Opinion
E065373
09-11-2017
ESTELLA ZARAGOZA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SELA HEALTHCARE, INC., Defendant and Respondent.
Rastegar Law Group, Farzad Rastegar and Thomas S. Campbell for Plaintiff and Appellant. Walraven & Westerfeld, Bryan A. Westerfeld and Nicole E. Wurscher for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1505964) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr., Judge. Affirmed. Rastegar Law Group, Farzad Rastegar and Thomas S. Campbell for Plaintiff and Appellant. Walraven & Westerfeld, Bryan A. Westerfeld and Nicole E. Wurscher for Defendant and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant Estela Zaragoza (Zaragoza) appeals from an order granting the motion to compel arbitration brought by defendant and respondent Sela Healthcare, Inc. dba Villa Mesa Care Center (Villa Mesa) and dismissing Zaragoza's class action.
Either the order is appealable under the "death knell" doctrine or the appeal may be treated as a petition for writ of mandate. (Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1122-1123; Larry Aanderud v. Superior Court, 2017 Cal.App. LEXIS 648, at p. *2.)
Zaragoza argues the arbitration agreement was void and obtained by fraud because she could not read English and did not understand the arbitration agreement. The law is clear, however, that a person cannot enter into a contract and then avoid it based on unfamiliarity with the English language. Furthermore, Zaragoza did not assert that she asked for a translation or that anyone at Villa Mesa denied her an opportunity to translate the agreement. Zaragoza's opposition to the motion to compel arbitration failed to establish any fraud in the execution of the agreement.
Villa Mesa, on the other hand, submitted substantial evidence refuting Zaragoza's arguments. The trial court's ruling that Zaragoza's signature on the arbitration agreement was not obtained through fraud was supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the judgment.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Zaragoza worked for Villa Mesa between October 2000 and November 2013. In 2007, Zaragoza signed the same version of an arbitration agreement that had been adopted by Villa Mesa in 2005 as part of a new employee handbook. Zaragoza filed a wage and hour class action in April 2015. Villa Mesa responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration with supporting declarations and documents, including the signed agreement for binding arbitration.
The arbitration agreement is titled "EMPLOYEE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND AGREEMENT" and states "I voluntarily agree that any claim, dispute and/or controversy . . . between myself and the Facility . . . shall be submitted to and determined exclusively by binding arbitration . . . ." It further states in capital letters: "I UNDERSTAND BY VOLUNTARILY AGREEING TO THIS BINDING ARBITRATION PROVISION, BOTH I AND THE FACILITY GIVE UP OUR RIGHTS TO TRIAL BY JURY."
In opposition, Zaragoza submitted a declaration stating she is fluent in Spanish and can understand some English but cannot read it. She said her supervisor told her that the document "was not changing anything" but she needed to sign it to keep working. Zaragoza claimed she did not know she was signing an agreement to arbitrate or that she was giving up the right to a jury trial. She also asserted she was not allowed to obtain a translation—although she did not actually request one.
Villa Mesa responded with the declaration of Zaragoza's supervisor, Jessica Fitivale. Fitivale attested that Zaragoza signed 11 other documents on October 5, 2007, all in English. Fitivale stated that none of the employees asked for help translating any of the documents but that Villa Mesa could have supplied a translator if necessary. Fitivale insisted, "I certainly did not tell any employee that they had to sign any document to keep working or to keep their job. Such a statement would not be something I would ever say to any employee."
At the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration, Zaragoza argued that no contract to arbitrate was ever formed because she could not read English and she did not understand that she was signing an arbitration agreement. Villa Mesa countered that Zaragoza did not contradict the evidence it presented to establish a binding arbitration agreement. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the class claims.
III
DISCUSSION
The appellate standard of review is "whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the findings below." (Jessup Farms v. Baldwin (1983) 33 Cal.3d 639, 660; Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1277 v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 673, 685.) We "view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in its favor . . . ." (Jessup Farms, at p. 660; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 958.)
We hold there is substantial evidence that Zaragoza agreed to arbitrate her claims against Villa Mesa. "There is no contract until there is mutual consent of the parties." (DeLeon v. Verizon Wireless, LLC (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 800, 813.) "Mutual consent necessary to the formation of a contract 'is determined under an objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or understandings. . . .'" (Ibid.)
Zaragoza's lack of facility with English does not negate the arbitration agreement. "'Ordinarily, one who accepts or signs an instrument, which on its face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all its terms, and cannot escape liability on the ground that he has not read it. If he cannot read, he should have it read or explained to him.'" (Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 158, 163; Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87, 93.) "It is a general rule a party is bound by contract provisions and cannot complain of unfamiliarity of the language of a contract." (Fields v. Blue Shield of California (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 570, 578.) As recognized nationally, a person who enters into a written contract must read the terms of the contract or, if the language or terms are unfamiliar, object or refrain. (Golden Stone Trading, Inc. v. Wayne Electro Systems, Inc. (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) 67 A.D.3d 731, 732 [a party who executes a contract is presumed to know and assent to its contents and an inability to understand the English language is insufficient to avoid this general rule]; Teran v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center (Ariz. App. 1985) 706 P.2d 382, 385 [enforcing contract although signatories neither spoke, read, nor understood English].) In summary, a person cannot knowingly enter into a contract and then subsequently use unfamiliarity with the English language as a shield against enforcement of that contract.
Here, substantial evidence established that Zaragoza assented to the arbitration agreement. It is undisputed that Zaragoza signed the agreement on October 5, 2007. Because she "sign[ed] an instrument, which on its face is a contract, [she] is deemed to assent to all its terms." (Randas v. YMCA of Metropolitan Los Angeles, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 163 [holding that contract written in English bound party who was literate in Greek but not in English].) Zaragoza's lack of facility with written English did not absolve her of its terms.
Zaragoza also did not demonstrate her assent was the result of fraud in the execution by producing a preponderance of evidence necessary to the defense. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) Most significantly, Zaragoza failed to provide any evidence of an actual fraudulent statement by Villa Mesa misrepresenting the terms of the agreement. Although Zaragoza was purportedly told the agreement "was not changing anything," she did not show this statement was untrue or that she was not previously subject to an arbitration agreement. In fact, Zaragoza had previously executed the same agreement with Villa Mesa in 2005. Furthermore, Zaragoza's complaint that she was not provided with a translation lacks foundation and, even if the agreement was a condition of her job, it does not mean a contract was not formed.
In addition, Fitivale directly rebutted Zaragoza's assertions about the execution of the arbitration agreement. Fitivale attested that no translation was requested but an employee was available at Villa Mesa who regularly provided help with Spanish translations. Zaragoza's own supervisor was also fluent in Spanish and would have been able to translate any document upon request. Fitivale also testified that she did not recall telling any employee that the documents in the packet were not changing anything that was in place with the management company. She was adamant that she never told any employees that they had to sign any document to keep working or to keep their job. Substantial evidence shows Zaragoza signed an agreement without any fraud in the execution.
IV
DISPOSITION
Sufficient evidence supports the trial court's ruling granting the motion to compel arbitration. We affirm the judgment. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. SLOUGH
J.