Opinion
No. 41 WAP 2006.
Argued March 5, 2007.
Decided May 31, 2007.
Appeal No. 41 WAP 2006 from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered April 5, 2006 at No. 1753 CD 2005, reversing the Order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board entered August 3, 2005 at No. A04-1485. 897 A.2d 530 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2006).
Jeanette Hsin Ho, Esq., Louis C. Long, Esq., Pietragallo, Bosick Gordon, L.L.P., Pittsburgh, for Zinc Corporation of America.
Amber Marie Kenger, Esq., Richard C. Lengler, Esq., for Workers' Compensation Appeal Board.
Daniel King Bricmont, Esq., Caroselli, Beachler, McTiernan Conboy, L.L.C., Pittsburgh, for Charles Young.
Thomas W. Corbett, Esq., Harrisburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
BEFORE: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER and BALDWIN, JJ.
ORDER
The Order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed with the caveat that the Commonwealth Court shall modify its Order to specify that the calculation and award of benefits should not include any award for lifetime claim benefits as claimant conceded that she was discontinuing her claim for lifetime benefits.
Justice SAYLOR files a concurring statement in which Justice BALDWIN joins.
I join the majority disposition of this appeal, because I believe that it effectuates a plain-meaning application of Section 301(c)(2) of the Workers?' Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 411(2). I write only to note that Employer's substantive due process argument gives me pause, since the plain-meaning interpretation of Section 301(c)(2) eliminates (or at least severely restricts) the conventional workers' compensation concept of employer-specific work relatedness in the occupational disease setting. I believe, however, that any developed discussion of substantive due process relative to workers' compensation would need to encompass a discussion of the trilogy of decisions in which the United States Supreme Court, in very general terms, approved the basic loss-spreading scheme inherent in the general workers' compensation concept as consistent with constitutional due process norms. See New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S.Ct. 247, 61 L.Ed. 667 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 37 S.Ct. 255, 61 L.Ed. 678 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. State, 243 U.S. 219, 37 S.Ct. 260, 61 L.Ed. 685 (1917). Since Employer has not included such a discussion in its brief, or referenced any other substantive due process decision, I find its argument on this point to be insufficiently developed to warrant further consideration in this case.
Justice BALDWIN joins this concurring statement.