Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC342211, John P. Shook, Judge.
Browne Woods & George, Allan Browne, Eric M. George, Miles J. Feldman and Ira Bibbero for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, Justs N. Karlsons, Matthew J. Kemner, David M. Rice and Troy M. Yoshino for Defendant and Respondent DaimlerChrysler AG.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Marjorie Ehrich Lewis, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., William E. Thomson, and Christopher Chorba for Defendants and Respondents Smart GMBH and Ulrich Walker.
KITCHING, J.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and Appellant ZAP (ZAP) filed suit against defendants and respondents DaimlerChysler AG (DCAG), Smart GMBH (Smart) and Ulrich Walker (Walker) (collectively defendants), for intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic relations among other causes of action. ZAP alleged that defendants interfered with ZAP’s prospective business relations with respect to ZAP’s efforts to become a United States distributor of fuel efficient cars, called “Smart Cars,” which were manufactured in Germany.
DCAG is a German corporation which manufactures automobiles. Smart is a wholly-owned subsidiary of DCAG and also a German corporation. Smart manufactures the line of cars called Smart Cars. Walker, a citizen and resident of Germany, is the chairman of the board of Smart.
ZAP served its complaint on defendants through procedures set forth in the Hague Convention. Defendants filed motions to quash service of the summons and to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court granted. ZAP appealed.
We affirm. For California to exercise personal jurisdiction over DCAG, Smart or Walker would not comport with fair play and substantial justice.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In this case, ZAP contends the trial court erred by granting defendants’ separate motions to quash service of the complaint and summons. ZAP also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining a number of defendants’ objections to ZAP’s evidence offered in opposition to the motions to quash. We will consider the evidence proffered by ZAP unless otherwise stated. Considering that evidence, we nevertheless conclude that the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motions to quash.
1. The Parties
a. Plaintiff ZAP is a California corporation. In its complaint, ZAP alleged that it is an industry leader in advanced transportation technologies for automobiles, motorcycles and bicycles. ZAP also alleged that it is at the forefront of fuel-efficient transportation with new technologies, such as hydrogen, electric, and energy-efficient gas systems. Steven Schneider (Schneider) is the CEO of ZAP.
b. Defendant DCAG is a German company which manufactures automobiles. DCAG is not the same company as the DaimlerChrysler Corporation, which manufactures Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles in Michigan.
c. Defendant Smart is a German limited liability company. It manufactures “Smart Cars,” which are a type of “microcar” that are popular in Europe. Smart is a wholly-owned subsidiary of DCAG. At all relevant times, Smart did not sell its Smart Cars in California or the United States. Smart was not licensed to conduct business in California. It did not have offices or employees in California and did not have an agency authorized to accept service of process in California.
In its complaint, ZAP alleged that it could modify the “Smart Cars” to satisfy U.S. regulatory requirements. At all relevant times, there were no authorized dealers of Smart Cars in the United States. In addition, the Smart Cars were not designed nor manufactured for sale in the United States.
d. Defendant Walker is the chairman of Smart’s Board of Management. At all relevant times, he was a citizen and resident of Germany.
2. The Sonoma, California Meeting
In 2003, ZAP’s CEO, Schneider, attended the “Michelin Challenge by Bibendum” event in Sonoma, California. At that event, Schneider met with Rosario Berretta (Berretta), a representative of DCAG. According to Schneider’s declaration in opposition to the motion to quash, Schneider and Berretta discussed ZAP’s plan to import Smart Cars into California and the United States.
Berretta provided Schneider with his business card. The business card shows that at that time, Berretta was a DCAG manager in vehicle assembly and operation for fuel cell and alternative powertrain vehicles. According to Schneider’s declaration, Berretta told Schneider to communicate directly with DCAG to explain how ZAP could convert Smart Cars for import to comply with United States regulations. Schneider also declared that Berretta told him to contact Eckhard Cordes, who was then an executive at DCAG.
3. ZAP’s Efforts to Solve Regulatory Compliance Issues
According to Schneider’s declaration in 2004, ZAP invested millions of dollars to find a way to make the Smart Cars comply with United States and California environmental and safety regulations. Schnieder also declared that in 2004, ZAP contracted with Smart Automobile LLC (SAL), a California corporation not affiliated with Smart in Germany, to assist ZAP with the technical aspects of converting Smart Cars to comply with U.S. regulations.
SAL’s principal is an individual named Thomas Heidemann (Heidemann), who is also a named defendant. He is not a party to this appeal.
ZAP also purportedly instituted a marketing effort to contract with automobile dealers to sell the Smart Cars throughout the United States. Zap also secured investors. According to Schneider, ZAP developed the technology necessary to make Smart Cars fully compliant with United States regulations. In this lawsuit, ZAP alleged that defendants engaged in conduct intended to entice ZAP to disclose this technology and then destroy ZAP as an import competitor.
4. Schneider Requests Meeting with DCAG
On March 3, 2005, Schneider wrote to Eckard Cordes at DCAG in Stuttgart, Germany “to propose a meeting to discuss the potential synergies and strategic opportunities” between ZAP and DCAG with respect to sales of Smart Cars in the United States. Schneider’s letter stated that ZAP had the capability to convert Smart Cars to comply with United Stated regulations and that ZAP had approximately two hundred million dollars worth of irrevocable orders for Smart Cars from new car dealers.
5. Smart CEO Walker Responds to Schneider
On March 3, 2005, Walker responded by email to Schneider’s letter to Eckard Cordes. Walker stated that Smart was interested in a meeting or telephone conference to discuss “any synergy potential between our companies.”
6. The Meeting in Stuttgart, Germany
On March 21, 2005, Schneider met with Smart personnel in Stuttgart, Germany, including Walker and Smart’s vice-president, Anders Jensen. In addition, Thomas Heidemann (Heidemann) and Matthias Heinze attended the meeting on behalf of SAL.
