Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99CV055-B-A.
February 24, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This cause is before the court upon the defendant, Elizabeth Vinson's, motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon due consideration of the motion and the parties' memoranda, the court finds that the defendant's motion is well taken and should be granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiff, Patty Young, representing herself, filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Rules of Civil Procedure and various Constitutional provisions. The plaintiff's claim is based upon the defendant, Elizabeth Vinson's, filing of an affidavit of bench warrant in the municipal court of Olive Branch, Mississippi, alleging the plaintiff violated § 97-3-107 of the Mississippi Code Annotated entitled "Stalking." The plaintiff alleges that this affidavit was false and frivolous, that it was done with malice and the intent to bring about malicious prosecution, and was founded on perjury. See Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint, p. 7. The plaintiff further alleges that the other defendants and Elizabeth Vinson acted in concert with one another and as a result, violated the plaintiff's rights. The plaintiff's Complaint seeks an excess of one hundred three million dollars ($103,000,000.00) in damages from (among others) Elizabeth Vinson, the City of Olive Branch, Olive Branch city officials and police officers and the Mississippi Municipal Liability Plan Insurance. See Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint, p. 11. The defendant, Elizabeth Vinson, has filed this motion to dismiss based upon Rule 12(b)(6), for the plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This case is substantially similar to the cases of Brinkman v. Johnston, 793 F.2d 111 (5 th Cir. 1986) and McDonald v. Griffin, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16543 (N.D.Miss. 1999), echoing their factual patterns of a plaintiff's misguided attempt to seek redress for a state court decision by harassing the defendants with baseless litigation.
The plaintiff maintains that she is appearing "in her own person, in propia persona, sui juris, and not pro se." See Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint, p. 1. In her amended verified complaint, she states that,
This action arises under the Constitution of the United States of America, particularly under the provisions of the USAC Art 1 § 10 and under the USAC, Bill of Rights, Art. II, Art. IV, and Art. XIV and arises under Federal Law particularly under the Civil Rights, under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983; to wit:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTION, Art. 1 § 10; to wit:
"No State Shall, . . . or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, . . ."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTION, Art. II; to wit:
". . . the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,"
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTION, Art. IV; to wit:
". . . and no Warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized"
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTION, Art. VI; to wit:
". . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,"
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTION, Art. VII; to wit:
". . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, . . ."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII; to wit:
". . . nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,"
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONSTITUTION, Art. XIV; to wit:
". . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor to deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,"
LAW
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is generally disfavored, and is rarely granted. Clark v. Amoco Prod. Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986); Sosa v. Coleman, 646 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1981). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12, the district court accepts as true the well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the plaintiff's complaint. C.C. Port, Ltd. v. Davis-Penn Mortgage Co., 61 F.3d 288, 289 (5th Cir. 1995). "Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true, if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle it to the relief it seeks," dismissal is proper. Id. It must appear beyond any doubt that the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995) (alterations and citations omitted). Even if it appears an almost certainty that the facts as alleged in the complaint cannot be proved to support the claim, the complaint cannot be dismissed so long as a claim is stated. Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coatings Corp., 728 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1984). If a required element, a prerequisite to obtaining the requested relief, is lacking in the complaint, dismissal is proper. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.").
A. Federal Review of State Court Decisions
This action is an improper use of the judicial process. It has long been established that litigants may not obtain review of state court actions by filing complaints about those actions in federal court. Brinkman, 793 F.2d at 113. This principle applies "to all actions which candidly seek review of the state court's actions" as well as extending "to all cases in which the constitutional claims presented in federal court are inextricably intertwined with the state court's action." McDonald v. Griffin, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16543, at *3. In so far as this action is based upon review of a state court decision, such review is improper and this cause should be dismissed.
A. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1983 requires that the individual who allegedly deprived a party of its constitutional rights must have acted under "color of state law." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the acts of private individuals may support an action for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the individuals are "willing participant[s] in a joint action with the state or its agents." Brinkman, 793 F.2d at 112; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980). "The elements of a civil conspiracy are 1) an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983 and 2)actions taken in concert by the defendants with specific intent to violate the aforementioned right." Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339 (5 th Cir. 1999). Section 1983 claims require that the "claimant . . . state specific facts, not merely conclusive allegations." Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 690 (5 th Cir. 1986); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1369 — 70 (5 th Cir. 1987); See also, Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d 565, 566 (5 th Cir. 1991). Specific facts of the conspiracy must be plead with particularity, not simply alleged in broad, vague assertions. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1370. Additionally, "a lengthy line of decisions [in the 5 th Circuit] . . . holds that litigants may not obtain review of state court actions by filing complaints about those actions in lower federal courts cast in the form of civil rights suits." Hale, 786 F.2d 690-91; Brinkman, at 112; See also, Sawyer v. Overton, 595 F.2d 252 (5 th Cir. 1979); Kimball v. The Florida Bar, 632 F.2d 1283 (5 th Cir. 1980).
