the prevailing party.
CONCLUSION
¶26 We affirm.