Opinion
Civil Action 1:22-cv-03134-NYW-SBP
08-25-2023
PHILIPPE ZATTA, Plaintiff, v. LON F. HURWITZ, individually and in his official capacity as Judge, PAUL T. MINERICH, individually and in his official capacity as Court Commissioner, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ORANGE, JOHN PAUL BANAS, individually and in his official capacity as Judge, 11TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT ST. CHARLES MISSOURI, and MONDONNA L. GHASEDI, individually and in her official capacity as Judge, Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Susan Prose, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before this court on the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Judge John P. Banas, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri (“Missouri Circuit Court”), and Judge Mondonna Ghasedi (collectively, the “Missouri Defendants”). ECF Nos. 8, 10. For the reasons set forth below, this court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 8 & 10, be GRANTED, and the claims against the Missouri Circuit Court and Judge Banas and Judge Ghasedi be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This court will address the claims against the Defendants from California-Hurwitz, Minerich, and the Superior Court of the County of Orange-in a separate recommendation related to its order directing Mr. Zatta to show cause why the California Defendants should not be dismissed for lack of proper service. See ECF No. 34.
SUMMARY FOR PRO SE PLAINTIFF
This court is recommending dismissal of your claims against the Missouri Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
With regard to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution bars this court from adjudicating your claims against the Missouri Defendants. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review state court decisions, even when those decisions are alleged to have violated federal law. Additionally, the Missouri Defendants are protected from suit because the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials and entities sued in their official capacities under § 1983.
Concerning the lack of personal jurisdiction, an out-of-state defendant must have sufficient contacts with the State of Colorado before they can be required to defend themselves in a Colorado court. A defendant's link to a plaintiff is not enough for the court to find personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Here, you have not established that any of the Missouri Defendants have the required contacts with the State of Colorado.
The court therefore recommends that your Complaint against the Missouri Defendants be dismissed. However, because the recommended dismissal would be for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the dismissal is without prejudice. See, e.g., Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[D]ismissals for lack of jurisdiction should be without prejudice because the court, having determined that it lacks jurisdiction over the action, is incapable of reaching a disposition on the merits of the underlying claims.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Frederiksen v. City of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004); Harrison v. United States, 329 Fed.Appx. 179, 182 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over the claims raised in [the] complaint, those claims should have been dismissed without prejudice.”).
This is only a high-level summary of this court's recommendation. The complete recommendation is set forth below.
BACKGROUND
I. Procedural History
Mr. Zatta filed his Complaint in this matter on December 5, 2022, raising claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two state judges from Missouri and a Missouri state court. See generally ECF No. 2. Judge Banas and the Missouri Circuit Court moved to dismiss the claims against them on February 1, 2023, ECF No. 8 (“Banas Motion”), and Judge Ghasedi filed a separate motion to dismiss all claims against her on March 2, 2023, ECF No. 10 (“Ghasedi Motion”). The Missouri Defendants argue that: (1) the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Zatta's claims; (2) the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Missouri Defendants; (3) venue is improper in the District of Colorado; (4) Judge Banas and Judge Ghasedi, as judicial officers, are entitled to absolute immunity; (5) Judge Banas and Judge Ghasedi are entitled to qualified immunity; and (6) the Missouri Defendants are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. See generally Motions to Dismiss.
Mr. Zatta filed opposition briefs in response to the Motions to Dismiss on June 23, 2023. ECF Nos. 30, 31. The Missouri Defendants filed a joint reply on June 28, 2023. ECF No. 32.
II. Mr. Zatta's Complaint
In this federal action, Mr. Zatta demands that this court review rulings issued by a state court in a domestic-relations action. The crux of the claims against the Missouri Defendants rests on Mr. Zatta's assertion that those Defendants permitted two dissolution-of-marriage cases, by the same ex-wife, to proceed against Mr. Zatta-allegedly because of his race. See generally Compl., Introduction at 1-4. At bottom, Mr. Zatta is seeking review of these underlying state court divorce proceedings.
