Opinion
No. C 02-5073 SBA, [Docket No. 85].
September 13, 2004
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Lilia Young's ("Plaintiff") motion for review of allowed costs [Docket No. 85]. Having read and considered the arguments presented by the parties in the papers submitted to the Court, the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. The Court hereby DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff's motion for review of allowed costs. Plaintiff is granted leave to submit additional evidence in support of her motion in accordance with this Order.
BACKGROUND
On October 18, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging (1) Discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3617; (3) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (4) Violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act; (5) Violation of California Civil Code § 827; (6) Breach of an alleged written and oral contract of employment; (7) Breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (8) Wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
On April 20, 2004, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and on May 27, 2004, the Court granted in part Defendant's motion. Specifically, the Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's three federal claims, denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's five state claims without prejudice, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the five state claims, and dismissed them without prejudice to their being refiled in state court.
On June 9, 2004, Defendants filed a Bill of Costs. On June 24, 2004, the Clerk of the Court taxed costs in the amount of $5,566.29 against Plaintiff. On June 29, 2004, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for review of allowed costs. Plaintiff does not dispute the amount of costs allowed, but argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to tax costs and, alternatively, that the Court should exercise its discretion to deny costs.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that "costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Id. "By its terms, the rule creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party, but vests in the district court discretion to refuse to award costs." Association of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000); see National Info. Servs., Inc. v. TRW, Inc., 51 F.3d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the district court's "discretion is not unlimited." Association of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 591. A district court must "specify reasons" for its refusal to award costs. Id.; see Subscription Television, Inc. v. Southern Cal. Theatre Owners Ass'n, 576 F.2d 230, 234 (9th Cir. 1978).
In past cases, the Ninth Circuit has approved the following reasons for refusing to award costs to a prevailing party: the losing party's limited financial resources, see National Org. for Women v. Bank of Cal., 680 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984); Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 486 (9th Cir. 1983); and misconduct on the part of the prevailing party, see National Info. Servs., 51 F.3d at 1472.
DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to award costs. See Cooter Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359, 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990) (recognizing that "federal courts may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending," including "motions for costs or attorney's fees"); Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U.S. 265, 268, 99 L. Ed. 2d 289, 108 S. Ct. 1130 (1988) ("[A] request for costs raises issues wholly collateral to the judgment in the main cause of action."); see also Citizens For a Better Environment v. The Steel Co., 230 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2000) ("In particular a court may lack authority to resolve the merits of a claim yet have jurisdiction to award costs and attorney's fees to the prevailing party."). In Sequa Corp. v. Cooper, 245 F.3d 1036 (8th Cir. 2001), the court noted that, "Rule 54(d)(1) simply provides that ordinarily costs shall be allowed `as of course' to the prevailing party `unless the court otherwise directs.'" Sequa, 245 F.3d at 1037-1038 (noting that voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(i) does not deprive a District Court of its authority to award costs), citing, Cantrell v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 2021, 69 F.3d 456, 458 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that district courts have the discretion to award costs when a party dismisses an action, with or without prejudice).
In this case, the Court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's three federal claims and dismissed Plaintiff's state claims without prejudice. Despite this, the Court retains jurisdiction over collateral issues such as the award of costs.
B. Costs
Plaintiff does not contest that Defendants were the prevailing parties. But Plaintiff argues that the Court should exercise its discretion and decline to award costs in this matter because of her limited financial resources. Plaintiff and her husband live together with three kids. Young Decl. ¶ 1. Plaintiff works as a property supervisor for a non profit organization and receives $3,293.34 gross income per month ($2,668.86 net income per month). Id.; Young Reply Decl. ¶ 2. Her husband does not have a steady job. Young Decl. ¶ 1. Their gross family income is less than $45,000 per year. Id.
Plaintiff's expenses include $1,010 per month for rent, $490 per month for car payments, $138 per month for vehicle insurance, about $600 per month for food, about $180 per month for gas and $110-125 per month for utilities. Young Reply Decl. ¶ 2. This results in monthly expenses totaling $2,528-$2,543 per month. While Plaintiff and her husband maintain two financial accounts, the current aggregate balance between the two accounts is slightly negative. Id. They do not own real estate, stock or other assets. Id. Plaintiff has a 401K account with a balance of around $500 but cannot withdraw this money without paying taxes and a penalty.
Plaintiff has not paid any of the costs incurred by her counsel during the course of this litigation. Young Reply Decl. ¶ 3.
Plaintiff's monthly expenses are objectively reasonable and the information that Plaintiff has provided support a finding that she does not have the financial resources to pay $5,566.29 in costs. However, Defendants argue that during the time this case was pending, Plaintiff settled a lawsuit against a former employer. Def't Exhs A, B. Defendants contend that the amount of this settlement may be sufficient to pay these costs. Plaintiff responds that the former lawsuit's resolution is confidential and that she "cannot discuss the resolution of the other lawsuit unless this Court orders her to do so." Rep. at 4. Depending on the amount of this settlement, Plaintiff may be able to pay the taxed costs. Plaintiff is granted leave to provide additional evidence from which the Court can determine, based on the amount of this settlement, whether Plaintiff may be able to pay the taxed costs.
CONCLUSION
Good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's motion for review of allowed costs [Docket No. 85] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties shall meet and confer for the purpose of resolving all disputed issues relating to Plaintiff's motion no later than September 24, 2004. In the event that any issues remain unresolved, Plaintiff shall file and serve a Certificate of Counsel, and supporting invoices and other evidence, responding to the issues raised by this Order, no later than October 1, 2004. Plaintiff shall also deliver a courtesy copy of her papers to chambers, no later than October 1, 2004. Thereafter, the Court shall take the matter under submission and shall base its ruling on the papers submitted by the parties.
No additional memoranda or any other papers may be filed in connection with Plaintiff's motion without prior leave of Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.