At the meeting, according to his declaration, Schneider explained: ZAP could convert Smart Cars to comply with United States regulations; ZAP could obtain Smart Cars on the open market; and ZAP had confirmed orders for United States compliant Smart Cars. Schneider also explained that ZAP wanted to pursue a cooperative relationship with Smart. Finally, Schneider explained that ZAP faced some urgency to immediately supply Smart Cars to honor certain orders in the United States.
Further, according to Schneider’s declaration, Walker stated that Smart was interested in a relationship with ZAP, and that Smart would negotiate in good faith with ZAP to reach a cooperative relationship. Schneider also declared that Walker represented that Smart would fulfill ZAP’s orders for Smart Cars and then encouraged ZAP to obtain additional orders.
7. Schneider Emails Walker
On March 29, 2005, Schneider sent an email to Walker and Jensen at Smart. There, Schneider stated that ZAP understood that Smart was interested in finding a way to cooperate with ZAP on a long-term basis. Schneider then stated that ZAP had obtained releases from United States regulatory authorities to begin the legal sale of Smart Cars. ZAP also stated, however, that the sales and any related press releases would be put on hold because of the ongoing negotiations with Smart. Schneider proposed an agenda for a follow-up meeting, stating: “Our primary goal and most pressing agenda items to be resolved [are] the brand posture of [Smart], [the Smart] US structure and the legal form of cooperation between our companies.” Schneider concluded: “Based on your direction we will prepare a draft brand strategy for [Smart] in the US.”
8. Schneider Again Emails Walker
On April 3, 2005, Schneider again emailed Walker at Smart. Schneider informed Walker that as part of the Securities and Exchange Commission audit requirements, ZAP must disclose the back log of Smart Car orders in its annual report. Schneider stated that he anticipated reporting that ZAP had $430 million in confirmed orders. Schneider also explained that the audit required ZAP to verify the ability of each dealer to execute on the purchase orders. Schneider stated that Dunn and Bradstreet had satisfied the auditors of each dealer’s ability to execute on the orders.
9. Smart Requests Information from ZAP
On April 7, 2007, a Smart representative, Dr. Tilo F. Schweers, emailed Schneider at ZAP. Schweers wrote: “[P]lease find enclosed our [detailed] information request as mentioned earlier. We are looking forward to discussing these items with you in the near future.”
On appeal, ZAP asserts that Schweers’s email requested detailed trade secret information from ZAP. The requests from Schweers, however, are not included in the record on appeal.
10. Schneider Updates Walker at Smart
On April 13, 2005, Schneider emailed Walker to “keep [him] updated.” There, Schneider wrote that he had a good meeting with Dr. Schweers regarding his request for information. Schneider also stated that he needed to address the timing of a possible cooperation between the two companies. Schneider stated that ZAP intended to release it had over half a billion in dealer purchase orders. He also wrote that ZAP intended to release its first Smart Car for sale. Schneider wrote: “With close to three quarters of a billion dollars in dealer purchase orders, our concerns are about the ability for execution and that we may harm the brand name for the future if we do not come up with a viable plan.”
11. ZAP Responds to Smart’s Request for Information
On April 17, 2005, Schneider emailed Dr. Schweers at Smart. There, he wrote that he was attaching answers to the questions presented by Dr. Schweers. The answers are not part of the record on appeal. In his declaration, Schneider stated that ZAP provided Smart with: detailed explanations of its business activities and financial situation, governmental certifications, a list of ZAP’s distributors, and information regarding ZAP’s suppliers.
Schneider also wrote that the ZAP had more than $750 million in orders and that it would be publicly announcing the sale of its first fully compliant Smart Car.
12. Schneider Writes to Walker
On April 17, 2005, Schneider also emailed Walker at Smart. There, Schneider assured Walker that the Smart Car orders were valid and had surpassed the $750 million mark. Schneider also stated that ZAP had created a window of opportunity by raising the expectations of the buying public. Schneider then stated that he would like “to propose engaging in direct dialogue about the possibility of a more formal relationship” in the immediate future to evaluate possible forms of cooperation and the legal implications of such a partnership.
13. Smart’s April 27, 2005 Letter to Zap
On April 27, 2005, Smart representatives sent a letter to ZAP CEO Schneider. There, Smart stated: “[W]e refer to your e-mail dated March 29th, 2005 and to the preliminary discussions held until now; we would like to thank you for the information you have provided to our operative staff concerning your proposals for ZAP’s potential future vehicle import and distribution business. [¶] As you approached us in March 2005 with a proposal for cooperation, we [became] interested to learn more about your intentions and the possible perspectives. [¶] Nevertheless we feel it is necessary to inform you about our understanding of the joint discussions. We would like to point out that, differently to what you stated in your mail of March 29th 2005, at the moment it is not [Smart’s] intention to negotiate, prepare or to set up a cooperation between ZAP and [Smart]. [¶] At this time we would like to evaluate whether ZAP could be a potential partner for a future cooperation (remaining the extent of a possible cooperation still to be defined). [¶] For obvious reasons and in the best interest of both parties, all discussions are to be kept confidential; therefore please note that [Smart] does not authorize any press or other communication to third parties about the subject. [¶] We are sure that you will therefore understand the persistence of our operative team, not intending to be [skeptical] towards [ZAP] . . . but aiming at collecting an extensive basis of information that will allow us to evaluate if the conditions for a partnership are given.”
The Smart representatives then suggested entering into a non-disclosure agreement: “We would welcome the continuation of the discussions and hence propose as next steps the signature of a non-disclosure-agreement (NDA) and a visit on site in California [by] our operative[.] Please inform whether you concur with this proposal in which case we shall send, in line with our standard proceedings, a bilateral NDA to be signed.”