Allegations concerning Judge Ghasedi . Mr. Zatta alleges that the Missouri Defendants wrongfully “prosecuted” him “for dissolution of a marriage that was dissolved six years [prior].” Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Specifically, Mr. Zatta alleges his ex-wife filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in the Missouri Circuit Court on May 8, 2018, captioned Lepe v. Zatta, Case No. 18SL-DR02412, over which Judge Ghasedi presided (the “First Proceeding”). Id. ¶ 36. Mr. Zatta sought dismissal of the First Proceeding based on lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that he was a resident of California, not Missouri, at the time the petition was filed. Id. ¶¶ 37-38.
According to Mr. Zatta, Judge Ghasedi “was proceeding any way with the prosecution of [Mr. Zatta] for dissolution of an already dissolved marriage,” despite “all proofs or evidence establishing the St. Louis court had no jurisdiction,” causing Mr. Zatta to incur “tens of thousands of dollars to defend himself[.]” Id. ¶ 38-39. The court docket from this matter shows that Mr. Zatta filed a motion to dismiss on July 20, 2018, a notice of objection and demand for immediate dismissal on August 30, 2018, and a “Special Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction of Court and Demand for Immediate Dismissal” on August 31, 2018. Before Judge Ghasedi could enter any final order regarding Mr. Zatta's motions, the dissolution of Mr. Zatta's marriage, or his child support obligations, the petition was voluntarily dismissed on October 1, 2018.
The court may take judicial notice of facts which are a matter of public record, including filings in other court proceedings. Binford v. United States, 436 F.3d 1252, 1256 n.7 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Schendzielos v. Silverman, 139 F.Supp.3d 1239, 1251 (D. Colo. 2015) (“A court may ‘take judicial notice of its own files and records, as well as facts which are a matter of public record.' . . . However, ‘we may take judicial notice of the existence of the opinions of other courts, but not the truth of the facts recited therein.'”) (citations omitted). The documents referenced by the court from the First Proceeding can be found on the Missouri Courts' website at https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/cases/newHeader.do?inputVO.caseNumber=18SL DR02412&inputVO1courtId=CT21#docket.
Allegations concerning Judge Banas . Mr. Zatta alleges that his ex-wife filed a second Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in the Missouri Circuit Court on March 6, 2020, captioned Lepe v. Zatta, Case No. 2011-FC00352, over which Judge Banas presided (the “Second Proceeding”). Id. ¶ 40. In the Second Proceeding, Mr. Zatta filed a “Notice of Special Appearance to Denounce Fraudulent Court Transaction and to Challenge Jurisdiction” on June 8, 2020. He asserts in his Complaint here that he provided evidence to the Missouri Circuit Court that his marriage had been dissolved by decree in the Ivory Coast in July 2016 and that he had remarried in California in 2017. Compl. ¶¶ 41-42. Judge Banas ultimately issued a Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage on August 18, 2022, ordering Mr. Zatta to pay $831.00 per month in child support. Mr. Zatta alleges that the Missouri Circuit Court is liable because it “condoned or approved of” the “reckless, lawless or fraudulent actions” of Judge Banas. Id. ¶ 46.
The documents referenced by the court from the Second Proceeding can be found on the Missouri Courts' website at https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/cases/newHeader.do?inputVO.caseNumber=2011-FC00352&inputVO.courtId=CT11#docket.
It appears that Mr. Zatta's address of record with the Missouri Circuit Court was a California address, and he was served at that address. See Second Proceeding, 3/31/2020 Affidavit of Service; see also Second Proceeding, Parties & Attorneys, https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/cases/newHeader.do?inputVO.caseNumber=2011FC00352&inputVO1eourtId=CT11#party (listing California address for Mr. Zatta); see also Second Proceeding, Service Information, https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/cases/newHeader.do7inputVO.caseNumberz2011 FC00352&inputVO.courtId=CT11#service (showing service made to “co-tenant” at California address).