In the instant cause, the plaintiff has alleged in broad, vague language that the defendant, Elizabeth Vinson, acted in concert with the other defendants, including those who are state actors, to violate her civil rights. The plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity any specific facts of the alleged conspiracy, but rather generally states conclusory allegations. Such bald conclusions will not suffice. The court holds that the plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to state a under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The court has also considered, sua sponte, the plaintiff's claims against the remaining defendants. The plaintiff's complaint seeks relief against the numerous Olive Branch defendants in their official capacities. It is well-established that a suit against state officials in their official capacities is not a suit against the officials but rather is a suit against the officials' offices and is, in effect, no different from a suit against the State itself. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Although section 1983 does provide for claims against persons who, under color of state law, deprive another of rights secured by the Constitution, the Supreme Court has made clear that neither a State, nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. See Id. Further, as stated above, the plaintiff's broad, vague allegations against these defendants are insufficient to state a claim under § 1983. See Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d at 690; Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d at 1369 — 70; Young v. Biggers, 938 F.2d at 566. Accordingly, dismissal of the claims against the Olive Branch defendants in their official capacities is proper.
The plaintiff filed this suit against "Elizabeth Vinson, City of Olive Branch, Mississippi, its Mayor Samuel P. Rikard, and its Board of Alderman, George, Collins, Aubrey Coleman, Steve Dawson, Richard E Dlugach, George Harrison, and its Police Department, its Chief of Police Jim Harris, Detective Cleatus Oliver, Scott Gentry, the Olive Branch Municipal Court de facto Judge Les Shumake; Deputy Clerk, Billy Baldwin, the de facto City of Olive Branch Mississippi Prosecutor Wallace Anderson the de facto Municipal Court Clerk Jennifer Carson and the Mississippi Municipal Liability Plan Insurance and any and all John Doe defendants and others to be joined after discovery et al." All of these defendants, except for Elizabeth Vinson, are associated with the city of Olive Branch, Mississippi. These defendants shall herein collectively be referred to as the "Olive Branch defendants."
B. Constitutional Claims
The plaintiff has also alleged numerous constitutional claims against all defendants. As with claims under § 1983, these claims too must be pled with particularity. Brinkman, 793 F.2d at 113. The plaintiff's vague and muddled factual ramblings fail to provide any details which could be interpreted to sufficiently state a constitutional claim. As such, these claims must fail also.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's frivolous filing of this action, seeking redress for some state court decision or action which she feels was in error, is a brazen attempt to commandeer the judicial system for her personal folly rather than for its intended use. The United States District court is not a place to carry grudges against individuals or government officials. Such action is a waste of judicial time, intended to harass the litigants, and is wholly improper. Due to the patent frivolity of this cause, the court finds that attorney's fees should be granted in favor of all defendants.
The plaintiff's claims, as stated in her complaint, are grossly insufficient to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or the United States Constitution. For the forgoing reasons, the defendant Elizabeth Vinson's motion to dismiss should be granted and the plaintiff's claims against the Olive Branch defendants should be dismissed. An order shall issue accordingly.
THIS, the ___ day of February, 2000.
ORDER
NEAL B. BIGGERS, JR., Chief Judge.
In accordance with the memorandum opinion this day issued, it is ORDERED:
that the defendant, Elizabeth Vinson's, motion to dismiss is GRANTED;
that the plaintiff's claims against Elizabeth Vinson are DISMISSED with prejudice;
that the plaintiff's claims against the Olive Branch defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice;
that sanctions are GRANTED against the plaintiff;
that all defendants' attorneys shall submit affidavits for attorney's fees and serve a copy upon the plaintiff; and
that all other motions pending in this action are DENIED as moot.
THIS, the ___ day of February, 2000.
TITLE 42 U.S.C. § 1983; to wit:
"§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and Laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress"
See Plaintiff's Amended Verified Complaint, p. 5-7.