14. Schneider’s April 27, 2005 Response to Smart
On April 27, 2005, Schneider responded by email to the foregoing letter. There, Schneider wrote: “Thank you for your letter and recommended next steps. As suggested please send us your NDA so we can proceed to communicate more directly. I look forward to our continued dialogue.”
15. The Proposed Non-Disclosure Agreement
On April 29, 2005, a Smart representative sent Schneider a draft non-disclosure agreement, and asked Schneider to initial each page, sign the last two pages, and send the agreement back to Germany. The NDA proposed that the parties would mutually agree to keep confidential any information exchanged, and to use the information for the evaluation of a possible relationship. The NDA also proposed that the parties’ discussions would remain confidential.
For example, the NDA provided: “The conclusion of this Non Disclosure Agreement does not imply any intention of the Parties to set up a cooperation of whatever kind, but is merely regulating the exchange of information between the Parties.”
The NDA provided that it would be governed by the laws of Germany, and that a competent court in Stuttgart, German would have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any disputes.
On May 11, 2005, Smart representative Stuffer emailed Schneider: “[A]s we haven’t heard anything from you after sending over the NDA, we were wondering if you have received it and what is the status quo?”
16. ZAP Places Order For Smart Cars
On May 17, 2005, Schneider wrote a letter to Walker enclosing a purchase order for 76,500 Smart Cars for a total amount of over $1 billion. Schneider further wrote: “Currently[,] we have over two billion dollars . . . in confirmed orders and we expect these orders to continue, especially with the delivery of the first US compliant [Smart Cars]. Obviously, we will be making these orders public shortly as we have been subject to shareholder pressure to justify our investments. [¶] It is our preference to have [Smart] deliver these vehicles fully US compliant. . . . As an alternative, we have aligned ourselves with tier one contract manufacturers to perform such tasks on US shores.”
With respect to the non-disclosure agreement, Schneider wrote: “In our opinion[,] the proposed NDA . . . does not sufficiently address our common time sensitive needs. To realize the full vale of the purchase order, a relevant, mutually beneficial and comprehensive contractual relationship is required, including the applicable disclosure provision.”
17. Schneider Confirms Purchase Order to Walker at Smart
On May 23, 2005, Schneider sent Walker an email announcing Zap’s intentions to share with the media its $1 billion order of Smart Cars. He wrote: “To assure the public and shareholders of our intentions and to fulfill our obligations as a public company to report major material events, ZAP will be making the submission of the Purchase Order . . . sent to you at the beginning of last week, public. The responsibility thus placed upon us requires me to seek your direct involvement and stewardship to advance this project
Schneider also informed Walker: “ZAP stands ready to work with you on the detailed purchase contract and cooperate on all issues that you may have concerning the brand strategy. We at ZAP are confident that if this purchase order is confirmed, ZAP can produce additional purchase orders of similar magnitude in short succession.”
18. ZAP’s Press Release
On May 24, 2005, ZAP issued a press release publicizing the $1 billion purchase order sent to Smart. (The press release is not included in the record on appeal.)
19. The May 24, 2005, News Items
On May 24, 2005, the Dow Jones news company released a news article from Frankfurt, Germany. The article stated: “[Smart] . . . said Tuesday it will not be delivering any cars to U.S. company ZAP . . . contrary to a ZAP press release saying it has ordered $1 billion worth of [Smart Cars.] [¶] . . . [¶] The Smart spokeswoman said she wasn’t aware of any order from Zap. Additionally, ‘we have absolutely no information that there has ever been any contact between [Smart] and Zap.’ ”
On May 24, 2005, the Reuters news company released a news article from Frankfurt, Germany. The article stated: “German-American carmaker DaimlerChrysler’s . . . Smart division would not confirm . . . that it had received a $1 billion order from U.S. car customiser ZAP . . . for Smart minicars.” [¶] ‘Smart is unaware of such an order,’ a Smart [Spokesman] said. ZAP had announced the order earlier but said it was unsure whether DaimlerChrysler would fulfill it.”
On May 24, 2005, the AOL business news service picked up the Dow Jones piece concerning ZAP’s $1 billion order of Smart Cars. In addition to the information presented in the Dow Jones article, the AOL business news article stated: “A spokeswoman for Smart, which makes mini-compact cars, said the company doesn’t deal with independent importers and is sticking to that policy. [¶] ZAP, which stands for Zero Air Pollution, is a transport technology company investing in fuel-efficient transportation, according to its website. [¶] According to the press release, ZAP owns the technology used to ‘Americanize’ the popular European-made Smart Car for the U.S. market by adjusting cars to meet U.S. emissions and safety standards.”
20. DCAG’s Office of General Counsel Communicates with ZAP
On May 25, 2005, the DCAG Office of General Counsel in Stuttgart sent a letter to Schneider at ZAP stating that it was representing Smart in this matter. The letter than explained: “With a lack of understanding[, Smart] and [DCAG] are currently following your communication activities to the media. [¶] We would like to clearly state the following: [¶] Representatives of [Smart] have had a meeting with you on your request in order to discuss your offer to bring the [Smart Car] to the US. [Smart’s] motivation was to verify your claim that you had obtained certification to sell [Smart Cars] in the US. [¶] In a letter, dated April 27, 2005, [Smart] has clearly stated that it had no intention to discuss co-operation with your company before having seen suitable confirmation for ZAP’s statements regarding technical competence, US vehicle certification, dealer network and customer demand. In this letter[, Smart] also requested you to keep the matter confidential in the best interests of both parties and clearly instructed you that it did not authorize any respective communication to the media. The requested confirmation/proof was never received, the proposal of a non-disclosure agreement was neglected by you – for obvious reasons as we have to learn now.”