Mr. Zatta makes several scurrilous allegations, devoid of supporting facts, concerning Judge Banas. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 3 (asserting that Zatta allegedly “received information” from an unidentified source concerning the judge). Mr. Zatta is cautioned that this court will not tolerate the inclusion of scandalous, unsupported material in his pleadings.
Mr. Zatta's claims . Based on these allegations, Mr. Zatta raises four claims against the Missouri Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The first claim alleges a violation of the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment, id. ¶¶ 49-59; the second alleges a violation of his substantive due process rights, id. ¶¶ 60-71; the third claims a “violation of international treaties of recognition of foreign judgments in United States Courts,” id. ¶¶ 72-84; and the fourth asserts a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, id. ¶¶ 85-93. Mr. Zatta sues the judges in both their individual and official capacities.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I. Subject Matter and Personal Jurisdiction
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts only have jurisdiction to hear certain “cases” and “controversies.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014). As such, courts “are duty bound to examine facts and law in every lawsuit before them to ensure that they possess subject matter jurisdiction.” Wilderness Soc. v. Kane Cty., 632 F.3d 1162, 1179 n.3 (10th Cir. 2011) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Indeed, courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from either party. Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds, Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a party may bring either a facial or factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction. See Pueblo of Jemez v. United States, 790 F.3d 1143, 1148 n.4 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). For a facial attack, the court takes the allegations in the complaint as true; for a factual attack, the court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations and may consider affidavits or other documents to resolve jurisdictional facts. Rural Water Dist. No. 2 v. City of Glenpool, 698 F.3d 1270, 1272 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Ulrich v. Dep't of Human Servs., No. 20-cv-03810-WJM-KMT, 2022 WL 223212, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2022) (holding that a 12(b)(1) motion “must be determined from the allegations of fact in the complaint, without regard to mere conclusory allegations of jurisdiction,” unless the court finds that it “may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's ‘factual allegations'”).
The burden of establishing jurisdiction rests with the party asserting jurisdiction. See Kline v. Biles, 861 F.3d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir. 2017). In this instance, Mr. Zatta has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. When a defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over that defendant. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Where, as here, the court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing to defeat the motion. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 903 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The plaintiff “must make this showing with respect to each of the claims alleged.” Dental Dynamics, LLC v. Jolly Dental Grp., LLC, 946 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). In evaluating whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists, the court accepts the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true. Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). If the presence or absence of personal jurisdiction can be established by reference to the complaint alone, the court need not look further.
II. Legal Standard for Pleadings of Pro Se Litigants
Mr. Zatta is proceeding pro se. The Court, therefore, “review[s] his pleadings and other papers liberally and hold[s] them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.” Trackwell v. United States, 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This rule applies to all proceedings involving pro se litigants. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 n.3 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); Shell v. Am. Family Rights Ass'n, 899 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1044 n.2 (D. Colo. 2012) (liberally construing pro se pleadings in review of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss).
However, Mr. Zatta's pro se status does not vitiate his obligation to adhere to, and comply with, “the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992)); Ogden v. San Juan Cty., 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that a pro se litigant must “comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure”). Thus, while the court makes “some allowances” for a pro se plaintiff's “failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with the pleading requirements,” the court “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as [his] attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110); see also Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (cautioning that the court may not “construct arguments or theories for the [pro se] plaintiff in the absence of any discussion of those issues”) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
The Court must first consider the Missouri Defendants' arguments that the claims against them should be dismissed for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction, because if the court finds that jurisdiction is lacking, it cannot consider the Missouri Defendants' remaining arguments for dismissal. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”) (quotation omitted); Payton v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 337 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Jurisdiction is a threshold question that a federal court must address before reaching the merits[.]”) (quotation omitted).
I. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A. Domestic-Relations and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). It also bars any “action in federal court that alleges an injury ‘inextricably intertwined with a state court decision, such that success in the federal court would require overturning the state court decision[.]'” Wideman v. Colorado, 242 Fed.Appx. 611, 613-14 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Epps v. Creditnet, Inc., 320 F.3d 756, 75859 (7th Cir. 2003)). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a district court has no jurisdiction to review challenges to state court decisions “even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional.” Jackson v. Peters, 81 Fed.Appx. 282, 285-86 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco), 226 F.3d 1103, 1108 (10th Cir. 2000)). Only the United States Supreme Court may review such decisions. Id. at 286. A court may, however, exercise jurisdiction so long as “it does not exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction by entertaining a suit that would disrupt the final judgment entered by the state court.” Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 880 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding that Rooker-Feldman did not apply when plaintiff was “not seeking to set aside [the state court's] order”).
In addition to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine's general bar against review of state court decisions, federal courts specifically lack jurisdiction over domestic-relations cases. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (holding that federal courts lack power “to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees”); Hunt v. Lamb, 427 F.3d 725, 727 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over child custody dispute). This doctrine is known as the “domestic-relations exception,” under which a federal court cannot “reopen, reissue, correct, or modify” an order in a domestic-relations case. Leathers v. Leathers, 856 F.3d 729, 756 (10th Cir. 2017); see also Alfaro v. Cty. of Arapahoe, 766 Fed.Appx. 657, 660-61 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the domesticrelations exception and Rooker-Feldman).
The court concludes that Mr. Zatta's claims against Judge Banas and the Missouri Circuit Court regarding the actions of Judge Banas in the Second Proceeding are procedurally barred by these principles. In so concluding this court emphasizes two points:
First, Mr. Zatta's Complaint makes clear that he is seeking review of the underlying divorce proceeding and accompanying child support order. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4, 20-22, 36, 40-43, 47, 54, 68, 77. Mr. Zatta indisputably is raising a challenge to the underlying judgment against him in a domestic-relations proceeding in the Missouri Circuit Court. Therefore, his claims are barred by both the domestic-relations exception and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and this court has no jurisdiction to hear these claims.
Second, even if Mr. Zatta were not directly challenging the decision from Judge Banas and the Missouri Circuit Court in the underlying domestic-relations dispute, his claims would still fail because they are inextricably intertwined with that decision. Specifically, Mr. Zatta's allegations concerning the actions of the Missouri Defendants are “inextricably intertwined with the state court['s] judgments regarding [his] divorce and child support obligations.” See Jackson, 81 Fed.Appx. at 286. “The fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment.” Read v. Klein, 1 Fed.Appx. 866, 869 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1356 (7th Cir. 1996)).
Here, Mr. Zatta alleges that his injuries stem from the decision in the Second Proceeding to dissolve his marriage and order child support payments. Compl. ¶¶ 43, 46 (Judge Banas issued “an alleged ‘final certificate of dissolution of marriage'” in the Second Proceeding, which ruling was “reckless, lawless or fraudulent”) (emphasis in original). Put simply, Mr. Zatta's alleged injury not only “resulted from” the state court decision; fundamentally, his injury is the state court decision. Because his claims are inextricably intertwined with this decision, review by this court is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Unlike Judge Banas, Judge Ghasedi never entered any dissolution or child support orders against Mr. Zatta. See First Proceeding, 10/01/2018 Order of Dismissal, found at https://www.courts.mo.gov/cnet/cases/newHeader.do?inputVO.caseNumber=18SL DR02412&inputVO.courtId=CT21#docket (showing that the petition was voluntarily dismissed by the petitioner prior to Judge Ghasedi entering any final orders). As such, Mr. Zatta's claims arising from the First Proceeding focus on Judge Ghasedi's alleged failure to timely dismiss the First Proceeding, causing Mr. Zatta to incur “tens of thousands of dollars to defend himself[.]” Compl. ¶¶ 38-39. Because Mr. Zatta does not challenge any final judgment entered by Judge Ghasedi or seek to “reopen, reissue, correct, or modify” an order in his domestic-relations case, neither the Rooker-Feldman doctrine nor the domestic-relations exception bar his claims against the Missouri Circuit Court or Judge Banas relating to the First Proceeding.
