Opinion
C/A 7:23-02172-MGL-MHC
08-29-2023
Corvin J. Young, Plaintiff, v. Beverly D. Jones, Michael D. Morin, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge.
This a civil action filed by a pretrial detainee. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, who is detained in South Carolina, brings claims about events that allegedly occurred in South Carolina against Defendants that are South Carolina residents. However, for reasons that are unclear, he initially filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. That court found that venue was not proper in the Northern District of Ohio and transferred the case here. See ECF No. 3.
In an Order (ECF No. 7) dated July 13, 2023, Plaintiff was directed to bring his case into proper form by providing the specified documents. Plaintiff was also notified of pleading deficiencies and given the opportunity to amend his Complaint. See ECF No. 7. The time for Plaintiff to bring his case into proper form has passed, and Plaintiff has failed to bring his case into proper form and has not filed an amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the Spartanburg County Detention Center. He names attorneys Michael D. Morin (Morin), the South Carolina Seventh Judicial Circuit (Spartanburg County) Public Defender, and Beverly Dorine Jones (Jones), an Assistant Public Defender for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, as Defendants.
Records from Spartanburg County indicate that Plaintiff has pending criminal charges for throwing of bodily fluids (2020A4210204363); shoplifting/value $2000 or less (2020A4210204364); financial transaction card fraud value $500 or less in a six-month period (2021A4210203231); receipt of goods, represented as stolen, value $2,000 or less (2021A4210203232); and second-degree harassment (2021A4210203409). A competency observation evaluation was ordered in these cases on September 21, 2022; all cases have been true billed; and Petitioner is represented by counsel in all of these cases. See Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Spartanburg/PublicIndex/ PISearch.aspx (search by the case numbers listed above) (last visited August 28, 2023).
A federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records of other courts. See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of other courts' records and proceedings).
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also claims that his rights under Article 6, Clause 2 (the Supremacy Clause) were violated. Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 4.
The Supremacy Clause is not the source of any federal rights, and does not create a cause of action. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324-325 (2015). It instructs courts what to do when state and federal law clash, but is silent regarding who may enforce federal laws in court, and in what circumstances they may do so. Id. Moreover, there is no suggestion in the record by Plaintiff of a clash between state and federal law.
Plaintiff appears to contend that Defendant Jones refuses to file a Brady motion for him. He states that he reported this to Defendant Morin and also reported that Plaintiff's previous public defender did not file this motion for him. Plaintiff in general appears to complain about his pending criminal proceedings. Plaintiff requests injunctive relief and monetary damages. ECF No. 1 at 7.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
It is recommended that this action be summarily dismissed for the reasons discussed below.
A. Defendants are not State Actors under § 1983
Plaintiff alleges claims under § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights by Defendants Jones and Morin. However, Plaintiff has alleged no facts to indicate that Defendants Jones and Morin acted under color of state law. See Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 91 (2009) (noting that a publicly assigned or privately retained counsel for a criminal defendant is not ordinarily considered a state actor); Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-324 nn. 8-16 (1981) (“A lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state law' within the meaning of § 1983.”); Hallv. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 11551156 & nn. 2-3 (4th Cir. 1980) (court-appointed attorney); Deas v. Potts, 547 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1976) (private attorney). Thus, Plaintiff's claims should be summarily dismissed.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
B. Younger/Interference with State Criminal Proceedings
To the extent Plaintiff is requesting that this Court intervene in his pending criminal cases, such a request is subject to summary dismissal. Federal courts, absent extraordinary circumstances, are not authorized to interfere with a State's pending criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 50-53 (4th Cir. 1989). Specifically, the Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44. Here, Plaintiff may raise claims about any pending criminal charge in the state court.
C. Failure to Bring Case Into Proper Form
As noted above, Plaintiff has also failed to bring this case into proper form. In the Court's Order dated July 25, 2023, Plaintiff was given the opportunity to bring his case into proper form by submitting a completed summons form for Defendant Morin, a completed and signed Form USM-285 for Defendant Jones, and a completed and signed Form USM-285 for Defendant Morin.
Plaintiff submitted a summons form listing only Defendant Jones. See ECF No. 1-3.
Plaintiff was warned that failure to provide the necessary information within the timeta in the Order would subject the case to dismissal. See ECF No. 7.
The time to bring this case into proper form has now lapsed, and Plaintiff h provide all the required items to bring his case into proper form and has failed to conta in any way. Thus, in the alternative, it is recommended that this action be dismissed in with Fed.R.Civ.P. 41. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Ballard 882 F.2d 93, 95-96 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that district court's dismissal following an reasonable warning was not an abuse of discretion).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process.
See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).