The DCAG Office of General Counsel closed the letter by stating: “We cannot accept your current communication activities. We regard this as an un-appropriate [sic] business conduct and expect you to stop all communication activities immediately. . . . [¶] We hereby communicate that, in the light of these events, [Smart] does not see a basis for evaluating any future business co-operation.”
21. Additional News Releases
A June 1, 2005, article about ZAP appeared in the Santa Rosa Press Democrat. The article explained that Smart had stated that it had not received ZAP’s $1 billion purchase order. The article then explained that ZAP had entered into arrangements with dealers to sell the Smart Cars, but that ZAP would face certain delay given the situation with Smart.
A June 6, 2005, Reuters news article reported that DaimlerChrysler’s Smart division had suffered losses since its inception. The article noted, however, that Smart’s CEO Walker believed the division would become profitable as demand for the cars increased. With respect to ZAP, the article explained: “Walker rejected a $1 billion order for Smart cars placed last month by U.S. car customizer ZAP . . . . The order for July 2005 delivery would have covered around 76,000 Smarts, a volume that the company makes in half a year. [¶] Walker said he was concerned the model might face liability lawsuits given the current lack of U.S. certification and that he was wary about ZAP’s financing of the deal. [¶] ‘We do not want to and will not have business ties to ZAP in any way,’ he said.”
A June 7, 2005, article appearing in the Santa Rosa Press Democrat reiterated much of the June 6, 2005, Reuters article. It noted that Smart CEO Walker stated that Smart would not enter into a business relationship with ZAP. The article noted that ZAP’s stock price fell sharply after Walker’s announcement.
A June 8, 2005, article appearing in the Santa Rosa Press Democrat reported that ZAP’s share price fell by two thirds after DaimlerChrysler announced that it would not work with ZAP to sell Smart Cars. The article reported that Walker gave prepared remarks stating that Smart had decided against working with ZAP because it was not certain that ZAP could pay for the cars or provide customers with adequate service or dealer networks.
A June 13, 2005, article in the Automotive News was titled: “[ZAP] gets zip from Smart.” The article explained: “Smart says it won’t do business with would-be U.S. importer [ZAP] now or in the future – apparently putting an end to confusion generated by [ZAP’s] recent announcement that it had ordered $1 billion in cars from Smart. [¶] Ulrich Walker, president [of Smart], says there are too many concerns about [ZAP]. The Santa Rosa, Calif., company sent Smart an unsolicited order for $1 billion worth of [Smart cars]. [ZAP] had asked that Smart build the two-seat microcars to meet American safety and emissions standards. [¶] . . . [¶] [ZAP] says it has the technology to homologate new European Smart cars to U.S. emissions and safety standards and has received federal approval to sell the vehicles in 45 states. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Smart acknowledged that it had studied the possibilities with [ZAP]. . . . [¶] Walker says Smart wasn’t sure [ZAP] could pay for [the] vehicles. There’s also concern about [the] quality of homologated vehicles – and the fear that Smart could end up spending ‘the same amount many times over on liability suits or measures to build up our brand again in the future,’ he said.”
The Automotive News article continued: “A [DCAG] source says Smart met with [ZAP] in March because [ZAP’s CEO] Schneider bombarded the company’s board members with letters complaining Walker would not meet with him. Schneider says he met with Walker on March 21. [¶] After that meeting, Smart investigated how difficult it would be to homologate a [Smart Car] to U.S. standards. It discovered that even with a change in engine electronics, the vehicle wouldn’t pass emissions standards, says a [DCAG] source. . . . [¶] Schneider could not provide Smart with data showing [ZAP] has the technology to meet these standards.”
A June 28, 2005, Wired News article reiterated that Smart turned down the $1 billion order from ZAP. The article noted that Walker stated that Smart would not do business with ZAP, “ ‘now or in [the] future.’ ” The article also reiterated Walker’s alleged comment that Smart would only conduct business if it was certain it would receive money following the delivery of the vehicles.
22. SAL ends Relationship with ZAP
The president of SAL, Heidemann, provided deposition testimony in this case. He testified that based upon the foregoing news articles, he became worried about conducting business with ZAP. Heidemann also testified that he received a telephone call in German from a person named Kirschner, who stated he worked for DCAG. According to Heidemann, Kirschner told Heidemann to stop any relationship with ZAP or SAL would not be part of the Smart Car business.
DCAG presented evidence that at all relevant times, it did not have an employee or agent named Kirschner with any relationship to the Smart Cars. In addition, ZAP presented no corroborating evidence that a Kirschner ever worked at DCAG in relation to the Smart Car program.
23. Zap Initiates Lawsuit
On October 28, 2005, ZAP filed a complaint against DCAG, Smart and Walker, among other defendants. There, ZAP alleged six causes of action: (1) intentional interference with prospective economic relations; (2) negligent interference with prospective economic relations; (3) trade libel; (4) defamation; (5) common law unfair business practices; and (6) statutory unfair business practices.
ZAP alleged that defendants lured ZAP into providing its confidential information regarding ZAP’s financial situation, certifications from governmental agencies, and the names of dealerships that contracted with ZAP. After obtaining this information, defendants allegedly set out to destroy ZAP as an import competitor. To effectuate this plan, ZAP alleged that defendants made false and misleading statements in widespread publications. ZAP further alleged that because of the news publicity, defendants interfered with ZAP’s relations with its suppliers, dealers, and investors.
In its complaint at paragraph 37, ZAP alleged that it did not provide Smart with its “highly sensitive trade secrets” regarding how to convert Smart Cars to comply with United States standards.
24. Motions to Quash
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (d), on May 8, 2006, defendants Smart and Walker made special appearances to file a motion to quash service of the summons and dismiss the complaint based upon lack of personal jurisdiction. DCAG filed a separate motion to quash.