B. Eleventh Amendment
There is another jurisdictional defect in subject matter jurisdiction that requires dismissal of all of Mr. Zatta's claims against the Missouri Circuit Court and Judge Banas and Judge Ghasedi in their official capacities: Eleventh Amendment immunity.
“The Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar that precludes unconsented suits in federal court against a state and arms of the state.” Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wagoner Cty. Rural Water Dist. No. 2 v. Grand River Dam Auth., 577 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2009)). “It is well established that under the Eleventh Amendment, sovereign immunity prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits against states brought by their own citizens or citizens of another state without their consent.” Hunt v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 271 Fed.Appx. 778, 780 (10th Cir. 2008). “State sovereign immunity is more than immunity from liability-it actually deprives federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Wood v. Milyard, 414 Fed.Appx. 103, 105 (10th Cir. 2011). The Eleventh Amendment thus bars suits against state officials sued in their official capacities pursuant to § 1983. See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Okla. TaxComm'n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that § 1983 “does not abrogate a state's sovereign immunity-indeed, states are not even ‘persons' within the meaning of § 1983”) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71).
As relevant here, where Mr. Zatta brings § 1983 claims against the Missouri Circuit Court and two judges in their official capacities, state courts and state court judges are immune from claims asserted against them. See, e.g., Strepka v. Miller, 28 Fed.Appx. 823, 828 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Plaintiff's official capacity claims against [the state court judge] . . . were really claims against the State of Colorado.”); Kirchner v. Marshall, No. 1:22-cv-01512-CNS-MEH, 2023 WL 110953, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 5., 2023) (holding that “the Eleventh Amendment bars [plaintiff's] claims against Defendant Jefferson County District Court” and recognizing that “[c]ourts have repeatedly held that, under the Eleventh Amendment, state courts and state court judges are immune from claims asserted against them”) (collecting cases); Silva v. U.S. Bank, Nat'lAssoc., 294 F.Supp.3d 1117, 1126 (D. Colo. 2018) (holding that state judicial district “is an arm of the state” and entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Fey v. Washington, No. 16-cv-03103-WJM-MEH, 2017 WL 1344451, at *4 (D. Colo. Apr. 12, 2017) (same); B.J.G. v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 11-CV-262-GKF-TLW, 2012 WL 28077, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 5, 2012), aff'das modified, 497 Fed.Appx. 807 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he claims against [Oklahoma appellate judges] are precluded by the Eleventh Amendment's grant of sovereign immunity to states.”).
Accordingly, this court finds that Mr. Zatta's claims against the Missouri Defendants-a state court and two state court judges-are barred under the Eleventh Amendment.
The court further concludes that none of the “three well-established exceptions to the bar” of the Eleventh Amendment apply here:
First, the States may consent to suit, waiving their immunity. . . . Second, “Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” . . . Finally, under the doctrine announced in Ex parte Young, . . . an individual seeking only prospective injunctive relief for ongoing violations of federal law may bring suit against state officials in federal courts.Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 866 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Exby-Stolley v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 979 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2020).
The first two exceptions are easily disposed of. First, the State of Missouri has not consented to this suit, in which a disaffected litigant sues a state court and state judges directly in federal court. Second, § 1983 “does not abrogate the state's sovereign immunity and neither the states nor the agencies qualify as ‘persons' under § 1983.” Davis v. California, 734 Fed.Appx. 560, 564 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 67, and Wood, 414 Fed.Appx. at 105).
