Opinion
Nos. CV 01 0084641, CV 01 0085916
May 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
These two consolidated actions arise out of the breakdown of a relationship during which Gail Sekeret and Vincent Zdanis, Jr. cohabited and allegedly entered into various agreements regarding the construction of a home on property acquired by Zdanis in 1984. Before this court is Zdanis' motion to strike Sekeret's claim for a jury. Both parties submitted briefs and the court heard oral argument on March 1, 2004.
The pleadings in both cases have been amended several times. Zdanis' most recent amended complaint alleges that he is a beneficiary of a declaration of trust and that Sekeret is the trustee. The complaint contains four counts and a prayer for relief. Count one seeks a declaratory judgment, count two seeks monetary damages, count three is a claim for unjust enrichment and count four is an action to settle title to personal property. Sekeret's amended special defenses claim that a constructive and/or resulting trust should be implemented, that Zdanis has refused reasonable offers made by Sekeret regarding the distribution of the trust premises, that Zdanis has waived/abandoned his right to rent or compensation under Connecticut General Statutes § 52-404 and that Sekeret is entitled to a set-off. Sekeret also seeks a right to recoupment of the monetary damages and claims that any failure to meet her duties as trustee was due to Zdanis' failure to make financial contributions, his faulty construction work and his refusal to allow the premises to be placed on the market. Lastly, Sekeret alleges that she is the rightful owner of the personal property sought by Zdanis in his complaint because she purchased the property.
Sekeret's most recent amended complaint sets forth claims for breach of express and implied contract and promissory estoppel. Sekeret seeks monetary damages and specific performance of a resulting and a constructive trust, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. Zdanis' special defenses allege that Sekeret is limited to remedies explicitly stated in the declaration of trust, that various counts were not brought within the relevant statute of limitations period, that various counts are barred by laches, that any payments made by Sekeret were made for the benefit of both parties without the expectation of reimbursement, that the rights and liabilities of the parties were determined in a prior judgment, that Sekeret interfered with Zdanis' use and occupancy, that Sekeret relinquished any rights to financial contributions from Zdanis and that Sekeret's pleading is internally inconsistent.
Sekeret v. Zdanis, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. FA 97 0141290 (January 15, 1998).
Zdanis claims that these cases should be stricken from the jury list because the rights asserted by the parties are essentially equitable in nature and therefore there is no right to a jury trial. Sekeret argues that Zdanis' motion was not timely filed pursuant to Practice Book § 10-8 and that Sekeret has a constitutional right to a jury trial because the claims are legal in nature. The court will decide the issue on its merits.
Connecticut General Statutes § 52-215 sets forth the basic principle that jury trials may be claimed in "civil actions involving such an issue of fact as, prior to January 1, 1880, would not present a question properly cognizable in equity . . ." "There is no right to a jury trial in an equitable action . . . When legal and equitable issues are combined in a single action, whether the right to a jury trial attaches depends upon the relative importance of the two types of claims." (Citation omitted.) United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 197 Conn. 34, 44-45, 495 A.2d 1034 (1985). Thus, the dispositive question is whether an action is essentially legal or essentially equitable. Id.; see Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn. App. 287, 301-02, 580 A.2d 1212, cert. denied, 217 Conn. 803, 584 A.2d 471 (1990).
"Causes of action that are essentially cognizable at law are triable to a jury, while actions that are essentially equitable are not . . . This distinction is easier to state than to apply, especially when legal and equitable issues are combined in a single action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. O'Neil, 203 Conn. 63, 76, 523 A.2d 486 (1987). "Where incidental issues of fact are presented in an action essentially equitable, the court may determine them without a jury in the exercise of its equitable powers . . . Where, however, the essential basis of the action is such that the issues presented would be properly cognizable in an action of law, either party has a right to have the legal issues tried to the jury, even though equitable relief is asked in order to give full effect to the legal rights claimed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., citing National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, 128 Conn. 307, 310, 22 A.2d 773 (1941). "Application of these principles to a particular controversy requires an analysis of the pleadings as a whole. In that analysis, [t]he form of the relief demanded is not dispositive." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn. of the United States, Inc. v. O'Neil, supra, 203 Conn. 76-77.
"[O]ur law is that where separate and distinct causes of action are joined one at law and one in equity, either party has the right to have a jury trial of the issues involved in the cause of action at law" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. John Fitch Court Associates Limited Partnership, 44 Conn. Sup. 411, 415, 691 A.2d 1134 (1996), quoting Berry v. Hartford National Bank Trust Co., 125 Conn. 615, 618, 7 A.2d 8947 (1939). A case with issues in both equity and in law may be claimed for the jury list. Klar Crest Realty, Inc., v. Rajon Realty Corp., 190 Conn. 163, 170 n. 4, 459 A.2d 1021 (1983). However, unless the court orders otherwise, only the issues at law shall be assigned to the jury docket. Id.
Actions to recover damages for breach of contract are essentially legal in nature; 669 Atlantic Street v. Atlantic-Rockland Stamford, 43 Conn. App. 113, 129-31, 682 A.2d 572, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 949, 686 A.2d 126 (1996); as are claims for monetary damages. Franc v. Bethel Holding Co., 73 Conn. App. 114, 807 A.2d 519 (2002). Additionally, actions for declaratory judgments are special statutory proceedings rather than actions in equity. Town of Wallingford v. Reliance Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 99 0420955 (January 13, 2000, Silbert, J.) ( 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 272). Conversely, claims for "unjust enrichment [are] essentially equitable, [their] basis being that in a given situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has come to him at the expense of another." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Meany v. Connecticut Hospital Assn., Inc., 250 Conn. 500, 511, 735 A.2d 813 (1999).
The pleadings in the present cases contain both legal issues and equitable issues and therefore Zdanis' motion to strike the claim from the jury docket is denied. Sekeret is entitled to have the legal issues submitted to a jury, while the court may itself decide any issues that are essentially equitable.
The court does note, the proper way to challenge a claim for a jury trial is an objection but since Sekeret did not object to this technical error the court has decided to treat the motion to strike as the proper mechanism. See Town of Wallingford v. Reliance Ins. Co., supra, 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 272.
Brunetti, J.