On June 1, 2006, ZAP filed oppositions to the motion as well as an appendix of exhibits and declarations. On June 21, 2006, the day before the hearing on the motions to quash, ZAP filed objections to defendants’ evidence.
25. Trial Court Grants Motions to Quash
On June 22, 2006, the trial court granted defendants’ motions to quash and dismiss the case. The trial court ruled that DCAG, Smart and Walker had insufficient contacts with the State of California for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The trial court sustained defendants’ evidentiary objections to parts of plaintiff’s evidence. The court also ruled that ZAP’s evidentiary objections were untimely and would not be considered. ZAP timely filed a notice of appeal from the order granting the motion to quash.
CONTENTIONS
Zap contends: (1) the trial court erred by granting the motion to quash; (2) the trial court erred by sustaining defendants’ evidentiary objections; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to consider plaintiff’s evidentiary objections on the basis that they were untimely; and (4) the trial court erred by denying ZAP’s request to conduct additional discovery.
Because we consider ZAP’s evidence, we do not address this contention.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262 (Pavlovich), our Supreme Court articulated the standard of proof: “In reviewing a trial court’s determination of jurisdiction, we will not disturb the court’s factual determinations ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘When no conflict in the evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record.’ ” (Id. at p. 273.)
In Integral Development Corp. v. Weissenbach (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 576, the court reversed an order granting a motion to quash service of process and found that California could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. As to the substantial evidence standard of review, the court explained that we accept the trial court’s resolution of factual disputes and we indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court order. (Id. at p. 584.)
DISCUSSION
1. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Granting the Motions to Quash
California’s Long-arm statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10, permits courts to “exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” The statute “manifests an intent to exercise the broadest possible jurisdiction, limited only by constitutional considerations.” (Sibley v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 442, 445.) “The exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with [the state and federal Constitutions] ‘if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” ’ ” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 268.)
Pursuant to section 410.10, California courts may exercise general or specific personal jurisdiction over non-residents. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 268-269.) Specific jurisdiction may be established in cases in which a defendant purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits and the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446 (Vons).)
In this case, ZAP does not contend that there is a basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction. We therefore only consider whether ZAP has demonstrated a basis for specific jurisdiction.
As to establishing specific jurisdiction, the Pavlovich court explained: “When determining whether specific jurisdiction exists, courts consider the “ ‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” [Citations.] A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) ‘the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the “controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant’s contacts with the forum” ’ [citation]; and (3) ‘ “the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) In making these assessments, each defendant’s contacts with the forum state must be assessed individually to determine whether the state can exercise personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant. (Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 790 (Calder).)
Because we conclude that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice, we do no address this second factor.
a. Purposeful Availment
In the defamation context, courts employ the “effects test” to determine whether a defendant has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits. (Calder, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 789; Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) Stated another way, personal jurisdiction can be based upon tortious conduct outside of California that is expressly aimed at causing tortious effects in this state. (DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1098.)
The “effects test” stems from Calder. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 269-270.) In Calder, a reporter in Florida wrote an article for the National Enquirer about Shirley Jones, an actress who lived in California. Jones sued the reporter and the National Enquirer for libel in California. (Calder, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 784-785.) The individual defendants moved to quash service of process. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court held that California could exercise jurisdiction over the individual defendants based on the “effects” of their Florida conduct in California. (Pavlovich, at p. 270.) The court found personal jurisdiction was proper because “[t]he allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California. The article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent’s emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.” (Calder, at pp. 788-789, fn. omitted.)
In Pavlovich, our Supreme Court held that California could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a Texas resident because he did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits of the California forum. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 266.) There, a Texas resident hosted an Internet web site which consisted of a single page of links to other web sites. The site only provided information; it did not transact any business. However, the site posted the source code for a program which allowed users to circumvent technology developed to encrypt and protect copyrighted motion pictures contained on DVD discs. The Texas resident knew there was a company that controlled the technology developed to encrypt and protect copyrighted motion pictures. He did not, however, know the name of the company or that its principal place of business was in California until after the plaintiff filed suit. (Id. at pp. 266-267.)
In concluding that California could not exercise jurisdiction over the Texas resident, the Pavlovich court explained: “[C]ourts agree that merely asserting that a defendant knew or should have known that his intentional acts would cause harm in the forum state is not enough to establish jurisdiction under the effects test. [Citations.] Instead, the plaintiff must also ‘point to contacts which demonstrate that the defendant expressly aimed its tortious conduct at the forum . . . .’ [Citation.] . . . Indeed, virtually every jurisdiction has held that the Calder effects test requires intentional conduct expressly aimed at or targeting the forum state in addition to the defendant’s knowledge that his intentional conduct would cause harm in the forum.” (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 270-271.)
The Pavlovich court stressed that knowledge, by itself, that tortious activities may harm California residents is not sufficient to the exercise of personal jurisdiction. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 276-277.) The Pavlovich court further explained: “[M]ere foreseeability is not enough for jurisdiction. [Citation.] Otherwise, the commission of any intentional tort affecting industries in California would subject a defendant to jurisdiction in California. We decline to adopt such an expansive interpretation of the effects test.” (Id. at p. 277.)
Additional cases in the defamation context are instructive on the issue of purposeful availment. In Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto (1st Cir. 1994) 26 F.3d 201 (Ticketmaster), Alioto, a California resident and an attorney, represented a plaintiff in a class action against Ticketmaster in California. A Massachusetts newspaper, the Boston Globe, undertook an investigation of Ticketmaster’s pricing practices. For his part, Alioto participated in a single unsolicited telephone interview with a Globe staff reporter. Alioto knew when speaking that his comments “would inform a story slated for publication in a newspaper circulated chiefly in Massachusetts.” (Id. at pp. 203-204.) The Boston Globe investigation culminated in a front-page expose. In the article, Alioto accused Ticketmaster of taking kickbacks, which he stated were “ ‘nothing more than a straight bribe.’ ” (Id. at p. 204.)
