Opinion
No. CIV S-03-2644 LKK CMK P.
July 7, 2006
FINDINGS RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff is a state prisoner, without counsel, prosecuting this civil rights action against defendant Broddrick, defendant Curren, defendant Murphy, defendant Porter, and defendant Terry. The case is before the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302(c) for findings and recommendations on defendants' motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
I. Standard of Review
On a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), the court must accept the evidence of the non-moving party as true and draw all reasonable inferences of fact in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact does actually exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. V. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment may not rest on conclusory allegations, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 422 (9th Cir. 1978) (involving a pro se litigant); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 586 n. 11. When the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
On May 24, 2004, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).
II. Background
The crux of plaintiff's claim is that defendants failed to protect him from harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment. Plaintiff also asserts that defendants conspired against him.
Taken in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the facts are as follows. Plaintiff is an inmate at California State Prison-Sacramento (CSP-S). Plaintiff has been diagnosed with psychiatric disorders and was attacked by other inmates while incarcerated in the Los Angeles County jail. The attack caused plaintiff to have reoccurring nightmares of violence and flashbacks; this made it impossible for him to share a cell with another inmate. Plaintiff warned CSP-S staff about his inability to be double-celled.
Despite plaintiff's warnings, he was kept on double-cell status. This was because he did not have a history of being a sexual predator or assaulting cell mates. Plaintiff disagreed with the decision to keep him on double cell status. Plaintiff states that after filing complaints regarding his double cell status, defendant Porter retaliated against him by housing him with an HIV positive inmate. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Porter was further motivated to retaliate against plaintiff because she knew that plaintiff had won a prior lawsuit against her brother-in-law.
In October 2003, plaintiff was moved into a cell with inmate Hodge. Plaintiff continued to request a single cell assignment because he and Hodge did not get along. On October 11, 2003, plaintiff and Hodge got into an altercation. Plaintiff states that his injuries were downplayed by prison staff, and plaintiff was charged with a mutual combat violation. Plaintiff avers that defendants "staged the fight" that he had with inmate Hodge. Plaintiff states that defendant Curren failed to protect his safety by not filing paperwork to ensure that plaintiff be single celled. Plaintiff states that defendants Terry, Murphy, and Broddrick were aware of the complaint that he submitted regarding possible violence between himself and Hodge, but disregarded the risk.
III. Discussion
Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's deliberate indifference, retaliation, and conspiracy claims. They further contend that they are shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
1. Failure to Protect
Plaintiff claims that, by forcing him to have a cell mate, defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to plaintiff's safety.
Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of prison inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1984). A prisoner may establish a claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against prison officials when the officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to the threat of serious harm or injury by another prisoner. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 1982). To show deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that prison officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This standard does not require that a prison guard or official know that with a "moral certainty" that an inmate is in danger of violence before the guard is obligated to take steps to prevent an assault. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1981). However, the prison guard must have more than a mere suspicion that violence will occur. See id.
Plaintiff's complaint asserts that defendants had reason to know that he was in danger of violence because he had warned staff of "[his] incompatibility to being housed in a double-cell and had advised the CDC employees for safety and security reasons why they should not force him to cell-up with other inmates." (Am. Compl. 5.) Plaintiff avers that he had specifically informed staff that he had a problem being celled with inmate Hodge prior to the October 11, 2003 mutual combat. (Id.) Specifically, plaintiff states in his complaint that he had filed an appeal and a cell move slip stating that he and Hodge did not get along. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he informed defendant Terry that he wanted to see the lieutenant or have a cell move right away. (Id.) Plaintiff also claims that officers "set-up staged cell fights amongst rival prisoners. . . ." (Id. 4.)
In their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that plaintiff cannot establish that defendants had reason to know that plaintiff was in danger of violence from a cell mate. Defendants offer evidence that since entering the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation System eleven years ago, plaintiff has consistently been cleared for double celling. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. Y.) Between March 2001 and March 2005, plaintiff was housed with thirty-nine different inmates with only one incident of violence — the incident with inmate Hodge. (Id.) In a sworn statement, inmate Hodge relates that he and plaintiff are related and personally knew each other; they lived together for two months prior to the October 11, 2003 incident. (Id. at Ex. X.) Hodge states that, two weeks prior to October 11, 2003, plaintiff requested a convenience cell change — plaintiff asked to be placed in a single cell, not to be moved to another double cell to get away from Hodge. (Id.) Plaintiff had prepared an appeal seeking a convenience cell change prior to October 11, 2003 but had never filed it. (Id.) Plaintiff never told Hodge that he felt threatened by him; plaintiff did say something to the effect that he and Hodge did not get along. (Id.)
Defendants Broddrick, Terry, and Murphy state that they had no knowledge that plaintiff felt threatened by being housed with inmate Hodge. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Exs. R, T, S.) Each of the defendants aver that plaintiff never made any statements to them concerning a threat of violence from inmate Hodge. (Id.) The record shows that the grievance that plaintiff has attached to his amended complaint, which was filed on October 12, 2003, makes no mention of any threat of violence to plaintiff. (Id. at Ex. R, Attach. A; see also, Am. Compl., Ex. A.) Further, the record shows that after the October 11, 2003 incident, plaintiff continued to make threats of violence if he was housed with another inmate. (Id. at Ex. Q.) However, these threats were determined to be "generic" because plaintiff was making them just because he did not want a cell mate and not because he was under any threat of harm. (Id.)