As for the third exception, Mr. Zatta does not seek “prospective relief for an ongoing violation of federal law.” Davis, 734 Fed.Appx. at 563 n.7 (emphasis added); Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 669 F.3d at 1167 (same). Rather, Mr. Zatta seeks various non-injunctive remedies that are not permitted by § 1983 against state court judges in their official capacities. See Comp. at 23-24 (seeking “[e]conomic losses[,]” “[compensatory, consequential and future damages[,]” and “[p]unitive damages[.]”). Mr. Zatta also generally seeks any “[appropriate relief at law and equity,” but he does not specify any particular prospective injunctive relief sought against the Missouri Defendants. Id. And while Mr. Zatta has filed a pending Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, that motion is not “directed towards” the Missouri Defendants. See ECF No. 18 at 17 (seeking Preliminary Injunction “ordering Defendants ARZOLA, KILGORE, and KNODELL to cease any enforcement of void judgments, void orders, nonexistent judgments or nonexistent orders”).
Additionally, to the extent Mr. Zatta seeks injunctive relief in relation to the marriage dissolution and child support orders already entered against him, this relief is intended “to address alleged past harms rather than prevent prospective violations of federal law,” which “does not fall within the exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.” Kirchner, 2023 WL 110953, at *3. The court further reiterates that Judge Ghasedi never entered any dissolution or child support orders against Mr. Zatta, so to the extent Mr. Zatta seeks any relief against Judge Ghasedi for refusing to dismiss his case earlier in the First Proceeding, he would once again be “merely seeking to address alleged past harms,” and his claims against Judge Ghasedi would not fall under the Ex parte Young exception.
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to claims for injunctive relief against state court judges. Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 142 S.Ct. 522, 532 (2021). In so holding, the Supreme Court emphasized that the exception is a “narrow” one, “grounded in traditional equity practice-one that allows certain private parties to seek judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal law.” Id. (emphasis added). Claims against judges, however, are a different story:
[A]s Ex parte Young explained, this traditional exception does not normally permit federal courts to issue injunctions against state-court judges or clerks. Usually, those individuals do not enforce state laws as executive officials might; instead, they work to resolve disputes between parties. If a state court errs in its rulings, too, the traditional remedy has been some form of appeal, including to this Court, not the entry of an ex ante injunction preventing the state court from hearing cases. As Ex parte Young put it, “an injunction against a state court” or its “machinery” “would be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government.”Id. (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 163).
For the same reasons, Ex parte Young does not except Mr. Zatta's claims against state court and state judicial officials from the protection of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Even construing Mr. Zatta's Complaint as one for injunctive relief, this court lacks the authority to “issue injunctions against state-court judges or clerks.” Id. The court therefore respectfully recommends that the official capacity claims against the Missouri Defendants be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The Missouri Defendants argue that, in addition to the flaws in subject matter jurisdiction, this court also lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Banas Motion at 7-8; Ghasedi Motion at 7. This court agrees.
To establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a plaintiff must show both that jurisdiction is proper under the forum state's long-arm statute and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. See Behavior Analyst Certification Bd., Inc. v. Moates, 22-cv-01247-NRN, 2022 WL 17486792, at *5 (citing Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1357 (10th Cir. 1990)). Colorado's long-arm statute permits the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction to the full extent of the Due Process Clause; therefore, the analysis collapses into a single due process inquiry. See id. (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-1-124(1)).
“The Due Process Clause authorizes personal jurisdiction if two elements are met.” Dental Dynamics, 946 F.3d at 1229. “First, a defendant must have ‘purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state.'” Id. (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state allow the defendant to “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Monge v. RG Petro-Mach. (Grp.) Co. Ltd., 701 F.3d 598, 613 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). “Second, the assertion of personal jurisdiction must comport with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Dental Dynamics, 946 F.3d at 1229 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)).
The “minimum contacts” requirement may be satisfied by showing either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1090-91; see also Old Republic, 877 F.3d at 903. The court examines both categories of “minimum contacts.”