Ticketmaster then sued Alioto in Massachusetts federal district court. The trial court dismissed the action based upon lack of personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals affirmed. (Ticketmaster, supra, 26 F.3d at p.203.)
The Ticketmaster court then examined a number of cases to determine whether Alioto purposefully availed himself of the Massachusetts forum. The court noted that the California lawyer did not initiate the contact with the Boston Globe reporter, but that the resultant alleged in-forum injury was foreseeable. (Ticketmaster, supra, 26 F.3d at pp. 208-209.) The court also recognized, however that a person who receives an unsolicited call from a reporter remains free to refrain from making defamatory statements. (Id. at p. 209, fn. 12.)
The Ticketmaster court concluded that Ticketmaster “made only the most marginal of showings that Alioto purposefully availed himself of an opportunity to act in Massachusetts.” (Ticketmaster, supra, 26 F.3d at p. 209, italics added.) Given the marginal purposeful availment, the Ticketmaster court concluded under part three of the test for determining specific jurisdiction that exercise of personal jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice. (Id. at pp. 210-212.)
In Core-Vent Corp v. Nobel Industries AB (9th Cir. 1993) 11 F.3d 1482 (Core-Vent), a California corporation that manufactured dental implants sued four Swedish doctors for allegedly writing defamatory articles published in international medical journals which were distributed worldwide, including California. (Id. at pp. 1483-1484.) The Core-Vent court affirmed the district court order dismissing the case against the four Swedish doctors for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 1484.)
The Core-Vent court explained that “Calder thus established that [specific] personal jurisdiction can be predicated on (1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered—and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered—in the forum state.” (Core-Vent, supra, 11 F.3d at p. 1486.) The Core-Vent court assumed, but did not hold, that the plaintiff there satisfied the foregoing test for purposeful availment, but nevertheless concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice. (Id. at p. 1487.)
In Mansour v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1750 (Mansour), the court held that the California Courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over an Ohio attorney who prepared an allegedly false report about a California company. (Id. at p. 1759.) The attorney prepared an opinion letter addressed to a person in Arizona which only referred to the plaintiff, a California resident, but did not identify him by name. (Ibid.) The court noted that while the defendant attorney may have foreseen that the allegedly defamatory statements might be published in California, foreseeability was an insufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. (Ibid.) The court explained that there was no evidence that the Ohio defendant purposefully directed his activities towards California. (Id. at p. 1762.)
Distinguishing Calder, the Mansour court stated: “[In Calder,] two Florida residents wrote and edited an allegedly defamatory article about a California resident for a national magazine with extensive circulation here. In this case, [the Ohio attorney] prepared an allegedly false report about the potentially criminal activities of an Arizona corporate executive that only inferentially refers to plaintiffs.” (Mansour, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th. at p. 1762.)
With the foregoing cases in mind, we separately examine whether ZAP has shown that DCAG, Smart or Walker purposefully availed themselves of the California forum sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction.
i. ZAP Has Not Established that DCAG Purposefully Availed Itself of the California Forum
In this case, ZAP has not shown that DCAG purposefully and voluntarily directed activities toward the forum to justify being subject to California’s jurisdiction. With respect to DCAG, the first contact occurred in 2003 in Sonoma, California. There, ZAP CEO Schneider had a chance meeting with Berretta, a DCAG representative. They discussed ZAP’s plan to import cars into the United States. According to Schneider’s declaration, Berretta told Schneider to contact Eckard Cordes at DCAG in Germany. As found by the trial court, this contact was nothing more than a random, fortuitous, or attenuated contact. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269 [“Thus, the ‘ “purposeful availment” ’ requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts.’ ”].)
ZAP asserts, however, that DCAG purposefully availed itself of the benefits of the State of California sufficient to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction based upon the assertion that a DCAG employee or agent named Kirschner called Heidemann of SAL and demanded that SAL not conduct business with ZAP. ZAP also relies upon the allegedly defamatory statements attributed to DCAG in the press statements identified in the foregoing factual summary. We conclude that ZAP has not shown that DCAG purposefully availed itself of the California forum
Other than the hearsay testimony of SAL president, Heidemann, there is no other evidence in the record that the Kirschner individual was a DCAG employee or agent. DCAG submitted evidence that no one by that name was employed by DCAG in the Smart Car program. In addition, the deposition of Heidemann occurred on April 21, 2006. Defendants filed their motions to quash on May 8, 2006. The hearing was not until June 22, 2006. ZAP had ample time to seek discovery into the identity of Kirschner.
Thus, whether there was a Kirschner who made such a telephone call is a disputed fact. Pursuant to the substantial evidence standard of review, we must indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court order. DCAG presented substantial evidence that it did not employ a Kirshner in the Smart Car program. We therefore conclude that there is no reliable evidence that a DCAG employee or agent named Kirschner made any threats to Heidemann about the Smart Car program.
In addition, with respect to DCAG’s alleged press statements, this court has reviewed each of the press releases presented to the trial court by ZAP. The record shows that ZAP presented two press releases containing statements allegedly made by DCAG representatives. We conclude that the press-statements attributed to DCAG are an insufficient basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
First, a June 8, 2005, article appearing in the Santa Rosa Press Democrat stated that “[a]t first [DCAG] denied getting the [$1 billion] order.”
Second, a June 13, 2005, Automotive News article entitled “[ZAP] gets zip from Smart,” stated: a“A [DCAG] source says Smart met with [ZAP] in March because [ZAP’s CEO] Schneider bombarded the company’s board members with letters complaining Walker would not meet with him. Schneider says he met with Walker on March 21. [¶] After that meeting, Smart investigated how difficult it would be to homologate a [Smart Car] to U.S. standards. It discovered that even with a change in engine electronics, the vehicle wouldn’t pass emissions standards, says a [DCAG] source.”
