Opinion
J-A19013-18 No. 147 MDA 2018
10-10-2018
PERI YUKSEL Appellant v. SANTANDER BANK AND GUNN MOWERY LLC Appellees
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered January 5, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Civil Division at No(s): CI-17-06944 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Appellant, Peri Yuksel, appeals pro se from the order entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Santander Bank ("Bank"), in this quiet title action. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. In December 2007, Christopher Connolly executed a mortgage on a residential property ("Property") in favor of Sovereign Bank, in exchange for a home equity line of credit. Bank recorded the mortgage in the Lancaster County Recorder of Deeds on January 8, 2008. In 2014, Gunn Mowery, LLC won a civil judgment against Mr. Connolly, and secured its judgment with a lien against the Property on May 8, 2014. Mr. Connolly died in August 2014, without having satisfied the mortgage and judgment lien.
In 2013, Sovereign Bank changed its name to Santander Bank.
On November 11, 2016, Appellant purchased the Property at an upset tax sale, when the mortgage and the judgment lien still encumbered the Property. On August 3, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se complaint to quiet title against Bank and Gunn Mowery, LLC. Bank filed an answer and new matter on September 6, 2017. On September 26, 2017, Bank filed a motion for summary judgment. On November 30, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se praecipe to dismiss her claims against Gunn Mowery, LLC in light of a settlement agreement between them. On January 5, 2018, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Bank, with Pa.R.C.P. 236 notice sent on January 8, 2018.
As a result of Appellant's voluntary dismissal of her claims against Gunn Mowery, LLC, the company is not a party to this appeal.
Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on January 19, 2018. The court ordered Appellant on January 22, 2018, with Rule 236 notice sent on January 24, 2018, to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Appellant timely complied on February 13, 2018.
Appellant raises three issues for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING [BANK]'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT [MOTION]?
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE ACTION TO QUIET TITLE?
WHEHER THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING THAT [MR. CONNOLLY]'S SIGNATURE WAS NOT AUTHENTICATED AND THAT THE MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE LOAN AGREEMENT/NOTE CONTAIN SEVERE OMISSIONS?(Appellant's Brief at 7).
The disposition of this case refers to the Real Estate Tax Sale Law at 72 P.S. §§ 5860.101-5860.803 ("Tax Sale Law"). Generally, the Commonwealth Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction over appeals interpreting the Tax Sale Law. Wells Fargo Bank , N.A. v. James , 90 A.3d 813, 816 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2014). The present case, however, requires us only to refer to the Tax Sale Law, but does not oblige us to interpret it, as the relevant provision governing the non-divestiture of liens in upset tax sales is settled law. Thus, we can retain jurisdiction where this appeal was properly perfected in our Court, and Bank has not objected. See Pa.R.A.P. 741 (stating, with some exceptions, that generally failure of appellee to object to appellate court jurisdiction before record is filed shall operate to perfect appellate jurisdiction of such appellate court, unless appellate court shall otherwise order, notwithstanding any provision of law vesting jurisdiction of such appeal in another appellate court).
Initially we observe:
Our scope of review of an order granting summary judgment is plenary. We apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered.
Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly implicate the plaintiff's proof of the elements of [its] cause of action. Summary judgment is proper if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted
to a jury. Thus, a record that supports summary judgment will either (1) show the material facts are undisputed or (2) contain insufficient evidence of facts to make out a prima facie cause of action or defense and, therefore, there is no issue to be submitted to the jury. Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court's conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions. The appellate Court may disturb the trial court's order only upon an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it does not follow legal procedure.
Where the discretion exercised by the trial court is challenged on appeal, the party bringing the challenge bears a heavy burden.
Lineberger v. Wyeth , 894 A.2d 141, 145-46 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).It is not sufficient to persuade the appellate court that it might have reached a different conclusion if...charged with the duty imposed on the court below; it is necessary to go further and show an abuse of the discretionary power. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Leonard G. Brown, III, we conclude Appellant's issues merit no relief. The trial court's opinions comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the questions presented. ( See Order, filed January 5, 2018, at 1 n.1; Trial Court Opinion, filed March 2, 2018, at 1-2) (finding: upset tax sale did not divest Property of Bank's prior mortgage lien; when Appellant bought Property at upset tax sale, she purchased it subject to Bank's lien; in her pleadings, Appellant did not specifically deny authenticity of Mr. Connolly's signatures on mortgage documents; thus, Appellant admitted authenticity of signatures; further, signature on mortgage is same as signature on note; Appellant's bald assertion that signature on note is invalid did not raise genuine issue of material fact regarding validity of Bank's lien). The record supports the trial court's rationale. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinions.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/10/2018