A. No General Jurisdiction
“General jurisdiction arises where the defendant's contacts with the forum state are ‘so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home' there.” C5 Med. Werks, LLC v. CeramTec GMBH, 937 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)) (alterations in original). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (citation omitted). A defendant's “activities within the jurisdiction must render it foreseeable that the party should reasonably anticipate being haled into the forum court.” In re Application to Enforce v. Knowles, 87 F.3d 413, 417 (10th Cir.1996) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
The court finds that Mr. Zatta has shown no affiliation with this forum that would render it foreseeable that a Missouri state court and two judges on that Missouri court should reasonably anticipate being haled into this court to defend decisions they made in domestic-relations proceedings in the Missouri Circuit Court. Simply to state the point is to expose Mr. Zatta's inability to show that the Missouri Defendants had “continuous and systematic contacts” with Colorado; indeed, the record here permits no inference of any contact between the Missouri Defendants and this forum.
In sum, Mr. Zatta has failed to make a make a prima facie showing that the Missouri Defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in Colorado. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1091 (plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate personal jurisdiction); see also Dodson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 878 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1235-36 (D. Colo. 2012) (“ Pro se status does not relieve Plaintiff of the duty to comply with . . . the requirements of the substantive law[.]”).
B. No Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant: (1) availed themselves of the forum state's laws through “‘purposefully directing]' [their] activities at residents of the forum,” and (2) when “the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to' those activities.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 474. “The purpose of [the purposeful direction] requirement is to ensure that a defendant will not be subject to the laws of a jurisdiction solely as the result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Emp'rs Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting AST Sports Sci., Inc. v. CLF Distribution Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054, 1058 (10th Cir. 2008)) (alteration and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, Mr. Zatta's focus is on his “unilateral activity” in choosing to move to Colorado, see ECF No. 31 at 9-10, but that does not show that the Missouri Defendants “purposefully directed” their own activities at Colorado by adjudicating cases brought against Mr. Zatta in Missouri. The defendant's relationship with the forum state “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself' creates with the forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475) (emphasis in original). It is well-settled that “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” Id. at 285 (emphasis added). Here, the mere fortuity that Mr. Zatta chose to move to Colorado is the only link between the Missouri Defendants and this forum. Accordingly, he has failed to make a prima facie showing that specific personal jurisdiction exists over the Missouri Defendants in this case.
Mr. Zatta argues in his opposition briefing that the Missouri Defendants waived their personal jurisdiction defenses by making “an appearance before this Court.” ECF No. 30 at 8; ECF No. 31 at 9. Not so. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h), a defendant waives their objection to personal jurisdiction by filing a responsive pleading that does not object on the basis ofpersonal jurisdiction. E.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, No. 14-cv-00811, 2015 WL 1945398, at *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 29, 2015). The Missouri Defendants each filed responsive pleadings in the form of Motions to Dismiss, and each preserved their objections to this court exercising personal jurisdiction over them. This defense has therefore not been waived.
The court therefore respectfully recommends that the claims against the Missouri Defendants in their individual capacities be dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Mr. Zatta should bear these jurisdictional bars in mind in submitting a future complaint, if any, as well as the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. See Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for judicial acts, unless committed in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. A judge does not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction even if the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority. Moreover, [a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)); accord Smith v. Arguello, 415 Fed.Appx. 57, 60 (10th Cir. 2011) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims against federal judges because “the judges were sued for their legal decisions in previous suits [and] they were entitled to absolute judicial immunity.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby respectfully RECOMMENDED that the Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 8 & 10, be GRANTED, and the claims against the Missouri Circuit Court and Judge Banas and Judge Ghasedi be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that within fourteen (14) days after service of a Magistrate Judge's order or recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A), (B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a), (b). Failure to make any such objection will result in a waiver of the right to appeal the Magistrate Judge's order or recommendation. See Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co. v. A & B Builders, Ltd., 989 F.3d 747, 783 (10th Cir. 2021) (firm waiver rule applies to non-dispositive orders). But see Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1119, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005) (firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review, including when a “pro se litigant has not been informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences of failing to object”).