Pursuant to the rationale of the Calder, Ticketmaster, Core-Vent and Mansour cases, these statements do not show purposeful availment. With respect to the June 8, 2005, article, ZAP’s purchase order was sent to Smart, not to DCAG. Thus, the statement that DCAG initially denied receiving the order does not appear to constitute a defamatory statement. In addition, such an initial denial does not show that DCAG engaged in an intentional act expressly aimed at the California forum.
With respect to the June 13, 2005, article, a DCAG representative allegedly told the press that ZAP “bombarded” the DCAG board with complaint letters about Walker. This single isolated statement does not show purposeful availment. The article does not establish that a DCAG representative actually made the statement.
Moreover, the statement purportedly explaining why Walker met with Schneider does not support the conclusion that DCAG engaged in an intentional act directed at the California forum. Instead, the record shows that a DCAG representative purportedly used the word “bombard” to explain to the press why Smart met with ZAP. This characterization of ZAP’s communications with the DCAG board does not amount to an intentional act designed to harm a California resident. Importantly, ZAP has the initial burden of demonstrating facts sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 273.) ZAP has not shown one way or another how many letters it sent to the DCAG board to request a meeting with Walker. Thus, ZAP has not shown that the alleged “bombarding” statement was defamatory or untrue.
In any event, to the extent that DCAG did purposefully avail itself of the California forum, for the reasons set forth below, exercise of personal jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice.
ii. We Assume Without Deciding that ZAP Has Made a Marginal Showing that Walker and Smart Purposefully Availed Themselves of the California Forum
Based upon the press release statements attributed to Smart and Walker, under the rationale of Ticketmaster and Core-Vent, we assume for the sake of argument that ZAP has made a showing of marginal purposeful availment of the California forum. In Ticketmaster, a California lawyer stated to the Massachusetts press that Ticketmaster accepted kickbacks and bribes. In Core-Vent, the four Swedish doctors allegedly made defamatory statements to the international press about Core-Vent’s dental implant.
Here, Walker and Smart allegedly made three defamatory statements. They (1) denied ever receiving the purchase order from ZAP, (2) denied any contact with ZAP, and (3) suggested that ZAP was not in a position to pay for the purchase of $1 billion in Smart cars.
Presuming that Walker and Smart made the foregoing statements to the press, we assume without deciding that ZAP has made a marginal showing of purposeful availment. The purposeful availment in this case, however, appears to be less purposeful than that at issue in Ticketmaster, where the lawyer accused Ticketmaster of taking bribes. Here, we know that ZAP met with Smart and sent a purchase order to Smart. Thus, the first two statements (i.e., that Smart did not meet with ZAP or receive a purchase order) appear to be untrue. However, we note that ZAP has made no showing that it had the financial ability to fulfill the $1 billion purchase order. Thus, on this record, we cannot form an opinion as to whether the third statement was true or untrue.
Contrary to the assertions of Walker and Smart, however, this case is not analogous to Pavlovich. There, the defendant did not know where the plaintiff resided. Here, by contrast, the record shows that Walker and Smart had to know that ZAP was located in California and would suffer harm in California from allegedly defamatory statements. Nevertheless, for the reasons explained below, exercise of personal jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice.
Moreover, contrary to ZAP’s assertions, the present case is not analogous to Calder. There, the individual defendants, the reporter and an editor, researched and wrote a story about a forum-based resident. (Calder, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 785-786.) In this case, the press contacted DCAG, Smart or Walker. They did not draft or edit the story. They were responding to press inquiries about an unsolicited $1 billion order.
The press statements by DCAG show no purposeful availment. The press statements by Smart or Walker were defensive in nature and showed only slight or marginal purposeful availment, if any.
b. The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Would Not Comport With Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Once a plaintiff establishes minimum contacts to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction, this court must consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction is fair. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 475-476.) In this case, defendants carried their burden to present a compelling case that exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Id. at p. 476 [“Because we conclude defendants had the requisite minimum contacts with California, the burden is now on them to ‘present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.’ [Citation.]”)
In Core-Vent, the court set forth seven factors to be considered for purposes of determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction is fair and reasonable. There, the court explained: “In determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with ‘fair play and substantial justice,’ we must consider seven factors: (1) the extent of the defendants’ purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendants’ state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.” (Core-Vent, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 1487-1488.) Neither of the factors is dispositive in itself. (Id. at p. 1488.) In addition, the foregoing list of factors is not an exclusive list. (Gordy v. Daily News, L.P. (9th Cir. 1996) 95 F.3d 829, 835.)
The Core-Vent factors are similar to those indentified in Vons. There, the California Supreme Court explained: “In this connection, a court ‘must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination “the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” ’ [Citations.]” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 476.)
i. Purposeful Interjection
In this case, analogous to the facts in Core-Vent and Ticketmaster, with respect to the first factor, defendants’ purposeful interjection into the forum was marginal or slight, if any. In fact, the record shows it was ZAP’s conduct, not defendants’, which triggered the events that led to the press inquires and the press releases related to the order of Smart Cars. Smart set forth a number of criteria in order for ZAP to engage in a dialogue about ZAP’s intentions to sell Smart Cars in the United States. In fact, on April 27, 2005, Smart instructed ZAP in writing that while it would conduct a dialogue with ZAP and evaluate whether ZAP could be a future partner, Smart had no present intention of creating a partnership or contractual relationship between ZAP and Smart. At that time, Smart expressly instructed ZAP that all communications about this process were to remain confidential.