Defendant Curren offers evidence that plaintiff's mental condition did not require single cell status. (Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Ex. V.) Plaintiff's treatment with Dr. Curren did not concern plaintiff's request for single cell status. (Id.) The evidence shows that plaintiff never mentioned needing a single cell or being threatened by a cell mate to Dr. Curren. (Id.)
In his reply to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff states that "defendants [sic] statements are not true or correct." (Pl.'s Opp. and Obj. to Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts at 1.) He includes a "statement of undisputed facts," which consists of allegations that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation have filled his central file with lies. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff states that defendants Broddrick, Murphy, and Terry admit that they knew of the procedures for moving inmates and knew that plaintiff filed an appeal prior to October 11, 2003; however, plaintiff does not assert that this appeal stated that plaintiff felt he was in danger, and that defendants failed to move plaintiff. Plaintiff fails to set forth any facts to support his assertion that defendants staged fights between inmates. (Id.)
The court finds that plaintiff has not demonstrated that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants Broddrick, Terry, Murphy, and Curren acted with deliberate indifference to a serious theat of harm to plaintiff. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (noting that once defendants have met their initial burden of informing the court for the basis of their motion and identifying those portions of the record which they believe demonstrate an absence of material fact, the burden shifts to plaintiff to establish a genuine issue as to any material fact that actually does exist). Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he ever indicated to any of the defendants that he felt that he was under threat of harm from his cell mate. Instead, the evidence shows that plaintiff made several attempts to be moved into a single cell situation; however, a desire to move into a single cell situation would not put defendants on notice of any threat of harm to plaintiff. Plaintiff has not established that defendants had any reason to suspect that he was in danger of violence from his cell mate, inmate Hodge. Accordingly, the court recommends that defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim be granted.
2. Retaliation and Conspiracy
Plaintiff appears to claim that defendant Porter placed him with an HIV positive cell mate in retaliation for plaintiff's "previous lawsuit victories against the L.A. Sheriffs and CDC prison guards at Chino and Folsom." (Am. Compl. at 9.) Plaintiff also makes vague assertions of defendants conspiring against him. For example, plaintiff asserts that ". . . even the administration, who I never see, and are "unknown defendants" [sic] make plots and give the CDC foot soldiers `Orders' to carry out hidden acts of retaliation." (Id.)
Within the prison context, a viable claim of retaliation entails five basic elements: "(1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate(2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct and that such action (4) chilled plaintiff's First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005). The court must afford appropriate deference to prison officials in the evaluation of the proffered legitimate correctional reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). The burden rests on plaintiff to demonstrate that there were no legitimate correctional purposes motivating the actions of which he complains. See id. at 808.
State actors, acting in concert to deprive an individual of constitutional rights, may be held liable for conspiracy under § 1983. See Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 293 (9th Cir. 1959) rev'd on other grounds, 300 F.2d 24, 30 (9th Cir. 1962). To be successful on a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must show that defendants conspired, or acted jointly or in concert and that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy. See id. at 292-294.
It is undisputed that filing lawsuits is protected conduct.See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that filing lawsuits is a First Amendment right of fundamental importance to prisoners). Thus, the question for the court is whether there is a genuine factual dispute about whether defendant Porter housed plaintiff with an HIV positive cell mate in retaliation for filing lawsuits. Defendants have put forth evidence showing that defendant Porter was unaware that plaintiff had filed previous lawsuits and that she was not, as plaintiff stated, related to the defendant in one of plaintiff's previous lawsuits. (Defs.' Mot. For Summ. J. at Ex. U.) Defendants have put forth evidence showing that defendant Porter was unaware of the HIV status of any inmates. (Id.) Beyond the vague allegations in his complaint, plaintiff has not put forth any evidence which would establish an issue of fact as to this issue. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Additionally, plaintiff has put forth no evidence which would indicate that defendant Porter had anything to do with the making decision about with whom plaintiff should be celled. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to set establish the elements of a retaliation claim and recommends that summary judgment be granted on this claim.
Defendant Porter is the only defendant against whom plaintiff makes specific retaliation claims. He makes several vague retaliation claims about other named and unnamed defendants.
Beyond making vague assertions in his amended complaint, plaintiff does not set forth any facts which would show that defendants conspired against him. These vague allegations are not sufficient to set forth a disputed issue of material fact on this claim. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Accordingly, the court recommends that summary judgment be granted on this claim.
3. Qualified Immunity
Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff's § 1983 claims. The first step in a qualified immunity analysis "is to consider the materials submitted in support of, and in opposition to, summary judgment in order to decide whether a constitutional right would be violated if all facts are viewed in favor of plaintiff." Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2001). If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
As discussed above, the court finds that, even when viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, no constitutional rights have been violated. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claims that his First and Eighth Amendment rights were violated.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted in its entirety and plaintiff's complaint dismissed with prejudice.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).