In violation of the express request for confidentiality, ZAP then issued a press release that it had placed a $1 billion order for Smart Cars. It was this press release which triggered the statements to the press by DCAG, Smart and Walker. Analogous to Ticketmaster, the defendants did not edit or write the news releases. Instead, they responded to unsolicited press inquiries caused by ZAP’s conduct.
In other words, ZAP forced DCAG, Smart and Walker to speak to the press about their relationship with ZAP. While ZAP’s alleged injuries from the press reports (if defamatory) might have been foreseeable, there is no evidence that DCAG intended to harm ZAP in California or directed its activities towards California. Likewise, the evidence is slight that Smart and Walker intended to harm ZAP in California. Instead, the record shows that the three defendants were caught in a storm of press inquiry, which storm was caused and created by ZAP, not defendants.
As the trial court found, defendants’ statements to the press and their press releases were in the nature of disclaimers that Smart had entered into any sort of contractual relationship with ZAP. In addition, defendants’ press statements would not have been made absent ZAP’s publicity of the unsolicited $1 billion order of Smart Cars. Thus, like the Ticketmaster court, we conclude that this factor weighs heavily in favor of defendants.
ii. Burden on Defendants
As for the second factor, in Core-Vent, the court noted “that defending a lawsuit in a foreign country can impose a substantial burden on a nonresident alien.” (Core-Vent, supra, 11 F.3d at p. 1488.) While this burden will weigh less heavily upon DCAG and Smart, it will impose a substantial burden on Walker. In the words of Core-Vent, the burden on Walker as an individual will be “particularly great” because there is no evidence that he has any ongoing connection with California. (Ibid.) Likewise, while DCAG and Smart are corporations (which lessens the burden), there is no evidence that they have ongoing contacts with California or the United States. Thus, this factor weighs heavily in favor of Walker and also in favor of DCAG and Smart.
iii. Conflict With the Sovereignty of the Defendants’ State
With respect to the third factor, the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendants’ state, the Core-Vent court explained: “ ‘[T]he foreign-acts-with-forum-effects jurisdictional principle must be applied with caution, particularly in an international context.’ [Citation.] ‘Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.’ [Citation.] ‘[L]itigation against an alien defendant creates a higher jurisdictional barrier than litigation against a citizen from a sister state because important sovereignty concerns exist.’ [Citation.] [¶] In determining how much weight to give this factor, we have focused on the presence or absence of connections to the United States in general, not just to the forum state. Sovereignty concerns weigh more heavily when the defendants have no United States-based relationships.” (Core-Vent, supra, 11 F.3d at p. 1489.)
Thus, this third factor weighs in favor of defendants. In this case, none of the defendants have ongoing contacts with California. While DCAG and Smart are corporations, there is no evidence that at the relevant times they had ongoing relationships with California or the United States.
iv. The Forum State’s Interest in Adjudicaing the Dispute
With respect to the fourth factor, California has a strong interest in adjudicating this lawsuit. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 477.) This factor weighs in favor of ZAP.
v. The Most Efficient Judicial Resolution of the Controversy and the Importance of the Forum to the Plaintiff’s Interest in Convenient and Effective Relief
As for the fifth and sixth factors, courts look to the where the evidence and witnesses are located. (Core-Vent, supra, 11 F.3d at p. 1489.) In this case, with respect to the case against the German defendants, we cannot conclude that these factors weigh in favor of ZAP. The witnesses are located in both forums. The only meeting occurred in Germany. The correspondence and documents appear to be located in both forums. These factors are neutral or slightly favor the German defendants.
vi. Existence of An Alternative Forum
With respect to the seventh factor, the existence of an alternative forum, the burden was on ZAP to show that a German forum was unavailable. (Core-Vent, supra, 11 F.3d at p. 1490.) Zap has not met this burden. This factor weighs in favor of defendants.
This case is closely analogous to the Core-Vent and Ticketmaster cases. There, as noted above, the courts found or assumed that there was purposeful availment. However, given the slight purposeful interjection into the forum states, the courts concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice. We reach the same conclusions here.
The trial court did not err by granting the motions to quash service of process. We are mindful that California has a strong interest in providing a forum to residents who are injured in this state. We conclude, however, that defendants have presented a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with fair play and substantial justice and would thus be unreasonable.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Refusing to Rule on ZAP’s Evidentiary Objections
ZAP asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to rule on ZAP’s evidentiary objections. We disagree. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding ZAP’s objections to be untimely.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivisions (a)(4) and (b), sets forth the filing deadlines on a motion to quash a summons. Section 1005, subdivision (b), states that all opposing papers shall be filed at least nine court days before the hearing.
In this case, defendants filed their separate motions to quash on May 8, 2006. The motions identified the hearing date as June 22, 2006. On June 1, 2006, ZAP filed oppositions to the motions to quash, as well as a request for judicial notice and an evidentiary appendix. However, ZAP did not file its objections to defendants’ evidence until June 21, 2006, the day before the hearing.
Thus, ZAP’s evidentiary objections were untimely pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b). Because ZAP filed its objections the day before the hearing on the motion to quash, defendants did not have an opportunity to respond to ZAP’s filing. Moreover, ZAP makes no showing of good cause as to why it waited until the day before the hearing to file its evidentiary objections.
On this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider ZAP’s objections.
3. The Trial Court did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying ZAP’s Motion to Conduct Additional Discovery
ZAP asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying ZAP’s motion to conduct additional jurisdictional-related discovery. We disagree.
To justify a continuance to conduct additional discovery, a party must show that the additional discovery would reasonably lead to the production of evidence establishing jurisdiction. (Beckman v. Thompson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 481, 487.) In this case, ZAP has not made such a showing. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying ZAP’s motion.
DISPOSITION
The order granting the motions to quash and dismissing DaimlerChrysler AG, Smart GMBH and Ulrich Walker is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to defendants and respondents.
We concur: KLEIN, P. J., CROSKEY, J.